![Peter Korsgaard](/assets/img/avatar_default.png)
Fixes the following security issues: CVE-2020-14367: Insecure writing of pidfile ------------------------------------------- When chronyd is configured to save the pidfile in a directory where the chrony user has write permissions (e.g. /var/run/chrony - the default since chrony-3.4), an attacker that compromised the chrony user account could create a symbolic link at the location of the pidfile to make chronyd starting with root privileges follow the symlink and write its process ID to a file for which the chrony user doesn't have write permissions, causing a denial of service, or data loss. This issue was reported by Matthias Gerstner of SUSE. For further details, see the oss-security posting: https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2020/08/21/1 Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com> Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
5 lines
296 B
Plaintext
5 lines
296 B
Plaintext
# From https://listengine.tuxfamily.org/chrony.tuxfamily.org/chrony-announce/2020/08/msg00000.html
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sha256 1ba82f70db85d414cd7420c39858e3ceca4b9eb8b028cbe869512c3a14a2dca7 chrony-3.5.1.tar.gz
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# Locally calculated
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sha256 ab15fd526bd8dd18a9e77ebc139656bf4d33e97fc7238cd11bf60e2b9b8666c6 COPYING
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