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alistair23-linux/arch/powerpc/lib/feature-fixups.c

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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
/*
* Copyright (C) 2001 Ben. Herrenschmidt (benh@kernel.crashing.org)
*
* Modifications for ppc64:
* Copyright (C) 2003 Dave Engebretsen <engebret@us.ibm.com>
*
* Copyright 2008 Michael Ellerman, IBM Corporation.
*/
powerpc: Fix feature-fixup tests for gcc 4.5 The feature-fixup test declare some extern void variables and then take their addresses. Fix this by declaring them as extern u8 instead. Fixes these warnings (treated as errors): CC arch/powerpc/lib/feature-fixups.o cc1: warnings being treated as errors arch/powerpc/lib/feature-fixups.c: In function 'test_cpu_macros': arch/powerpc/lib/feature-fixups.c:293:23: error: taking address of expression of type 'void' arch/powerpc/lib/feature-fixups.c:294:9: error: taking address of expression of type 'void' arch/powerpc/lib/feature-fixups.c:297:2: error: taking address of expression of type 'void' arch/powerpc/lib/feature-fixups.c:297:2: error: taking address of expression of type 'void' arch/powerpc/lib/feature-fixups.c: In function 'test_fw_macros': arch/powerpc/lib/feature-fixups.c:306:23: error: taking address of expression of type 'void' arch/powerpc/lib/feature-fixups.c:307:9: error: taking address of expression of type 'void' arch/powerpc/lib/feature-fixups.c:310:2: error: taking address of expression of type 'void' arch/powerpc/lib/feature-fixups.c:310:2: error: taking address of expression of type 'void' arch/powerpc/lib/feature-fixups.c: In function 'test_lwsync_macros': arch/powerpc/lib/feature-fixups.c:321:23: error: taking address of expression of type 'void' arch/powerpc/lib/feature-fixups.c:322:9: error: taking address of expression of type 'void' arch/powerpc/lib/feature-fixups.c:326:3: error: taking address of expression of type 'void' arch/powerpc/lib/feature-fixups.c:326:3: error: taking address of expression of type 'void' arch/powerpc/lib/feature-fixups.c:329:3: error: taking address of expression of type 'void' arch/powerpc/lib/feature-fixups.c:329:3: error: taking address of expression of type 'void' Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
2010-06-28 15:08:29 -06:00
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/jump_label.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/sched/mm.h>
#include <asm/cputable.h>
#include <asm/code-patching.h>
#include <asm/page.h>
#include <asm/sections.h>
#include <asm/setup.h>
#include <asm/security_features.h>
#include <asm/firmware.h>
#include <asm/inst.h>
struct fixup_entry {
unsigned long mask;
unsigned long value;
long start_off;
long end_off;
powerpc: Introduce infrastructure for feature sections with alternatives The current feature section logic only supports nop'ing out code, this means if you want to choose at runtime between instruction sequences, one or both cases will have to execute the nop'ed out contents of the other section, eg: BEGIN_FTR_SECTION or 1,1,1 END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(FOO) BEGIN_FTR_SECTION or 2,2,2 END_FTR_SECTION_IFCLR(FOO) and the resulting code will be either, or 1,1,1 nop or, nop or 2,2,2 For small code segments this is fine, but for larger code blocks and in performance criticial code segments, it would be nice to avoid the nops. This commit starts to implement logic to allow the following: BEGIN_FTR_SECTION or 1,1,1 FTR_SECTION_ELSE or 2,2,2 ALT_FTR_SECTION_END_IFSET(FOO) and the resulting code will be: or 1,1,1 or, or 2,2,2 We achieve this by extending the existing FTR macros. The current feature section semantic just becomes a special case, ie. if the else case is empty we nop out the default case. The key limitation is that the size of the else case must be less than or equal to the size of the default case. If the else case is smaller the remainder of the section is nop'ed. We let the linker put the else case code in with the rest of the text, so that relative branches from the else case are more likley to link, this has the disadvantage that we can't free the unused else cases. This commit introduces the required macro and linker script changes, but does not enable the patching of the alternative sections. We also need to update two hand-made section entries in reg.h and timex.h Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
2008-06-23 19:32:54 -06:00
long alt_start_off;
long alt_end_off;
};
static struct ppc_inst *calc_addr(struct fixup_entry *fcur, long offset)
{
/*
* We store the offset to the code as a negative offset from
* the start of the alt_entry, to support the VDSO. This
* routine converts that back into an actual address.
*/
return (struct ppc_inst *)((unsigned long)fcur + offset);
}
static int patch_alt_instruction(struct ppc_inst *src, struct ppc_inst *dest,
struct ppc_inst *alt_start, struct ppc_inst *alt_end)
{
int err;
struct ppc_inst instr;
instr = ppc_inst_read(src);
if (instr_is_relative_branch(*src)) {
struct ppc_inst *target = (struct ppc_inst *)branch_target(src);
/* Branch within the section doesn't need translating */
if (target < alt_start || target > alt_end) {
err = translate_branch(&instr, dest, src);
if (err)
return 1;
}
}
raw_patch_instruction(dest, instr);
return 0;
}
static int patch_feature_section(unsigned long value, struct fixup_entry *fcur)
{
struct ppc_inst *start, *end, *alt_start, *alt_end, *src, *dest, nop;
start = calc_addr(fcur, fcur->start_off);
end = calc_addr(fcur, fcur->end_off);
alt_start = calc_addr(fcur, fcur->alt_start_off);
alt_end = calc_addr(fcur, fcur->alt_end_off);
if ((alt_end - alt_start) > (end - start))
return 1;
if ((value & fcur->mask) == fcur->value)
return 0;
src = alt_start;
dest = start;
for (; src < alt_end; src = ppc_inst_next(src, src),
dest = ppc_inst_next(dest, dest)) {
if (patch_alt_instruction(src, dest, alt_start, alt_end))
return 1;
}
nop = ppc_inst(PPC_INST_NOP);
for (; dest < end; dest = ppc_inst_next(dest, &nop))
raw_patch_instruction(dest, nop);
return 0;
}
void do_feature_fixups(unsigned long value, void *fixup_start, void *fixup_end)
{
struct fixup_entry *fcur, *fend;
fcur = fixup_start;
fend = fixup_end;
for (; fcur < fend; fcur++) {
if (patch_feature_section(value, fcur)) {
WARN_ON(1);
printk("Unable to patch feature section at %p - %p" \
" with %p - %p\n",
calc_addr(fcur, fcur->start_off),
calc_addr(fcur, fcur->end_off),
calc_addr(fcur, fcur->alt_start_off),
calc_addr(fcur, fcur->alt_end_off));
}
}
}
powerpc/64s: Add support for RFI flush of L1-D cache On some CPUs we can prevent the Meltdown vulnerability by flushing the L1-D cache on exit from kernel to user mode, and from hypervisor to guest. This is known to be the case on at least Power7, Power8 and Power9. At this time we do not know the status of the vulnerability on other CPUs such as the 970 (Apple G5), pasemi CPUs (AmigaOne X1000) or Freescale CPUs. As more information comes to light we can enable this, or other mechanisms on those CPUs. The vulnerability occurs when the load of an architecturally inaccessible memory region (eg. userspace load of kernel memory) is speculatively executed to the point where its result can influence the address of a subsequent speculatively executed load. In order for that to happen, the first load must hit in the L1, because before the load is sent to the L2 the permission check is performed. Therefore if no kernel addresses hit in the L1 the vulnerability can not occur. We can ensure that is the case by flushing the L1 whenever we return to userspace. Similarly for hypervisor vs guest. In order to flush the L1-D cache on exit, we add a section of nops at each (h)rfi location that returns to a lower privileged context, and patch that with some sequence. Newer firmwares are able to advertise to us that there is a special nop instruction that flushes the L1-D. If we do not see that advertised, we fall back to doing a displacement flush in software. For guest kernels we support migration between some CPU versions, and different CPUs may use different flush instructions. So that we are prepared to migrate to a machine with a different flush instruction activated, we may have to patch more than one flush instruction at boot if the hypervisor tells us to. In the end this patch is mostly the work of Nicholas Piggin and Michael Ellerman. However a cast of thousands contributed to analysis of the issue, earlier versions of the patch, back ports testing etc. Many thanks to all of them. Tested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2018-01-09 09:07:15 -07:00
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64
static void do_stf_entry_barrier_fixups(enum stf_barrier_type types)
{
unsigned int instrs[3], *dest;
long *start, *end;
int i;
start = PTRRELOC(&__start___stf_entry_barrier_fixup),
end = PTRRELOC(&__stop___stf_entry_barrier_fixup);
instrs[0] = 0x60000000; /* nop */
instrs[1] = 0x60000000; /* nop */
instrs[2] = 0x60000000; /* nop */
i = 0;
if (types & STF_BARRIER_FALLBACK) {
instrs[i++] = 0x7d4802a6; /* mflr r10 */
instrs[i++] = 0x60000000; /* branch patched below */
instrs[i++] = 0x7d4803a6; /* mtlr r10 */
} else if (types & STF_BARRIER_EIEIO) {
instrs[i++] = 0x7e0006ac; /* eieio + bit 6 hint */
} else if (types & STF_BARRIER_SYNC_ORI) {
instrs[i++] = 0x7c0004ac; /* hwsync */
instrs[i++] = 0xe94d0000; /* ld r10,0(r13) */
instrs[i++] = 0x63ff0000; /* ori 31,31,0 speculation barrier */
}
for (i = 0; start < end; start++, i++) {
dest = (void *)start + *start;
pr_devel("patching dest %lx\n", (unsigned long)dest);
patch_instruction((struct ppc_inst *)dest, ppc_inst(instrs[0]));
if (types & STF_BARRIER_FALLBACK)
patch_branch((struct ppc_inst *)(dest + 1),
(unsigned long)&stf_barrier_fallback,
BRANCH_SET_LINK);
else
patch_instruction((struct ppc_inst *)(dest + 1),
ppc_inst(instrs[1]));
patch_instruction((struct ppc_inst *)(dest + 2), ppc_inst(instrs[2]));
}
printk(KERN_DEBUG "stf-barrier: patched %d entry locations (%s barrier)\n", i,
(types == STF_BARRIER_NONE) ? "no" :
(types == STF_BARRIER_FALLBACK) ? "fallback" :
(types == STF_BARRIER_EIEIO) ? "eieio" :
(types == (STF_BARRIER_SYNC_ORI)) ? "hwsync"
: "unknown");
}
static void do_stf_exit_barrier_fixups(enum stf_barrier_type types)
{
unsigned int instrs[6], *dest;
long *start, *end;
int i;
start = PTRRELOC(&__start___stf_exit_barrier_fixup),
end = PTRRELOC(&__stop___stf_exit_barrier_fixup);
instrs[0] = 0x60000000; /* nop */
instrs[1] = 0x60000000; /* nop */
instrs[2] = 0x60000000; /* nop */
instrs[3] = 0x60000000; /* nop */
instrs[4] = 0x60000000; /* nop */
instrs[5] = 0x60000000; /* nop */
i = 0;
if (types & STF_BARRIER_FALLBACK || types & STF_BARRIER_SYNC_ORI) {
if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_HVMODE)) {
instrs[i++] = 0x7db14ba6; /* mtspr 0x131, r13 (HSPRG1) */
instrs[i++] = 0x7db04aa6; /* mfspr r13, 0x130 (HSPRG0) */
} else {
instrs[i++] = 0x7db243a6; /* mtsprg 2,r13 */
instrs[i++] = 0x7db142a6; /* mfsprg r13,1 */
}
instrs[i++] = 0x7c0004ac; /* hwsync */
instrs[i++] = 0xe9ad0000; /* ld r13,0(r13) */
instrs[i++] = 0x63ff0000; /* ori 31,31,0 speculation barrier */
if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_HVMODE)) {
instrs[i++] = 0x7db14aa6; /* mfspr r13, 0x131 (HSPRG1) */
} else {
instrs[i++] = 0x7db242a6; /* mfsprg r13,2 */
}
} else if (types & STF_BARRIER_EIEIO) {
instrs[i++] = 0x7e0006ac; /* eieio + bit 6 hint */
}
for (i = 0; start < end; start++, i++) {
dest = (void *)start + *start;
pr_devel("patching dest %lx\n", (unsigned long)dest);
patch_instruction((struct ppc_inst *)dest, ppc_inst(instrs[0]));
patch_instruction((struct ppc_inst *)(dest + 1), ppc_inst(instrs[1]));
patch_instruction((struct ppc_inst *)(dest + 2), ppc_inst(instrs[2]));
patch_instruction((struct ppc_inst *)(dest + 3), ppc_inst(instrs[3]));
patch_instruction((struct ppc_inst *)(dest + 4), ppc_inst(instrs[4]));
patch_instruction((struct ppc_inst *)(dest + 5), ppc_inst(instrs[5]));
}
printk(KERN_DEBUG "stf-barrier: patched %d exit locations (%s barrier)\n", i,
(types == STF_BARRIER_NONE) ? "no" :
(types == STF_BARRIER_FALLBACK) ? "fallback" :
(types == STF_BARRIER_EIEIO) ? "eieio" :
(types == (STF_BARRIER_SYNC_ORI)) ? "hwsync"
: "unknown");
}
void do_stf_barrier_fixups(enum stf_barrier_type types)
{
do_stf_entry_barrier_fixups(types);
do_stf_exit_barrier_fixups(types);
}
void do_uaccess_flush_fixups(enum l1d_flush_type types)
{
unsigned int instrs[4], *dest;
long *start, *end;
int i;
start = PTRRELOC(&__start___uaccess_flush_fixup);
end = PTRRELOC(&__stop___uaccess_flush_fixup);
instrs[0] = 0x60000000; /* nop */
instrs[1] = 0x60000000; /* nop */
instrs[2] = 0x60000000; /* nop */
instrs[3] = 0x4e800020; /* blr */
i = 0;
if (types == L1D_FLUSH_FALLBACK) {
instrs[3] = 0x60000000; /* nop */
/* fallthrough to fallback flush */
}
if (types & L1D_FLUSH_ORI) {
instrs[i++] = 0x63ff0000; /* ori 31,31,0 speculation barrier */
instrs[i++] = 0x63de0000; /* ori 30,30,0 L1d flush*/
}
if (types & L1D_FLUSH_MTTRIG)
instrs[i++] = 0x7c12dba6; /* mtspr TRIG2,r0 (SPR #882) */
for (i = 0; start < end; start++, i++) {
dest = (void *)start + *start;
pr_devel("patching dest %lx\n", (unsigned long)dest);
patch_instruction((struct ppc_inst *)dest, ppc_inst(instrs[0]));
patch_instruction((struct ppc_inst *)(dest + 1), ppc_inst(instrs[1]));
patch_instruction((struct ppc_inst *)(dest + 2), ppc_inst(instrs[2]));
patch_instruction((struct ppc_inst *)(dest + 3), ppc_inst(instrs[3]));
}
printk(KERN_DEBUG "uaccess-flush: patched %d locations (%s flush)\n", i,
(types == L1D_FLUSH_NONE) ? "no" :
(types == L1D_FLUSH_FALLBACK) ? "fallback displacement" :
(types & L1D_FLUSH_ORI) ? (types & L1D_FLUSH_MTTRIG)
? "ori+mttrig type"
: "ori type" :
(types & L1D_FLUSH_MTTRIG) ? "mttrig type"
: "unknown");
}
void do_entry_flush_fixups(enum l1d_flush_type types)
{
unsigned int instrs[3], *dest;
long *start, *end;
int i;
start = PTRRELOC(&__start___entry_flush_fixup);
end = PTRRELOC(&__stop___entry_flush_fixup);
instrs[0] = 0x60000000; /* nop */
instrs[1] = 0x60000000; /* nop */
instrs[2] = 0x60000000; /* nop */
i = 0;
if (types == L1D_FLUSH_FALLBACK) {
instrs[i++] = 0x7d4802a6; /* mflr r10 */
instrs[i++] = 0x60000000; /* branch patched below */
instrs[i++] = 0x7d4803a6; /* mtlr r10 */
}
if (types & L1D_FLUSH_ORI) {
instrs[i++] = 0x63ff0000; /* ori 31,31,0 speculation barrier */
instrs[i++] = 0x63de0000; /* ori 30,30,0 L1d flush*/
}
if (types & L1D_FLUSH_MTTRIG)
instrs[i++] = 0x7c12dba6; /* mtspr TRIG2,r0 (SPR #882) */
for (i = 0; start < end; start++, i++) {
dest = (void *)start + *start;
pr_devel("patching dest %lx\n", (unsigned long)dest);
patch_instruction((struct ppc_inst *)dest, ppc_inst(instrs[0]));
if (types == L1D_FLUSH_FALLBACK)
patch_branch((struct ppc_inst *)(dest + 1), (unsigned long)&entry_flush_fallback,
BRANCH_SET_LINK);
else
patch_instruction((struct ppc_inst *)(dest + 1), ppc_inst(instrs[1]));
patch_instruction((struct ppc_inst *)(dest + 2), ppc_inst(instrs[2]));
}
printk(KERN_DEBUG "entry-flush: patched %d locations (%s flush)\n", i,
(types == L1D_FLUSH_NONE) ? "no" :
(types == L1D_FLUSH_FALLBACK) ? "fallback displacement" :
(types & L1D_FLUSH_ORI) ? (types & L1D_FLUSH_MTTRIG)
? "ori+mttrig type"
: "ori type" :
(types & L1D_FLUSH_MTTRIG) ? "mttrig type"
: "unknown");
}
powerpc/64s: Add support for RFI flush of L1-D cache On some CPUs we can prevent the Meltdown vulnerability by flushing the L1-D cache on exit from kernel to user mode, and from hypervisor to guest. This is known to be the case on at least Power7, Power8 and Power9. At this time we do not know the status of the vulnerability on other CPUs such as the 970 (Apple G5), pasemi CPUs (AmigaOne X1000) or Freescale CPUs. As more information comes to light we can enable this, or other mechanisms on those CPUs. The vulnerability occurs when the load of an architecturally inaccessible memory region (eg. userspace load of kernel memory) is speculatively executed to the point where its result can influence the address of a subsequent speculatively executed load. In order for that to happen, the first load must hit in the L1, because before the load is sent to the L2 the permission check is performed. Therefore if no kernel addresses hit in the L1 the vulnerability can not occur. We can ensure that is the case by flushing the L1 whenever we return to userspace. Similarly for hypervisor vs guest. In order to flush the L1-D cache on exit, we add a section of nops at each (h)rfi location that returns to a lower privileged context, and patch that with some sequence. Newer firmwares are able to advertise to us that there is a special nop instruction that flushes the L1-D. If we do not see that advertised, we fall back to doing a displacement flush in software. For guest kernels we support migration between some CPU versions, and different CPUs may use different flush instructions. So that we are prepared to migrate to a machine with a different flush instruction activated, we may have to patch more than one flush instruction at boot if the hypervisor tells us to. In the end this patch is mostly the work of Nicholas Piggin and Michael Ellerman. However a cast of thousands contributed to analysis of the issue, earlier versions of the patch, back ports testing etc. Many thanks to all of them. Tested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2018-01-09 09:07:15 -07:00
void do_rfi_flush_fixups(enum l1d_flush_type types)
{
unsigned int instrs[3], *dest;
long *start, *end;
int i;
start = PTRRELOC(&__start___rfi_flush_fixup),
end = PTRRELOC(&__stop___rfi_flush_fixup);
instrs[0] = 0x60000000; /* nop */
instrs[1] = 0x60000000; /* nop */
instrs[2] = 0x60000000; /* nop */
if (types & L1D_FLUSH_FALLBACK)
/* b .+16 to fallback flush */
instrs[0] = 0x48000010;
i = 0;
if (types & L1D_FLUSH_ORI) {
instrs[i++] = 0x63ff0000; /* ori 31,31,0 speculation barrier */
instrs[i++] = 0x63de0000; /* ori 30,30,0 L1d flush*/
}
if (types & L1D_FLUSH_MTTRIG)
instrs[i++] = 0x7c12dba6; /* mtspr TRIG2,r0 (SPR #882) */
for (i = 0; start < end; start++, i++) {
dest = (void *)start + *start;
pr_devel("patching dest %lx\n", (unsigned long)dest);
patch_instruction((struct ppc_inst *)dest, ppc_inst(instrs[0]));
patch_instruction((struct ppc_inst *)(dest + 1), ppc_inst(instrs[1]));
patch_instruction((struct ppc_inst *)(dest + 2), ppc_inst(instrs[2]));
powerpc/64s: Add support for RFI flush of L1-D cache On some CPUs we can prevent the Meltdown vulnerability by flushing the L1-D cache on exit from kernel to user mode, and from hypervisor to guest. This is known to be the case on at least Power7, Power8 and Power9. At this time we do not know the status of the vulnerability on other CPUs such as the 970 (Apple G5), pasemi CPUs (AmigaOne X1000) or Freescale CPUs. As more information comes to light we can enable this, or other mechanisms on those CPUs. The vulnerability occurs when the load of an architecturally inaccessible memory region (eg. userspace load of kernel memory) is speculatively executed to the point where its result can influence the address of a subsequent speculatively executed load. In order for that to happen, the first load must hit in the L1, because before the load is sent to the L2 the permission check is performed. Therefore if no kernel addresses hit in the L1 the vulnerability can not occur. We can ensure that is the case by flushing the L1 whenever we return to userspace. Similarly for hypervisor vs guest. In order to flush the L1-D cache on exit, we add a section of nops at each (h)rfi location that returns to a lower privileged context, and patch that with some sequence. Newer firmwares are able to advertise to us that there is a special nop instruction that flushes the L1-D. If we do not see that advertised, we fall back to doing a displacement flush in software. For guest kernels we support migration between some CPU versions, and different CPUs may use different flush instructions. So that we are prepared to migrate to a machine with a different flush instruction activated, we may have to patch more than one flush instruction at boot if the hypervisor tells us to. In the end this patch is mostly the work of Nicholas Piggin and Michael Ellerman. However a cast of thousands contributed to analysis of the issue, earlier versions of the patch, back ports testing etc. Many thanks to all of them. Tested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2018-01-09 09:07:15 -07:00
}
printk(KERN_DEBUG "rfi-flush: patched %d locations (%s flush)\n", i,
(types == L1D_FLUSH_NONE) ? "no" :
(types == L1D_FLUSH_FALLBACK) ? "fallback displacement" :
(types & L1D_FLUSH_ORI) ? (types & L1D_FLUSH_MTTRIG)
? "ori+mttrig type"
: "ori type" :
(types & L1D_FLUSH_MTTRIG) ? "mttrig type"
: "unknown");
powerpc/64s: Add support for RFI flush of L1-D cache On some CPUs we can prevent the Meltdown vulnerability by flushing the L1-D cache on exit from kernel to user mode, and from hypervisor to guest. This is known to be the case on at least Power7, Power8 and Power9. At this time we do not know the status of the vulnerability on other CPUs such as the 970 (Apple G5), pasemi CPUs (AmigaOne X1000) or Freescale CPUs. As more information comes to light we can enable this, or other mechanisms on those CPUs. The vulnerability occurs when the load of an architecturally inaccessible memory region (eg. userspace load of kernel memory) is speculatively executed to the point where its result can influence the address of a subsequent speculatively executed load. In order for that to happen, the first load must hit in the L1, because before the load is sent to the L2 the permission check is performed. Therefore if no kernel addresses hit in the L1 the vulnerability can not occur. We can ensure that is the case by flushing the L1 whenever we return to userspace. Similarly for hypervisor vs guest. In order to flush the L1-D cache on exit, we add a section of nops at each (h)rfi location that returns to a lower privileged context, and patch that with some sequence. Newer firmwares are able to advertise to us that there is a special nop instruction that flushes the L1-D. If we do not see that advertised, we fall back to doing a displacement flush in software. For guest kernels we support migration between some CPU versions, and different CPUs may use different flush instructions. So that we are prepared to migrate to a machine with a different flush instruction activated, we may have to patch more than one flush instruction at boot if the hypervisor tells us to. In the end this patch is mostly the work of Nicholas Piggin and Michael Ellerman. However a cast of thousands contributed to analysis of the issue, earlier versions of the patch, back ports testing etc. Many thanks to all of them. Tested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2018-01-09 09:07:15 -07:00
}
void do_barrier_nospec_fixups_range(bool enable, void *fixup_start, void *fixup_end)
{
unsigned int instr, *dest;
long *start, *end;
int i;
start = fixup_start;
end = fixup_end;
instr = 0x60000000; /* nop */
if (enable) {
pr_info("barrier-nospec: using ORI speculation barrier\n");
instr = 0x63ff0000; /* ori 31,31,0 speculation barrier */
}
for (i = 0; start < end; start++, i++) {
dest = (void *)start + *start;
pr_devel("patching dest %lx\n", (unsigned long)dest);
patch_instruction((struct ppc_inst *)dest, ppc_inst(instr));
}
printk(KERN_DEBUG "barrier-nospec: patched %d locations\n", i);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64 */
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BARRIER_NOSPEC
void do_barrier_nospec_fixups(bool enable)
{
void *start, *end;
start = PTRRELOC(&__start___barrier_nospec_fixup),
end = PTRRELOC(&__stop___barrier_nospec_fixup);
do_barrier_nospec_fixups_range(enable, start, end);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_BARRIER_NOSPEC */
powerpc/64s: Add support for RFI flush of L1-D cache On some CPUs we can prevent the Meltdown vulnerability by flushing the L1-D cache on exit from kernel to user mode, and from hypervisor to guest. This is known to be the case on at least Power7, Power8 and Power9. At this time we do not know the status of the vulnerability on other CPUs such as the 970 (Apple G5), pasemi CPUs (AmigaOne X1000) or Freescale CPUs. As more information comes to light we can enable this, or other mechanisms on those CPUs. The vulnerability occurs when the load of an architecturally inaccessible memory region (eg. userspace load of kernel memory) is speculatively executed to the point where its result can influence the address of a subsequent speculatively executed load. In order for that to happen, the first load must hit in the L1, because before the load is sent to the L2 the permission check is performed. Therefore if no kernel addresses hit in the L1 the vulnerability can not occur. We can ensure that is the case by flushing the L1 whenever we return to userspace. Similarly for hypervisor vs guest. In order to flush the L1-D cache on exit, we add a section of nops at each (h)rfi location that returns to a lower privileged context, and patch that with some sequence. Newer firmwares are able to advertise to us that there is a special nop instruction that flushes the L1-D. If we do not see that advertised, we fall back to doing a displacement flush in software. For guest kernels we support migration between some CPU versions, and different CPUs may use different flush instructions. So that we are prepared to migrate to a machine with a different flush instruction activated, we may have to patch more than one flush instruction at boot if the hypervisor tells us to. In the end this patch is mostly the work of Nicholas Piggin and Michael Ellerman. However a cast of thousands contributed to analysis of the issue, earlier versions of the patch, back ports testing etc. Many thanks to all of them. Tested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2018-01-09 09:07:15 -07:00
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_FSL_BOOK3E
void do_barrier_nospec_fixups_range(bool enable, void *fixup_start, void *fixup_end)
{
unsigned int instr[2], *dest;
long *start, *end;
int i;
start = fixup_start;
end = fixup_end;
instr[0] = PPC_INST_NOP;
instr[1] = PPC_INST_NOP;
if (enable) {
pr_info("barrier-nospec: using isync; sync as speculation barrier\n");
instr[0] = PPC_INST_ISYNC;
instr[1] = PPC_INST_SYNC;
}
for (i = 0; start < end; start++, i++) {
dest = (void *)start + *start;
pr_devel("patching dest %lx\n", (unsigned long)dest);
patch_instruction((struct ppc_inst *)dest, ppc_inst(instr[0]));
patch_instruction((struct ppc_inst *)(dest + 1), ppc_inst(instr[1]));
}
printk(KERN_DEBUG "barrier-nospec: patched %d locations\n", i);
}
static void patch_btb_flush_section(long *curr)
{
unsigned int *start, *end;
start = (void *)curr + *curr;
end = (void *)curr + *(curr + 1);
for (; start < end; start++) {
pr_devel("patching dest %lx\n", (unsigned long)start);
patch_instruction((struct ppc_inst *)start, ppc_inst(PPC_INST_NOP));
}
}
void do_btb_flush_fixups(void)
{
long *start, *end;
start = PTRRELOC(&__start__btb_flush_fixup);
end = PTRRELOC(&__stop__btb_flush_fixup);
for (; start < end; start += 2)
patch_btb_flush_section(start);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_FSL_BOOK3E */
void do_lwsync_fixups(unsigned long value, void *fixup_start, void *fixup_end)
{
long *start, *end;
struct ppc_inst *dest;
if (!(value & CPU_FTR_LWSYNC))
return ;
start = fixup_start;
end = fixup_end;
for (; start < end; start++) {
dest = (void *)start + *start;
raw_patch_instruction(dest, ppc_inst(PPC_INST_LWSYNC));
}
}
static void do_final_fixups(void)
{
#if defined(CONFIG_PPC64) && defined(CONFIG_RELOCATABLE)
struct ppc_inst inst, *src, *dest, *end;
if (PHYSICAL_START == 0)
return;
src = (struct ppc_inst *)(KERNELBASE + PHYSICAL_START);
dest = (struct ppc_inst *)KERNELBASE;
end = (void *)src + (__end_interrupts - _stext);
while (src < end) {
inst = ppc_inst_read(src);
raw_patch_instruction(dest, inst);
src = ppc_inst_next(src, src);
dest = ppc_inst_next(dest, dest);
}
#endif
}
static unsigned long __initdata saved_cpu_features;
static unsigned int __initdata saved_mmu_features;
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64
static unsigned long __initdata saved_firmware_features;
#endif
void __init apply_feature_fixups(void)
{
struct cpu_spec *spec = PTRRELOC(*PTRRELOC(&cur_cpu_spec));
*PTRRELOC(&saved_cpu_features) = spec->cpu_features;
*PTRRELOC(&saved_mmu_features) = spec->mmu_features;
/*
* Apply the CPU-specific and firmware specific fixups to kernel text
* (nop out sections not relevant to this CPU or this firmware).
*/
do_feature_fixups(spec->cpu_features,
PTRRELOC(&__start___ftr_fixup),
PTRRELOC(&__stop___ftr_fixup));
do_feature_fixups(spec->mmu_features,
PTRRELOC(&__start___mmu_ftr_fixup),
PTRRELOC(&__stop___mmu_ftr_fixup));
do_lwsync_fixups(spec->cpu_features,
PTRRELOC(&__start___lwsync_fixup),
PTRRELOC(&__stop___lwsync_fixup));
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64
saved_firmware_features = powerpc_firmware_features;
do_feature_fixups(powerpc_firmware_features,
&__start___fw_ftr_fixup, &__stop___fw_ftr_fixup);
#endif
do_final_fixups();
}
void __init setup_feature_keys(void)
{
/*
* Initialise jump label. This causes all the cpu/mmu_has_feature()
* checks to take on their correct polarity based on the current set of
* CPU/MMU features.
*/
jump_label_init();
cpu_feature_keys_init();
mmu_feature_keys_init();
}
static int __init check_features(void)
{
WARN(saved_cpu_features != cur_cpu_spec->cpu_features,
"CPU features changed after feature patching!\n");
WARN(saved_mmu_features != cur_cpu_spec->mmu_features,
"MMU features changed after feature patching!\n");
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64
WARN(saved_firmware_features != powerpc_firmware_features,
"Firmware features changed after feature patching!\n");
#endif
return 0;
}
late_initcall(check_features);
#ifdef CONFIG_FTR_FIXUP_SELFTEST
#define check(x) \
if (!(x)) printk("feature-fixups: test failed at line %d\n", __LINE__);
/* This must be after the text it fixes up, vmlinux.lds.S enforces that atm */
static struct fixup_entry fixup;
static long calc_offset(struct fixup_entry *entry, unsigned int *p)
{
return (unsigned long)p - (unsigned long)entry;
}
static void test_basic_patching(void)
{
powerpc: make feature-fixup tests fortify-safe Testing the fortified string functions[1] would cause a kernel panic on boot in test_feature_fixups() due to a buffer overflow in memcmp. This boils down to things like this: extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1; extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1_orig; check(memcmp(&ftr_fixup_test1, &ftr_fixup_test1_orig, size) == 0); We know that these are asm labels so it is safe to read up to 'size' bytes at those addresses. However, because we have passed the address of a single unsigned int to memcmp, the compiler believes the underlying object is in fact a single unsigned int. So if size > sizeof(unsigned int), there will be a panic at runtime. We can fix this by changing the types: instead of calling the asm labels unsigned ints, call them unsigned int[]s. Therefore the size isn't incorrectly determined at compile time and we get a regular unsafe memcmp and no panic. [1] http://openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/05/09/2 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-7-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Suggested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Tested-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-12 15:36:07 -06:00
extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1[];
extern unsigned int end_ftr_fixup_test1[];
extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1_orig[];
extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1_expected[];
int size = 4 * (end_ftr_fixup_test1 - ftr_fixup_test1);
fixup.value = fixup.mask = 8;
powerpc: make feature-fixup tests fortify-safe Testing the fortified string functions[1] would cause a kernel panic on boot in test_feature_fixups() due to a buffer overflow in memcmp. This boils down to things like this: extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1; extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1_orig; check(memcmp(&ftr_fixup_test1, &ftr_fixup_test1_orig, size) == 0); We know that these are asm labels so it is safe to read up to 'size' bytes at those addresses. However, because we have passed the address of a single unsigned int to memcmp, the compiler believes the underlying object is in fact a single unsigned int. So if size > sizeof(unsigned int), there will be a panic at runtime. We can fix this by changing the types: instead of calling the asm labels unsigned ints, call them unsigned int[]s. Therefore the size isn't incorrectly determined at compile time and we get a regular unsafe memcmp and no panic. [1] http://openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/05/09/2 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-7-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Suggested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Tested-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-12 15:36:07 -06:00
fixup.start_off = calc_offset(&fixup, ftr_fixup_test1 + 1);
fixup.end_off = calc_offset(&fixup, ftr_fixup_test1 + 2);
fixup.alt_start_off = fixup.alt_end_off = 0;
/* Sanity check */
powerpc: make feature-fixup tests fortify-safe Testing the fortified string functions[1] would cause a kernel panic on boot in test_feature_fixups() due to a buffer overflow in memcmp. This boils down to things like this: extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1; extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1_orig; check(memcmp(&ftr_fixup_test1, &ftr_fixup_test1_orig, size) == 0); We know that these are asm labels so it is safe to read up to 'size' bytes at those addresses. However, because we have passed the address of a single unsigned int to memcmp, the compiler believes the underlying object is in fact a single unsigned int. So if size > sizeof(unsigned int), there will be a panic at runtime. We can fix this by changing the types: instead of calling the asm labels unsigned ints, call them unsigned int[]s. Therefore the size isn't incorrectly determined at compile time and we get a regular unsafe memcmp and no panic. [1] http://openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/05/09/2 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-7-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Suggested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Tested-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-12 15:36:07 -06:00
check(memcmp(ftr_fixup_test1, ftr_fixup_test1_orig, size) == 0);
/* Check we don't patch if the value matches */
patch_feature_section(8, &fixup);
powerpc: make feature-fixup tests fortify-safe Testing the fortified string functions[1] would cause a kernel panic on boot in test_feature_fixups() due to a buffer overflow in memcmp. This boils down to things like this: extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1; extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1_orig; check(memcmp(&ftr_fixup_test1, &ftr_fixup_test1_orig, size) == 0); We know that these are asm labels so it is safe to read up to 'size' bytes at those addresses. However, because we have passed the address of a single unsigned int to memcmp, the compiler believes the underlying object is in fact a single unsigned int. So if size > sizeof(unsigned int), there will be a panic at runtime. We can fix this by changing the types: instead of calling the asm labels unsigned ints, call them unsigned int[]s. Therefore the size isn't incorrectly determined at compile time and we get a regular unsafe memcmp and no panic. [1] http://openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/05/09/2 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-7-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Suggested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Tested-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-12 15:36:07 -06:00
check(memcmp(ftr_fixup_test1, ftr_fixup_test1_orig, size) == 0);
/* Check we do patch if the value doesn't match */
patch_feature_section(0, &fixup);
powerpc: make feature-fixup tests fortify-safe Testing the fortified string functions[1] would cause a kernel panic on boot in test_feature_fixups() due to a buffer overflow in memcmp. This boils down to things like this: extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1; extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1_orig; check(memcmp(&ftr_fixup_test1, &ftr_fixup_test1_orig, size) == 0); We know that these are asm labels so it is safe to read up to 'size' bytes at those addresses. However, because we have passed the address of a single unsigned int to memcmp, the compiler believes the underlying object is in fact a single unsigned int. So if size > sizeof(unsigned int), there will be a panic at runtime. We can fix this by changing the types: instead of calling the asm labels unsigned ints, call them unsigned int[]s. Therefore the size isn't incorrectly determined at compile time and we get a regular unsafe memcmp and no panic. [1] http://openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/05/09/2 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-7-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Suggested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Tested-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-12 15:36:07 -06:00
check(memcmp(ftr_fixup_test1, ftr_fixup_test1_expected, size) == 0);
/* Check we do patch if the mask doesn't match */
powerpc: make feature-fixup tests fortify-safe Testing the fortified string functions[1] would cause a kernel panic on boot in test_feature_fixups() due to a buffer overflow in memcmp. This boils down to things like this: extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1; extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1_orig; check(memcmp(&ftr_fixup_test1, &ftr_fixup_test1_orig, size) == 0); We know that these are asm labels so it is safe to read up to 'size' bytes at those addresses. However, because we have passed the address of a single unsigned int to memcmp, the compiler believes the underlying object is in fact a single unsigned int. So if size > sizeof(unsigned int), there will be a panic at runtime. We can fix this by changing the types: instead of calling the asm labels unsigned ints, call them unsigned int[]s. Therefore the size isn't incorrectly determined at compile time and we get a regular unsafe memcmp and no panic. [1] http://openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/05/09/2 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-7-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Suggested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Tested-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-12 15:36:07 -06:00
memcpy(ftr_fixup_test1, ftr_fixup_test1_orig, size);
check(memcmp(ftr_fixup_test1, ftr_fixup_test1_orig, size) == 0);
patch_feature_section(~8, &fixup);
powerpc: make feature-fixup tests fortify-safe Testing the fortified string functions[1] would cause a kernel panic on boot in test_feature_fixups() due to a buffer overflow in memcmp. This boils down to things like this: extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1; extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1_orig; check(memcmp(&ftr_fixup_test1, &ftr_fixup_test1_orig, size) == 0); We know that these are asm labels so it is safe to read up to 'size' bytes at those addresses. However, because we have passed the address of a single unsigned int to memcmp, the compiler believes the underlying object is in fact a single unsigned int. So if size > sizeof(unsigned int), there will be a panic at runtime. We can fix this by changing the types: instead of calling the asm labels unsigned ints, call them unsigned int[]s. Therefore the size isn't incorrectly determined at compile time and we get a regular unsafe memcmp and no panic. [1] http://openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/05/09/2 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-7-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Suggested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Tested-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-12 15:36:07 -06:00
check(memcmp(ftr_fixup_test1, ftr_fixup_test1_expected, size) == 0);
}
static void test_alternative_patching(void)
{
powerpc: make feature-fixup tests fortify-safe Testing the fortified string functions[1] would cause a kernel panic on boot in test_feature_fixups() due to a buffer overflow in memcmp. This boils down to things like this: extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1; extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1_orig; check(memcmp(&ftr_fixup_test1, &ftr_fixup_test1_orig, size) == 0); We know that these are asm labels so it is safe to read up to 'size' bytes at those addresses. However, because we have passed the address of a single unsigned int to memcmp, the compiler believes the underlying object is in fact a single unsigned int. So if size > sizeof(unsigned int), there will be a panic at runtime. We can fix this by changing the types: instead of calling the asm labels unsigned ints, call them unsigned int[]s. Therefore the size isn't incorrectly determined at compile time and we get a regular unsafe memcmp and no panic. [1] http://openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/05/09/2 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-7-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Suggested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Tested-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-12 15:36:07 -06:00
extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test2[];
extern unsigned int end_ftr_fixup_test2[];
extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test2_orig[];
extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test2_alt[];
extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test2_expected[];
int size = 4 * (end_ftr_fixup_test2 - ftr_fixup_test2);
fixup.value = fixup.mask = 0xF;
powerpc: make feature-fixup tests fortify-safe Testing the fortified string functions[1] would cause a kernel panic on boot in test_feature_fixups() due to a buffer overflow in memcmp. This boils down to things like this: extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1; extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1_orig; check(memcmp(&ftr_fixup_test1, &ftr_fixup_test1_orig, size) == 0); We know that these are asm labels so it is safe to read up to 'size' bytes at those addresses. However, because we have passed the address of a single unsigned int to memcmp, the compiler believes the underlying object is in fact a single unsigned int. So if size > sizeof(unsigned int), there will be a panic at runtime. We can fix this by changing the types: instead of calling the asm labels unsigned ints, call them unsigned int[]s. Therefore the size isn't incorrectly determined at compile time and we get a regular unsafe memcmp and no panic. [1] http://openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/05/09/2 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-7-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Suggested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Tested-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-12 15:36:07 -06:00
fixup.start_off = calc_offset(&fixup, ftr_fixup_test2 + 1);
fixup.end_off = calc_offset(&fixup, ftr_fixup_test2 + 2);
fixup.alt_start_off = calc_offset(&fixup, ftr_fixup_test2_alt);
fixup.alt_end_off = calc_offset(&fixup, ftr_fixup_test2_alt + 1);
/* Sanity check */
powerpc: make feature-fixup tests fortify-safe Testing the fortified string functions[1] would cause a kernel panic on boot in test_feature_fixups() due to a buffer overflow in memcmp. This boils down to things like this: extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1; extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1_orig; check(memcmp(&ftr_fixup_test1, &ftr_fixup_test1_orig, size) == 0); We know that these are asm labels so it is safe to read up to 'size' bytes at those addresses. However, because we have passed the address of a single unsigned int to memcmp, the compiler believes the underlying object is in fact a single unsigned int. So if size > sizeof(unsigned int), there will be a panic at runtime. We can fix this by changing the types: instead of calling the asm labels unsigned ints, call them unsigned int[]s. Therefore the size isn't incorrectly determined at compile time and we get a regular unsafe memcmp and no panic. [1] http://openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/05/09/2 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-7-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Suggested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Tested-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-12 15:36:07 -06:00
check(memcmp(ftr_fixup_test2, ftr_fixup_test2_orig, size) == 0);
/* Check we don't patch if the value matches */
patch_feature_section(0xF, &fixup);
powerpc: make feature-fixup tests fortify-safe Testing the fortified string functions[1] would cause a kernel panic on boot in test_feature_fixups() due to a buffer overflow in memcmp. This boils down to things like this: extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1; extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1_orig; check(memcmp(&ftr_fixup_test1, &ftr_fixup_test1_orig, size) == 0); We know that these are asm labels so it is safe to read up to 'size' bytes at those addresses. However, because we have passed the address of a single unsigned int to memcmp, the compiler believes the underlying object is in fact a single unsigned int. So if size > sizeof(unsigned int), there will be a panic at runtime. We can fix this by changing the types: instead of calling the asm labels unsigned ints, call them unsigned int[]s. Therefore the size isn't incorrectly determined at compile time and we get a regular unsafe memcmp and no panic. [1] http://openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/05/09/2 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-7-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Suggested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Tested-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-12 15:36:07 -06:00
check(memcmp(ftr_fixup_test2, ftr_fixup_test2_orig, size) == 0);
/* Check we do patch if the value doesn't match */
patch_feature_section(0, &fixup);
powerpc: make feature-fixup tests fortify-safe Testing the fortified string functions[1] would cause a kernel panic on boot in test_feature_fixups() due to a buffer overflow in memcmp. This boils down to things like this: extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1; extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1_orig; check(memcmp(&ftr_fixup_test1, &ftr_fixup_test1_orig, size) == 0); We know that these are asm labels so it is safe to read up to 'size' bytes at those addresses. However, because we have passed the address of a single unsigned int to memcmp, the compiler believes the underlying object is in fact a single unsigned int. So if size > sizeof(unsigned int), there will be a panic at runtime. We can fix this by changing the types: instead of calling the asm labels unsigned ints, call them unsigned int[]s. Therefore the size isn't incorrectly determined at compile time and we get a regular unsafe memcmp and no panic. [1] http://openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/05/09/2 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-7-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Suggested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Tested-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-12 15:36:07 -06:00
check(memcmp(ftr_fixup_test2, ftr_fixup_test2_expected, size) == 0);
/* Check we do patch if the mask doesn't match */
powerpc: make feature-fixup tests fortify-safe Testing the fortified string functions[1] would cause a kernel panic on boot in test_feature_fixups() due to a buffer overflow in memcmp. This boils down to things like this: extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1; extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1_orig; check(memcmp(&ftr_fixup_test1, &ftr_fixup_test1_orig, size) == 0); We know that these are asm labels so it is safe to read up to 'size' bytes at those addresses. However, because we have passed the address of a single unsigned int to memcmp, the compiler believes the underlying object is in fact a single unsigned int. So if size > sizeof(unsigned int), there will be a panic at runtime. We can fix this by changing the types: instead of calling the asm labels unsigned ints, call them unsigned int[]s. Therefore the size isn't incorrectly determined at compile time and we get a regular unsafe memcmp and no panic. [1] http://openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/05/09/2 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-7-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Suggested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Tested-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-12 15:36:07 -06:00
memcpy(ftr_fixup_test2, ftr_fixup_test2_orig, size);
check(memcmp(ftr_fixup_test2, ftr_fixup_test2_orig, size) == 0);
patch_feature_section(~0xF, &fixup);
powerpc: make feature-fixup tests fortify-safe Testing the fortified string functions[1] would cause a kernel panic on boot in test_feature_fixups() due to a buffer overflow in memcmp. This boils down to things like this: extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1; extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1_orig; check(memcmp(&ftr_fixup_test1, &ftr_fixup_test1_orig, size) == 0); We know that these are asm labels so it is safe to read up to 'size' bytes at those addresses. However, because we have passed the address of a single unsigned int to memcmp, the compiler believes the underlying object is in fact a single unsigned int. So if size > sizeof(unsigned int), there will be a panic at runtime. We can fix this by changing the types: instead of calling the asm labels unsigned ints, call them unsigned int[]s. Therefore the size isn't incorrectly determined at compile time and we get a regular unsafe memcmp and no panic. [1] http://openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/05/09/2 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-7-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Suggested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Tested-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-12 15:36:07 -06:00
check(memcmp(ftr_fixup_test2, ftr_fixup_test2_expected, size) == 0);
}
static void test_alternative_case_too_big(void)
{
powerpc: make feature-fixup tests fortify-safe Testing the fortified string functions[1] would cause a kernel panic on boot in test_feature_fixups() due to a buffer overflow in memcmp. This boils down to things like this: extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1; extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1_orig; check(memcmp(&ftr_fixup_test1, &ftr_fixup_test1_orig, size) == 0); We know that these are asm labels so it is safe to read up to 'size' bytes at those addresses. However, because we have passed the address of a single unsigned int to memcmp, the compiler believes the underlying object is in fact a single unsigned int. So if size > sizeof(unsigned int), there will be a panic at runtime. We can fix this by changing the types: instead of calling the asm labels unsigned ints, call them unsigned int[]s. Therefore the size isn't incorrectly determined at compile time and we get a regular unsafe memcmp and no panic. [1] http://openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/05/09/2 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-7-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Suggested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Tested-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-12 15:36:07 -06:00
extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test3[];
extern unsigned int end_ftr_fixup_test3[];
extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test3_orig[];
extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test3_alt[];
int size = 4 * (end_ftr_fixup_test3 - ftr_fixup_test3);
fixup.value = fixup.mask = 0xC;
powerpc: make feature-fixup tests fortify-safe Testing the fortified string functions[1] would cause a kernel panic on boot in test_feature_fixups() due to a buffer overflow in memcmp. This boils down to things like this: extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1; extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1_orig; check(memcmp(&ftr_fixup_test1, &ftr_fixup_test1_orig, size) == 0); We know that these are asm labels so it is safe to read up to 'size' bytes at those addresses. However, because we have passed the address of a single unsigned int to memcmp, the compiler believes the underlying object is in fact a single unsigned int. So if size > sizeof(unsigned int), there will be a panic at runtime. We can fix this by changing the types: instead of calling the asm labels unsigned ints, call them unsigned int[]s. Therefore the size isn't incorrectly determined at compile time and we get a regular unsafe memcmp and no panic. [1] http://openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/05/09/2 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-7-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Suggested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Tested-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-12 15:36:07 -06:00
fixup.start_off = calc_offset(&fixup, ftr_fixup_test3 + 1);
fixup.end_off = calc_offset(&fixup, ftr_fixup_test3 + 2);
fixup.alt_start_off = calc_offset(&fixup, ftr_fixup_test3_alt);
fixup.alt_end_off = calc_offset(&fixup, ftr_fixup_test3_alt + 2);
/* Sanity check */
powerpc: make feature-fixup tests fortify-safe Testing the fortified string functions[1] would cause a kernel panic on boot in test_feature_fixups() due to a buffer overflow in memcmp. This boils down to things like this: extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1; extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1_orig; check(memcmp(&ftr_fixup_test1, &ftr_fixup_test1_orig, size) == 0); We know that these are asm labels so it is safe to read up to 'size' bytes at those addresses. However, because we have passed the address of a single unsigned int to memcmp, the compiler believes the underlying object is in fact a single unsigned int. So if size > sizeof(unsigned int), there will be a panic at runtime. We can fix this by changing the types: instead of calling the asm labels unsigned ints, call them unsigned int[]s. Therefore the size isn't incorrectly determined at compile time and we get a regular unsafe memcmp and no panic. [1] http://openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/05/09/2 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-7-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Suggested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Tested-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-12 15:36:07 -06:00
check(memcmp(ftr_fixup_test3, ftr_fixup_test3_orig, size) == 0);
/* Expect nothing to be patched, and the error returned to us */
check(patch_feature_section(0xF, &fixup) == 1);
powerpc: make feature-fixup tests fortify-safe Testing the fortified string functions[1] would cause a kernel panic on boot in test_feature_fixups() due to a buffer overflow in memcmp. This boils down to things like this: extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1; extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1_orig; check(memcmp(&ftr_fixup_test1, &ftr_fixup_test1_orig, size) == 0); We know that these are asm labels so it is safe to read up to 'size' bytes at those addresses. However, because we have passed the address of a single unsigned int to memcmp, the compiler believes the underlying object is in fact a single unsigned int. So if size > sizeof(unsigned int), there will be a panic at runtime. We can fix this by changing the types: instead of calling the asm labels unsigned ints, call them unsigned int[]s. Therefore the size isn't incorrectly determined at compile time and we get a regular unsafe memcmp and no panic. [1] http://openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/05/09/2 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-7-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Suggested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Tested-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-12 15:36:07 -06:00
check(memcmp(ftr_fixup_test3, ftr_fixup_test3_orig, size) == 0);
check(patch_feature_section(0, &fixup) == 1);
powerpc: make feature-fixup tests fortify-safe Testing the fortified string functions[1] would cause a kernel panic on boot in test_feature_fixups() due to a buffer overflow in memcmp. This boils down to things like this: extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1; extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1_orig; check(memcmp(&ftr_fixup_test1, &ftr_fixup_test1_orig, size) == 0); We know that these are asm labels so it is safe to read up to 'size' bytes at those addresses. However, because we have passed the address of a single unsigned int to memcmp, the compiler believes the underlying object is in fact a single unsigned int. So if size > sizeof(unsigned int), there will be a panic at runtime. We can fix this by changing the types: instead of calling the asm labels unsigned ints, call them unsigned int[]s. Therefore the size isn't incorrectly determined at compile time and we get a regular unsafe memcmp and no panic. [1] http://openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/05/09/2 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-7-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Suggested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Tested-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-12 15:36:07 -06:00
check(memcmp(ftr_fixup_test3, ftr_fixup_test3_orig, size) == 0);
check(patch_feature_section(~0xF, &fixup) == 1);
powerpc: make feature-fixup tests fortify-safe Testing the fortified string functions[1] would cause a kernel panic on boot in test_feature_fixups() due to a buffer overflow in memcmp. This boils down to things like this: extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1; extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1_orig; check(memcmp(&ftr_fixup_test1, &ftr_fixup_test1_orig, size) == 0); We know that these are asm labels so it is safe to read up to 'size' bytes at those addresses. However, because we have passed the address of a single unsigned int to memcmp, the compiler believes the underlying object is in fact a single unsigned int. So if size > sizeof(unsigned int), there will be a panic at runtime. We can fix this by changing the types: instead of calling the asm labels unsigned ints, call them unsigned int[]s. Therefore the size isn't incorrectly determined at compile time and we get a regular unsafe memcmp and no panic. [1] http://openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/05/09/2 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-7-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Suggested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Tested-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-12 15:36:07 -06:00
check(memcmp(ftr_fixup_test3, ftr_fixup_test3_orig, size) == 0);
}
static void test_alternative_case_too_small(void)
{
powerpc: make feature-fixup tests fortify-safe Testing the fortified string functions[1] would cause a kernel panic on boot in test_feature_fixups() due to a buffer overflow in memcmp. This boils down to things like this: extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1; extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1_orig; check(memcmp(&ftr_fixup_test1, &ftr_fixup_test1_orig, size) == 0); We know that these are asm labels so it is safe to read up to 'size' bytes at those addresses. However, because we have passed the address of a single unsigned int to memcmp, the compiler believes the underlying object is in fact a single unsigned int. So if size > sizeof(unsigned int), there will be a panic at runtime. We can fix this by changing the types: instead of calling the asm labels unsigned ints, call them unsigned int[]s. Therefore the size isn't incorrectly determined at compile time and we get a regular unsafe memcmp and no panic. [1] http://openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/05/09/2 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-7-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Suggested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Tested-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-12 15:36:07 -06:00
extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test4[];
extern unsigned int end_ftr_fixup_test4[];
extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test4_orig[];
extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test4_alt[];
extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test4_expected[];
int size = 4 * (end_ftr_fixup_test4 - ftr_fixup_test4);
unsigned long flag;
/* Check a high-bit flag */
flag = 1UL << ((sizeof(unsigned long) - 1) * 8);
fixup.value = fixup.mask = flag;
powerpc: make feature-fixup tests fortify-safe Testing the fortified string functions[1] would cause a kernel panic on boot in test_feature_fixups() due to a buffer overflow in memcmp. This boils down to things like this: extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1; extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1_orig; check(memcmp(&ftr_fixup_test1, &ftr_fixup_test1_orig, size) == 0); We know that these are asm labels so it is safe to read up to 'size' bytes at those addresses. However, because we have passed the address of a single unsigned int to memcmp, the compiler believes the underlying object is in fact a single unsigned int. So if size > sizeof(unsigned int), there will be a panic at runtime. We can fix this by changing the types: instead of calling the asm labels unsigned ints, call them unsigned int[]s. Therefore the size isn't incorrectly determined at compile time and we get a regular unsafe memcmp and no panic. [1] http://openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/05/09/2 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-7-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Suggested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Tested-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-12 15:36:07 -06:00
fixup.start_off = calc_offset(&fixup, ftr_fixup_test4 + 1);
fixup.end_off = calc_offset(&fixup, ftr_fixup_test4 + 5);
fixup.alt_start_off = calc_offset(&fixup, ftr_fixup_test4_alt);
fixup.alt_end_off = calc_offset(&fixup, ftr_fixup_test4_alt + 2);
/* Sanity check */
powerpc: make feature-fixup tests fortify-safe Testing the fortified string functions[1] would cause a kernel panic on boot in test_feature_fixups() due to a buffer overflow in memcmp. This boils down to things like this: extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1; extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1_orig; check(memcmp(&ftr_fixup_test1, &ftr_fixup_test1_orig, size) == 0); We know that these are asm labels so it is safe to read up to 'size' bytes at those addresses. However, because we have passed the address of a single unsigned int to memcmp, the compiler believes the underlying object is in fact a single unsigned int. So if size > sizeof(unsigned int), there will be a panic at runtime. We can fix this by changing the types: instead of calling the asm labels unsigned ints, call them unsigned int[]s. Therefore the size isn't incorrectly determined at compile time and we get a regular unsafe memcmp and no panic. [1] http://openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/05/09/2 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-7-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Suggested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Tested-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-12 15:36:07 -06:00
check(memcmp(ftr_fixup_test4, ftr_fixup_test4_orig, size) == 0);
/* Check we don't patch if the value matches */
patch_feature_section(flag, &fixup);
powerpc: make feature-fixup tests fortify-safe Testing the fortified string functions[1] would cause a kernel panic on boot in test_feature_fixups() due to a buffer overflow in memcmp. This boils down to things like this: extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1; extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1_orig; check(memcmp(&ftr_fixup_test1, &ftr_fixup_test1_orig, size) == 0); We know that these are asm labels so it is safe to read up to 'size' bytes at those addresses. However, because we have passed the address of a single unsigned int to memcmp, the compiler believes the underlying object is in fact a single unsigned int. So if size > sizeof(unsigned int), there will be a panic at runtime. We can fix this by changing the types: instead of calling the asm labels unsigned ints, call them unsigned int[]s. Therefore the size isn't incorrectly determined at compile time and we get a regular unsafe memcmp and no panic. [1] http://openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/05/09/2 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-7-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Suggested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Tested-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-12 15:36:07 -06:00
check(memcmp(ftr_fixup_test4, ftr_fixup_test4_orig, size) == 0);
/* Check we do patch if the value doesn't match */
patch_feature_section(0, &fixup);
powerpc: make feature-fixup tests fortify-safe Testing the fortified string functions[1] would cause a kernel panic on boot in test_feature_fixups() due to a buffer overflow in memcmp. This boils down to things like this: extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1; extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1_orig; check(memcmp(&ftr_fixup_test1, &ftr_fixup_test1_orig, size) == 0); We know that these are asm labels so it is safe to read up to 'size' bytes at those addresses. However, because we have passed the address of a single unsigned int to memcmp, the compiler believes the underlying object is in fact a single unsigned int. So if size > sizeof(unsigned int), there will be a panic at runtime. We can fix this by changing the types: instead of calling the asm labels unsigned ints, call them unsigned int[]s. Therefore the size isn't incorrectly determined at compile time and we get a regular unsafe memcmp and no panic. [1] http://openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/05/09/2 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-7-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Suggested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Tested-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-12 15:36:07 -06:00
check(memcmp(ftr_fixup_test4, ftr_fixup_test4_expected, size) == 0);
/* Check we do patch if the mask doesn't match */
powerpc: make feature-fixup tests fortify-safe Testing the fortified string functions[1] would cause a kernel panic on boot in test_feature_fixups() due to a buffer overflow in memcmp. This boils down to things like this: extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1; extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1_orig; check(memcmp(&ftr_fixup_test1, &ftr_fixup_test1_orig, size) == 0); We know that these are asm labels so it is safe to read up to 'size' bytes at those addresses. However, because we have passed the address of a single unsigned int to memcmp, the compiler believes the underlying object is in fact a single unsigned int. So if size > sizeof(unsigned int), there will be a panic at runtime. We can fix this by changing the types: instead of calling the asm labels unsigned ints, call them unsigned int[]s. Therefore the size isn't incorrectly determined at compile time and we get a regular unsafe memcmp and no panic. [1] http://openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/05/09/2 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-7-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Suggested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Tested-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-12 15:36:07 -06:00
memcpy(ftr_fixup_test4, ftr_fixup_test4_orig, size);
check(memcmp(ftr_fixup_test4, ftr_fixup_test4_orig, size) == 0);
patch_feature_section(~flag, &fixup);
powerpc: make feature-fixup tests fortify-safe Testing the fortified string functions[1] would cause a kernel panic on boot in test_feature_fixups() due to a buffer overflow in memcmp. This boils down to things like this: extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1; extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1_orig; check(memcmp(&ftr_fixup_test1, &ftr_fixup_test1_orig, size) == 0); We know that these are asm labels so it is safe to read up to 'size' bytes at those addresses. However, because we have passed the address of a single unsigned int to memcmp, the compiler believes the underlying object is in fact a single unsigned int. So if size > sizeof(unsigned int), there will be a panic at runtime. We can fix this by changing the types: instead of calling the asm labels unsigned ints, call them unsigned int[]s. Therefore the size isn't incorrectly determined at compile time and we get a regular unsafe memcmp and no panic. [1] http://openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/05/09/2 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-7-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Suggested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Tested-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-12 15:36:07 -06:00
check(memcmp(ftr_fixup_test4, ftr_fixup_test4_expected, size) == 0);
}
static void test_alternative_case_with_branch(void)
{
powerpc: make feature-fixup tests fortify-safe Testing the fortified string functions[1] would cause a kernel panic on boot in test_feature_fixups() due to a buffer overflow in memcmp. This boils down to things like this: extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1; extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1_orig; check(memcmp(&ftr_fixup_test1, &ftr_fixup_test1_orig, size) == 0); We know that these are asm labels so it is safe to read up to 'size' bytes at those addresses. However, because we have passed the address of a single unsigned int to memcmp, the compiler believes the underlying object is in fact a single unsigned int. So if size > sizeof(unsigned int), there will be a panic at runtime. We can fix this by changing the types: instead of calling the asm labels unsigned ints, call them unsigned int[]s. Therefore the size isn't incorrectly determined at compile time and we get a regular unsafe memcmp and no panic. [1] http://openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/05/09/2 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-7-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Suggested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Tested-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-12 15:36:07 -06:00
extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test5[];
extern unsigned int end_ftr_fixup_test5[];
extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test5_expected[];
int size = 4 * (end_ftr_fixup_test5 - ftr_fixup_test5);
powerpc: make feature-fixup tests fortify-safe Testing the fortified string functions[1] would cause a kernel panic on boot in test_feature_fixups() due to a buffer overflow in memcmp. This boils down to things like this: extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1; extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1_orig; check(memcmp(&ftr_fixup_test1, &ftr_fixup_test1_orig, size) == 0); We know that these are asm labels so it is safe to read up to 'size' bytes at those addresses. However, because we have passed the address of a single unsigned int to memcmp, the compiler believes the underlying object is in fact a single unsigned int. So if size > sizeof(unsigned int), there will be a panic at runtime. We can fix this by changing the types: instead of calling the asm labels unsigned ints, call them unsigned int[]s. Therefore the size isn't incorrectly determined at compile time and we get a regular unsafe memcmp and no panic. [1] http://openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/05/09/2 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-7-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Suggested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Tested-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-12 15:36:07 -06:00
check(memcmp(ftr_fixup_test5, ftr_fixup_test5_expected, size) == 0);
}
static void test_alternative_case_with_external_branch(void)
{
powerpc: make feature-fixup tests fortify-safe Testing the fortified string functions[1] would cause a kernel panic on boot in test_feature_fixups() due to a buffer overflow in memcmp. This boils down to things like this: extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1; extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1_orig; check(memcmp(&ftr_fixup_test1, &ftr_fixup_test1_orig, size) == 0); We know that these are asm labels so it is safe to read up to 'size' bytes at those addresses. However, because we have passed the address of a single unsigned int to memcmp, the compiler believes the underlying object is in fact a single unsigned int. So if size > sizeof(unsigned int), there will be a panic at runtime. We can fix this by changing the types: instead of calling the asm labels unsigned ints, call them unsigned int[]s. Therefore the size isn't incorrectly determined at compile time and we get a regular unsafe memcmp and no panic. [1] http://openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/05/09/2 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-7-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Suggested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Tested-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-12 15:36:07 -06:00
extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test6[];
extern unsigned int end_ftr_fixup_test6[];
extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test6_expected[];
int size = 4 * (end_ftr_fixup_test6 - ftr_fixup_test6);
powerpc: make feature-fixup tests fortify-safe Testing the fortified string functions[1] would cause a kernel panic on boot in test_feature_fixups() due to a buffer overflow in memcmp. This boils down to things like this: extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1; extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1_orig; check(memcmp(&ftr_fixup_test1, &ftr_fixup_test1_orig, size) == 0); We know that these are asm labels so it is safe to read up to 'size' bytes at those addresses. However, because we have passed the address of a single unsigned int to memcmp, the compiler believes the underlying object is in fact a single unsigned int. So if size > sizeof(unsigned int), there will be a panic at runtime. We can fix this by changing the types: instead of calling the asm labels unsigned ints, call them unsigned int[]s. Therefore the size isn't incorrectly determined at compile time and we get a regular unsafe memcmp and no panic. [1] http://openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/05/09/2 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-7-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Suggested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Tested-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-12 15:36:07 -06:00
check(memcmp(ftr_fixup_test6, ftr_fixup_test6_expected, size) == 0);
}
static void test_alternative_case_with_branch_to_end(void)
{
extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test7[];
extern unsigned int end_ftr_fixup_test7[];
extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test7_expected[];
int size = 4 * (end_ftr_fixup_test7 - ftr_fixup_test7);
check(memcmp(ftr_fixup_test7, ftr_fixup_test7_expected, size) == 0);
}
static void test_cpu_macros(void)
{
powerpc: make feature-fixup tests fortify-safe Testing the fortified string functions[1] would cause a kernel panic on boot in test_feature_fixups() due to a buffer overflow in memcmp. This boils down to things like this: extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1; extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1_orig; check(memcmp(&ftr_fixup_test1, &ftr_fixup_test1_orig, size) == 0); We know that these are asm labels so it is safe to read up to 'size' bytes at those addresses. However, because we have passed the address of a single unsigned int to memcmp, the compiler believes the underlying object is in fact a single unsigned int. So if size > sizeof(unsigned int), there will be a panic at runtime. We can fix this by changing the types: instead of calling the asm labels unsigned ints, call them unsigned int[]s. Therefore the size isn't incorrectly determined at compile time and we get a regular unsafe memcmp and no panic. [1] http://openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/05/09/2 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-7-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Suggested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Tested-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-12 15:36:07 -06:00
extern u8 ftr_fixup_test_FTR_macros[];
extern u8 ftr_fixup_test_FTR_macros_expected[];
unsigned long size = ftr_fixup_test_FTR_macros_expected -
ftr_fixup_test_FTR_macros;
/* The fixups have already been done for us during boot */
powerpc: make feature-fixup tests fortify-safe Testing the fortified string functions[1] would cause a kernel panic on boot in test_feature_fixups() due to a buffer overflow in memcmp. This boils down to things like this: extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1; extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1_orig; check(memcmp(&ftr_fixup_test1, &ftr_fixup_test1_orig, size) == 0); We know that these are asm labels so it is safe to read up to 'size' bytes at those addresses. However, because we have passed the address of a single unsigned int to memcmp, the compiler believes the underlying object is in fact a single unsigned int. So if size > sizeof(unsigned int), there will be a panic at runtime. We can fix this by changing the types: instead of calling the asm labels unsigned ints, call them unsigned int[]s. Therefore the size isn't incorrectly determined at compile time and we get a regular unsafe memcmp and no panic. [1] http://openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/05/09/2 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-7-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Suggested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Tested-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-12 15:36:07 -06:00
check(memcmp(ftr_fixup_test_FTR_macros,
ftr_fixup_test_FTR_macros_expected, size) == 0);
}
static void test_fw_macros(void)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64
powerpc: make feature-fixup tests fortify-safe Testing the fortified string functions[1] would cause a kernel panic on boot in test_feature_fixups() due to a buffer overflow in memcmp. This boils down to things like this: extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1; extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1_orig; check(memcmp(&ftr_fixup_test1, &ftr_fixup_test1_orig, size) == 0); We know that these are asm labels so it is safe to read up to 'size' bytes at those addresses. However, because we have passed the address of a single unsigned int to memcmp, the compiler believes the underlying object is in fact a single unsigned int. So if size > sizeof(unsigned int), there will be a panic at runtime. We can fix this by changing the types: instead of calling the asm labels unsigned ints, call them unsigned int[]s. Therefore the size isn't incorrectly determined at compile time and we get a regular unsafe memcmp and no panic. [1] http://openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/05/09/2 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-7-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Suggested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Tested-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-12 15:36:07 -06:00
extern u8 ftr_fixup_test_FW_FTR_macros[];
extern u8 ftr_fixup_test_FW_FTR_macros_expected[];
unsigned long size = ftr_fixup_test_FW_FTR_macros_expected -
ftr_fixup_test_FW_FTR_macros;
/* The fixups have already been done for us during boot */
powerpc: make feature-fixup tests fortify-safe Testing the fortified string functions[1] would cause a kernel panic on boot in test_feature_fixups() due to a buffer overflow in memcmp. This boils down to things like this: extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1; extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1_orig; check(memcmp(&ftr_fixup_test1, &ftr_fixup_test1_orig, size) == 0); We know that these are asm labels so it is safe to read up to 'size' bytes at those addresses. However, because we have passed the address of a single unsigned int to memcmp, the compiler believes the underlying object is in fact a single unsigned int. So if size > sizeof(unsigned int), there will be a panic at runtime. We can fix this by changing the types: instead of calling the asm labels unsigned ints, call them unsigned int[]s. Therefore the size isn't incorrectly determined at compile time and we get a regular unsafe memcmp and no panic. [1] http://openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/05/09/2 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-7-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Suggested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Tested-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-12 15:36:07 -06:00
check(memcmp(ftr_fixup_test_FW_FTR_macros,
ftr_fixup_test_FW_FTR_macros_expected, size) == 0);
#endif
}
static void test_lwsync_macros(void)
{
powerpc: make feature-fixup tests fortify-safe Testing the fortified string functions[1] would cause a kernel panic on boot in test_feature_fixups() due to a buffer overflow in memcmp. This boils down to things like this: extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1; extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1_orig; check(memcmp(&ftr_fixup_test1, &ftr_fixup_test1_orig, size) == 0); We know that these are asm labels so it is safe to read up to 'size' bytes at those addresses. However, because we have passed the address of a single unsigned int to memcmp, the compiler believes the underlying object is in fact a single unsigned int. So if size > sizeof(unsigned int), there will be a panic at runtime. We can fix this by changing the types: instead of calling the asm labels unsigned ints, call them unsigned int[]s. Therefore the size isn't incorrectly determined at compile time and we get a regular unsafe memcmp and no panic. [1] http://openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/05/09/2 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-7-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Suggested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Tested-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-12 15:36:07 -06:00
extern u8 lwsync_fixup_test[];
extern u8 end_lwsync_fixup_test[];
extern u8 lwsync_fixup_test_expected_LWSYNC[];
extern u8 lwsync_fixup_test_expected_SYNC[];
unsigned long size = end_lwsync_fixup_test -
lwsync_fixup_test;
/* The fixups have already been done for us during boot */
if (cur_cpu_spec->cpu_features & CPU_FTR_LWSYNC) {
powerpc: make feature-fixup tests fortify-safe Testing the fortified string functions[1] would cause a kernel panic on boot in test_feature_fixups() due to a buffer overflow in memcmp. This boils down to things like this: extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1; extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1_orig; check(memcmp(&ftr_fixup_test1, &ftr_fixup_test1_orig, size) == 0); We know that these are asm labels so it is safe to read up to 'size' bytes at those addresses. However, because we have passed the address of a single unsigned int to memcmp, the compiler believes the underlying object is in fact a single unsigned int. So if size > sizeof(unsigned int), there will be a panic at runtime. We can fix this by changing the types: instead of calling the asm labels unsigned ints, call them unsigned int[]s. Therefore the size isn't incorrectly determined at compile time and we get a regular unsafe memcmp and no panic. [1] http://openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/05/09/2 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-7-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Suggested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Tested-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-12 15:36:07 -06:00
check(memcmp(lwsync_fixup_test,
lwsync_fixup_test_expected_LWSYNC, size) == 0);
} else {
powerpc: make feature-fixup tests fortify-safe Testing the fortified string functions[1] would cause a kernel panic on boot in test_feature_fixups() due to a buffer overflow in memcmp. This boils down to things like this: extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1; extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1_orig; check(memcmp(&ftr_fixup_test1, &ftr_fixup_test1_orig, size) == 0); We know that these are asm labels so it is safe to read up to 'size' bytes at those addresses. However, because we have passed the address of a single unsigned int to memcmp, the compiler believes the underlying object is in fact a single unsigned int. So if size > sizeof(unsigned int), there will be a panic at runtime. We can fix this by changing the types: instead of calling the asm labels unsigned ints, call them unsigned int[]s. Therefore the size isn't incorrectly determined at compile time and we get a regular unsafe memcmp and no panic. [1] http://openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/05/09/2 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-7-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Suggested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Tested-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-12 15:36:07 -06:00
check(memcmp(lwsync_fixup_test,
lwsync_fixup_test_expected_SYNC, size) == 0);
}
}
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64
static void __init test_prefix_patching(void)
{
extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_prefix1[];
extern unsigned int end_ftr_fixup_prefix1[];
extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_prefix1_orig[];
extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_prefix1_expected[];
int size = sizeof(unsigned int) * (end_ftr_fixup_prefix1 - ftr_fixup_prefix1);
fixup.value = fixup.mask = 8;
fixup.start_off = calc_offset(&fixup, ftr_fixup_prefix1 + 1);
fixup.end_off = calc_offset(&fixup, ftr_fixup_prefix1 + 3);
fixup.alt_start_off = fixup.alt_end_off = 0;
/* Sanity check */
check(memcmp(ftr_fixup_prefix1, ftr_fixup_prefix1_orig, size) == 0);
patch_feature_section(0, &fixup);
check(memcmp(ftr_fixup_prefix1, ftr_fixup_prefix1_expected, size) == 0);
check(memcmp(ftr_fixup_prefix1, ftr_fixup_prefix1_orig, size) != 0);
}
static void __init test_prefix_alt_patching(void)
{
extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_prefix2[];
extern unsigned int end_ftr_fixup_prefix2[];
extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_prefix2_orig[];
extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_prefix2_expected[];
extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_prefix2_alt[];
int size = sizeof(unsigned int) * (end_ftr_fixup_prefix2 - ftr_fixup_prefix2);
fixup.value = fixup.mask = 8;
fixup.start_off = calc_offset(&fixup, ftr_fixup_prefix2 + 1);
fixup.end_off = calc_offset(&fixup, ftr_fixup_prefix2 + 3);
fixup.alt_start_off = calc_offset(&fixup, ftr_fixup_prefix2_alt);
fixup.alt_end_off = calc_offset(&fixup, ftr_fixup_prefix2_alt + 2);
/* Sanity check */
check(memcmp(ftr_fixup_prefix2, ftr_fixup_prefix2_orig, size) == 0);
patch_feature_section(0, &fixup);
check(memcmp(ftr_fixup_prefix2, ftr_fixup_prefix2_expected, size) == 0);
check(memcmp(ftr_fixup_prefix2, ftr_fixup_prefix2_orig, size) != 0);
}
static void __init test_prefix_word_alt_patching(void)
{
extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_prefix3[];
extern unsigned int end_ftr_fixup_prefix3[];
extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_prefix3_orig[];
extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_prefix3_expected[];
extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_prefix3_alt[];
int size = sizeof(unsigned int) * (end_ftr_fixup_prefix3 - ftr_fixup_prefix3);
fixup.value = fixup.mask = 8;
fixup.start_off = calc_offset(&fixup, ftr_fixup_prefix3 + 1);
fixup.end_off = calc_offset(&fixup, ftr_fixup_prefix3 + 4);
fixup.alt_start_off = calc_offset(&fixup, ftr_fixup_prefix3_alt);
fixup.alt_end_off = calc_offset(&fixup, ftr_fixup_prefix3_alt + 3);
/* Sanity check */
check(memcmp(ftr_fixup_prefix3, ftr_fixup_prefix3_orig, size) == 0);
patch_feature_section(0, &fixup);
check(memcmp(ftr_fixup_prefix3, ftr_fixup_prefix3_expected, size) == 0);
patch_feature_section(0, &fixup);
check(memcmp(ftr_fixup_prefix3, ftr_fixup_prefix3_orig, size) != 0);
}
#else
static inline void test_prefix_patching(void) {}
static inline void test_prefix_alt_patching(void) {}
static inline void test_prefix_word_alt_patching(void) {}
#endif /* CONFIG_PPC64 */
static int __init test_feature_fixups(void)
{
printk(KERN_DEBUG "Running feature fixup self-tests ...\n");
test_basic_patching();
test_alternative_patching();
test_alternative_case_too_big();
test_alternative_case_too_small();
test_alternative_case_with_branch();
test_alternative_case_with_external_branch();
test_alternative_case_with_branch_to_end();
test_cpu_macros();
test_fw_macros();
test_lwsync_macros();
test_prefix_patching();
test_prefix_alt_patching();
test_prefix_word_alt_patching();
return 0;
}
late_initcall(test_feature_fixups);
#endif /* CONFIG_FTR_FIXUP_SELFTEST */