![Peter Korsgaard](/assets/img/avatar_default.png)
Fixes the following security vulnerability: - CVE-2019-18218: cdf_read_property_info in cdf.c in file through 5.37 does not restrict the number of CDF_VECTOR elements, which allows a heap-based buffer overflow (4-byte out-of-bounds write). Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
69 lines
1.8 KiB
Diff
69 lines
1.8 KiB
Diff
From 06de62c022138f63de9bcd04074491945eaa8662 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Christos Zoulas <christos@zoulas.com>
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Date: Fri, 23 Aug 2019 14:29:14 +0000
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Subject: [PATCH] Detect multiplication overflow when computing sector position
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(found by oss-fuzz)
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Fixes CVE-2019-18218
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Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
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---
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src/cdf.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++---
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1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/src/cdf.c b/src/cdf.c
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index 556a3ff8..9d639674 100644
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--- a/src/cdf.c
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+++ b/src/cdf.c
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@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
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#include "file.h"
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#ifndef lint
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-FILE_RCSID("@(#)$File: cdf.c,v 1.114 2019/02/20 02:35:27 christos Exp $")
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+FILE_RCSID("@(#)$File: cdf.c,v 1.115 2019/08/23 14:29:14 christos Exp $")
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#endif
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#include <assert.h>
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@@ -53,6 +53,10 @@ FILE_RCSID("@(#)$File: cdf.c,v 1.114 2019/02/20 02:35:27 christos Exp $")
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#define EFTYPE EINVAL
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#endif
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+#ifndef SIZE_T_MAX
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+#define SIZE_T_MAX CAST(size_t, ~0ULL)
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+#endif
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+
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#include "cdf.h"
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#ifdef CDF_DEBUG
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@@ -405,7 +409,12 @@ cdf_read_sector(const cdf_info_t *info, void *buf, size_t offs, size_t len,
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const cdf_header_t *h, cdf_secid_t id)
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{
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size_t ss = CDF_SEC_SIZE(h);
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- size_t pos = CDF_SEC_POS(h, id);
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+ size_t pos;
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+
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+ if (SIZE_T_MAX / ss < CAST(size_t, id))
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+ return -1;
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+
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+ pos = CDF_SEC_POS(h, id);
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assert(ss == len);
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return cdf_read(info, CAST(off_t, pos), RCAST(char *, buf) + offs, len);
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}
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@@ -415,7 +424,12 @@ cdf_read_short_sector(const cdf_stream_t *sst, void *buf, size_t offs,
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size_t len, const cdf_header_t *h, cdf_secid_t id)
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{
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size_t ss = CDF_SHORT_SEC_SIZE(h);
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- size_t pos = CDF_SHORT_SEC_POS(h, id);
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+ size_t pos;
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+
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+ if (SIZE_T_MAX / ss < CAST(size_t, id))
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+ return -1;
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+
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+ pos = CDF_SHORT_SEC_POS(h, id);
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assert(ss == len);
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if (pos + len > CDF_SEC_SIZE(h) * sst->sst_len) {
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DPRINTF(("Out of bounds read %" SIZE_T_FORMAT "u > %"
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--
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2.20.1
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