2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
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/*
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* arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c
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*
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* S390 version
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* Copyright (C) 1999,2000 IBM Deutschland Entwicklung GmbH, IBM Corporation
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* Author(s): Denis Joseph Barrow (djbarrow@de.ibm.com,barrow_dj@yahoo.com),
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* Martin Schwidefsky (schwidefsky@de.ibm.com)
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*
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* Based on PowerPC version
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* Copyright (C) 1995-1996 Gary Thomas (gdt@linuxppc.org)
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*
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* Derived from "arch/m68k/kernel/ptrace.c"
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* Copyright (C) 1994 by Hamish Macdonald
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* Taken from linux/kernel/ptrace.c and modified for M680x0.
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* linux/kernel/ptrace.c is by Ross Biro 1/23/92, edited by Linus Torvalds
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*
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* Modified by Cort Dougan (cort@cs.nmt.edu)
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*
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*
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* This file is subject to the terms and conditions of the GNU General
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* Public License. See the file README.legal in the main directory of
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* this archive for more details.
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*/
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#include <linux/kernel.h>
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#include <linux/sched.h>
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#include <linux/mm.h>
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#include <linux/smp.h>
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#include <linux/errno.h>
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#include <linux/ptrace.h>
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#include <linux/user.h>
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#include <linux/security.h>
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#include <linux/audit.h>
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2005-05-01 09:59:14 -06:00
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#include <linux/signal.h>
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2008-07-14 01:58:54 -06:00
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#include <linux/elf.h>
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#include <linux/regset.h>
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2008-10-10 13:33:20 -06:00
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#include <linux/tracehook.h>
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2009-06-12 02:26:26 -06:00
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#include <linux/seccomp.h>
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2009-06-12 02:26:47 -06:00
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#include <trace/syscall.h>
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2009-06-12 02:26:26 -06:00
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#include <asm/compat.h>
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2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
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#include <asm/segment.h>
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#include <asm/page.h>
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#include <asm/pgtable.h>
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#include <asm/pgalloc.h>
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#include <asm/system.h>
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#include <asm/uaccess.h>
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2005-06-04 16:43:30 -06:00
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#include <asm/unistd.h>
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2008-04-16 23:46:26 -06:00
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#include "entry.h"
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2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
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2006-01-06 01:19:28 -07:00
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#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
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2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
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#include "compat_ptrace.h"
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#endif
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2008-07-14 01:58:54 -06:00
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enum s390_regset {
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REGSET_GENERAL,
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REGSET_FP,
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};
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2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
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static void
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FixPerRegisters(struct task_struct *task)
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{
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struct pt_regs *regs;
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per_struct *per_info;
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2006-01-12 02:05:49 -07:00
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regs = task_pt_regs(task);
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2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
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per_info = (per_struct *) &task->thread.per_info;
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per_info->control_regs.bits.em_instruction_fetch =
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per_info->single_step | per_info->instruction_fetch;
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if (per_info->single_step) {
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per_info->control_regs.bits.starting_addr = 0;
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2006-01-06 01:19:28 -07:00
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#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
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2009-06-12 02:26:25 -06:00
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if (is_compat_task())
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2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
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per_info->control_regs.bits.ending_addr = 0x7fffffffUL;
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else
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#endif
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per_info->control_regs.bits.ending_addr = PSW_ADDR_INSN;
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} else {
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per_info->control_regs.bits.starting_addr =
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per_info->starting_addr;
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per_info->control_regs.bits.ending_addr =
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per_info->ending_addr;
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}
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/*
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* if any of the control reg tracing bits are on
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* we switch on per in the psw
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*/
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if (per_info->control_regs.words.cr[0] & PER_EM_MASK)
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regs->psw.mask |= PSW_MASK_PER;
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else
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regs->psw.mask &= ~PSW_MASK_PER;
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if (per_info->control_regs.bits.em_storage_alteration)
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per_info->control_regs.bits.storage_alt_space_ctl = 1;
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else
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per_info->control_regs.bits.storage_alt_space_ctl = 0;
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}
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2008-01-26 06:11:22 -07:00
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void user_enable_single_step(struct task_struct *task)
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2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
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{
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task->thread.per_info.single_step = 1;
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FixPerRegisters(task);
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}
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2008-01-26 06:11:22 -07:00
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void user_disable_single_step(struct task_struct *task)
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2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
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{
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task->thread.per_info.single_step = 0;
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FixPerRegisters(task);
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}
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/*
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* Called by kernel/ptrace.c when detaching..
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*
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* Make sure single step bits etc are not set.
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*/
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void
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ptrace_disable(struct task_struct *child)
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{
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/* make sure the single step bit is not set. */
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2008-01-26 06:11:22 -07:00
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user_disable_single_step(child);
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2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
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}
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2006-01-06 01:19:28 -07:00
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#ifndef CONFIG_64BIT
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2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
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# define __ADDR_MASK 3
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#else
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# define __ADDR_MASK 7
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#endif
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/*
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* Read the word at offset addr from the user area of a process. The
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* trouble here is that the information is littered over different
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* locations. The process registers are found on the kernel stack,
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* the floating point stuff and the trace settings are stored in
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* the task structure. In addition the different structures in
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* struct user contain pad bytes that should be read as zeroes.
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* Lovely...
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*/
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2008-07-14 01:58:54 -06:00
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static unsigned long __peek_user(struct task_struct *child, addr_t addr)
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2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
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{
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struct user *dummy = NULL;
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2008-07-14 01:58:54 -06:00
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addr_t offset, tmp;
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2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
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if (addr < (addr_t) &dummy->regs.acrs) {
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/*
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* psw and gprs are stored on the stack
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*/
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2006-01-12 02:05:49 -07:00
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tmp = *(addr_t *)((addr_t) &task_pt_regs(child)->psw + addr);
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2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
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if (addr == (addr_t) &dummy->regs.psw.mask)
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/* Remove per bit from user psw. */
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tmp &= ~PSW_MASK_PER;
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} else if (addr < (addr_t) &dummy->regs.orig_gpr2) {
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/*
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* access registers are stored in the thread structure
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*/
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offset = addr - (addr_t) &dummy->regs.acrs;
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2006-01-06 01:19:28 -07:00
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#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
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2005-06-04 16:43:30 -06:00
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/*
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* Very special case: old & broken 64 bit gdb reading
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* from acrs[15]. Result is a 64 bit value. Read the
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* 32 bit acrs[15] value and shift it by 32. Sick...
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*/
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if (addr == (addr_t) &dummy->regs.acrs[15])
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tmp = ((unsigned long) child->thread.acrs[15]) << 32;
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else
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#endif
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2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
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tmp = *(addr_t *)((addr_t) &child->thread.acrs + offset);
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} else if (addr == (addr_t) &dummy->regs.orig_gpr2) {
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/*
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* orig_gpr2 is stored on the kernel stack
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*/
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2006-01-12 02:05:49 -07:00
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tmp = (addr_t) task_pt_regs(child)->orig_gpr2;
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2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
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[S390] CVE-2008-1514: prevent ptrace padding area read/write in 31-bit mode
When running a 31-bit ptrace, on either an s390 or s390x kernel,
reads and writes into a padding area in struct user_regs_struct32
will result in a kernel panic.
This is also known as CVE-2008-1514.
Test case available here:
http://sources.redhat.com/cgi-bin/cvsweb.cgi/~checkout~/tests/ptrace-tests/tests/user-area-padding.c?cvsroot=systemtap
Steps to reproduce:
1) wget the above
2) gcc -o user-area-padding-31bit user-area-padding.c -Wall -ggdb2 -D_GNU_SOURCE -m31
3) ./user-area-padding-31bit
<panic>
Test status
-----------
Without patch, both s390 and s390x kernels panic. With patch, the test case,
as well as the gdb testsuite, pass without incident, padding area reads
returning zero, writes ignored.
Nb: original version returned -EINVAL on write attempts, which broke the
gdb test and made the test case slightly unhappy, Jan Kratochvil suggested
the change to return 0 on write attempts.
Signed-off-by: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jan Kratochvil <jan.kratochvil@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
2008-09-09 04:38:56 -06:00
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} else if (addr < (addr_t) &dummy->regs.fp_regs) {
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/*
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* prevent reads of padding hole between
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* orig_gpr2 and fp_regs on s390.
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*/
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tmp = 0;
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2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
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} else if (addr < (addr_t) (&dummy->regs.fp_regs + 1)) {
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/*
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* floating point regs. are stored in the thread structure
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*/
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offset = addr - (addr_t) &dummy->regs.fp_regs;
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tmp = *(addr_t *)((addr_t) &child->thread.fp_regs + offset);
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2005-06-04 16:43:30 -06:00
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if (addr == (addr_t) &dummy->regs.fp_regs.fpc)
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tmp &= (unsigned long) FPC_VALID_MASK
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<< (BITS_PER_LONG - 32);
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2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
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} else if (addr < (addr_t) (&dummy->regs.per_info + 1)) {
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/*
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* per_info is found in the thread structure
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*/
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offset = addr - (addr_t) &dummy->regs.per_info;
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tmp = *(addr_t *)((addr_t) &child->thread.per_info + offset);
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} else
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tmp = 0;
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2008-07-14 01:58:54 -06:00
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return tmp;
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2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
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}
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static int
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2008-07-14 01:58:54 -06:00
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peek_user(struct task_struct *child, addr_t addr, addr_t data)
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2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
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{
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2008-07-14 01:58:54 -06:00
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addr_t tmp, mask;
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2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
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/*
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* Stupid gdb peeks/pokes the access registers in 64 bit with
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2008-07-14 01:58:54 -06:00
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* an alignment of 4. Programmers from hell...
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2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
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*/
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2005-06-04 16:43:30 -06:00
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mask = __ADDR_MASK;
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2006-01-06 01:19:28 -07:00
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#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
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2008-12-25 05:39:00 -07:00
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if (addr >= (addr_t) &((struct user *) NULL)->regs.acrs &&
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addr < (addr_t) &((struct user *) NULL)->regs.orig_gpr2)
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2005-06-04 16:43:30 -06:00
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mask = 3;
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#endif
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if ((addr & mask) || addr > sizeof(struct user) - __ADDR_MASK)
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2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
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return -EIO;
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2008-07-14 01:58:54 -06:00
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tmp = __peek_user(child, addr);
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return put_user(tmp, (addr_t __user *) data);
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}
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/*
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* Write a word to the user area of a process at location addr. This
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* operation does have an additional problem compared to peek_user.
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* Stores to the program status word and on the floating point
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* control register needs to get checked for validity.
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*/
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static int __poke_user(struct task_struct *child, addr_t addr, addr_t data)
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{
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struct user *dummy = NULL;
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addr_t offset;
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2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
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if (addr < (addr_t) &dummy->regs.acrs) {
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/*
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* psw and gprs are stored on the stack
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*/
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if (addr == (addr_t) &dummy->regs.psw.mask &&
|
2006-01-06 01:19:28 -07:00
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#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
|
2007-02-05 13:18:17 -07:00
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data != PSW_MASK_MERGE(psw_user32_bits, data) &&
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2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
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#endif
|
2007-02-05 13:18:17 -07:00
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data != PSW_MASK_MERGE(psw_user_bits, data))
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2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
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/* Invalid psw mask. */
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return -EINVAL;
|
2006-01-06 01:19:28 -07:00
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#ifndef CONFIG_64BIT
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2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
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if (addr == (addr_t) &dummy->regs.psw.addr)
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/* I'd like to reject addresses without the
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high order bit but older gdb's rely on it */
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data |= PSW_ADDR_AMODE;
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#endif
|
2006-01-12 02:05:49 -07:00
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*(addr_t *)((addr_t) &task_pt_regs(child)->psw + addr) = data;
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
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} else if (addr < (addr_t) (&dummy->regs.orig_gpr2)) {
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/*
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* access registers are stored in the thread structure
|
|
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*/
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|
offset = addr - (addr_t) &dummy->regs.acrs;
|
2006-01-06 01:19:28 -07:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
|
2005-06-04 16:43:30 -06:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Very special case: old & broken 64 bit gdb writing
|
|
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|
* to acrs[15] with a 64 bit value. Ignore the lower
|
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|
* half of the value and write the upper 32 bit to
|
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* acrs[15]. Sick...
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|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (addr == (addr_t) &dummy->regs.acrs[15])
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|
|
child->thread.acrs[15] = (unsigned int) (data >> 32);
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|
else
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|
|
#endif
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
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|
*(addr_t *)((addr_t) &child->thread.acrs + offset) = data;
|
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|
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|
} else if (addr == (addr_t) &dummy->regs.orig_gpr2) {
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|
|
|
/*
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|
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|
* orig_gpr2 is stored on the kernel stack
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2006-01-12 02:05:49 -07:00
|
|
|
task_pt_regs(child)->orig_gpr2 = data;
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
|
[S390] CVE-2008-1514: prevent ptrace padding area read/write in 31-bit mode
When running a 31-bit ptrace, on either an s390 or s390x kernel,
reads and writes into a padding area in struct user_regs_struct32
will result in a kernel panic.
This is also known as CVE-2008-1514.
Test case available here:
http://sources.redhat.com/cgi-bin/cvsweb.cgi/~checkout~/tests/ptrace-tests/tests/user-area-padding.c?cvsroot=systemtap
Steps to reproduce:
1) wget the above
2) gcc -o user-area-padding-31bit user-area-padding.c -Wall -ggdb2 -D_GNU_SOURCE -m31
3) ./user-area-padding-31bit
<panic>
Test status
-----------
Without patch, both s390 and s390x kernels panic. With patch, the test case,
as well as the gdb testsuite, pass without incident, padding area reads
returning zero, writes ignored.
Nb: original version returned -EINVAL on write attempts, which broke the
gdb test and made the test case slightly unhappy, Jan Kratochvil suggested
the change to return 0 on write attempts.
Signed-off-by: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jan Kratochvil <jan.kratochvil@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
2008-09-09 04:38:56 -06:00
|
|
|
} else if (addr < (addr_t) &dummy->regs.fp_regs) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* prevent writes of padding hole between
|
|
|
|
* orig_gpr2 and fp_regs on s390.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
} else if (addr < (addr_t) (&dummy->regs.fp_regs + 1)) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* floating point regs. are stored in the thread structure
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (addr == (addr_t) &dummy->regs.fp_regs.fpc &&
|
2005-06-04 16:43:30 -06:00
|
|
|
(data & ~((unsigned long) FPC_VALID_MASK
|
|
|
|
<< (BITS_PER_LONG - 32))) != 0)
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
offset = addr - (addr_t) &dummy->regs.fp_regs;
|
|
|
|
*(addr_t *)((addr_t) &child->thread.fp_regs + offset) = data;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} else if (addr < (addr_t) (&dummy->regs.per_info + 1)) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* per_info is found in the thread structure
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
offset = addr - (addr_t) &dummy->regs.per_info;
|
|
|
|
*(addr_t *)((addr_t) &child->thread.per_info + offset) = data;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
FixPerRegisters(child);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-07-14 01:58:54 -06:00
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
poke_user(struct task_struct *child, addr_t addr, addr_t data)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
addr_t mask;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Stupid gdb peeks/pokes the access registers in 64 bit with
|
|
|
|
* an alignment of 4. Programmers from hell indeed...
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
mask = __ADDR_MASK;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
|
2008-12-25 05:39:00 -07:00
|
|
|
if (addr >= (addr_t) &((struct user *) NULL)->regs.acrs &&
|
|
|
|
addr < (addr_t) &((struct user *) NULL)->regs.orig_gpr2)
|
2008-07-14 01:58:54 -06:00
|
|
|
mask = 3;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if ((addr & mask) || addr > sizeof(struct user) - __ADDR_MASK)
|
|
|
|
return -EIO;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return __poke_user(child, addr, data);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-05-07 01:22:57 -06:00
|
|
|
long arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *child, long request, long addr, long data)
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ptrace_area parea;
|
|
|
|
int copied, ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (request) {
|
|
|
|
case PTRACE_PEEKTEXT:
|
|
|
|
case PTRACE_PEEKDATA:
|
|
|
|
/* Remove high order bit from address (only for 31 bit). */
|
|
|
|
addr &= PSW_ADDR_INSN;
|
|
|
|
/* read word at location addr. */
|
2007-07-17 05:03:43 -06:00
|
|
|
return generic_ptrace_peekdata(child, addr, data);
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case PTRACE_PEEKUSR:
|
|
|
|
/* read the word at location addr in the USER area. */
|
|
|
|
return peek_user(child, addr, data);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case PTRACE_POKETEXT:
|
|
|
|
case PTRACE_POKEDATA:
|
|
|
|
/* Remove high order bit from address (only for 31 bit). */
|
|
|
|
addr &= PSW_ADDR_INSN;
|
|
|
|
/* write the word at location addr. */
|
2007-07-17 05:03:44 -06:00
|
|
|
return generic_ptrace_pokedata(child, addr, data);
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case PTRACE_POKEUSR:
|
|
|
|
/* write the word at location addr in the USER area */
|
|
|
|
return poke_user(child, addr, data);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case PTRACE_PEEKUSR_AREA:
|
|
|
|
case PTRACE_POKEUSR_AREA:
|
2007-02-05 13:16:47 -07:00
|
|
|
if (copy_from_user(&parea, (void __force __user *) addr,
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
sizeof(parea)))
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
addr = parea.kernel_addr;
|
|
|
|
data = parea.process_addr;
|
|
|
|
copied = 0;
|
|
|
|
while (copied < parea.len) {
|
|
|
|
if (request == PTRACE_PEEKUSR_AREA)
|
|
|
|
ret = peek_user(child, addr, data);
|
|
|
|
else {
|
2007-02-05 13:16:47 -07:00
|
|
|
addr_t utmp;
|
|
|
|
if (get_user(utmp,
|
|
|
|
(addr_t __force __user *) data))
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
2007-02-05 13:16:47 -07:00
|
|
|
ret = poke_user(child, addr, utmp);
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
addr += sizeof(unsigned long);
|
|
|
|
data += sizeof(unsigned long);
|
|
|
|
copied += sizeof(unsigned long);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ptrace_request(child, request, addr, data);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2006-01-06 01:19:28 -07:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Now the fun part starts... a 31 bit program running in the
|
|
|
|
* 31 bit emulation tracing another program. PTRACE_PEEKTEXT,
|
|
|
|
* PTRACE_PEEKDATA, PTRACE_POKETEXT and PTRACE_POKEDATA are easy
|
|
|
|
* to handle, the difference to the 64 bit versions of the requests
|
|
|
|
* is that the access is done in multiples of 4 byte instead of
|
|
|
|
* 8 bytes (sizeof(unsigned long) on 31/64 bit).
|
|
|
|
* The ugly part are PTRACE_PEEKUSR, PTRACE_PEEKUSR_AREA,
|
|
|
|
* PTRACE_POKEUSR and PTRACE_POKEUSR_AREA. If the traced program
|
|
|
|
* is a 31 bit program too, the content of struct user can be
|
|
|
|
* emulated. A 31 bit program peeking into the struct user of
|
|
|
|
* a 64 bit program is a no-no.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Same as peek_user but for a 31 bit program.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2008-07-14 01:58:54 -06:00
|
|
|
static u32 __peek_user_compat(struct task_struct *child, addr_t addr)
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct user32 *dummy32 = NULL;
|
|
|
|
per_struct32 *dummy_per32 = NULL;
|
|
|
|
addr_t offset;
|
|
|
|
__u32 tmp;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (addr < (addr_t) &dummy32->regs.acrs) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* psw and gprs are stored on the stack
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (addr == (addr_t) &dummy32->regs.psw.mask) {
|
|
|
|
/* Fake a 31 bit psw mask. */
|
2006-01-12 02:05:49 -07:00
|
|
|
tmp = (__u32)(task_pt_regs(child)->psw.mask >> 32);
|
2007-02-05 13:18:17 -07:00
|
|
|
tmp = PSW32_MASK_MERGE(psw32_user_bits, tmp);
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
} else if (addr == (addr_t) &dummy32->regs.psw.addr) {
|
|
|
|
/* Fake a 31 bit psw address. */
|
2006-01-12 02:05:49 -07:00
|
|
|
tmp = (__u32) task_pt_regs(child)->psw.addr |
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
PSW32_ADDR_AMODE31;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/* gpr 0-15 */
|
2006-01-12 02:05:49 -07:00
|
|
|
tmp = *(__u32 *)((addr_t) &task_pt_regs(child)->psw +
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
addr*2 + 4);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else if (addr < (addr_t) (&dummy32->regs.orig_gpr2)) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* access registers are stored in the thread structure
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
offset = addr - (addr_t) &dummy32->regs.acrs;
|
|
|
|
tmp = *(__u32*)((addr_t) &child->thread.acrs + offset);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} else if (addr == (addr_t) (&dummy32->regs.orig_gpr2)) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* orig_gpr2 is stored on the kernel stack
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2006-01-12 02:05:49 -07:00
|
|
|
tmp = *(__u32*)((addr_t) &task_pt_regs(child)->orig_gpr2 + 4);
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
|
[S390] CVE-2008-1514: prevent ptrace padding area read/write in 31-bit mode
When running a 31-bit ptrace, on either an s390 or s390x kernel,
reads and writes into a padding area in struct user_regs_struct32
will result in a kernel panic.
This is also known as CVE-2008-1514.
Test case available here:
http://sources.redhat.com/cgi-bin/cvsweb.cgi/~checkout~/tests/ptrace-tests/tests/user-area-padding.c?cvsroot=systemtap
Steps to reproduce:
1) wget the above
2) gcc -o user-area-padding-31bit user-area-padding.c -Wall -ggdb2 -D_GNU_SOURCE -m31
3) ./user-area-padding-31bit
<panic>
Test status
-----------
Without patch, both s390 and s390x kernels panic. With patch, the test case,
as well as the gdb testsuite, pass without incident, padding area reads
returning zero, writes ignored.
Nb: original version returned -EINVAL on write attempts, which broke the
gdb test and made the test case slightly unhappy, Jan Kratochvil suggested
the change to return 0 on write attempts.
Signed-off-by: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jan Kratochvil <jan.kratochvil@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
2008-09-09 04:38:56 -06:00
|
|
|
} else if (addr < (addr_t) &dummy32->regs.fp_regs) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* prevent reads of padding hole between
|
|
|
|
* orig_gpr2 and fp_regs on s390.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
tmp = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
} else if (addr < (addr_t) (&dummy32->regs.fp_regs + 1)) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* floating point regs. are stored in the thread structure
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
offset = addr - (addr_t) &dummy32->regs.fp_regs;
|
|
|
|
tmp = *(__u32 *)((addr_t) &child->thread.fp_regs + offset);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} else if (addr < (addr_t) (&dummy32->regs.per_info + 1)) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* per_info is found in the thread structure
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
offset = addr - (addr_t) &dummy32->regs.per_info;
|
|
|
|
/* This is magic. See per_struct and per_struct32. */
|
|
|
|
if ((offset >= (addr_t) &dummy_per32->control_regs &&
|
|
|
|
offset < (addr_t) (&dummy_per32->control_regs + 1)) ||
|
|
|
|
(offset >= (addr_t) &dummy_per32->starting_addr &&
|
|
|
|
offset <= (addr_t) &dummy_per32->ending_addr) ||
|
|
|
|
offset == (addr_t) &dummy_per32->lowcore.words.address)
|
|
|
|
offset = offset*2 + 4;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
offset = offset*2;
|
|
|
|
tmp = *(__u32 *)((addr_t) &child->thread.per_info + offset);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
tmp = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2008-07-14 01:58:54 -06:00
|
|
|
return tmp;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int peek_user_compat(struct task_struct *child,
|
|
|
|
addr_t addr, addr_t data)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
__u32 tmp;
|
|
|
|
|
2009-06-12 02:26:25 -06:00
|
|
|
if (!is_compat_task() || (addr & 3) || addr > sizeof(struct user) - 3)
|
2008-07-14 01:58:54 -06:00
|
|
|
return -EIO;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tmp = __peek_user_compat(child, addr);
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
return put_user(tmp, (__u32 __user *) data);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Same as poke_user but for a 31 bit program.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2008-07-14 01:58:54 -06:00
|
|
|
static int __poke_user_compat(struct task_struct *child,
|
|
|
|
addr_t addr, addr_t data)
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct user32 *dummy32 = NULL;
|
|
|
|
per_struct32 *dummy_per32 = NULL;
|
2008-07-14 01:58:54 -06:00
|
|
|
__u32 tmp = (__u32) data;
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
addr_t offset;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (addr < (addr_t) &dummy32->regs.acrs) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* psw, gprs, acrs and orig_gpr2 are stored on the stack
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (addr == (addr_t) &dummy32->regs.psw.mask) {
|
|
|
|
/* Build a 64 bit psw mask from 31 bit mask. */
|
2007-02-05 13:18:17 -07:00
|
|
|
if (tmp != PSW32_MASK_MERGE(psw32_user_bits, tmp))
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
/* Invalid psw mask. */
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2006-01-12 02:05:49 -07:00
|
|
|
task_pt_regs(child)->psw.mask =
|
2007-02-05 13:18:17 -07:00
|
|
|
PSW_MASK_MERGE(psw_user32_bits, (__u64) tmp << 32);
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
} else if (addr == (addr_t) &dummy32->regs.psw.addr) {
|
|
|
|
/* Build a 64 bit psw address from 31 bit address. */
|
2006-01-12 02:05:49 -07:00
|
|
|
task_pt_regs(child)->psw.addr =
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
(__u64) tmp & PSW32_ADDR_INSN;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/* gpr 0-15 */
|
2006-01-12 02:05:49 -07:00
|
|
|
*(__u32*)((addr_t) &task_pt_regs(child)->psw
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
+ addr*2 + 4) = tmp;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else if (addr < (addr_t) (&dummy32->regs.orig_gpr2)) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* access registers are stored in the thread structure
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
offset = addr - (addr_t) &dummy32->regs.acrs;
|
|
|
|
*(__u32*)((addr_t) &child->thread.acrs + offset) = tmp;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} else if (addr == (addr_t) (&dummy32->regs.orig_gpr2)) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* orig_gpr2 is stored on the kernel stack
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2006-01-12 02:05:49 -07:00
|
|
|
*(__u32*)((addr_t) &task_pt_regs(child)->orig_gpr2 + 4) = tmp;
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
|
[S390] CVE-2008-1514: prevent ptrace padding area read/write in 31-bit mode
When running a 31-bit ptrace, on either an s390 or s390x kernel,
reads and writes into a padding area in struct user_regs_struct32
will result in a kernel panic.
This is also known as CVE-2008-1514.
Test case available here:
http://sources.redhat.com/cgi-bin/cvsweb.cgi/~checkout~/tests/ptrace-tests/tests/user-area-padding.c?cvsroot=systemtap
Steps to reproduce:
1) wget the above
2) gcc -o user-area-padding-31bit user-area-padding.c -Wall -ggdb2 -D_GNU_SOURCE -m31
3) ./user-area-padding-31bit
<panic>
Test status
-----------
Without patch, both s390 and s390x kernels panic. With patch, the test case,
as well as the gdb testsuite, pass without incident, padding area reads
returning zero, writes ignored.
Nb: original version returned -EINVAL on write attempts, which broke the
gdb test and made the test case slightly unhappy, Jan Kratochvil suggested
the change to return 0 on write attempts.
Signed-off-by: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jan Kratochvil <jan.kratochvil@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
2008-09-09 04:38:56 -06:00
|
|
|
} else if (addr < (addr_t) &dummy32->regs.fp_regs) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* prevent writess of padding hole between
|
|
|
|
* orig_gpr2 and fp_regs on s390.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
} else if (addr < (addr_t) (&dummy32->regs.fp_regs + 1)) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* floating point regs. are stored in the thread structure
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (addr == (addr_t) &dummy32->regs.fp_regs.fpc &&
|
|
|
|
(tmp & ~FPC_VALID_MASK) != 0)
|
|
|
|
/* Invalid floating point control. */
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
offset = addr - (addr_t) &dummy32->regs.fp_regs;
|
|
|
|
*(__u32 *)((addr_t) &child->thread.fp_regs + offset) = tmp;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} else if (addr < (addr_t) (&dummy32->regs.per_info + 1)) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* per_info is found in the thread structure.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
offset = addr - (addr_t) &dummy32->regs.per_info;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* This is magic. See per_struct and per_struct32.
|
|
|
|
* By incident the offsets in per_struct are exactly
|
|
|
|
* twice the offsets in per_struct32 for all fields.
|
|
|
|
* The 8 byte fields need special handling though,
|
|
|
|
* because the second half (bytes 4-7) is needed and
|
|
|
|
* not the first half.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if ((offset >= (addr_t) &dummy_per32->control_regs &&
|
|
|
|
offset < (addr_t) (&dummy_per32->control_regs + 1)) ||
|
|
|
|
(offset >= (addr_t) &dummy_per32->starting_addr &&
|
|
|
|
offset <= (addr_t) &dummy_per32->ending_addr) ||
|
|
|
|
offset == (addr_t) &dummy_per32->lowcore.words.address)
|
|
|
|
offset = offset*2 + 4;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
offset = offset*2;
|
|
|
|
*(__u32 *)((addr_t) &child->thread.per_info + offset) = tmp;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
FixPerRegisters(child);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-07-14 01:58:54 -06:00
|
|
|
static int poke_user_compat(struct task_struct *child,
|
|
|
|
addr_t addr, addr_t data)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2009-06-12 02:26:25 -06:00
|
|
|
if (!is_compat_task() || (addr & 3) || addr > sizeof(struct user32) - 3)
|
2008-07-14 01:58:54 -06:00
|
|
|
return -EIO;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return __poke_user_compat(child, addr, data);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-05-07 01:22:57 -06:00
|
|
|
long compat_arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *child, compat_long_t request,
|
|
|
|
compat_ulong_t caddr, compat_ulong_t cdata)
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
{
|
2008-05-07 01:22:57 -06:00
|
|
|
unsigned long addr = caddr;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long data = cdata;
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
ptrace_area_emu31 parea;
|
|
|
|
int copied, ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (request) {
|
|
|
|
case PTRACE_PEEKUSR:
|
|
|
|
/* read the word at location addr in the USER area. */
|
2008-07-14 01:58:54 -06:00
|
|
|
return peek_user_compat(child, addr, data);
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case PTRACE_POKEUSR:
|
|
|
|
/* write the word at location addr in the USER area */
|
2008-07-14 01:58:54 -06:00
|
|
|
return poke_user_compat(child, addr, data);
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case PTRACE_PEEKUSR_AREA:
|
|
|
|
case PTRACE_POKEUSR_AREA:
|
2007-02-05 13:16:47 -07:00
|
|
|
if (copy_from_user(&parea, (void __force __user *) addr,
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
sizeof(parea)))
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
addr = parea.kernel_addr;
|
|
|
|
data = parea.process_addr;
|
|
|
|
copied = 0;
|
|
|
|
while (copied < parea.len) {
|
|
|
|
if (request == PTRACE_PEEKUSR_AREA)
|
2008-07-14 01:58:54 -06:00
|
|
|
ret = peek_user_compat(child, addr, data);
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
else {
|
2007-02-05 13:16:47 -07:00
|
|
|
__u32 utmp;
|
|
|
|
if (get_user(utmp,
|
|
|
|
(__u32 __force __user *) data))
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
2008-07-14 01:58:54 -06:00
|
|
|
ret = poke_user_compat(child, addr, utmp);
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
addr += sizeof(unsigned int);
|
|
|
|
data += sizeof(unsigned int);
|
|
|
|
copied += sizeof(unsigned int);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2008-05-07 01:22:57 -06:00
|
|
|
return compat_ptrace_request(child, request, addr, data);
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2008-10-10 13:33:20 -06:00
|
|
|
asmlinkage long do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
{
|
2008-10-10 13:33:20 -06:00
|
|
|
long ret;
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
|
2009-06-12 02:26:26 -06:00
|
|
|
/* Do the secure computing check first. */
|
|
|
|
secure_computing(regs->gprs[2]);
|
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] s390: uml ptrace fixes
To make UML build and run on s390, I needed to do these two little
changes:
1) UML includes some of the subarch's (s390) headers. I had to
change one of them with the following one-liner, to make this
compile. AFAICS, this change doesn't break compilation of s390
itself.
2) UML needs to intercept syscalls via ptrace to invalidate the syscall,
read syscall's parameters and write the result with the result of
UML's syscall processing. Also, UML needs to make sure, that the host
does no syscall restart processing. On i386 for example, this can be
done by writing -1 to orig_eax on the 2nd syscall interception
(orig_eax is the syscall number, which after the interception is used
as a "interrupt was a syscall" flag only.
Unfortunately, s390 holds syscall number and syscall result in gpr2 and
its "interrupt was a syscall" flag (trap) is unreachable via ptrace.
So I changed the host to set trap to -1, if the syscall number is changed
to an invalid value on the first syscall interception.
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-04 16:43:32 -06:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2008-10-10 13:33:20 -06:00
|
|
|
* The sysc_tracesys code in entry.S stored the system
|
|
|
|
* call number to gprs[2].
|
[PATCH] s390: uml ptrace fixes
To make UML build and run on s390, I needed to do these two little
changes:
1) UML includes some of the subarch's (s390) headers. I had to
change one of them with the following one-liner, to make this
compile. AFAICS, this change doesn't break compilation of s390
itself.
2) UML needs to intercept syscalls via ptrace to invalidate the syscall,
read syscall's parameters and write the result with the result of
UML's syscall processing. Also, UML needs to make sure, that the host
does no syscall restart processing. On i386 for example, this can be
done by writing -1 to orig_eax on the 2nd syscall interception
(orig_eax is the syscall number, which after the interception is used
as a "interrupt was a syscall" flag only.
Unfortunately, s390 holds syscall number and syscall result in gpr2 and
its "interrupt was a syscall" flag (trap) is unreachable via ptrace.
So I changed the host to set trap to -1, if the syscall number is changed
to an invalid value on the first syscall interception.
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-04 16:43:32 -06:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2008-10-10 13:33:20 -06:00
|
|
|
ret = regs->gprs[2];
|
|
|
|
if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) &&
|
|
|
|
(tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs) ||
|
|
|
|
regs->gprs[2] >= NR_syscalls)) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Tracing decided this syscall should not happen or the
|
|
|
|
* debugger stored an invalid system call number. Skip
|
|
|
|
* the system call and the system call restart handling.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2008-11-27 03:05:55 -07:00
|
|
|
regs->svcnr = 0;
|
2008-10-10 13:33:20 -06:00
|
|
|
ret = -1;
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
}
|
2008-10-10 13:33:20 -06:00
|
|
|
|
2009-06-12 02:26:47 -06:00
|
|
|
if (unlikely(test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_FTRACE)))
|
|
|
|
ftrace_syscall_enter(regs);
|
|
|
|
|
2008-10-10 13:33:20 -06:00
|
|
|
if (unlikely(current->audit_context))
|
2009-06-12 02:26:25 -06:00
|
|
|
audit_syscall_entry(is_compat_task() ?
|
2008-10-10 13:33:20 -06:00
|
|
|
AUDIT_ARCH_S390 : AUDIT_ARCH_S390X,
|
|
|
|
regs->gprs[2], regs->orig_gpr2,
|
|
|
|
regs->gprs[3], regs->gprs[4],
|
|
|
|
regs->gprs[5]);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
asmlinkage void do_syscall_trace_exit(struct pt_regs *regs)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(current->audit_context))
|
|
|
|
audit_syscall_exit(AUDITSC_RESULT(regs->gprs[2]),
|
|
|
|
regs->gprs[2]);
|
|
|
|
|
2009-06-12 02:26:47 -06:00
|
|
|
if (unlikely(test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_FTRACE)))
|
|
|
|
ftrace_syscall_exit(regs);
|
|
|
|
|
2008-10-10 13:33:20 -06:00
|
|
|
if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE))
|
|
|
|
tracehook_report_syscall_exit(regs, 0);
|
2005-04-16 16:20:36 -06:00
|
|
|
}
|
2008-07-14 01:58:54 -06:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* user_regset definitions.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int s390_regs_get(struct task_struct *target,
|
|
|
|
const struct user_regset *regset,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int pos, unsigned int count,
|
|
|
|
void *kbuf, void __user *ubuf)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (target == current)
|
|
|
|
save_access_regs(target->thread.acrs);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (kbuf) {
|
|
|
|
unsigned long *k = kbuf;
|
|
|
|
while (count > 0) {
|
|
|
|
*k++ = __peek_user(target, pos);
|
|
|
|
count -= sizeof(*k);
|
|
|
|
pos += sizeof(*k);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
unsigned long __user *u = ubuf;
|
|
|
|
while (count > 0) {
|
|
|
|
if (__put_user(__peek_user(target, pos), u++))
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
count -= sizeof(*u);
|
|
|
|
pos += sizeof(*u);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int s390_regs_set(struct task_struct *target,
|
|
|
|
const struct user_regset *regset,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int pos, unsigned int count,
|
|
|
|
const void *kbuf, const void __user *ubuf)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int rc = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (target == current)
|
|
|
|
save_access_regs(target->thread.acrs);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (kbuf) {
|
|
|
|
const unsigned long *k = kbuf;
|
|
|
|
while (count > 0 && !rc) {
|
|
|
|
rc = __poke_user(target, pos, *k++);
|
|
|
|
count -= sizeof(*k);
|
|
|
|
pos += sizeof(*k);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
const unsigned long __user *u = ubuf;
|
|
|
|
while (count > 0 && !rc) {
|
|
|
|
unsigned long word;
|
|
|
|
rc = __get_user(word, u++);
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
rc = __poke_user(target, pos, word);
|
|
|
|
count -= sizeof(*u);
|
|
|
|
pos += sizeof(*u);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (rc == 0 && target == current)
|
|
|
|
restore_access_regs(target->thread.acrs);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int s390_fpregs_get(struct task_struct *target,
|
|
|
|
const struct user_regset *regset, unsigned int pos,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int count, void *kbuf, void __user *ubuf)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (target == current)
|
|
|
|
save_fp_regs(&target->thread.fp_regs);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return user_regset_copyout(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf,
|
|
|
|
&target->thread.fp_regs, 0, -1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int s390_fpregs_set(struct task_struct *target,
|
|
|
|
const struct user_regset *regset, unsigned int pos,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int count, const void *kbuf,
|
|
|
|
const void __user *ubuf)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int rc = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (target == current)
|
|
|
|
save_fp_regs(&target->thread.fp_regs);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If setting FPC, must validate it first. */
|
|
|
|
if (count > 0 && pos < offsetof(s390_fp_regs, fprs)) {
|
|
|
|
u32 fpc[2] = { target->thread.fp_regs.fpc, 0 };
|
|
|
|
rc = user_regset_copyin(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf, &fpc,
|
|
|
|
0, offsetof(s390_fp_regs, fprs));
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
if ((fpc[0] & ~FPC_VALID_MASK) != 0 || fpc[1] != 0)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
target->thread.fp_regs.fpc = fpc[0];
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (rc == 0 && count > 0)
|
|
|
|
rc = user_regset_copyin(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf,
|
|
|
|
target->thread.fp_regs.fprs,
|
|
|
|
offsetof(s390_fp_regs, fprs), -1);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (rc == 0 && target == current)
|
|
|
|
restore_fp_regs(&target->thread.fp_regs);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static const struct user_regset s390_regsets[] = {
|
|
|
|
[REGSET_GENERAL] = {
|
|
|
|
.core_note_type = NT_PRSTATUS,
|
|
|
|
.n = sizeof(s390_regs) / sizeof(long),
|
|
|
|
.size = sizeof(long),
|
|
|
|
.align = sizeof(long),
|
|
|
|
.get = s390_regs_get,
|
|
|
|
.set = s390_regs_set,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
[REGSET_FP] = {
|
|
|
|
.core_note_type = NT_PRFPREG,
|
|
|
|
.n = sizeof(s390_fp_regs) / sizeof(long),
|
|
|
|
.size = sizeof(long),
|
|
|
|
.align = sizeof(long),
|
|
|
|
.get = s390_fpregs_get,
|
|
|
|
.set = s390_fpregs_set,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static const struct user_regset_view user_s390_view = {
|
|
|
|
.name = UTS_MACHINE,
|
|
|
|
.e_machine = EM_S390,
|
|
|
|
.regsets = s390_regsets,
|
|
|
|
.n = ARRAY_SIZE(s390_regsets)
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
|
|
|
|
static int s390_compat_regs_get(struct task_struct *target,
|
|
|
|
const struct user_regset *regset,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int pos, unsigned int count,
|
|
|
|
void *kbuf, void __user *ubuf)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (target == current)
|
|
|
|
save_access_regs(target->thread.acrs);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (kbuf) {
|
|
|
|
compat_ulong_t *k = kbuf;
|
|
|
|
while (count > 0) {
|
|
|
|
*k++ = __peek_user_compat(target, pos);
|
|
|
|
count -= sizeof(*k);
|
|
|
|
pos += sizeof(*k);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
compat_ulong_t __user *u = ubuf;
|
|
|
|
while (count > 0) {
|
|
|
|
if (__put_user(__peek_user_compat(target, pos), u++))
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
count -= sizeof(*u);
|
|
|
|
pos += sizeof(*u);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int s390_compat_regs_set(struct task_struct *target,
|
|
|
|
const struct user_regset *regset,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int pos, unsigned int count,
|
|
|
|
const void *kbuf, const void __user *ubuf)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int rc = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (target == current)
|
|
|
|
save_access_regs(target->thread.acrs);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (kbuf) {
|
|
|
|
const compat_ulong_t *k = kbuf;
|
|
|
|
while (count > 0 && !rc) {
|
|
|
|
rc = __poke_user_compat(target, pos, *k++);
|
|
|
|
count -= sizeof(*k);
|
|
|
|
pos += sizeof(*k);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
const compat_ulong_t __user *u = ubuf;
|
|
|
|
while (count > 0 && !rc) {
|
|
|
|
compat_ulong_t word;
|
|
|
|
rc = __get_user(word, u++);
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
rc = __poke_user_compat(target, pos, word);
|
|
|
|
count -= sizeof(*u);
|
|
|
|
pos += sizeof(*u);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (rc == 0 && target == current)
|
|
|
|
restore_access_regs(target->thread.acrs);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static const struct user_regset s390_compat_regsets[] = {
|
|
|
|
[REGSET_GENERAL] = {
|
|
|
|
.core_note_type = NT_PRSTATUS,
|
|
|
|
.n = sizeof(s390_compat_regs) / sizeof(compat_long_t),
|
|
|
|
.size = sizeof(compat_long_t),
|
|
|
|
.align = sizeof(compat_long_t),
|
|
|
|
.get = s390_compat_regs_get,
|
|
|
|
.set = s390_compat_regs_set,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
[REGSET_FP] = {
|
|
|
|
.core_note_type = NT_PRFPREG,
|
|
|
|
.n = sizeof(s390_fp_regs) / sizeof(compat_long_t),
|
|
|
|
.size = sizeof(compat_long_t),
|
|
|
|
.align = sizeof(compat_long_t),
|
|
|
|
.get = s390_fpregs_get,
|
|
|
|
.set = s390_fpregs_set,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static const struct user_regset_view user_s390_compat_view = {
|
|
|
|
.name = "s390",
|
|
|
|
.e_machine = EM_S390,
|
|
|
|
.regsets = s390_compat_regsets,
|
|
|
|
.n = ARRAY_SIZE(s390_compat_regsets)
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
const struct user_regset_view *task_user_regset_view(struct task_struct *task)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
|
|
|
|
if (test_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_31BIT))
|
|
|
|
return &user_s390_compat_view;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
return &user_s390_view;
|
|
|
|
}
|