1
0
Fork 0
alistair23-linux/fs/notify/inode_mark.c

248 lines
6.8 KiB
C
Raw Normal View History

/*
* Copyright (C) 2008 Red Hat, Inc., Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2, or (at your option)
* any later version.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; see the file COPYING. If not, write to
* the Free Software Foundation, 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
*/
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/mutex.h>
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
#include <linux/atomic.h>
#include <linux/fsnotify_backend.h>
#include "fsnotify.h"
#include "../internal.h"
/*
* Recalculate the inode->i_fsnotify_mask, or the mask of all FS_* event types
* any notifier is interested in hearing for this inode.
*/
void fsnotify_recalc_inode_mask(struct inode *inode)
{
spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
inode->i_fsnotify_mask = fsnotify_recalc_mask(&inode->i_fsnotify_marks);
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
__fsnotify_update_child_dentry_flags(inode);
}
void fsnotify_destroy_inode_mark(struct fsnotify_mark *mark)
{
struct inode *inode = mark->inode;
BUG_ON(!mutex_is_locked(&mark->group->mark_mutex));
assert_spin_locked(&mark->lock);
spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
hlist_del_init_rcu(&mark->obj_list);
mark->inode = NULL;
/*
* this mark is now off the inode->i_fsnotify_marks list and we
* hold the inode->i_lock, so this is the perfect time to update the
* inode->i_fsnotify_mask
*/
inode->i_fsnotify_mask = fsnotify_recalc_mask(&inode->i_fsnotify_marks);
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
}
/*
* Given an inode, destroy all of the marks associated with that inode.
*/
void fsnotify_clear_marks_by_inode(struct inode *inode)
{
struct fsnotify_mark *mark;
hlist: drop the node parameter from iterators I'm not sure why, but the hlist for each entry iterators were conceived list_for_each_entry(pos, head, member) The hlist ones were greedy and wanted an extra parameter: hlist_for_each_entry(tpos, pos, head, member) Why did they need an extra pos parameter? I'm not quite sure. Not only they don't really need it, it also prevents the iterator from looking exactly like the list iterator, which is unfortunate. Besides the semantic patch, there was some manual work required: - Fix up the actual hlist iterators in linux/list.h - Fix up the declaration of other iterators based on the hlist ones. - A very small amount of places were using the 'node' parameter, this was modified to use 'obj->member' instead. - Coccinelle didn't handle the hlist_for_each_entry_safe iterator properly, so those had to be fixed up manually. The semantic patch which is mostly the work of Peter Senna Tschudin is here: @@ iterator name hlist_for_each_entry, hlist_for_each_entry_continue, hlist_for_each_entry_from, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh, hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu_bh, for_each_busy_worker, ax25_uid_for_each, ax25_for_each, inet_bind_bucket_for_each, sctp_for_each_hentry, sk_for_each, sk_for_each_rcu, sk_for_each_from, sk_for_each_safe, sk_for_each_bound, hlist_for_each_entry_safe, hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu, nr_neigh_for_each, nr_neigh_for_each_safe, nr_node_for_each, nr_node_for_each_safe, for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp, for_each_gfn_sp, for_each_host; type T; expression a,c,d,e; identifier b; statement S; @@ -T b; <+... when != b ( hlist_for_each_entry(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_from(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu_bh(a, - b, c) S | for_each_busy_worker(a, c, - b, d) S | ax25_uid_for_each(a, - b, c) S | ax25_for_each(a, - b, c) S | inet_bind_bucket_for_each(a, - b, c) S | sctp_for_each_hentry(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each_rcu(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each_from -(a, b) +(a) S + sk_for_each_from(a) S | sk_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | sk_for_each_bound(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_safe(a, - b, c, d, e) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu(a, - b, c) S | nr_neigh_for_each(a, - b, c) S | nr_neigh_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | nr_node_for_each(a, - b, c) S | nr_node_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | - for_each_gfn_sp(a, c, d, b) S + for_each_gfn_sp(a, c, d) S | - for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp(a, c, d, b) S + for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp(a, c, d) S | for_each_host(a, - b, c) S | for_each_host_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | for_each_mesh_entry(a, - b, c, d) S ) ...+> [akpm@linux-foundation.org: drop bogus change from net/ipv4/raw.c] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: drop bogus hunk from net/ipv6/raw.c] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warnings] [akpm@linux-foudnation.org: redo intrusive kvm changes] Tested-by: Peter Senna Tschudin <peter.senna@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: Wu Fengguang <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-02-27 18:06:00 -07:00
struct hlist_node *n;
LIST_HEAD(free_list);
spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
hlist_for_each_entry_safe(mark, n, &inode->i_fsnotify_marks, obj_list) {
list_add(&mark->free_list, &free_list);
hlist_del_init_rcu(&mark->obj_list);
fsnotify_get_mark(mark);
}
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
fsnotify_destroy_marks(&free_list);
}
/*
* Given a group clear all of the inode marks associated with that group.
*/
void fsnotify_clear_inode_marks_by_group(struct fsnotify_group *group)
{
fsnotify_clear_marks_by_group_flags(group, FSNOTIFY_MARK_FLAG_INODE);
}
/*
* given a group and inode, find the mark associated with that combination.
* if found take a reference to that mark and return it, else return NULL
*/
struct fsnotify_mark *fsnotify_find_inode_mark(struct fsnotify_group *group,
struct inode *inode)
{
struct fsnotify_mark *mark;
spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
mark = fsnotify_find_mark(&inode->i_fsnotify_marks, group);
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
return mark;
}
/*
* If we are setting a mark mask on an inode mark we should pin the inode
* in memory.
*/
void fsnotify_set_inode_mark_mask_locked(struct fsnotify_mark *mark,
__u32 mask)
{
struct inode *inode;
assert_spin_locked(&mark->lock);
if (mask &&
mark->inode &&
!(mark->flags & FSNOTIFY_MARK_FLAG_OBJECT_PINNED)) {
mark->flags |= FSNOTIFY_MARK_FLAG_OBJECT_PINNED;
inode = igrab(mark->inode);
/*
* we shouldn't be able to get here if the inode wasn't
* already safely held in memory. But bug in case it
* ever is wrong.
*/
BUG_ON(!inode);
}
}
/*
* Attach an initialized mark to a given inode.
* These marks may be used for the fsnotify backend to determine which
* event types should be delivered to which group and for which inodes. These
* marks are ordered according to priority, highest number first, and then by
* the group's location in memory.
*/
int fsnotify_add_inode_mark(struct fsnotify_mark *mark,
struct fsnotify_group *group, struct inode *inode,
int allow_dups)
{
int ret;
mark->flags |= FSNOTIFY_MARK_FLAG_INODE;
BUG_ON(!mutex_is_locked(&group->mark_mutex));
assert_spin_locked(&mark->lock);
spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
mark->inode = inode;
ret = fsnotify_add_mark_list(&inode->i_fsnotify_marks, mark,
allow_dups);
inode->i_fsnotify_mask = fsnotify_recalc_mask(&inode->i_fsnotify_marks);
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
return ret;
}
/**
* fsnotify_unmount_inodes - an sb is unmounting. handle any watched inodes.
* @list: list of inodes being unmounted (sb->s_inodes)
*
* Called during unmount with no locks held, so needs to be safe against
* concurrent modifiers. We temporarily drop inode_sb_list_lock and CAN block.
*/
void fsnotify_unmount_inodes(struct list_head *list)
{
struct inode *inode, *next_i, *need_iput = NULL;
spin_lock(&inode_sb_list_lock);
list_for_each_entry_safe(inode, next_i, list, i_sb_list) {
struct inode *need_iput_tmp;
/*
* We cannot __iget() an inode in state I_FREEING,
* I_WILL_FREE, or I_NEW which is fine because by that point
* the inode cannot have any associated watches.
*/
spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
if (inode->i_state & (I_FREEING|I_WILL_FREE|I_NEW)) {
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
continue;
}
/*
* If i_count is zero, the inode cannot have any watches and
* doing an __iget/iput with MS_ACTIVE clear would actually
* evict all inodes with zero i_count from icache which is
* unnecessarily violent and may in fact be illegal to do.
*/
if (!atomic_read(&inode->i_count)) {
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
continue;
}
need_iput_tmp = need_iput;
need_iput = NULL;
/* In case fsnotify_inode_delete() drops a reference. */
if (inode != need_iput_tmp)
__iget(inode);
else
need_iput_tmp = NULL;
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
/* In case the dropping of a reference would nuke next_i. */
fsnotify: next_i is freed during fsnotify_unmount_inodes. During file system stress testing on 3.10 and 3.12 based kernels, the umount command occasionally hung in fsnotify_unmount_inodes in the section of code: spin_lock(&inode->i_lock); if (inode->i_state & (I_FREEING|I_WILL_FREE|I_NEW)) { spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock); continue; } As this section of code holds the global inode_sb_list_lock, eventually the system hangs trying to acquire the lock. Multiple crash dumps showed: The inode->i_state == 0x60 and i_count == 0 and i_sb_list would point back at itself. As this is not the value of list upon entry to the function, the kernel never exits the loop. To help narrow down problem, the call to list_del_init in inode_sb_list_del was changed to list_del. This poisons the pointers in the i_sb_list and causes a kernel to panic if it transverse a freed inode. Subsequent stress testing paniced in fsnotify_unmount_inodes at the bottom of the list_for_each_entry_safe loop showing next_i had become free. We believe the root cause of the problem is that next_i is being freed during the window of time that the list_for_each_entry_safe loop temporarily releases inode_sb_list_lock to call fsnotify and fsnotify_inode_delete. The code in fsnotify_unmount_inodes attempts to prevent the freeing of inode and next_i by calling __iget. However, the code doesn't do the __iget call on next_i if i_count == 0 or if i_state & (I_FREEING | I_WILL_FREE) The patch addresses this issue by advancing next_i in the above two cases until we either find a next_i which we can __iget or we reach the end of the list. This makes the handling of next_i more closely match the handling of the variable "inode." The time to reproduce the hang is highly variable (from hours to days.) We ran the stress test on a 3.10 kernel with the proposed patch for a week without failure. During list_for_each_entry_safe, next_i is becoming free causing the loop to never terminate. Advance next_i in those cases where __iget is not done. Signed-off-by: Jerry Hoemann <jerry.hoemann@hp.com> Cc: Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com> Cc: Ken Helias <kenhelias@firemail.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-10-29 15:50:22 -06:00
while (&next_i->i_sb_list != list) {
spin_lock(&next_i->i_lock);
fsnotify: next_i is freed during fsnotify_unmount_inodes. During file system stress testing on 3.10 and 3.12 based kernels, the umount command occasionally hung in fsnotify_unmount_inodes in the section of code: spin_lock(&inode->i_lock); if (inode->i_state & (I_FREEING|I_WILL_FREE|I_NEW)) { spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock); continue; } As this section of code holds the global inode_sb_list_lock, eventually the system hangs trying to acquire the lock. Multiple crash dumps showed: The inode->i_state == 0x60 and i_count == 0 and i_sb_list would point back at itself. As this is not the value of list upon entry to the function, the kernel never exits the loop. To help narrow down problem, the call to list_del_init in inode_sb_list_del was changed to list_del. This poisons the pointers in the i_sb_list and causes a kernel to panic if it transverse a freed inode. Subsequent stress testing paniced in fsnotify_unmount_inodes at the bottom of the list_for_each_entry_safe loop showing next_i had become free. We believe the root cause of the problem is that next_i is being freed during the window of time that the list_for_each_entry_safe loop temporarily releases inode_sb_list_lock to call fsnotify and fsnotify_inode_delete. The code in fsnotify_unmount_inodes attempts to prevent the freeing of inode and next_i by calling __iget. However, the code doesn't do the __iget call on next_i if i_count == 0 or if i_state & (I_FREEING | I_WILL_FREE) The patch addresses this issue by advancing next_i in the above two cases until we either find a next_i which we can __iget or we reach the end of the list. This makes the handling of next_i more closely match the handling of the variable "inode." The time to reproduce the hang is highly variable (from hours to days.) We ran the stress test on a 3.10 kernel with the proposed patch for a week without failure. During list_for_each_entry_safe, next_i is becoming free causing the loop to never terminate. Advance next_i in those cases where __iget is not done. Signed-off-by: Jerry Hoemann <jerry.hoemann@hp.com> Cc: Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com> Cc: Ken Helias <kenhelias@firemail.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-10-29 15:50:22 -06:00
if (!(next_i->i_state & (I_FREEING | I_WILL_FREE)) &&
atomic_read(&next_i->i_count)) {
__iget(next_i);
need_iput = next_i;
fsnotify: next_i is freed during fsnotify_unmount_inodes. During file system stress testing on 3.10 and 3.12 based kernels, the umount command occasionally hung in fsnotify_unmount_inodes in the section of code: spin_lock(&inode->i_lock); if (inode->i_state & (I_FREEING|I_WILL_FREE|I_NEW)) { spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock); continue; } As this section of code holds the global inode_sb_list_lock, eventually the system hangs trying to acquire the lock. Multiple crash dumps showed: The inode->i_state == 0x60 and i_count == 0 and i_sb_list would point back at itself. As this is not the value of list upon entry to the function, the kernel never exits the loop. To help narrow down problem, the call to list_del_init in inode_sb_list_del was changed to list_del. This poisons the pointers in the i_sb_list and causes a kernel to panic if it transverse a freed inode. Subsequent stress testing paniced in fsnotify_unmount_inodes at the bottom of the list_for_each_entry_safe loop showing next_i had become free. We believe the root cause of the problem is that next_i is being freed during the window of time that the list_for_each_entry_safe loop temporarily releases inode_sb_list_lock to call fsnotify and fsnotify_inode_delete. The code in fsnotify_unmount_inodes attempts to prevent the freeing of inode and next_i by calling __iget. However, the code doesn't do the __iget call on next_i if i_count == 0 or if i_state & (I_FREEING | I_WILL_FREE) The patch addresses this issue by advancing next_i in the above two cases until we either find a next_i which we can __iget or we reach the end of the list. This makes the handling of next_i more closely match the handling of the variable "inode." The time to reproduce the hang is highly variable (from hours to days.) We ran the stress test on a 3.10 kernel with the proposed patch for a week without failure. During list_for_each_entry_safe, next_i is becoming free causing the loop to never terminate. Advance next_i in those cases where __iget is not done. Signed-off-by: Jerry Hoemann <jerry.hoemann@hp.com> Cc: Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com> Cc: Ken Helias <kenhelias@firemail.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-10-29 15:50:22 -06:00
spin_unlock(&next_i->i_lock);
break;
}
spin_unlock(&next_i->i_lock);
fsnotify: next_i is freed during fsnotify_unmount_inodes. During file system stress testing on 3.10 and 3.12 based kernels, the umount command occasionally hung in fsnotify_unmount_inodes in the section of code: spin_lock(&inode->i_lock); if (inode->i_state & (I_FREEING|I_WILL_FREE|I_NEW)) { spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock); continue; } As this section of code holds the global inode_sb_list_lock, eventually the system hangs trying to acquire the lock. Multiple crash dumps showed: The inode->i_state == 0x60 and i_count == 0 and i_sb_list would point back at itself. As this is not the value of list upon entry to the function, the kernel never exits the loop. To help narrow down problem, the call to list_del_init in inode_sb_list_del was changed to list_del. This poisons the pointers in the i_sb_list and causes a kernel to panic if it transverse a freed inode. Subsequent stress testing paniced in fsnotify_unmount_inodes at the bottom of the list_for_each_entry_safe loop showing next_i had become free. We believe the root cause of the problem is that next_i is being freed during the window of time that the list_for_each_entry_safe loop temporarily releases inode_sb_list_lock to call fsnotify and fsnotify_inode_delete. The code in fsnotify_unmount_inodes attempts to prevent the freeing of inode and next_i by calling __iget. However, the code doesn't do the __iget call on next_i if i_count == 0 or if i_state & (I_FREEING | I_WILL_FREE) The patch addresses this issue by advancing next_i in the above two cases until we either find a next_i which we can __iget or we reach the end of the list. This makes the handling of next_i more closely match the handling of the variable "inode." The time to reproduce the hang is highly variable (from hours to days.) We ran the stress test on a 3.10 kernel with the proposed patch for a week without failure. During list_for_each_entry_safe, next_i is becoming free causing the loop to never terminate. Advance next_i in those cases where __iget is not done. Signed-off-by: Jerry Hoemann <jerry.hoemann@hp.com> Cc: Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com> Cc: Ken Helias <kenhelias@firemail.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-10-29 15:50:22 -06:00
next_i = list_entry(next_i->i_sb_list.next,
struct inode, i_sb_list);
}
/*
fsnotify: next_i is freed during fsnotify_unmount_inodes. During file system stress testing on 3.10 and 3.12 based kernels, the umount command occasionally hung in fsnotify_unmount_inodes in the section of code: spin_lock(&inode->i_lock); if (inode->i_state & (I_FREEING|I_WILL_FREE|I_NEW)) { spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock); continue; } As this section of code holds the global inode_sb_list_lock, eventually the system hangs trying to acquire the lock. Multiple crash dumps showed: The inode->i_state == 0x60 and i_count == 0 and i_sb_list would point back at itself. As this is not the value of list upon entry to the function, the kernel never exits the loop. To help narrow down problem, the call to list_del_init in inode_sb_list_del was changed to list_del. This poisons the pointers in the i_sb_list and causes a kernel to panic if it transverse a freed inode. Subsequent stress testing paniced in fsnotify_unmount_inodes at the bottom of the list_for_each_entry_safe loop showing next_i had become free. We believe the root cause of the problem is that next_i is being freed during the window of time that the list_for_each_entry_safe loop temporarily releases inode_sb_list_lock to call fsnotify and fsnotify_inode_delete. The code in fsnotify_unmount_inodes attempts to prevent the freeing of inode and next_i by calling __iget. However, the code doesn't do the __iget call on next_i if i_count == 0 or if i_state & (I_FREEING | I_WILL_FREE) The patch addresses this issue by advancing next_i in the above two cases until we either find a next_i which we can __iget or we reach the end of the list. This makes the handling of next_i more closely match the handling of the variable "inode." The time to reproduce the hang is highly variable (from hours to days.) We ran the stress test on a 3.10 kernel with the proposed patch for a week without failure. During list_for_each_entry_safe, next_i is becoming free causing the loop to never terminate. Advance next_i in those cases where __iget is not done. Signed-off-by: Jerry Hoemann <jerry.hoemann@hp.com> Cc: Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com> Cc: Ken Helias <kenhelias@firemail.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-10-29 15:50:22 -06:00
* We can safely drop inode_sb_list_lock here because either
* we actually hold references on both inode and next_i or
* end of list. Also no new inodes will be added since the
* umount has begun.
*/
spin_unlock(&inode_sb_list_lock);
if (need_iput_tmp)
iput(need_iput_tmp);
/* for each watch, send FS_UNMOUNT and then remove it */
fsnotify(inode, FS_UNMOUNT, inode, FSNOTIFY_EVENT_INODE, NULL, 0);
fsnotify_inode_delete(inode);
iput(inode);
spin_lock(&inode_sb_list_lock);
}
spin_unlock(&inode_sb_list_lock);
}