From 8233c666124890fff713ecb254993b52b1fa7674 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Baruch Siach Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2019 13:17:53 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] package/openssh: add upstream security fix Fixes CVE-2018-20685: The scp client allows server to modify permissions of the target directory by using empty ("D0777 0 \n") or dot ("D0777 0 .\n") directory name. The bug reporter lists a number of related vulnerabilities that are not fixed yet: https://sintonen.fi/advisories/scp-client-multiple-vulnerabilities.txt Signed-off-by: Baruch Siach Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard --- ...w-empty-incoming-filename-or-ones-th.patch | 39 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 39 insertions(+) create mode 100644 package/openssh/0001-upstream-disallow-empty-incoming-filename-or-ones-th.patch diff --git a/package/openssh/0001-upstream-disallow-empty-incoming-filename-or-ones-th.patch b/package/openssh/0001-upstream-disallow-empty-incoming-filename-or-ones-th.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2b5a958d13 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/openssh/0001-upstream-disallow-empty-incoming-filename-or-ones-th.patch @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +From 6010c0303a422a9c5fa8860c061bf7105eb7f8b2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "djm@openbsd.org" +Date: Fri, 16 Nov 2018 03:03:10 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] upstream: disallow empty incoming filename or ones that refer + to the + +current directory; based on report/patch from Harry Sintonen + +OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f27651b30eaee2df49540ab68d030865c04f6de9 +Signed-off-by: Baruch Siach +--- +Upstream status (openssh-portable): commit 6010c0303a422 + + scp.c | 5 +++-- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c +index 60682c68769b..4f3fdcd3db89 100644 +--- a/scp.c ++++ b/scp.c +@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ +-/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.197 2018/06/01 04:31:48 dtucker Exp $ */ ++/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.198 2018/11/16 03:03:10 djm Exp $ */ + /* + * scp - secure remote copy. This is basically patched BSD rcp which + * uses ssh to do the data transfer (instead of using rcmd). +@@ -1106,7 +1106,8 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv) + SCREWUP("size out of range"); + size = (off_t)ull; + +- if ((strchr(cp, '/') != NULL) || (strcmp(cp, "..") == 0)) { ++ if (*cp == '\0' || strchr(cp, '/') != NULL || ++ strcmp(cp, ".") == 0 || strcmp(cp, "..") == 0) { + run_err("error: unexpected filename: %s", cp); + exit(1); + } +-- +2.20.1 +