buildroot/package/libsndfile/0001-double64_init-Check-psf-sf.channels-against-upper-bo.patch
Peter Korsgaard 45014da2b7 package/libsndfile: add upstream post-1.0.28 security fixes
Fixes the following security vulnerabilities:

CVE-2017-14634: In libsndfile 1.0.28, a divide-by-zero error exists in the
function double64_init() in double64.c, which may lead to DoS when playing a
crafted audio file

CVE-2017-17456: The function d2alaw_array() in alaw.c of libsndfile
1.0.29pre1 may lead to a remote DoS attack (SEGV on unknown address
0x000000000000), a different vulnerability than CVE-2017-14245

CVE-2017-17457: The function d2ulaw_array() in ulaw.c of libsndfile
1.0.29pre1 may lead to a remote DoS attack (SEGV on unknown address
0x000000000000), a different vulnerability than CVE-2017-14246

CVE-2018-13139: A stack-based buffer overflow in psf_memset in common.c in
libsndfile 1.0.28 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service
(application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted
audio file.  The vulnerability can be triggered by the executable
sndfile-deinterleave

CVE-2018-19661: An issue was discovered in libsndfile 1.0.28.  There is a
buffer over-read in the function i2ulaw_array in ulaw.c that will lead to a
denial of service

CVE-2018-19662: An issue was discovered in libsndfile 1.0.28.  There is a
buffer over-read in the function i2alaw_array in alaw.c that will lead to a
denial of service

Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2019-01-19 16:33:14 +01:00

40 lines
1.3 KiB
Diff

From 85c877d5072866aadbe8ed0c3e0590fbb5e16788 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Fabian Greffrath <fabian@greffrath.com>
Date: Thu, 28 Sep 2017 12:15:04 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] double64_init: Check psf->sf.channels against upper bound
This prevents division by zero later in the code.
While the trivial case to catch this (i.e. sf.channels < 1) has already
been covered, a crafted file may report a number of channels that is
so high (i.e. > INT_MAX/sizeof(double)) that it "somehow" gets
miscalculated to zero (if this makes sense) in the determination of the
blockwidth. Since we only support a limited number of channels anyway,
make sure to check here as well.
CVE-2017-14634
Closes: https://github.com/erikd/libsndfile/issues/318
Signed-off-by: Erik de Castro Lopo <erikd@mega-nerd.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
---
src/double64.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/double64.c b/src/double64.c
index b318ea86..78dfef7f 100644
--- a/src/double64.c
+++ b/src/double64.c
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ int
double64_init (SF_PRIVATE *psf)
{ static int double64_caps ;
- if (psf->sf.channels < 1)
+ if (psf->sf.channels < 1 || psf->sf.channels > SF_MAX_CHANNELS)
{ psf_log_printf (psf, "double64_init : internal error : channels = %d\n", psf->sf.channels) ;
return SFE_INTERNAL ;
} ;
--
2.11.0