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alistair23-linux/arch/arm64/kernel/sys_compat.c

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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
* Based on arch/arm/kernel/sys_arm.c
*
* Copyright (C) People who wrote linux/arch/i386/kernel/sys_i386.c
* Copyright (C) 1995, 1996 Russell King.
* Copyright (C) 2012 ARM Ltd.
*/
#include <linux/compat.h>
#include <linux/cpufeature.h>
#include <linux/personality.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
#include <asm/system_misc.h>
#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
#include <asm/unistd.h>
static long
__do_compat_cache_op(unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
{
long ret;
do {
unsigned long chunk = min(PAGE_SIZE, end - start);
if (fatal_signal_pending(current))
return 0;
if (cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_WORKAROUND_1542419)) {
/*
* The workaround requires an inner-shareable tlbi.
* We pick the reserved-ASID to minimise the impact.
*/
__tlbi(aside1is, __TLBI_VADDR(0, 0));
dsb(ish);
}
ret = __flush_cache_user_range(start, start + chunk);
if (ret)
return ret;
cond_resched();
start += chunk;
} while (start < end);
return 0;
}
static inline long
do_compat_cache_op(unsigned long start, unsigned long end, int flags)
{
if (end < start || flags)
return -EINVAL;
Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand. It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact. A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's just get this done once and for all. This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form. There were a couple of notable cases: - csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias. - the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing really used it) - microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch. I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-03 19:57:57 -07:00
if (!access_ok((const void __user *)start, end - start))
return -EFAULT;
return __do_compat_cache_op(start, end);
}
/*
* Handle all unrecognised system calls.
*/
long compat_arm_syscall(struct pt_regs *regs, int scno)
{
void __user *addr;
switch (scno) {
/*
* Flush a region from virtual address 'r0' to virtual address 'r1'
* _exclusive_. There is no alignment requirement on either address;
* user space does not need to know the hardware cache layout.
*
* r2 contains flags. It should ALWAYS be passed as ZERO until it
* is defined to be something else. For now we ignore it, but may
* the fires of hell burn in your belly if you break this rule. ;)
*
* (at a later date, we may want to allow this call to not flush
* various aspects of the cache. Passing '0' will guarantee that
* everything necessary gets flushed to maintain consistency in
* the specified region).
*/
case __ARM_NR_compat_cacheflush:
return do_compat_cache_op(regs->regs[0], regs->regs[1], regs->regs[2]);
case __ARM_NR_compat_set_tls:
arm64: uaccess: Fix omissions from usercopy whitelist When the hardend usercopy support was added for arm64, it was concluded that all cases of usercopy into and out of thread_struct were statically sized and so didn't require explicit whitelisting of the appropriate fields in thread_struct. Testing with usercopy hardening enabled has revealed that this is not the case for certain ptrace regset manipulation calls on arm64. This occurs because the sizes of usercopies associated with the regset API are dynamic by construction, and because arm64 does not always stage such copies via the stack: indeed the regset API is designed to avoid the need for that by adding some bounds checking. This is currently believed to affect only the fpsimd and TLS registers. Because the whitelisted fields in thread_struct must be contiguous, this patch groups them together in a nested struct. It is also necessary to be able to determine the location and size of that struct, so rather than making the struct anonymous (which would save on edits elsewhere) or adding an anonymous union containing named and unnamed instances of the same struct (gross), this patch gives the struct a name and makes the necessary edits to code that references it (noisy but simple). Care is needed to ensure that the new struct does not contain padding (which the usercopy hardening would fail to protect). For this reason, the presence of tp2_value is made unconditional, since a padding field would be needed there in any case. This pads up to the 16-byte alignment required by struct user_fpsimd_state. Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reported-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Fixes: 9e8084d3f761 ("arm64: Implement thread_struct whitelist for hardened usercopy") Signed-off-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2018-03-28 03:50:49 -06:00
current->thread.uw.tp_value = regs->regs[0];
/*
* Protect against register corruption from context switch.
* See comment in tls_thread_flush.
*/
barrier();
write_sysreg(regs->regs[0], tpidrro_el0);
return 0;
default:
/*
* Calls 0xf0xxx..0xf07ff are defined to return -ENOSYS
* if not implemented, rather than raising SIGILL. This
* way the calling program can gracefully determine whether
* a feature is supported.
*/
if (scno < __ARM_NR_COMPAT_END)
return -ENOSYS;
break;
}
addr = (void __user *)instruction_pointer(regs) -
(compat_thumb_mode(regs) ? 2 : 4);
arm64_notify_die("Oops - bad compat syscall(2)", regs,
SIGILL, ILL_ILLTRP, addr, scno);
return 0;
}