libcroco: add upstream security fixes
These have been added to upstream git after 0.6.12 was released. CVE-2017-7960 - The cr_input_new_from_uri function in cr-input.c in libcroco 0.6.11 and 0.6.12 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer over-read) via a crafted CSS file. CVE-2017-7961 - The cr_tknzr_parse_rgb function in cr-tknzr.c in libcroco 0.6.11 and 0.6.12 has an "outside the range of representable values of type long" undefined behavior issue, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted CSS file. For more details, see: https://blogs.gentoo.org/ago/2017/04/17/libcroco-heap-overflow-and-undefined-behavior/ Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
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From 898e3a8c8c0314d2e6b106809a8e3e93cf9d4394 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Ignacio Casal Quinteiro <qignacio@amazon.com>
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Date: Sun, 16 Apr 2017 13:13:43 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH] input: check end of input before reading a byte
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Fixes CVE-2017-7960
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When reading bytes we weren't check that the index wasn't
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out of bound and this could produce an invalid read which
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could deal to a security bug.
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Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
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---
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src/cr-input.c | 11 +++++++++--
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1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/src/cr-input.c b/src/cr-input.c
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index 49000b1..3b63a88 100644
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--- a/src/cr-input.c
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+++ b/src/cr-input.c
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@@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ cr_input_new_from_uri (const gchar * a_file_uri, enum CREncoding a_enc)
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*we should free buf here because it's own by CRInput.
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*(see the last parameter of cr_input_new_from_buf().
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*/
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- buf = NULL ;
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+ buf = NULL;
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}
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cleanup:
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@@ -404,6 +404,8 @@ cr_input_get_nb_bytes_left (CRInput const * a_this)
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enum CRStatus
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cr_input_read_byte (CRInput * a_this, guchar * a_byte)
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{
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+ gulong nb_bytes_left = 0;
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+
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g_return_val_if_fail (a_this && PRIVATE (a_this)
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&& a_byte, CR_BAD_PARAM_ERROR);
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@@ -413,6 +415,12 @@ cr_input_read_byte (CRInput * a_this, guchar * a_byte)
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if (PRIVATE (a_this)->end_of_input == TRUE)
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return CR_END_OF_INPUT_ERROR;
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+ nb_bytes_left = cr_input_get_nb_bytes_left (a_this);
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+
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+ if (nb_bytes_left < 1) {
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+ return CR_END_OF_INPUT_ERROR;
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+ }
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+
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*a_byte = PRIVATE (a_this)->in_buf[PRIVATE (a_this)->next_byte_index];
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if (PRIVATE (a_this)->nb_bytes -
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@@ -477,7 +485,6 @@ cr_input_read_char (CRInput * a_this, guint32 * a_char)
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if (*a_char == '\n') {
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PRIVATE (a_this)->end_of_line = TRUE;
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}
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-
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}
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return status;
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--
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2.11.0
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@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
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From 9ad72875e9f08e4c519ef63d44cdbd94aa9504f7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Ignacio Casal Quinteiro <qignacio@amazon.com>
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Date: Sun, 16 Apr 2017 13:56:09 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH] tknzr: support only max long rgb values
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Fixes CVE-2017-7961
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This fixes a possible out of bound when reading rgbs which
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are longer than the support MAXLONG
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Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
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---
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src/cr-tknzr.c | 10 ++++++++++
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1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
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diff --git a/src/cr-tknzr.c b/src/cr-tknzr.c
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index 1a7cfeb..1548c35 100644
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--- a/src/cr-tknzr.c
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+++ b/src/cr-tknzr.c
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@@ -1279,6 +1279,11 @@ cr_tknzr_parse_rgb (CRTknzr * a_this, CRRgb ** a_rgb)
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status = cr_tknzr_parse_num (a_this, &num);
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ENSURE_PARSING_COND ((status == CR_OK) && (num != NULL));
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+ if (num->val > G_MAXLONG) {
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+ status = CR_PARSING_ERROR;
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+ goto error;
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+ }
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+
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red = num->val;
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cr_num_destroy (num);
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num = NULL;
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@@ -1298,6 +1303,11 @@ cr_tknzr_parse_rgb (CRTknzr * a_this, CRRgb ** a_rgb)
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status = cr_tknzr_parse_num (a_this, &num);
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ENSURE_PARSING_COND ((status == CR_OK) && (num != NULL));
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+ if (num->val > G_MAXLONG) {
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+ status = CR_PARSING_ERROR;
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+ goto error;
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+ }
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+
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PEEK_BYTE (a_this, 1, &next_bytes[0]);
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if (next_bytes[0] == '%') {
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SKIP_CHARS (a_this, 1);
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--
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2.11.0
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