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License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 08:07:57 -06:00
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
/* thread_info.h: PowerPC low-level thread information
* adapted from the i386 version by Paul Mackerras
*
* Copyright (C) 2002 David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
* - Incorporating suggestions made by Linus Torvalds and Dave Miller
*/
#ifndef _ASM_POWERPC_THREAD_INFO_H
#define _ASM_POWERPC_THREAD_INFO_H
#include <asm/asm-const.h>
#ifdef __KERNEL__
#define THREAD_SHIFT CONFIG_THREAD_SHIFT
#define THREAD_SIZE (1 << THREAD_SHIFT)
#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
#include <linux/cache.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
#include <asm/page.h>
#include <asm/accounting.h>
#define SLB_PRELOAD_NR 16U
/*
* low level task data.
*/
struct thread_info {
int preempt_count; /* 0 => preemptable,
<0 => BUG */
unsigned long local_flags; /* private flags for thread */
#ifdef CONFIG_LIVEPATCH
unsigned long *livepatch_sp;
#endif
#if defined(CONFIG_VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING_NATIVE) && defined(CONFIG_PPC32)
struct cpu_accounting_data accounting;
#endif
unsigned char slb_preload_nr;
unsigned char slb_preload_tail;
u32 slb_preload_esid[SLB_PRELOAD_NR];
/* low level flags - has atomic operations done on it */
unsigned long flags ____cacheline_aligned_in_smp;
};
/*
* macros/functions for gaining access to the thread information structure
*/
#define INIT_THREAD_INFO(tsk) \
{ \
.preempt_count = INIT_PREEMPT_COUNT, \
.flags = 0, \
}
#define THREAD_SIZE_ORDER (THREAD_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT)
/* how to get the thread information struct from C */
extern int arch_dup_task_struct(struct task_struct *dst, struct task_struct *src);
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64
void arch_setup_new_exec(void);
#define arch_setup_new_exec arch_setup_new_exec
#endif
#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
/*
* thread information flag bit numbers
*/
#define TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE 0 /* syscall trace active */
#define TIF_SIGPENDING 1 /* signal pending */
#define TIF_NEED_RESCHED 2 /* rescheduling necessary */
powerpc: Check address limit on user-mode return (TIF_FSCHECK) set_fs() sets the addr_limit, which is used in access_ok() to determine if an address is a user or kernel address. Some code paths use set_fs() to temporarily elevate the addr_limit so that kernel code can read/write kernel memory as if it were user memory. That is fine as long as the code can't ever return to userspace with the addr_limit still elevated. If that did happen, then userspace can read/write kernel memory as if it were user memory, eg. just with write(2). In case it's not clear, that is very bad. It has also happened in the past due to bugs. Commit 5ea0727b163c ("x86/syscalls: Check address limit on user-mode return") added a mechanism to check the addr_limit value before returning to userspace. Any call to set_fs() sets a thread flag, TIF_FSCHECK, and if we see that on the return to userspace we go out of line to check that the addr_limit value is not elevated. For further info see the above commit, as well as: https://lwn.net/Articles/722267/ https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=990 Verified to work on 64-bit Book3S using a POC that objdumps the system call handler, and a modified lkdtm_CORRUPT_USER_DS() that doesn't kill the caller. Before: $ sudo ./test-tif-fscheck ... 0000000000000000 <.data>: 0: e1 f7 8a 79 rldicl. r10,r12,30,63 4: 80 03 82 40 bne 0x384 8: 00 40 8a 71 andi. r10,r12,16384 c: 78 0b 2a 7c mr r10,r1 10: 10 fd 21 38 addi r1,r1,-752 14: 08 00 c2 41 beq- 0x1c 18: 58 09 2d e8 ld r1,2392(r13) 1c: 00 00 41 f9 std r10,0(r1) 20: 70 01 61 f9 std r11,368(r1) 24: 78 01 81 f9 std r12,376(r1) 28: 70 00 01 f8 std r0,112(r1) 2c: 78 00 41 f9 std r10,120(r1) 30: 20 00 82 41 beq 0x50 34: a6 42 4c 7d mftb r10 After: $ sudo ./test-tif-fscheck Killed And in dmesg: Invalid address limit on user-mode return WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 3689 at ../include/linux/syscalls.h:260 do_notify_resume+0x140/0x170 ... NIP [c00000000001ee50] do_notify_resume+0x140/0x170 LR [c00000000001ee4c] do_notify_resume+0x13c/0x170 Call Trace: do_notify_resume+0x13c/0x170 (unreliable) ret_from_except_lite+0x70/0x74 Performance overhead is essentially zero in the usual case, because the bit is checked as part of the existing _TIF_USER_WORK_MASK check. Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2018-05-14 07:03:16 -06:00
#define TIF_FSCHECK 3 /* Check FS is USER_DS on return */
#define TIF_SYSCALL_EMU 4 /* syscall emulation active */
powerpc: Don't corrupt transactional state when using FP/VMX in kernel Currently, when we have a process using the transactional memory facilities on POWER8 (that is, the processor is in transactional or suspended state), and the process enters the kernel and the kernel then uses the floating-point or vector (VMX/Altivec) facility, we end up corrupting the user-visible FP/VMX/VSX state. This happens, for example, if a page fault causes a copy-on-write operation, because the copy_page function will use VMX to do the copy on POWER8. The test program below demonstrates the bug. The bug happens because when FP/VMX state for a transactional process is stored in the thread_struct, we store the checkpointed state in .fp_state/.vr_state and the transactional (current) state in .transact_fp/.transact_vr. However, when the kernel wants to use FP/VMX, it calls enable_kernel_fp() or enable_kernel_altivec(), which saves the current state in .fp_state/.vr_state. Furthermore, when we return to the user process we return with FP/VMX/VSX disabled. The next time the process uses FP/VMX/VSX, we don't know which set of state (the current register values, .fp_state/.vr_state, or .transact_fp/.transact_vr) we should be using, since we have no way to tell if we are still in the same transaction, and if not, whether the previous transaction succeeded or failed. Thus it is necessary to strictly adhere to the rule that if FP has been enabled at any point in a transaction, we must keep FP enabled for the user process with the current transactional state in the FP registers, until we detect that it is no longer in a transaction. Similarly for VMX; once enabled it must stay enabled until the process is no longer transactional. In order to keep this rule, we add a new thread_info flag which we test when returning from the kernel to userspace, called TIF_RESTORE_TM. This flag indicates that there is FP/VMX/VSX state to be restored before entering userspace, and when it is set the .tm_orig_msr field in the thread_struct indicates what state needs to be restored. The restoration is done by restore_tm_state(). The TIF_RESTORE_TM bit is set by new giveup_fpu/altivec_maybe_transactional helpers, which are called from enable_kernel_fp/altivec, giveup_vsx, and flush_fp/altivec_to_thread instead of giveup_fpu/altivec. The other thing to be done is to get the transactional FP/VMX/VSX state from .fp_state/.vr_state when doing reclaim, if that state has been saved there by giveup_fpu/altivec_maybe_transactional. Having done this, we set the FP/VMX bit in the thread's MSR after reclaim to indicate that that part of the state is now valid (having been reclaimed from the processor's checkpointed state). Finally, in the signal handling code, we move the clearing of the transactional state bits in the thread's MSR a bit earlier, before calling flush_fp_to_thread(), so that we don't unnecessarily set the TIF_RESTORE_TM bit. This is the test program: /* Michael Neuling 4/12/2013 * * See if the altivec state is leaked out of an aborted transaction due to * kernel vmx copy loops. * * gcc -m64 htm_vmxcopy.c -o htm_vmxcopy * */ /* We don't use all of these, but for reference: */ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { long double vecin = 1.3; long double vecout; unsigned long pgsize = getpagesize(); int i; int fd; int size = pgsize*16; char tmpfile[] = "/tmp/page_faultXXXXXX"; char buf[pgsize]; char *a; uint64_t aborted = 0; fd = mkstemp(tmpfile); assert(fd >= 0); memset(buf, 0, pgsize); for (i = 0; i < size; i += pgsize) assert(write(fd, buf, pgsize) == pgsize); unlink(tmpfile); a = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0); assert(a != MAP_FAILED); asm __volatile__( "lxvd2x 40,0,%[vecinptr] ; " // set 40 to initial value TBEGIN "beq 3f ;" TSUSPEND "xxlxor 40,40,40 ; " // set 40 to 0 "std 5, 0(%[map]) ;" // cause kernel vmx copy page TABORT TRESUME TEND "li %[res], 0 ;" "b 5f ;" "3: ;" // Abort handler "li %[res], 1 ;" "5: ;" "stxvd2x 40,0,%[vecoutptr] ; " : [res]"=r"(aborted) : [vecinptr]"r"(&vecin), [vecoutptr]"r"(&vecout), [map]"r"(a) : "memory", "r0", "r3", "r4", "r5", "r6", "r7"); if (aborted && (vecin != vecout)){ printf("FAILED: vector state leaked on abort %f != %f\n", (double)vecin, (double)vecout); exit(1); } munmap(a, size); close(fd); printf("PASSED!\n"); return 0; } Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
2014-01-12 21:56:29 -07:00
#define TIF_RESTORE_TM 5 /* need to restore TM FP/VEC/VSX */
#define TIF_PATCH_PENDING 6 /* pending live patching update */
#define TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT 7 /* syscall auditing active */
#define TIF_SINGLESTEP 8 /* singlestepping active */
#define TIF_NOHZ 9 /* in adaptive nohz mode */
#define TIF_SECCOMP 10 /* secure computing */
#define TIF_RESTOREALL 11 /* Restore all regs (implies NOERROR) */
#define TIF_NOERROR 12 /* Force successful syscall return */
#define TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME 13 /* callback before returning to user */
#define TIF_UPROBE 14 /* breakpointed or single-stepping */
#define TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT 15 /* syscall tracepoint instrumentation */
#define TIF_EMULATE_STACK_STORE 16 /* Is an instruction emulation
for stack store? */
#define TIF_MEMDIE 17 /* is terminating due to OOM killer */
#if defined(CONFIG_PPC64)
#define TIF_ELF2ABI 18 /* function descriptors must die! */
#endif
powerpc: Check address limit on user-mode return (TIF_FSCHECK) set_fs() sets the addr_limit, which is used in access_ok() to determine if an address is a user or kernel address. Some code paths use set_fs() to temporarily elevate the addr_limit so that kernel code can read/write kernel memory as if it were user memory. That is fine as long as the code can't ever return to userspace with the addr_limit still elevated. If that did happen, then userspace can read/write kernel memory as if it were user memory, eg. just with write(2). In case it's not clear, that is very bad. It has also happened in the past due to bugs. Commit 5ea0727b163c ("x86/syscalls: Check address limit on user-mode return") added a mechanism to check the addr_limit value before returning to userspace. Any call to set_fs() sets a thread flag, TIF_FSCHECK, and if we see that on the return to userspace we go out of line to check that the addr_limit value is not elevated. For further info see the above commit, as well as: https://lwn.net/Articles/722267/ https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=990 Verified to work on 64-bit Book3S using a POC that objdumps the system call handler, and a modified lkdtm_CORRUPT_USER_DS() that doesn't kill the caller. Before: $ sudo ./test-tif-fscheck ... 0000000000000000 <.data>: 0: e1 f7 8a 79 rldicl. r10,r12,30,63 4: 80 03 82 40 bne 0x384 8: 00 40 8a 71 andi. r10,r12,16384 c: 78 0b 2a 7c mr r10,r1 10: 10 fd 21 38 addi r1,r1,-752 14: 08 00 c2 41 beq- 0x1c 18: 58 09 2d e8 ld r1,2392(r13) 1c: 00 00 41 f9 std r10,0(r1) 20: 70 01 61 f9 std r11,368(r1) 24: 78 01 81 f9 std r12,376(r1) 28: 70 00 01 f8 std r0,112(r1) 2c: 78 00 41 f9 std r10,120(r1) 30: 20 00 82 41 beq 0x50 34: a6 42 4c 7d mftb r10 After: $ sudo ./test-tif-fscheck Killed And in dmesg: Invalid address limit on user-mode return WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 3689 at ../include/linux/syscalls.h:260 do_notify_resume+0x140/0x170 ... NIP [c00000000001ee50] do_notify_resume+0x140/0x170 LR [c00000000001ee4c] do_notify_resume+0x13c/0x170 Call Trace: do_notify_resume+0x13c/0x170 (unreliable) ret_from_except_lite+0x70/0x74 Performance overhead is essentially zero in the usual case, because the bit is checked as part of the existing _TIF_USER_WORK_MASK check. Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2018-05-14 07:03:16 -06:00
#define TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG 19 /* true if poll_idle() is polling TIF_NEED_RESCHED */
#define TIF_32BIT 20 /* 32 bit binary */
/* as above, but as bit values */
#define _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE (1<<TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE)
#define _TIF_SIGPENDING (1<<TIF_SIGPENDING)
#define _TIF_NEED_RESCHED (1<<TIF_NEED_RESCHED)
#define _TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG (1<<TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG)
#define _TIF_32BIT (1<<TIF_32BIT)
powerpc: Don't corrupt transactional state when using FP/VMX in kernel Currently, when we have a process using the transactional memory facilities on POWER8 (that is, the processor is in transactional or suspended state), and the process enters the kernel and the kernel then uses the floating-point or vector (VMX/Altivec) facility, we end up corrupting the user-visible FP/VMX/VSX state. This happens, for example, if a page fault causes a copy-on-write operation, because the copy_page function will use VMX to do the copy on POWER8. The test program below demonstrates the bug. The bug happens because when FP/VMX state for a transactional process is stored in the thread_struct, we store the checkpointed state in .fp_state/.vr_state and the transactional (current) state in .transact_fp/.transact_vr. However, when the kernel wants to use FP/VMX, it calls enable_kernel_fp() or enable_kernel_altivec(), which saves the current state in .fp_state/.vr_state. Furthermore, when we return to the user process we return with FP/VMX/VSX disabled. The next time the process uses FP/VMX/VSX, we don't know which set of state (the current register values, .fp_state/.vr_state, or .transact_fp/.transact_vr) we should be using, since we have no way to tell if we are still in the same transaction, and if not, whether the previous transaction succeeded or failed. Thus it is necessary to strictly adhere to the rule that if FP has been enabled at any point in a transaction, we must keep FP enabled for the user process with the current transactional state in the FP registers, until we detect that it is no longer in a transaction. Similarly for VMX; once enabled it must stay enabled until the process is no longer transactional. In order to keep this rule, we add a new thread_info flag which we test when returning from the kernel to userspace, called TIF_RESTORE_TM. This flag indicates that there is FP/VMX/VSX state to be restored before entering userspace, and when it is set the .tm_orig_msr field in the thread_struct indicates what state needs to be restored. The restoration is done by restore_tm_state(). The TIF_RESTORE_TM bit is set by new giveup_fpu/altivec_maybe_transactional helpers, which are called from enable_kernel_fp/altivec, giveup_vsx, and flush_fp/altivec_to_thread instead of giveup_fpu/altivec. The other thing to be done is to get the transactional FP/VMX/VSX state from .fp_state/.vr_state when doing reclaim, if that state has been saved there by giveup_fpu/altivec_maybe_transactional. Having done this, we set the FP/VMX bit in the thread's MSR after reclaim to indicate that that part of the state is now valid (having been reclaimed from the processor's checkpointed state). Finally, in the signal handling code, we move the clearing of the transactional state bits in the thread's MSR a bit earlier, before calling flush_fp_to_thread(), so that we don't unnecessarily set the TIF_RESTORE_TM bit. This is the test program: /* Michael Neuling 4/12/2013 * * See if the altivec state is leaked out of an aborted transaction due to * kernel vmx copy loops. * * gcc -m64 htm_vmxcopy.c -o htm_vmxcopy * */ /* We don't use all of these, but for reference: */ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { long double vecin = 1.3; long double vecout; unsigned long pgsize = getpagesize(); int i; int fd; int size = pgsize*16; char tmpfile[] = "/tmp/page_faultXXXXXX"; char buf[pgsize]; char *a; uint64_t aborted = 0; fd = mkstemp(tmpfile); assert(fd >= 0); memset(buf, 0, pgsize); for (i = 0; i < size; i += pgsize) assert(write(fd, buf, pgsize) == pgsize); unlink(tmpfile); a = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0); assert(a != MAP_FAILED); asm __volatile__( "lxvd2x 40,0,%[vecinptr] ; " // set 40 to initial value TBEGIN "beq 3f ;" TSUSPEND "xxlxor 40,40,40 ; " // set 40 to 0 "std 5, 0(%[map]) ;" // cause kernel vmx copy page TABORT TRESUME TEND "li %[res], 0 ;" "b 5f ;" "3: ;" // Abort handler "li %[res], 1 ;" "5: ;" "stxvd2x 40,0,%[vecoutptr] ; " : [res]"=r"(aborted) : [vecinptr]"r"(&vecin), [vecoutptr]"r"(&vecout), [map]"r"(a) : "memory", "r0", "r3", "r4", "r5", "r6", "r7"); if (aborted && (vecin != vecout)){ printf("FAILED: vector state leaked on abort %f != %f\n", (double)vecin, (double)vecout); exit(1); } munmap(a, size); close(fd); printf("PASSED!\n"); return 0; } Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
2014-01-12 21:56:29 -07:00
#define _TIF_RESTORE_TM (1<<TIF_RESTORE_TM)
#define _TIF_PATCH_PENDING (1<<TIF_PATCH_PENDING)
#define _TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT (1<<TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT)
#define _TIF_SINGLESTEP (1<<TIF_SINGLESTEP)
#define _TIF_SECCOMP (1<<TIF_SECCOMP)
[PATCH] syscall entry/exit revamp This cleanup patch speeds up the null syscall path on ppc64 by about 3%, and brings the ppc32 and ppc64 code slightly closer together. The ppc64 code was checking current_thread_info()->flags twice in the syscall exit path; once for TIF_SYSCALL_T_OR_A before disabling interrupts, and then again for TIF_SIGPENDING|TIF_NEED_RESCHED etc after disabling interrupts. Now we do the same as ppc32 -- check the flags only once in the fast path, and re-enable interrupts if necessary in the ptrace case. The patch abolishes the 'syscall_noerror' member of struct thread_info and replaces it with a TIF_NOERROR bit in the flags, which is handled in the slow path. This shortens the syscall entry code, which no longer needs to clear syscall_noerror. The patch adds a TIF_SAVE_NVGPRS flag which causes the syscall exit slow path to save the non-volatile GPRs into a signal frame. This removes the need for the assembly wrappers around sys_sigsuspend(), sys_rt_sigsuspend(), et al which existed solely to save those registers in advance. It also means I don't have to add new wrappers for ppoll() and pselect(), which is what I was supposed to be doing when I got distracted into this... Finally, it unifies the ppc64 and ppc32 methods of handling syscall exit directly into a signal handler (as required by sigsuspend et al) by introducing a TIF_RESTOREALL flag which causes _all_ the registers to be reloaded from the pt_regs by taking the ret_from_exception path, instead of the normal syscall exit path which stomps on the callee-saved GPRs. It appears to pass an LTP test run on ppc64, and passes basic testing on ppc32 too. Brief tests of ptrace functionality with strace and gdb also appear OK. I wouldn't send it to Linus for 2.6.15 just yet though :) Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
2005-11-15 11:52:18 -07:00
#define _TIF_RESTOREALL (1<<TIF_RESTOREALL)
#define _TIF_NOERROR (1<<TIF_NOERROR)
#define _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME (1<<TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME)
#define _TIF_UPROBE (1<<TIF_UPROBE)
#define _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT (1<<TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT)
#define _TIF_EMULATE_STACK_STORE (1<<TIF_EMULATE_STACK_STORE)
#define _TIF_NOHZ (1<<TIF_NOHZ)
powerpc: Check address limit on user-mode return (TIF_FSCHECK) set_fs() sets the addr_limit, which is used in access_ok() to determine if an address is a user or kernel address. Some code paths use set_fs() to temporarily elevate the addr_limit so that kernel code can read/write kernel memory as if it were user memory. That is fine as long as the code can't ever return to userspace with the addr_limit still elevated. If that did happen, then userspace can read/write kernel memory as if it were user memory, eg. just with write(2). In case it's not clear, that is very bad. It has also happened in the past due to bugs. Commit 5ea0727b163c ("x86/syscalls: Check address limit on user-mode return") added a mechanism to check the addr_limit value before returning to userspace. Any call to set_fs() sets a thread flag, TIF_FSCHECK, and if we see that on the return to userspace we go out of line to check that the addr_limit value is not elevated. For further info see the above commit, as well as: https://lwn.net/Articles/722267/ https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=990 Verified to work on 64-bit Book3S using a POC that objdumps the system call handler, and a modified lkdtm_CORRUPT_USER_DS() that doesn't kill the caller. Before: $ sudo ./test-tif-fscheck ... 0000000000000000 <.data>: 0: e1 f7 8a 79 rldicl. r10,r12,30,63 4: 80 03 82 40 bne 0x384 8: 00 40 8a 71 andi. r10,r12,16384 c: 78 0b 2a 7c mr r10,r1 10: 10 fd 21 38 addi r1,r1,-752 14: 08 00 c2 41 beq- 0x1c 18: 58 09 2d e8 ld r1,2392(r13) 1c: 00 00 41 f9 std r10,0(r1) 20: 70 01 61 f9 std r11,368(r1) 24: 78 01 81 f9 std r12,376(r1) 28: 70 00 01 f8 std r0,112(r1) 2c: 78 00 41 f9 std r10,120(r1) 30: 20 00 82 41 beq 0x50 34: a6 42 4c 7d mftb r10 After: $ sudo ./test-tif-fscheck Killed And in dmesg: Invalid address limit on user-mode return WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 3689 at ../include/linux/syscalls.h:260 do_notify_resume+0x140/0x170 ... NIP [c00000000001ee50] do_notify_resume+0x140/0x170 LR [c00000000001ee4c] do_notify_resume+0x13c/0x170 Call Trace: do_notify_resume+0x13c/0x170 (unreliable) ret_from_except_lite+0x70/0x74 Performance overhead is essentially zero in the usual case, because the bit is checked as part of the existing _TIF_USER_WORK_MASK check. Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2018-05-14 07:03:16 -06:00
#define _TIF_FSCHECK (1<<TIF_FSCHECK)
#define _TIF_SYSCALL_EMU (1<<TIF_SYSCALL_EMU)
#define _TIF_SYSCALL_DOTRACE (_TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE | _TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT | \
_TIF_SECCOMP | _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT | \
_TIF_NOHZ | _TIF_SYSCALL_EMU)
#define _TIF_USER_WORK_MASK (_TIF_SIGPENDING | _TIF_NEED_RESCHED | \
powerpc: Don't corrupt transactional state when using FP/VMX in kernel Currently, when we have a process using the transactional memory facilities on POWER8 (that is, the processor is in transactional or suspended state), and the process enters the kernel and the kernel then uses the floating-point or vector (VMX/Altivec) facility, we end up corrupting the user-visible FP/VMX/VSX state. This happens, for example, if a page fault causes a copy-on-write operation, because the copy_page function will use VMX to do the copy on POWER8. The test program below demonstrates the bug. The bug happens because when FP/VMX state for a transactional process is stored in the thread_struct, we store the checkpointed state in .fp_state/.vr_state and the transactional (current) state in .transact_fp/.transact_vr. However, when the kernel wants to use FP/VMX, it calls enable_kernel_fp() or enable_kernel_altivec(), which saves the current state in .fp_state/.vr_state. Furthermore, when we return to the user process we return with FP/VMX/VSX disabled. The next time the process uses FP/VMX/VSX, we don't know which set of state (the current register values, .fp_state/.vr_state, or .transact_fp/.transact_vr) we should be using, since we have no way to tell if we are still in the same transaction, and if not, whether the previous transaction succeeded or failed. Thus it is necessary to strictly adhere to the rule that if FP has been enabled at any point in a transaction, we must keep FP enabled for the user process with the current transactional state in the FP registers, until we detect that it is no longer in a transaction. Similarly for VMX; once enabled it must stay enabled until the process is no longer transactional. In order to keep this rule, we add a new thread_info flag which we test when returning from the kernel to userspace, called TIF_RESTORE_TM. This flag indicates that there is FP/VMX/VSX state to be restored before entering userspace, and when it is set the .tm_orig_msr field in the thread_struct indicates what state needs to be restored. The restoration is done by restore_tm_state(). The TIF_RESTORE_TM bit is set by new giveup_fpu/altivec_maybe_transactional helpers, which are called from enable_kernel_fp/altivec, giveup_vsx, and flush_fp/altivec_to_thread instead of giveup_fpu/altivec. The other thing to be done is to get the transactional FP/VMX/VSX state from .fp_state/.vr_state when doing reclaim, if that state has been saved there by giveup_fpu/altivec_maybe_transactional. Having done this, we set the FP/VMX bit in the thread's MSR after reclaim to indicate that that part of the state is now valid (having been reclaimed from the processor's checkpointed state). Finally, in the signal handling code, we move the clearing of the transactional state bits in the thread's MSR a bit earlier, before calling flush_fp_to_thread(), so that we don't unnecessarily set the TIF_RESTORE_TM bit. This is the test program: /* Michael Neuling 4/12/2013 * * See if the altivec state is leaked out of an aborted transaction due to * kernel vmx copy loops. * * gcc -m64 htm_vmxcopy.c -o htm_vmxcopy * */ /* We don't use all of these, but for reference: */ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { long double vecin = 1.3; long double vecout; unsigned long pgsize = getpagesize(); int i; int fd; int size = pgsize*16; char tmpfile[] = "/tmp/page_faultXXXXXX"; char buf[pgsize]; char *a; uint64_t aborted = 0; fd = mkstemp(tmpfile); assert(fd >= 0); memset(buf, 0, pgsize); for (i = 0; i < size; i += pgsize) assert(write(fd, buf, pgsize) == pgsize); unlink(tmpfile); a = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0); assert(a != MAP_FAILED); asm __volatile__( "lxvd2x 40,0,%[vecinptr] ; " // set 40 to initial value TBEGIN "beq 3f ;" TSUSPEND "xxlxor 40,40,40 ; " // set 40 to 0 "std 5, 0(%[map]) ;" // cause kernel vmx copy page TABORT TRESUME TEND "li %[res], 0 ;" "b 5f ;" "3: ;" // Abort handler "li %[res], 1 ;" "5: ;" "stxvd2x 40,0,%[vecoutptr] ; " : [res]"=r"(aborted) : [vecinptr]"r"(&vecin), [vecoutptr]"r"(&vecout), [map]"r"(a) : "memory", "r0", "r3", "r4", "r5", "r6", "r7"); if (aborted && (vecin != vecout)){ printf("FAILED: vector state leaked on abort %f != %f\n", (double)vecin, (double)vecout); exit(1); } munmap(a, size); close(fd); printf("PASSED!\n"); return 0; } Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
2014-01-12 21:56:29 -07:00
_TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME | _TIF_UPROBE | \
powerpc: Check address limit on user-mode return (TIF_FSCHECK) set_fs() sets the addr_limit, which is used in access_ok() to determine if an address is a user or kernel address. Some code paths use set_fs() to temporarily elevate the addr_limit so that kernel code can read/write kernel memory as if it were user memory. That is fine as long as the code can't ever return to userspace with the addr_limit still elevated. If that did happen, then userspace can read/write kernel memory as if it were user memory, eg. just with write(2). In case it's not clear, that is very bad. It has also happened in the past due to bugs. Commit 5ea0727b163c ("x86/syscalls: Check address limit on user-mode return") added a mechanism to check the addr_limit value before returning to userspace. Any call to set_fs() sets a thread flag, TIF_FSCHECK, and if we see that on the return to userspace we go out of line to check that the addr_limit value is not elevated. For further info see the above commit, as well as: https://lwn.net/Articles/722267/ https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=990 Verified to work on 64-bit Book3S using a POC that objdumps the system call handler, and a modified lkdtm_CORRUPT_USER_DS() that doesn't kill the caller. Before: $ sudo ./test-tif-fscheck ... 0000000000000000 <.data>: 0: e1 f7 8a 79 rldicl. r10,r12,30,63 4: 80 03 82 40 bne 0x384 8: 00 40 8a 71 andi. r10,r12,16384 c: 78 0b 2a 7c mr r10,r1 10: 10 fd 21 38 addi r1,r1,-752 14: 08 00 c2 41 beq- 0x1c 18: 58 09 2d e8 ld r1,2392(r13) 1c: 00 00 41 f9 std r10,0(r1) 20: 70 01 61 f9 std r11,368(r1) 24: 78 01 81 f9 std r12,376(r1) 28: 70 00 01 f8 std r0,112(r1) 2c: 78 00 41 f9 std r10,120(r1) 30: 20 00 82 41 beq 0x50 34: a6 42 4c 7d mftb r10 After: $ sudo ./test-tif-fscheck Killed And in dmesg: Invalid address limit on user-mode return WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 3689 at ../include/linux/syscalls.h:260 do_notify_resume+0x140/0x170 ... NIP [c00000000001ee50] do_notify_resume+0x140/0x170 LR [c00000000001ee4c] do_notify_resume+0x13c/0x170 Call Trace: do_notify_resume+0x13c/0x170 (unreliable) ret_from_except_lite+0x70/0x74 Performance overhead is essentially zero in the usual case, because the bit is checked as part of the existing _TIF_USER_WORK_MASK check. Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2018-05-14 07:03:16 -06:00
_TIF_RESTORE_TM | _TIF_PATCH_PENDING | \
_TIF_FSCHECK)
powerpc: Fix various syscall/signal/swapcontext bugs A careful reading of the recent changes to the system call entry/exit paths revealed several problems, plus some things that could be simplified and improved: * 32-bit wasn't testing the _TIF_NOERROR bit in the syscall fast exit path, so it was only doing anything with it once it saw some other bit being set. In other words, the noerror behaviour would apply to the next system call where we had to reschedule or deliver a signal, which is not necessarily the current system call. * 32-bit wasn't doing the call to ptrace_notify in the syscall exit path when the _TIF_SINGLESTEP bit was set. * _TIF_RESTOREALL was in both _TIF_USER_WORK_MASK and _TIF_PERSYSCALL_MASK, which is odd since _TIF_RESTOREALL is only set by system calls. I took it out of _TIF_USER_WORK_MASK. * On 64-bit, _TIF_RESTOREALL wasn't causing the non-volatile registers to be restored (unless perhaps a signal was delivered or the syscall was traced or single-stepped). Thus the non-volatile registers weren't restored on exit from a signal handler. We probably got away with it mostly because signal handlers written in C wouldn't alter the non-volatile registers. * On 32-bit I simplified the code and made it more like 64-bit by making the syscall exit path jump to ret_from_except to handle preemption and signal delivery. * 32-bit was calling do_signal unnecessarily when _TIF_RESTOREALL was set - but I think because of that 32-bit was actually restoring the non-volatile registers on exit from a signal handler. * I changed the order of enabling interrupts and saving the non-volatile registers before calling do_syscall_trace_leave; now we enable interrupts first. Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
2006-03-07 19:24:22 -07:00
#define _TIF_PERSYSCALL_MASK (_TIF_RESTOREALL|_TIF_NOERROR)
/* Bits in local_flags */
/* Don't move TLF_NAPPING without adjusting the code in entry_32.S */
#define TLF_NAPPING 0 /* idle thread enabled NAP mode */
#define TLF_SLEEPING 1 /* suspend code enabled SLEEP mode */
#define TLF_LAZY_MMU 3 /* tlb_batch is active */
#define TLF_RUNLATCH 4 /* Is the runlatch enabled? */
#define _TLF_NAPPING (1 << TLF_NAPPING)
#define _TLF_SLEEPING (1 << TLF_SLEEPING)
#define _TLF_LAZY_MMU (1 << TLF_LAZY_MMU)
#define _TLF_RUNLATCH (1 << TLF_RUNLATCH)
#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
static inline bool test_thread_local_flags(unsigned int flags)
{
struct thread_info *ti = current_thread_info();
return (ti->local_flags & flags) != 0;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64
#define is_32bit_task() (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT))
#else
#define is_32bit_task() (1)
#endif
#if defined(CONFIG_PPC64)
#define is_elf2_task() (test_thread_flag(TIF_ELF2ABI))
#else
#define is_elf2_task() (0)
#endif
#endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
#endif /* __KERNEL__ */
#endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_THREAD_INFO_H */