![]() - Fix CVE-2020-11739: An issue was discovered in Xen through 4.13.x, allowing guest OS users to cause a denial of service or possibly gain privileges because of missing memory barriers in read-write unlock paths. The read-write unlock paths don't contain a memory barrier. On Arm, this means a processor is allowed to re-order the memory access with the preceding ones. In other words, the unlock may be seen by another processor before all the memory accesses within the "critical" section. As a consequence, it may be possible to have a writer executing a critical section at the same time as readers or another writer. In other words, many of the assumptions (e.g., a variable cannot be modified after a check) in the critical sections are not safe anymore. The read-write locks are used in hypercalls (such as grant-table ones), so a malicious guest could exploit the race. For instance, there is a small window where Xen can leak memory if XENMAPSPACE_grant_table is used concurrently. A malicious guest may be able to leak memory, or cause a hypervisor crash resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS). Information leak and privilege escalation cannot be excluded. - Fix CVE-2020-11740: An issue was discovered in xenoprof in Xen through 4.13.x, allowing guest OS users (without active profiling) to obtain sensitive information about other guests. Unprivileged guests can request to map xenoprof buffers, even if profiling has not been enabled for those guests. These buffers were not scrubbed. - Fix CVE-2020-11741: An issue was discovered in xenoprof in Xen through 4.13.x, allowing guest OS users (with active profiling) to obtain sensitive information about other guests, cause a denial of service, or possibly gain privileges. For guests for which "active" profiling was enabled by the administrator, the xenoprof code uses the standard Xen shared ring structure. Unfortunately, this code did not treat the guest as a potential adversary: it trusts the guest not to modify buffer size information or modify head / tail pointers in unexpected ways. This can crash the host (DoS). Privilege escalation cannot be ruled out. - Fix CVE-2020-11742: An issue was discovered in Xen through 4.13.x, allowing guest OS users to cause a denial of service because of bad continuation handling in GNTTABOP_copy. Grant table operations are expected to return 0 for success, and a negative number for errors. The fix for CVE-2017-12135 introduced a path through grant copy handling where success may be returned to the caller without any action taken. In particular, the status fields of individual operations are left uninitialised, and may result in errant behaviour in the caller of GNTTABOP_copy. A buggy or malicious guest can construct its grant table in such a way that, when a backend domain tries to copy a grant, it hits the incorrect exit path. This returns success to the caller without doing anything, which may cause crashes or other incorrect behaviour. - Fix CVE-2020-11743: An issue was discovered in Xen through 4.13.x, allowing guest OS users to cause a denial of service because of a bad error path in GNTTABOP_map_grant. Grant table operations are expected to return 0 for success, and a negative number for errors. Some misplaced brackets cause one error path to return 1 instead of a negative value. The grant table code in Linux treats this condition as success, and proceeds with incorrectly initialised state. A buggy or malicious guest can construct its grant table in such a way that, when a backend domain tries to map a grant, it hits the incorrect error path. This will crash a Linux based dom0 or backend domain. https://xenproject.org/downloads/xen-project-archives/xen-project-4-13-series/xen-project-4-13-1 Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr> |
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arch | ||
board | ||
boot | ||
configs | ||
docs | ||
fs | ||
linux | ||
package | ||
support | ||
system | ||
toolchain | ||
utils | ||
.defconfig | ||
.flake8 | ||
.gitignore | ||
.gitlab-ci.yml | ||
.gitlab-ci.yml.in | ||
CHANGES | ||
Config.in | ||
Config.in.legacy | ||
COPYING | ||
DEVELOPERS | ||
Makefile | ||
Makefile.legacy | ||
README |
Buildroot is a simple, efficient and easy-to-use tool to generate embedded Linux systems through cross-compilation. The documentation can be found in docs/manual. You can generate a text document with 'make manual-text' and read output/docs/manual/manual.text. Online documentation can be found at http://buildroot.org/docs.html To build and use the buildroot stuff, do the following: 1) run 'make menuconfig' 2) select the target architecture and the packages you wish to compile 3) run 'make' 4) wait while it compiles 5) find the kernel, bootloader, root filesystem, etc. in output/images You do not need to be root to build or run buildroot. Have fun! Buildroot comes with a basic configuration for a number of boards. Run 'make list-defconfigs' to view the list of provided configurations. Please feed suggestions, bug reports, insults, and bribes back to the buildroot mailing list: buildroot@buildroot.org You can also find us on #buildroot on Freenode IRC. If you would like to contribute patches, please read https://buildroot.org/manual.html#submitting-patches