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libcroco: add upstream security fixes

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These have been added to upstream git after 0.6.12 was released.

CVE-2017-7960 - The cr_input_new_from_uri function in cr-input.c in libcroco
0.6.11 and 0.6.12 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service
(heap-based buffer over-read) via a crafted CSS file.

CVE-2017-7961 - The cr_tknzr_parse_rgb function in cr-tknzr.c in libcroco
0.6.11 and 0.6.12 has an "outside the range of representable values of type
long" undefined behavior issue, which might allow remote attackers to cause
a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other
impact via a crafted CSS file.

For more details, see:
https://blogs.gentoo.org/ago/2017/04/17/libcroco-heap-overflow-and-undefined-behavior/

Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
This commit is contained in:
Peter Korsgaard 2017-04-25 16:16:59 +02:00
parent a534030c6e
commit 52bfb4b1ce
2 changed files with 108 additions and 0 deletions
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62
package/libcroco/0001-input-check-end-of-input-before-reading-a-byte.patch Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
From 898e3a8c8c0314d2e6b106809a8e3e93cf9d4394 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ignacio Casal Quinteiro <qignacio@amazon.com>
Date: Sun, 16 Apr 2017 13:13:43 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] input: check end of input before reading a byte
Fixes CVE-2017-7960
When reading bytes we weren't check that the index wasn't
out of bound and this could produce an invalid read which
could deal to a security bug.
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
---
src/cr-input.c | 11 +++++++++--
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/cr-input.c b/src/cr-input.c
index 49000b1..3b63a88 100644
--- a/src/cr-input.c
+++ b/src/cr-input.c
@@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ cr_input_new_from_uri (const gchar * a_file_uri, enum CREncoding a_enc)
*we should free buf here because it's own by CRInput.
*(see the last parameter of cr_input_new_from_buf().
*/
- buf = NULL ;
+ buf = NULL;
}
cleanup:
@@ -404,6 +404,8 @@ cr_input_get_nb_bytes_left (CRInput const * a_this)
enum CRStatus
cr_input_read_byte (CRInput * a_this, guchar * a_byte)
{
+ gulong nb_bytes_left = 0;
+
g_return_val_if_fail (a_this && PRIVATE (a_this)
&& a_byte, CR_BAD_PARAM_ERROR);
@@ -413,6 +415,12 @@ cr_input_read_byte (CRInput * a_this, guchar * a_byte)
if (PRIVATE (a_this)->end_of_input == TRUE)
return CR_END_OF_INPUT_ERROR;
+ nb_bytes_left = cr_input_get_nb_bytes_left (a_this);
+
+ if (nb_bytes_left < 1) {
+ return CR_END_OF_INPUT_ERROR;
+ }
+
*a_byte = PRIVATE (a_this)->in_buf[PRIVATE (a_this)->next_byte_index];
if (PRIVATE (a_this)->nb_bytes -
@@ -477,7 +485,6 @@ cr_input_read_char (CRInput * a_this, guint32 * a_char)
if (*a_char == '\n') {
PRIVATE (a_this)->end_of_line = TRUE;
}
-
}
return status;
--
2.11.0

46
package/libcroco/0002-tknzr-support-only-max-long-rgb-values.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
From 9ad72875e9f08e4c519ef63d44cdbd94aa9504f7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ignacio Casal Quinteiro <qignacio@amazon.com>
Date: Sun, 16 Apr 2017 13:56:09 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] tknzr: support only max long rgb values
Fixes CVE-2017-7961
This fixes a possible out of bound when reading rgbs which
are longer than the support MAXLONG
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
---
src/cr-tknzr.c | 10 ++++++++++
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/cr-tknzr.c b/src/cr-tknzr.c
index 1a7cfeb..1548c35 100644
--- a/src/cr-tknzr.c
+++ b/src/cr-tknzr.c
@@ -1279,6 +1279,11 @@ cr_tknzr_parse_rgb (CRTknzr * a_this, CRRgb ** a_rgb)
status = cr_tknzr_parse_num (a_this, &num);
ENSURE_PARSING_COND ((status == CR_OK) && (num != NULL));
+ if (num->val > G_MAXLONG) {
+ status = CR_PARSING_ERROR;
+ goto error;
+ }
+
red = num->val;
cr_num_destroy (num);
num = NULL;
@@ -1298,6 +1303,11 @@ cr_tknzr_parse_rgb (CRTknzr * a_this, CRRgb ** a_rgb)
status = cr_tknzr_parse_num (a_this, &num);
ENSURE_PARSING_COND ((status == CR_OK) && (num != NULL));
+ if (num->val > G_MAXLONG) {
+ status = CR_PARSING_ERROR;
+ goto error;
+ }
+
PEEK_BYTE (a_this, 1, &next_bytes[0]);
if (next_bytes[0] == '%') {
SKIP_CHARS (a_this, 1);
--
2.11.0