![Peter Korsgaard](/assets/img/avatar_default.png)
Fixes the following security vulnerabilities: - CVE-2014-9638: oggenc in vorbis-tools 1.4.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (divide-by-zero error and crash) via a WAV file with the number of channels set to zero. - CVE-2014-9639: Integer overflow in oggenc in vorbis-tools 1.4.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) via a crafted number of channels in a WAV file, which triggers an out-of-bounds memory access. - CVE-2014-9640: oggenc/oggenc.c in vorbis-tools 1.4.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a crafted raw file. Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
89 lines
2.8 KiB
Diff
89 lines
2.8 KiB
Diff
From 3bbabc06c4b35c84f6747ed850213161aca568c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Petter Reinholdtsen <pere@debian.org>
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Date: Tue, 22 Sep 2015 15:14:06 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH] oggenc: validate count of channels in the header
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(CVE-2014-9638 & CVE-2014-9639)
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Author: Kamil Dudka <kdudka@redhat.com>
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Origin: http://lists.xiph.org/pipermail/vorbis-dev/2015-February/020423.html
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Bug: https://trac.xiph.org/ticket/2136
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Bug: https://trac.xiph.org/ticket/2137
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Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/776086
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Forwarded: not-needed
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Reviewed-By: Petter Reinholdtsen <pere@hungry.com>
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Last-Update: 2015-09-22
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Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
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---
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oggenc/audio.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++--
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1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/oggenc/audio.c b/oggenc/audio.c
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index 4921fb9..535a704 100644
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--- a/oggenc/audio.c
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+++ b/oggenc/audio.c
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@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
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#include <config.h>
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#endif
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+#include <limits.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <string.h>
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@@ -251,6 +252,7 @@ int aiff_open(FILE *in, oe_enc_opt *opt, unsigned char *buf, int buflen)
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aiff_fmt format;
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aifffile *aiff = malloc(sizeof(aifffile));
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int i;
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+ long channels;
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if(buf[11]=='C')
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aifc=1;
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@@ -277,11 +279,16 @@ int aiff_open(FILE *in, oe_enc_opt *opt, unsigned char *buf, int buflen)
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return 0;
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}
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- format.channels = READ_U16_BE(buffer);
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+ format.channels = channels = READ_U16_BE(buffer);
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format.totalframes = READ_U32_BE(buffer+2);
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format.samplesize = READ_U16_BE(buffer+6);
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format.rate = (int)read_IEEE80(buffer+8);
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+ if(channels <= 0L || SHRT_MAX < channels)
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+ {
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+ fprintf(stderr, _("Warning: Unsupported count of channels in AIFF header\n"));
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+ return 0;
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+ }
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aiff->bigendian = 1;
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if(aifc)
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@@ -416,6 +423,7 @@ int wav_open(FILE *in, oe_enc_opt *opt, unsigned char *oldbuf, int buflen)
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wav_fmt format;
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wavfile *wav = malloc(sizeof(wavfile));
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int i;
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+ long channels;
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/* Ok. At this point, we know we have a WAV file. Now we have to detect
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* whether we support the subtype, and we have to find the actual data
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@@ -453,12 +461,18 @@ int wav_open(FILE *in, oe_enc_opt *opt, unsigned char *oldbuf, int buflen)
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}
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format.format = READ_U16_LE(buf);
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- format.channels = READ_U16_LE(buf+2);
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+ format.channels = channels = READ_U16_LE(buf+2);
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format.samplerate = READ_U32_LE(buf+4);
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format.bytespersec = READ_U32_LE(buf+8);
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format.align = READ_U16_LE(buf+12);
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format.samplesize = READ_U16_LE(buf+14);
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+ if(channels <= 0L || SHRT_MAX < channels)
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+ {
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+ fprintf(stderr, _("Warning: Unsupported count of channels in WAV header\n"));
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+ return 0;
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+ }
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+
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if(format.format == -2) /* WAVE_FORMAT_EXTENSIBLE */
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{
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if(len<40)
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--
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2.20.1
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