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License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 08:07:57 -06:00
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
/*
* connection tracking event cache.
*/
#ifndef _NF_CONNTRACK_ECACHE_H
#define _NF_CONNTRACK_ECACHE_H
#include <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack.h>
#include <net/net_namespace.h>
#include <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.h>
#include <linux/netfilter/nf_conntrack_common.h>
#include <linux/netfilter/nf_conntrack_tuple_common.h>
#include <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_extend.h>
netfilter: don't rely on DYING bit to detect when destroy event was sent The reliable event delivery mode currently (ab)uses the DYING bit to detect which entries on the dying list have to be skipped when re-delivering events from the eache worker in reliable event mode. Currently when we delete the conntrack from main table we only set this bit if we could also deliver the netlink destroy event to userspace. If we fail we move it to the dying list, the ecache worker will reattempt event delivery for all confirmed conntracks on the dying list that do not have the DYING bit set. Once timer is gone, we can no longer use if (del_timer()) to detect when we 'stole' the reference count owned by the timer/hash entry, so we need some other way to avoid racing with other cpu. Pablo suggested to add a marker in the ecache extension that skips entries that have been unhashed from main table but are still waiting for the last reference count to be dropped (e.g. because one skb waiting on nfqueue verdict still holds a reference). We do this by adding a tristate. If we fail to deliver the destroy event, make a note of this in the eache extension. The worker can then skip all entries that are in a different state. Either they never delivered a destroy event, e.g. because the netlink backend was not loaded, or redelivery took place already. Once the conntrack timer is removed we will now be able to replace del_timer() test with test_and_set_bit(DYING, &ct->status) to avoid racing with other cpu that tries to evict the same conntrack. Because DYING will then be set right before we report the destroy event we can no longer skip event reporting when dying bit is set. Suggested-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2016-08-25 07:33:30 -06:00
enum nf_ct_ecache_state {
NFCT_ECACHE_UNKNOWN, /* destroy event not sent */
NFCT_ECACHE_DESTROY_FAIL, /* tried but failed to send destroy event */
NFCT_ECACHE_DESTROY_SENT, /* sent destroy event after failure */
};
struct nf_conntrack_ecache {
netfilter: don't rely on DYING bit to detect when destroy event was sent The reliable event delivery mode currently (ab)uses the DYING bit to detect which entries on the dying list have to be skipped when re-delivering events from the eache worker in reliable event mode. Currently when we delete the conntrack from main table we only set this bit if we could also deliver the netlink destroy event to userspace. If we fail we move it to the dying list, the ecache worker will reattempt event delivery for all confirmed conntracks on the dying list that do not have the DYING bit set. Once timer is gone, we can no longer use if (del_timer()) to detect when we 'stole' the reference count owned by the timer/hash entry, so we need some other way to avoid racing with other cpu. Pablo suggested to add a marker in the ecache extension that skips entries that have been unhashed from main table but are still waiting for the last reference count to be dropped (e.g. because one skb waiting on nfqueue verdict still holds a reference). We do this by adding a tristate. If we fail to deliver the destroy event, make a note of this in the eache extension. The worker can then skip all entries that are in a different state. Either they never delivered a destroy event, e.g. because the netlink backend was not loaded, or redelivery took place already. Once the conntrack timer is removed we will now be able to replace del_timer() test with test_and_set_bit(DYING, &ct->status) to avoid racing with other cpu that tries to evict the same conntrack. Because DYING will then be set right before we report the destroy event we can no longer skip event reporting when dying bit is set. Suggested-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2016-08-25 07:33:30 -06:00
unsigned long cache; /* bitops want long */
u16 missed; /* missed events */
netfilter: don't rely on DYING bit to detect when destroy event was sent The reliable event delivery mode currently (ab)uses the DYING bit to detect which entries on the dying list have to be skipped when re-delivering events from the eache worker in reliable event mode. Currently when we delete the conntrack from main table we only set this bit if we could also deliver the netlink destroy event to userspace. If we fail we move it to the dying list, the ecache worker will reattempt event delivery for all confirmed conntracks on the dying list that do not have the DYING bit set. Once timer is gone, we can no longer use if (del_timer()) to detect when we 'stole' the reference count owned by the timer/hash entry, so we need some other way to avoid racing with other cpu. Pablo suggested to add a marker in the ecache extension that skips entries that have been unhashed from main table but are still waiting for the last reference count to be dropped (e.g. because one skb waiting on nfqueue verdict still holds a reference). We do this by adding a tristate. If we fail to deliver the destroy event, make a note of this in the eache extension. The worker can then skip all entries that are in a different state. Either they never delivered a destroy event, e.g. because the netlink backend was not loaded, or redelivery took place already. Once the conntrack timer is removed we will now be able to replace del_timer() test with test_and_set_bit(DYING, &ct->status) to avoid racing with other cpu that tries to evict the same conntrack. Because DYING will then be set right before we report the destroy event we can no longer skip event reporting when dying bit is set. Suggested-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2016-08-25 07:33:30 -06:00
u16 ctmask; /* bitmask of ct events to be delivered */
u16 expmask; /* bitmask of expect events to be delivered */
enum nf_ct_ecache_state state:8;/* ecache state */
netfilter: don't rely on DYING bit to detect when destroy event was sent The reliable event delivery mode currently (ab)uses the DYING bit to detect which entries on the dying list have to be skipped when re-delivering events from the eache worker in reliable event mode. Currently when we delete the conntrack from main table we only set this bit if we could also deliver the netlink destroy event to userspace. If we fail we move it to the dying list, the ecache worker will reattempt event delivery for all confirmed conntracks on the dying list that do not have the DYING bit set. Once timer is gone, we can no longer use if (del_timer()) to detect when we 'stole' the reference count owned by the timer/hash entry, so we need some other way to avoid racing with other cpu. Pablo suggested to add a marker in the ecache extension that skips entries that have been unhashed from main table but are still waiting for the last reference count to be dropped (e.g. because one skb waiting on nfqueue verdict still holds a reference). We do this by adding a tristate. If we fail to deliver the destroy event, make a note of this in the eache extension. The worker can then skip all entries that are in a different state. Either they never delivered a destroy event, e.g. because the netlink backend was not loaded, or redelivery took place already. Once the conntrack timer is removed we will now be able to replace del_timer() test with test_and_set_bit(DYING, &ct->status) to avoid racing with other cpu that tries to evict the same conntrack. Because DYING will then be set right before we report the destroy event we can no longer skip event reporting when dying bit is set. Suggested-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2016-08-25 07:33:30 -06:00
u32 portid; /* netlink portid of destroyer */
};
static inline struct nf_conntrack_ecache *
nf_ct_ecache_find(const struct nf_conn *ct)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_EVENTS
return nf_ct_ext_find(ct, NF_CT_EXT_ECACHE);
#else
return NULL;
#endif
}
static inline struct nf_conntrack_ecache *
nf_ct_ecache_ext_add(struct nf_conn *ct, u16 ctmask, u16 expmask, gfp_t gfp)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_EVENTS
struct net *net = nf_ct_net(ct);
struct nf_conntrack_ecache *e;
if (!ctmask && !expmask && net->ct.sysctl_events) {
ctmask = ~0;
expmask = ~0;
}
if (!ctmask && !expmask)
return NULL;
e = nf_ct_ext_add(ct, NF_CT_EXT_ECACHE, gfp);
if (e) {
e->ctmask = ctmask;
e->expmask = expmask;
}
return e;
#else
return NULL;
#endif
};
#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_EVENTS
/* This structure is passed to event handler */
struct nf_ct_event {
struct nf_conn *ct;
u32 portid;
int report;
};
struct nf_ct_event_notifier {
int (*fcn)(unsigned int events, struct nf_ct_event *item);
};
int nf_conntrack_register_notifier(struct net *net,
struct nf_ct_event_notifier *nb);
void nf_conntrack_unregister_notifier(struct net *net,
struct nf_ct_event_notifier *nb);
void nf_ct_deliver_cached_events(struct nf_conn *ct);
int nf_conntrack_eventmask_report(unsigned int eventmask, struct nf_conn *ct,
u32 portid, int report);
static inline void
nf_conntrack_event_cache(enum ip_conntrack_events event, struct nf_conn *ct)
{
struct net *net = nf_ct_net(ct);
struct nf_conntrack_ecache *e;
if (!rcu_access_pointer(net->ct.nf_conntrack_event_cb))
return;
e = nf_ct_ecache_find(ct);
if (e == NULL)
return;
set_bit(event, &e->cache);
}
netfilter: conntrack: optional reliable conntrack event delivery This patch improves ctnetlink event reliability if one broadcast listener has set the NETLINK_BROADCAST_ERROR socket option. The logic is the following: if an event delivery fails, we keep the undelivered events in the missed event cache. Once the next packet arrives, we add the new events (if any) to the missed events in the cache and we try a new delivery, and so on. Thus, if ctnetlink fails to deliver an event, we try to deliver them once we see a new packet. Therefore, we may lose state transitions but the userspace process gets in sync at some point. At worst case, if no events were delivered to userspace, we make sure that destroy events are successfully delivered. Basically, if ctnetlink fails to deliver the destroy event, we remove the conntrack entry from the hashes and we insert them in the dying list, which contains inactive entries. Then, the conntrack timer is added with an extra grace timeout of random32() % 15 seconds to trigger the event again (this grace timeout is tunable via /proc). The use of a limited random timeout value allows distributing the "destroy" resends, thus, avoiding accumulating lots "destroy" events at the same time. Event delivery may re-order but we can identify them by means of the tuple plus the conntrack ID. The maximum number of conntrack entries (active or inactive) is still handled by nf_conntrack_max. Thus, we may start dropping packets at some point if we accumulate a lot of inactive conntrack entries that did not successfully report the destroy event to userspace. During my stress tests consisting of setting a very small buffer of 2048 bytes for conntrackd and the NETLINK_BROADCAST_ERROR socket flag, and generating lots of very small connections, I noticed very few destroy entries on the fly waiting to be resend. A simple way to test this patch consist of creating a lot of entries, set a very small Netlink buffer in conntrackd (+ a patch which is not in the git tree to set the BROADCAST_ERROR flag) and invoke `conntrack -F'. For expectations, no changes are introduced in this patch. Currently, event delivery is only done for new expectations (no events from expectation expiration, removal and confirmation). In that case, they need a per-expectation event cache to implement the same idea that is exposed in this patch. This patch can be useful to provide reliable flow-accouting. We still have to add a new conntrack extension to store the creation and destroy time. Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
2009-06-13 04:30:52 -06:00
static inline int
nf_conntrack_event_report(enum ip_conntrack_events event, struct nf_conn *ct,
u32 portid, int report)
{
const struct net *net = nf_ct_net(ct);
if (!rcu_access_pointer(net->ct.nf_conntrack_event_cb))
return 0;
return nf_conntrack_eventmask_report(1 << event, ct, portid, report);
}
netfilter: conntrack: optional reliable conntrack event delivery This patch improves ctnetlink event reliability if one broadcast listener has set the NETLINK_BROADCAST_ERROR socket option. The logic is the following: if an event delivery fails, we keep the undelivered events in the missed event cache. Once the next packet arrives, we add the new events (if any) to the missed events in the cache and we try a new delivery, and so on. Thus, if ctnetlink fails to deliver an event, we try to deliver them once we see a new packet. Therefore, we may lose state transitions but the userspace process gets in sync at some point. At worst case, if no events were delivered to userspace, we make sure that destroy events are successfully delivered. Basically, if ctnetlink fails to deliver the destroy event, we remove the conntrack entry from the hashes and we insert them in the dying list, which contains inactive entries. Then, the conntrack timer is added with an extra grace timeout of random32() % 15 seconds to trigger the event again (this grace timeout is tunable via /proc). The use of a limited random timeout value allows distributing the "destroy" resends, thus, avoiding accumulating lots "destroy" events at the same time. Event delivery may re-order but we can identify them by means of the tuple plus the conntrack ID. The maximum number of conntrack entries (active or inactive) is still handled by nf_conntrack_max. Thus, we may start dropping packets at some point if we accumulate a lot of inactive conntrack entries that did not successfully report the destroy event to userspace. During my stress tests consisting of setting a very small buffer of 2048 bytes for conntrackd and the NETLINK_BROADCAST_ERROR socket flag, and generating lots of very small connections, I noticed very few destroy entries on the fly waiting to be resend. A simple way to test this patch consist of creating a lot of entries, set a very small Netlink buffer in conntrackd (+ a patch which is not in the git tree to set the BROADCAST_ERROR flag) and invoke `conntrack -F'. For expectations, no changes are introduced in this patch. Currently, event delivery is only done for new expectations (no events from expectation expiration, removal and confirmation). In that case, they need a per-expectation event cache to implement the same idea that is exposed in this patch. This patch can be useful to provide reliable flow-accouting. We still have to add a new conntrack extension to store the creation and destroy time. Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
2009-06-13 04:30:52 -06:00
static inline int
nf_conntrack_event(enum ip_conntrack_events event, struct nf_conn *ct)
{
const struct net *net = nf_ct_net(ct);
if (!rcu_access_pointer(net->ct.nf_conntrack_event_cb))
return 0;
netfilter: conntrack: optional reliable conntrack event delivery This patch improves ctnetlink event reliability if one broadcast listener has set the NETLINK_BROADCAST_ERROR socket option. The logic is the following: if an event delivery fails, we keep the undelivered events in the missed event cache. Once the next packet arrives, we add the new events (if any) to the missed events in the cache and we try a new delivery, and so on. Thus, if ctnetlink fails to deliver an event, we try to deliver them once we see a new packet. Therefore, we may lose state transitions but the userspace process gets in sync at some point. At worst case, if no events were delivered to userspace, we make sure that destroy events are successfully delivered. Basically, if ctnetlink fails to deliver the destroy event, we remove the conntrack entry from the hashes and we insert them in the dying list, which contains inactive entries. Then, the conntrack timer is added with an extra grace timeout of random32() % 15 seconds to trigger the event again (this grace timeout is tunable via /proc). The use of a limited random timeout value allows distributing the "destroy" resends, thus, avoiding accumulating lots "destroy" events at the same time. Event delivery may re-order but we can identify them by means of the tuple plus the conntrack ID. The maximum number of conntrack entries (active or inactive) is still handled by nf_conntrack_max. Thus, we may start dropping packets at some point if we accumulate a lot of inactive conntrack entries that did not successfully report the destroy event to userspace. During my stress tests consisting of setting a very small buffer of 2048 bytes for conntrackd and the NETLINK_BROADCAST_ERROR socket flag, and generating lots of very small connections, I noticed very few destroy entries on the fly waiting to be resend. A simple way to test this patch consist of creating a lot of entries, set a very small Netlink buffer in conntrackd (+ a patch which is not in the git tree to set the BROADCAST_ERROR flag) and invoke `conntrack -F'. For expectations, no changes are introduced in this patch. Currently, event delivery is only done for new expectations (no events from expectation expiration, removal and confirmation). In that case, they need a per-expectation event cache to implement the same idea that is exposed in this patch. This patch can be useful to provide reliable flow-accouting. We still have to add a new conntrack extension to store the creation and destroy time. Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
2009-06-13 04:30:52 -06:00
return nf_conntrack_eventmask_report(1 << event, ct, 0, 0);
}
struct nf_exp_event {
struct nf_conntrack_expect *exp;
u32 portid;
int report;
};
struct nf_exp_event_notifier {
int (*fcn)(unsigned int events, struct nf_exp_event *item);
};
int nf_ct_expect_register_notifier(struct net *net,
struct nf_exp_event_notifier *nb);
void nf_ct_expect_unregister_notifier(struct net *net,
struct nf_exp_event_notifier *nb);
void nf_ct_expect_event_report(enum ip_conntrack_expect_events event,
struct nf_conntrack_expect *exp,
u32 portid, int report);
int nf_conntrack_ecache_pernet_init(struct net *net);
void nf_conntrack_ecache_pernet_fini(struct net *net);
int nf_conntrack_ecache_init(void);
void nf_conntrack_ecache_fini(void);
static inline void nf_conntrack_ecache_delayed_work(struct net *net)
{
if (!delayed_work_pending(&net->ct.ecache_dwork)) {
schedule_delayed_work(&net->ct.ecache_dwork, HZ);
net->ct.ecache_dwork_pending = true;
}
}
static inline void nf_conntrack_ecache_work(struct net *net)
{
if (net->ct.ecache_dwork_pending) {
net->ct.ecache_dwork_pending = false;
mod_delayed_work(system_wq, &net->ct.ecache_dwork, 0);
}
}
#else /* CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_EVENTS */
static inline void nf_conntrack_event_cache(enum ip_conntrack_events event,
struct nf_conn *ct) {}
netfilter: conntrack: optional reliable conntrack event delivery This patch improves ctnetlink event reliability if one broadcast listener has set the NETLINK_BROADCAST_ERROR socket option. The logic is the following: if an event delivery fails, we keep the undelivered events in the missed event cache. Once the next packet arrives, we add the new events (if any) to the missed events in the cache and we try a new delivery, and so on. Thus, if ctnetlink fails to deliver an event, we try to deliver them once we see a new packet. Therefore, we may lose state transitions but the userspace process gets in sync at some point. At worst case, if no events were delivered to userspace, we make sure that destroy events are successfully delivered. Basically, if ctnetlink fails to deliver the destroy event, we remove the conntrack entry from the hashes and we insert them in the dying list, which contains inactive entries. Then, the conntrack timer is added with an extra grace timeout of random32() % 15 seconds to trigger the event again (this grace timeout is tunable via /proc). The use of a limited random timeout value allows distributing the "destroy" resends, thus, avoiding accumulating lots "destroy" events at the same time. Event delivery may re-order but we can identify them by means of the tuple plus the conntrack ID. The maximum number of conntrack entries (active or inactive) is still handled by nf_conntrack_max. Thus, we may start dropping packets at some point if we accumulate a lot of inactive conntrack entries that did not successfully report the destroy event to userspace. During my stress tests consisting of setting a very small buffer of 2048 bytes for conntrackd and the NETLINK_BROADCAST_ERROR socket flag, and generating lots of very small connections, I noticed very few destroy entries on the fly waiting to be resend. A simple way to test this patch consist of creating a lot of entries, set a very small Netlink buffer in conntrackd (+ a patch which is not in the git tree to set the BROADCAST_ERROR flag) and invoke `conntrack -F'. For expectations, no changes are introduced in this patch. Currently, event delivery is only done for new expectations (no events from expectation expiration, removal and confirmation). In that case, they need a per-expectation event cache to implement the same idea that is exposed in this patch. This patch can be useful to provide reliable flow-accouting. We still have to add a new conntrack extension to store the creation and destroy time. Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
2009-06-13 04:30:52 -06:00
static inline int nf_conntrack_eventmask_report(unsigned int eventmask,
struct nf_conn *ct,
u32 portid,
netfilter: conntrack: optional reliable conntrack event delivery This patch improves ctnetlink event reliability if one broadcast listener has set the NETLINK_BROADCAST_ERROR socket option. The logic is the following: if an event delivery fails, we keep the undelivered events in the missed event cache. Once the next packet arrives, we add the new events (if any) to the missed events in the cache and we try a new delivery, and so on. Thus, if ctnetlink fails to deliver an event, we try to deliver them once we see a new packet. Therefore, we may lose state transitions but the userspace process gets in sync at some point. At worst case, if no events were delivered to userspace, we make sure that destroy events are successfully delivered. Basically, if ctnetlink fails to deliver the destroy event, we remove the conntrack entry from the hashes and we insert them in the dying list, which contains inactive entries. Then, the conntrack timer is added with an extra grace timeout of random32() % 15 seconds to trigger the event again (this grace timeout is tunable via /proc). The use of a limited random timeout value allows distributing the "destroy" resends, thus, avoiding accumulating lots "destroy" events at the same time. Event delivery may re-order but we can identify them by means of the tuple plus the conntrack ID. The maximum number of conntrack entries (active or inactive) is still handled by nf_conntrack_max. Thus, we may start dropping packets at some point if we accumulate a lot of inactive conntrack entries that did not successfully report the destroy event to userspace. During my stress tests consisting of setting a very small buffer of 2048 bytes for conntrackd and the NETLINK_BROADCAST_ERROR socket flag, and generating lots of very small connections, I noticed very few destroy entries on the fly waiting to be resend. A simple way to test this patch consist of creating a lot of entries, set a very small Netlink buffer in conntrackd (+ a patch which is not in the git tree to set the BROADCAST_ERROR flag) and invoke `conntrack -F'. For expectations, no changes are introduced in this patch. Currently, event delivery is only done for new expectations (no events from expectation expiration, removal and confirmation). In that case, they need a per-expectation event cache to implement the same idea that is exposed in this patch. This patch can be useful to provide reliable flow-accouting. We still have to add a new conntrack extension to store the creation and destroy time. Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
2009-06-13 04:30:52 -06:00
int report) { return 0; }
static inline int nf_conntrack_event(enum ip_conntrack_events event,
struct nf_conn *ct) { return 0; }
static inline int nf_conntrack_event_report(enum ip_conntrack_events event,
struct nf_conn *ct,
u32 portid,
netfilter: conntrack: optional reliable conntrack event delivery This patch improves ctnetlink event reliability if one broadcast listener has set the NETLINK_BROADCAST_ERROR socket option. The logic is the following: if an event delivery fails, we keep the undelivered events in the missed event cache. Once the next packet arrives, we add the new events (if any) to the missed events in the cache and we try a new delivery, and so on. Thus, if ctnetlink fails to deliver an event, we try to deliver them once we see a new packet. Therefore, we may lose state transitions but the userspace process gets in sync at some point. At worst case, if no events were delivered to userspace, we make sure that destroy events are successfully delivered. Basically, if ctnetlink fails to deliver the destroy event, we remove the conntrack entry from the hashes and we insert them in the dying list, which contains inactive entries. Then, the conntrack timer is added with an extra grace timeout of random32() % 15 seconds to trigger the event again (this grace timeout is tunable via /proc). The use of a limited random timeout value allows distributing the "destroy" resends, thus, avoiding accumulating lots "destroy" events at the same time. Event delivery may re-order but we can identify them by means of the tuple plus the conntrack ID. The maximum number of conntrack entries (active or inactive) is still handled by nf_conntrack_max. Thus, we may start dropping packets at some point if we accumulate a lot of inactive conntrack entries that did not successfully report the destroy event to userspace. During my stress tests consisting of setting a very small buffer of 2048 bytes for conntrackd and the NETLINK_BROADCAST_ERROR socket flag, and generating lots of very small connections, I noticed very few destroy entries on the fly waiting to be resend. A simple way to test this patch consist of creating a lot of entries, set a very small Netlink buffer in conntrackd (+ a patch which is not in the git tree to set the BROADCAST_ERROR flag) and invoke `conntrack -F'. For expectations, no changes are introduced in this patch. Currently, event delivery is only done for new expectations (no events from expectation expiration, removal and confirmation). In that case, they need a per-expectation event cache to implement the same idea that is exposed in this patch. This patch can be useful to provide reliable flow-accouting. We still have to add a new conntrack extension to store the creation and destroy time. Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
2009-06-13 04:30:52 -06:00
int report) { return 0; }
static inline void nf_ct_deliver_cached_events(const struct nf_conn *ct) {}
static inline void nf_ct_expect_event_report(enum ip_conntrack_expect_events e,
struct nf_conntrack_expect *exp,
u32 portid,
int report) {}
static inline int nf_conntrack_ecache_pernet_init(struct net *net)
{
return 0;
}
static inline void nf_conntrack_ecache_pernet_fini(struct net *net)
{
}
static inline int nf_conntrack_ecache_init(void)
{
return 0;
}
static inline void nf_conntrack_ecache_fini(void)
{
}
static inline void nf_conntrack_ecache_delayed_work(struct net *net)
{
}
static inline void nf_conntrack_ecache_work(struct net *net)
{
}
#endif /* CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_EVENTS */
#endif /*_NF_CONNTRACK_ECACHE_H*/