package/libexif: security bump to version 0.6.22
- Switch site to github - Drop patches (already in version) - Fix the following CVEs: - CVE-2020-13114: Time consumption DoS when parsing canon array markers - CVE-2020-13113: Potential use of uninitialized memory - CVE-2020-13112: Various buffer overread fixes due to integer overflows in maker notes - CVE-2020-0093: read overflow - CVE-2020-12767: fixed division by zero https://github.com/libexif/libexif/releases/tag/libexif-0_6_22-release Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
This commit is contained in:
parent
78e7807112
commit
ca0547ffea
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@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
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From 41bd04234b104312f54d25822f68738ba8d7133d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Marcus Meissner <marcus@jet.franken.de>
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Date: Tue, 25 Jul 2017 23:44:44 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH] fixes some (not all) buffer overreads during decoding pentax
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makernote entries.
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This should fix:
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https://sourceforge.net/p/libexif/bugs/125/ CVE-2016-6328
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Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
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---
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libexif/pentax/mnote-pentax-entry.c | 16 +++++++++++++---
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1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/libexif/pentax/mnote-pentax-entry.c b/libexif/pentax/mnote-pentax-entry.c
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index d03d159..ea0429a 100644
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--- a/libexif/pentax/mnote-pentax-entry.c
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+++ b/libexif/pentax/mnote-pentax-entry.c
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@@ -425,24 +425,34 @@ mnote_pentax_entry_get_value (MnotePentaxEntry *entry,
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case EXIF_FORMAT_SHORT:
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{
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const unsigned char *data = entry->data;
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- size_t k, len = strlen(val);
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+ size_t k, len = strlen(val), sizeleft;
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+
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+ sizeleft = entry->size;
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for(k=0; k<entry->components; k++) {
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+ if (sizeleft < 2)
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+ break;
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vs = exif_get_short (data, entry->order);
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snprintf (val+len, maxlen-len, "%i ", vs);
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len = strlen(val);
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data += 2;
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+ sizeleft -= 2;
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}
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}
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break;
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case EXIF_FORMAT_LONG:
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{
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const unsigned char *data = entry->data;
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- size_t k, len = strlen(val);
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+ size_t k, len = strlen(val), sizeleft;
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+
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+ sizeleft = entry->size;
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for(k=0; k<entry->components; k++) {
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+ if (sizeleft < 4)
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+ break;
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vl = exif_get_long (data, entry->order);
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snprintf (val+len, maxlen-len, "%li", (long int) vl);
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len = strlen(val);
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data += 4;
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+ sizeleft -= 4;
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}
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}
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break;
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@@ -455,5 +465,5 @@ mnote_pentax_entry_get_value (MnotePentaxEntry *entry,
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break;
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}
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- return (val);
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+ return val;
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}
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--
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2.20.1
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@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
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From c39acd1692023b26290778a02a9232c873f9d71a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Marcus Meissner <marcus@jet.franken.de>
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Date: Tue, 25 Jul 2017 23:38:56 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH] On saving makernotes, make sure the makernote container tags
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has a type with 1 byte components.
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Fixes (at least):
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https://sourceforge.net/p/libexif/bugs/130
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https://sourceforge.net/p/libexif/bugs/129
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CVE-2017-7544: libexif through 0.6.21 is vulnerable to out-of-bounds heap
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read vulnerability in exif_data_save_data_entry function in
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libexif/exif-data.c caused by improper length computation of the allocated
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data of an ExifMnote entry which can cause denial-of-service or possibly
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information disclosure.
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Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
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---
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libexif/exif-data.c | 6 ++++++
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1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
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diff --git a/libexif/exif-data.c b/libexif/exif-data.c
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index 67df4db..91f4c33 100644
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--- a/libexif/exif-data.c
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+++ b/libexif/exif-data.c
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@@ -255,6 +255,12 @@ exif_data_save_data_entry (ExifData *data, ExifEntry *e,
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exif_mnote_data_set_offset (data->priv->md, *ds - 6);
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exif_mnote_data_save (data->priv->md, &e->data, &e->size);
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e->components = e->size;
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+ if (exif_format_get_size (e->format) != 1) {
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+ /* e->format is taken from input code,
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+ * but we need to make sure it is a 1 byte
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+ * entity due to the multiplication below. */
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+ e->format = EXIF_FORMAT_UNDEFINED;
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+ }
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}
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}
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--
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2.20.1
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@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
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From 5d28011c40ec86cf52cffad541093d37c263898a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Dan Fandrich <dan@coneharvesters.com>
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Date: Fri, 20 Apr 2018 18:05:19 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH] Reduce maximum recursion depth in exif_data_load_data_content
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This only needs to be a small, single digit integer for normal files,
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and reducing the maximum closer to this reduces the time and space
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needed to detect pathological cases.
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Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
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---
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libexif/exif-data.c | 2 +-
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1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
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diff --git a/libexif/exif-data.c b/libexif/exif-data.c
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index 91f4c33..04cdda2 100644
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--- a/libexif/exif-data.c
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+++ b/libexif/exif-data.c
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@@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ exif_data_load_data_content (ExifData *data, ExifIfd ifd,
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if ((((int)ifd) < 0) || ( ((int)ifd) >= EXIF_IFD_COUNT))
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return;
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- if (recursion_depth > 30) {
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+ if (recursion_depth > 12) {
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exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_CORRUPT_DATA, "ExifData",
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"Deep recursion detected!");
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return;
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--
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2.20.1
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From 6aa11df549114ebda520dde4cdaea2f9357b2c89 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Dan Fandrich <dan@coneharvesters.com>
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Date: Fri, 12 Oct 2018 16:01:45 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH] Improve deep recursion detection in
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exif_data_load_data_content.
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The existing detection was still vulnerable to pathological cases
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causing DoS by wasting CPU. The new algorithm takes the number of tags
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into account to make it harder to abuse by cases using shallow recursion
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but with a very large number of tags. This improves on commit 5d28011c
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which wasn't sufficient to counter this kind of case.
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The limitation in the previous fix was discovered by Laurent Delosieres,
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Secunia Research at Flexera (Secunia Advisory SA84652) and is assigned
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the identifier CVE-2018-20030.
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[Peter: drop NEWS change]
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Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
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---
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libexif/exif-data.c | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
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1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/libexif/exif-data.c b/libexif/exif-data.c
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index e35403d..a6f9c94 100644
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--- a/libexif/exif-data.c
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+++ b/libexif/exif-data.c
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@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
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#include <libexif/olympus/exif-mnote-data-olympus.h>
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#include <libexif/pentax/exif-mnote-data-pentax.h>
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+#include <math.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <string.h>
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@@ -350,6 +351,20 @@ if (data->ifd[(i)]->count) { \
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break; \
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}
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+/*! Calculate the recursion cost added by one level of IFD loading.
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+ *
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+ * The work performed is related to the cost in the exponential relation
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+ * work=1.1**cost
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+ */
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+static unsigned int
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+level_cost(unsigned int n)
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+{
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+ static const double log_1_1 = 0.09531017980432493;
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+
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+ /* Adding 0.1 protects against the case where n==1 */
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+ return ceil(log(n + 0.1)/log_1_1);
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+}
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+
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/*! Load data for an IFD.
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*
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* \param[in,out] data #ExifData
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@@ -357,13 +372,13 @@ if (data->ifd[(i)]->count) { \
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* \param[in] d pointer to buffer containing raw IFD data
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* \param[in] ds size of raw data in buffer at \c d
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* \param[in] offset offset into buffer at \c d at which IFD starts
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- * \param[in] recursion_depth number of times this function has been
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- * recursively called without returning
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+ * \param[in] recursion_cost factor indicating how expensive this recursive
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+ * call could be
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*/
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static void
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exif_data_load_data_content (ExifData *data, ExifIfd ifd,
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const unsigned char *d,
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- unsigned int ds, unsigned int offset, unsigned int recursion_depth)
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+ unsigned int ds, unsigned int offset, unsigned int recursion_cost)
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{
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ExifLong o, thumbnail_offset = 0, thumbnail_length = 0;
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ExifShort n;
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@@ -378,9 +393,20 @@ exif_data_load_data_content (ExifData *data, ExifIfd ifd,
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if ((((int)ifd) < 0) || ( ((int)ifd) >= EXIF_IFD_COUNT))
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return;
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- if (recursion_depth > 12) {
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+ if (recursion_cost > 170) {
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+ /*
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+ * recursion_cost is a logarithmic-scale indicator of how expensive this
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+ * recursive call might end up being. It is an indicator of the depth of
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+ * recursion as well as the potential for worst-case future recursive
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+ * calls. Since it's difficult to tell ahead of time how often recursion
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+ * will occur, this assumes the worst by assuming every tag could end up
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+ * causing recursion.
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+ * The value of 170 was chosen to limit typical EXIF structures to a
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+ * recursive depth of about 6, but pathological ones (those with very
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+ * many tags) to only 2.
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+ */
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exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_CORRUPT_DATA, "ExifData",
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|
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- "Deep recursion detected!");
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|
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+ "Deep/expensive recursion detected!");
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|
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return;
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|
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}
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|
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|
|
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@@ -422,15 +448,18 @@ exif_data_load_data_content (ExifData *data, ExifIfd ifd,
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|
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switch (tag) {
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|
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case EXIF_TAG_EXIF_IFD_POINTER:
|
|
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CHECK_REC (EXIF_IFD_EXIF);
|
|
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- exif_data_load_data_content (data, EXIF_IFD_EXIF, d, ds, o, recursion_depth + 1);
|
|
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+ exif_data_load_data_content (data, EXIF_IFD_EXIF, d, ds, o,
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|
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+ recursion_cost + level_cost(n));
|
|
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break;
|
|
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case EXIF_TAG_GPS_INFO_IFD_POINTER:
|
|
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CHECK_REC (EXIF_IFD_GPS);
|
|
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- exif_data_load_data_content (data, EXIF_IFD_GPS, d, ds, o, recursion_depth + 1);
|
|
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+ exif_data_load_data_content (data, EXIF_IFD_GPS, d, ds, o,
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|
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+ recursion_cost + level_cost(n));
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|
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break;
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|
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case EXIF_TAG_INTEROPERABILITY_IFD_POINTER:
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|
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CHECK_REC (EXIF_IFD_INTEROPERABILITY);
|
|
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- exif_data_load_data_content (data, EXIF_IFD_INTEROPERABILITY, d, ds, o, recursion_depth + 1);
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|
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+ exif_data_load_data_content (data, EXIF_IFD_INTEROPERABILITY, d, ds, o,
|
|
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+ recursion_cost + level_cost(n));
|
|
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break;
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|
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case EXIF_TAG_JPEG_INTERCHANGE_FORMAT:
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|
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thumbnail_offset = o;
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|
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--
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2.20.1
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|
|
@ -1,90 +0,0 @@
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From 75aa73267fdb1e0ebfbc00369e7312bac43d0566 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
|
||||||
From: Marcus Meissner <meissner@suse.de>
|
|
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Date: Sat, 18 Jan 2020 09:29:42 +0100
|
|
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Subject: [PATCH] fix CVE-2019-9278
|
|
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|
|
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avoid the use of unsafe integer overflow checking constructs (unsigned integer operations cannot overflow, so "u1 + u2 > u1" can be optimized away)
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|
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|
|
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check for the actual sizes, which should also handle the overflows
|
|
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document other places google patched, but do not seem relevant due to other restrictions
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|
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|
|
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fixes https://github.com/libexif/libexif/issues/26
|
|
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|
|
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Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
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|
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---
|
|
||||||
libexif/exif-data.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++----------
|
|
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1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
|
|
||||||
|
|
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diff --git a/libexif/exif-data.c b/libexif/exif-data.c
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|
||||||
index a6f9c94..6332cd1 100644
|
|
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--- a/libexif/exif-data.c
|
|
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+++ b/libexif/exif-data.c
|
|
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@@ -192,9 +192,15 @@ exif_data_load_data_entry (ExifData *data, ExifEntry *entry,
|
|
||||||
doff = offset + 8;
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
/* Sanity checks */
|
|
||||||
- if ((doff + s < doff) || (doff + s < s) || (doff + s > size)) {
|
|
||||||
+ if (doff >= size) {
|
|
||||||
exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData",
|
|
||||||
- "Tag data past end of buffer (%u > %u)", doff+s, size);
|
|
||||||
+ "Tag starts past end of buffer (%u > %u)", doff, size);
|
|
||||||
+ return 0;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+
|
|
||||||
+ if (s > size - doff) {
|
|
||||||
+ exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData",
|
|
||||||
+ "Tag data goes past end of buffer (%u > %u)", doff+s, size);
|
|
||||||
return 0;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@@ -315,13 +321,14 @@ exif_data_load_data_thumbnail (ExifData *data, const unsigned char *d,
|
|
||||||
unsigned int ds, ExifLong o, ExifLong s)
|
|
||||||
{
|
|
||||||
/* Sanity checks */
|
|
||||||
- if ((o + s < o) || (o + s < s) || (o + s > ds) || (o > ds)) {
|
|
||||||
- exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData",
|
|
||||||
- "Bogus thumbnail offset (%u) or size (%u).",
|
|
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- o, s);
|
|
||||||
+ if (o >= ds) {
|
|
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+ exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData", "Bogus thumbnail offset (%u).", o);
|
|
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+ return;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+ if (s > ds - o) {
|
|
||||||
+ exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData", "Bogus thumbnail size (%u), max would be %u.", s, ds-o);
|
|
||||||
return;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
-
|
|
||||||
if (data->data)
|
|
||||||
exif_mem_free (data->priv->mem, data->data);
|
|
||||||
if (!(data->data = exif_data_alloc (data, s))) {
|
|
||||||
@@ -947,7 +954,7 @@ exif_data_load_data (ExifData *data, const unsigned char *d_orig,
|
|
||||||
exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData",
|
|
||||||
"IFD 0 at %i.", (int) offset);
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
- /* Sanity check the offset, being careful about overflow */
|
|
||||||
+ /* ds is restricted to 16 bit above, so offset is restricted too, and offset+8 should not overflow. */
|
|
||||||
if (offset > ds || offset + 6 + 2 > ds)
|
|
||||||
return;
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@@ -956,6 +963,7 @@ exif_data_load_data (ExifData *data, const unsigned char *d_orig,
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
/* IFD 1 offset */
|
|
||||||
n = exif_get_short (d + 6 + offset, data->priv->order);
|
|
||||||
+ /* offset < 2<<16, n is 16 bit at most, so this op will not overflow */
|
|
||||||
if (offset + 6 + 2 + 12 * n + 4 > ds)
|
|
||||||
return;
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@@ -964,8 +972,8 @@ exif_data_load_data (ExifData *data, const unsigned char *d_orig,
|
|
||||||
exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData",
|
|
||||||
"IFD 1 at %i.", (int) offset);
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
- /* Sanity check. */
|
|
||||||
- if (offset > ds || offset + 6 > ds) {
|
|
||||||
+ /* Sanity check. ds is ensured to be above 6 above, offset is 16bit */
|
|
||||||
+ if (offset > ds - 6) {
|
|
||||||
exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_CORRUPT_DATA,
|
|
||||||
"ExifData", "Bogus offset of IFD1.");
|
|
||||||
} else {
|
|
||||||
--
|
|
||||||
2.20.1
|
|
||||||
|
|
|
@ -6,4 +6,4 @@ config BR2_PACKAGE_LIBEXIF
|
||||||
image. The EXIF library allows you to parse an EXIF file
|
image. The EXIF library allows you to parse an EXIF file
|
||||||
and read the data from those tags.
|
and read the data from those tags.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
http://libexif.sf.net
|
https://libexif.github.io
|
||||||
|
|
|
@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
|
||||||
# Locally computed:
|
# Locally computed:
|
||||||
sha256 16cdaeb62eb3e6dfab2435f7d7bccd2f37438d21c5218ec4e58efa9157d4d41a libexif-0.6.21.tar.bz2
|
sha256 5048f1c8fc509cc636c2f97f4b40c293338b6041a5652082d5ee2cf54b530c56 libexif-0.6.22.tar.xz
|
||||||
sha256 36b6d3fa47916943fd5fec313c584784946047ec1337a78b440e5992cb595f89 COPYING
|
sha256 36b6d3fa47916943fd5fec313c584784946047ec1337a78b440e5992cb595f89 COPYING
|
||||||
|
|
|
@ -4,21 +4,13 @@
|
||||||
#
|
#
|
||||||
################################################################################
|
################################################################################
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
LIBEXIF_VERSION = 0.6.21
|
LIBEXIF_VERSION = 0.6.22
|
||||||
LIBEXIF_SOURCE = libexif-$(LIBEXIF_VERSION).tar.bz2
|
LIBEXIF_SOURCE = libexif-$(LIBEXIF_VERSION).tar.xz
|
||||||
LIBEXIF_SITE = http://downloads.sourceforge.net/project/libexif/libexif/$(LIBEXIF_VERSION)
|
LIBEXIF_SITE = \
|
||||||
|
https://github.com/libexif/libexif/releases/download/libexif-$(subst .,_,$(LIBEXIF_VERSION))-release
|
||||||
LIBEXIF_INSTALL_STAGING = YES
|
LIBEXIF_INSTALL_STAGING = YES
|
||||||
LIBEXIF_DEPENDENCIES = host-pkgconf
|
LIBEXIF_DEPENDENCIES = host-pkgconf
|
||||||
LIBEXIF_LICENSE = LGPL-2.1+
|
LIBEXIF_LICENSE = LGPL-2.1+
|
||||||
LIBEXIF_LICENSE_FILES = COPYING
|
LIBEXIF_LICENSE_FILES = COPYING
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
# 0001-fixes-some-not-all-buffer-overreads-during-decoding-.patch
|
|
||||||
LIBEXIF_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2016-6328
|
|
||||||
# 0002-On-saving-makernotes-make-sure-the-makernote-contain.patch
|
|
||||||
LIBEXIF_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2017-7544
|
|
||||||
# 0004-Improve-deep-recursion-detection-in-exif_data_load_d.patch
|
|
||||||
LIBEXIF_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2018-20030
|
|
||||||
# 0005-fix-CVE-2019-9278.patch
|
|
||||||
LIBEXIF_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2019-9278
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
$(eval $(autotools-package))
|
$(eval $(autotools-package))
|
||||||
|
|
Loading…
Reference in a new issue