1
0
Fork 0
alistair23-linux/arch/powerpc/platforms/cell/spufs/file.c

2663 lines
61 KiB
C
Raw Normal View History

/*
* SPU file system -- file contents
*
* (C) Copyright IBM Deutschland Entwicklung GmbH 2005
*
* Author: Arnd Bergmann <arndb@de.ibm.com>
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2, or (at your option)
* any later version.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
*/
#undef DEBUG
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/ioctl.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/pagemap.h>
#include <linux/poll.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies. percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is used as the basis of conversion. http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py The script does the followings. * Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used, gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h. * When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered - alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there doesn't seem to be any matching order. * If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the file. The conversion was done in the following steps. 1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400 files. 2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion, some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added inclusions to around 150 files. 3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits from #2 to make sure no file was left behind. 4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed. e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually. 5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as necessary. 6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h. 7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq). * x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config. * powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig * sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig * ia64 SMP allmodconfig * s390 SMP allmodconfig * alpha SMP allmodconfig * um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig 8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as a separate patch and serve as bisection point. Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step 6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch. If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of the specific arch. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
2010-03-24 02:04:11 -06:00
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <asm/io.h>
#include <asm/time.h>
#include <asm/spu.h>
#include <asm/spu_info.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include "spufs.h"
#include "sputrace.h"
#define SPUFS_MMAP_4K (PAGE_SIZE == 0x1000)
/* Simple attribute files */
struct spufs_attr {
int (*get)(void *, u64 *);
int (*set)(void *, u64);
char get_buf[24]; /* enough to store a u64 and "\n\0" */
char set_buf[24];
void *data;
const char *fmt; /* format for read operation */
struct mutex mutex; /* protects access to these buffers */
};
static int spufs_attr_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file,
int (*get)(void *, u64 *), int (*set)(void *, u64),
const char *fmt)
{
struct spufs_attr *attr;
attr = kmalloc(sizeof(*attr), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!attr)
return -ENOMEM;
attr->get = get;
attr->set = set;
attr->data = inode->i_private;
attr->fmt = fmt;
mutex_init(&attr->mutex);
file->private_data = attr;
return nonseekable_open(inode, file);
}
static int spufs_attr_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
kfree(file->private_data);
return 0;
}
static ssize_t spufs_attr_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
size_t len, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct spufs_attr *attr;
size_t size;
ssize_t ret;
attr = file->private_data;
if (!attr->get)
return -EACCES;
ret = mutex_lock_interruptible(&attr->mutex);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (*ppos) { /* continued read */
size = strlen(attr->get_buf);
} else { /* first read */
u64 val;
ret = attr->get(attr->data, &val);
if (ret)
goto out;
size = scnprintf(attr->get_buf, sizeof(attr->get_buf),
attr->fmt, (unsigned long long)val);
}
ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, len, ppos, attr->get_buf, size);
out:
mutex_unlock(&attr->mutex);
return ret;
}
static ssize_t spufs_attr_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t len, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct spufs_attr *attr;
u64 val;
size_t size;
ssize_t ret;
attr = file->private_data;
if (!attr->set)
return -EACCES;
ret = mutex_lock_interruptible(&attr->mutex);
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = -EFAULT;
size = min(sizeof(attr->set_buf) - 1, len);
if (copy_from_user(attr->set_buf, buf, size))
goto out;
ret = len; /* claim we got the whole input */
attr->set_buf[size] = '\0';
val = simple_strtol(attr->set_buf, NULL, 0);
attr->set(attr->data, val);
out:
mutex_unlock(&attr->mutex);
return ret;
}
#define DEFINE_SPUFS_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE(__fops, __get, __set, __fmt) \
static int __fops ## _open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) \
{ \
__simple_attr_check_format(__fmt, 0ull); \
return spufs_attr_open(inode, file, __get, __set, __fmt); \
} \
static const struct file_operations __fops = { \
.open = __fops ## _open, \
.release = spufs_attr_release, \
.read = spufs_attr_read, \
.write = spufs_attr_write, \
.llseek = generic_file_llseek, \
};
static int
spufs_mem_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct spufs_inode_info *i = SPUFS_I(inode);
struct spu_context *ctx = i->i_ctx;
mutex_lock(&ctx->mapping_lock);
file->private_data = ctx;
if (!i->i_openers++)
ctx->local_store = inode->i_mapping;
mutex_unlock(&ctx->mapping_lock);
return 0;
}
static int
spufs_mem_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct spufs_inode_info *i = SPUFS_I(inode);
struct spu_context *ctx = i->i_ctx;
mutex_lock(&ctx->mapping_lock);
if (!--i->i_openers)
ctx->local_store = NULL;
mutex_unlock(&ctx->mapping_lock);
return 0;
}
static ssize_t
__spufs_mem_read(struct spu_context *ctx, char __user *buffer,
size_t size, loff_t *pos)
{
char *local_store = ctx->ops->get_ls(ctx);
return simple_read_from_buffer(buffer, size, pos, local_store,
LS_SIZE);
}
static ssize_t
spufs_mem_read(struct file *file, char __user *buffer,
size_t size, loff_t *pos)
{
struct spu_context *ctx = file->private_data;
ssize_t ret;
ret = spu_acquire(ctx);
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = __spufs_mem_read(ctx, buffer, size, pos);
spu_release(ctx);
return ret;
}
static ssize_t
spufs_mem_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,
size_t size, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct spu_context *ctx = file->private_data;
char *local_store;
loff_t pos = *ppos;
int ret;
if (pos > LS_SIZE)
return -EFBIG;
ret = spu_acquire(ctx);
if (ret)
return ret;
local_store = ctx->ops->get_ls(ctx);
size = simple_write_to_buffer(local_store, LS_SIZE, ppos, buffer, size);
spu_release(ctx);
return size;
}
static vm_fault_t
spufs_mem_mmap_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
{
struct vm_area_struct *vma = vmf->vma;
struct spu_context *ctx = vma->vm_file->private_data;
unsigned long pfn, offset;
vm_fault_t ret;
offset = vmf->pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT;
if (offset >= LS_SIZE)
return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
pr_debug("spufs_mem_mmap_fault address=0x%lx, offset=0x%lx\n",
vmf->address, offset);
if (spu_acquire(ctx))
return VM_FAULT_NOPAGE;
if (ctx->state == SPU_STATE_SAVED) {
vma->vm_page_prot = pgprot_cached(vma->vm_page_prot);
pfn = vmalloc_to_pfn(ctx->csa.lscsa->ls + offset);
} else {
vma->vm_page_prot = pgprot_noncached_wc(vma->vm_page_prot);
pfn = (ctx->spu->local_store_phys + offset) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
}
ret = vmf_insert_pfn(vma, vmf->address, pfn);
spu_release(ctx);
return ret;
}
static int spufs_mem_mmap_access(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long address,
void *buf, int len, int write)
{
struct spu_context *ctx = vma->vm_file->private_data;
unsigned long offset = address - vma->vm_start;
char *local_store;
if (write && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE))
return -EACCES;
if (spu_acquire(ctx))
return -EINTR;
if ((offset + len) > vma->vm_end)
len = vma->vm_end - offset;
local_store = ctx->ops->get_ls(ctx);
if (write)
memcpy_toio(local_store + offset, buf, len);
else
memcpy_fromio(buf, local_store + offset, len);
spu_release(ctx);
return len;
}
static const struct vm_operations_struct spufs_mem_mmap_vmops = {
.fault = spufs_mem_mmap_fault,
.access = spufs_mem_mmap_access,
};
static int spufs_mem_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED))
return -EINVAL;
vma->vm_flags |= VM_IO | VM_PFNMAP;
vma->vm_page_prot = pgprot_noncached_wc(vma->vm_page_prot);
vma->vm_ops = &spufs_mem_mmap_vmops;
return 0;
}
static const struct file_operations spufs_mem_fops = {
.open = spufs_mem_open,
.release = spufs_mem_release,
.read = spufs_mem_read,
.write = spufs_mem_write,
.llseek = generic_file_llseek,
.mmap = spufs_mem_mmap,
};
static vm_fault_t spufs_ps_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf,
unsigned long ps_offs,
unsigned long ps_size)
{
struct spu_context *ctx = vmf->vma->vm_file->private_data;
unsigned long area, offset = vmf->pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT;
int err = 0;
vm_fault_t ret = VM_FAULT_NOPAGE;
spu_context_nospu_trace(spufs_ps_fault__enter, ctx);
if (offset >= ps_size)
return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
if (fatal_signal_pending(current))
return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
/*
* Because we release the mmap_sem, the context may be destroyed while
* we're in spu_wait. Grab an extra reference so it isn't destroyed
* in the meantime.
*/
get_spu_context(ctx);
/*
* We have to wait for context to be loaded before we have
* pages to hand out to the user, but we don't want to wait
* with the mmap_sem held.
* It is possible to drop the mmap_sem here, but then we need
* to return VM_FAULT_NOPAGE because the mappings may have
* hanged.
*/
if (spu_acquire(ctx))
goto refault;
if (ctx->state == SPU_STATE_SAVED) {
up_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
spu_context_nospu_trace(spufs_ps_fault__sleep, ctx);
err = spufs_wait(ctx->run_wq, ctx->state == SPU_STATE_RUNNABLE);
spu_context_trace(spufs_ps_fault__wake, ctx, ctx->spu);
down_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
} else {
area = ctx->spu->problem_phys + ps_offs;
ret = vmf_insert_pfn(vmf->vma, vmf->address,
(area + offset) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
spu_context_trace(spufs_ps_fault__insert, ctx, ctx->spu);
}
if (!err)
spu_release(ctx);
refault:
put_spu_context(ctx);
return ret;
}
#if SPUFS_MMAP_4K
static vm_fault_t spufs_cntl_mmap_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
{
return spufs_ps_fault(vmf, 0x4000, SPUFS_CNTL_MAP_SIZE);
}
static const struct vm_operations_struct spufs_cntl_mmap_vmops = {
.fault = spufs_cntl_mmap_fault,
};
/*
* mmap support for problem state control area [0x4000 - 0x4fff].
*/
static int spufs_cntl_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED))
return -EINVAL;
vma->vm_flags |= VM_IO | VM_PFNMAP;
vma->vm_page_prot = pgprot_noncached(vma->vm_page_prot);
vma->vm_ops = &spufs_cntl_mmap_vmops;
return 0;
}
#else /* SPUFS_MMAP_4K */
#define spufs_cntl_mmap NULL
#endif /* !SPUFS_MMAP_4K */
static int spufs_cntl_get(void *data, u64 *val)
{
struct spu_context *ctx = data;
int ret;
ret = spu_acquire(ctx);
if (ret)
return ret;
*val = ctx->ops->status_read(ctx);
spu_release(ctx);
return 0;
}
static int spufs_cntl_set(void *data, u64 val)
{
struct spu_context *ctx = data;
int ret;
ret = spu_acquire(ctx);
if (ret)
return ret;
ctx->ops->runcntl_write(ctx, val);
spu_release(ctx);
return 0;
}
static int spufs_cntl_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct spufs_inode_info *i = SPUFS_I(inode);
struct spu_context *ctx = i->i_ctx;
mutex_lock(&ctx->mapping_lock);
file->private_data = ctx;
if (!i->i_openers++)
ctx->cntl = inode->i_mapping;
mutex_unlock(&ctx->mapping_lock);
return simple_attr_open(inode, file, spufs_cntl_get,
spufs_cntl_set, "0x%08lx");
}
static int
spufs_cntl_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct spufs_inode_info *i = SPUFS_I(inode);
struct spu_context *ctx = i->i_ctx;
simple_attr_release(inode, file);
mutex_lock(&ctx->mapping_lock);
if (!--i->i_openers)
ctx->cntl = NULL;
mutex_unlock(&ctx->mapping_lock);
return 0;
}
static const struct file_operations spufs_cntl_fops = {
.open = spufs_cntl_open,
.release = spufs_cntl_release,
.read = simple_attr_read,
.write = simple_attr_write,
.llseek = generic_file_llseek,
.mmap = spufs_cntl_mmap,
};
static int
spufs_regs_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct spufs_inode_info *i = SPUFS_I(inode);
file->private_data = i->i_ctx;
return 0;
}
static ssize_t
__spufs_regs_read(struct spu_context *ctx, char __user *buffer,
size_t size, loff_t *pos)
{
struct spu_lscsa *lscsa = ctx->csa.lscsa;
return simple_read_from_buffer(buffer, size, pos,
lscsa->gprs, sizeof lscsa->gprs);
}
static ssize_t
spufs_regs_read(struct file *file, char __user *buffer,
size_t size, loff_t *pos)
{
int ret;
struct spu_context *ctx = file->private_data;
/* pre-check for file position: if we'd return EOF, there's no point
* causing a deschedule */
if (*pos >= sizeof(ctx->csa.lscsa->gprs))
return 0;
ret = spu_acquire_saved(ctx);
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = __spufs_regs_read(ctx, buffer, size, pos);
spu_release_saved(ctx);
return ret;
}
static ssize_t
spufs_regs_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,
size_t size, loff_t *pos)
{
struct spu_context *ctx = file->private_data;
struct spu_lscsa *lscsa = ctx->csa.lscsa;
int ret;
if (*pos >= sizeof(lscsa->gprs))
return -EFBIG;
ret = spu_acquire_saved(ctx);
if (ret)
return ret;
size = simple_write_to_buffer(lscsa->gprs, sizeof(lscsa->gprs), pos,
buffer, size);
spu_release_saved(ctx);
return size;
}
static const struct file_operations spufs_regs_fops = {
.open = spufs_regs_open,
.read = spufs_regs_read,
.write = spufs_regs_write,
.llseek = generic_file_llseek,
};
static ssize_t
__spufs_fpcr_read(struct spu_context *ctx, char __user * buffer,
size_t size, loff_t * pos)
{
struct spu_lscsa *lscsa = ctx->csa.lscsa;
return simple_read_from_buffer(buffer, size, pos,
&lscsa->fpcr, sizeof(lscsa->fpcr));
}
static ssize_t
spufs_fpcr_read(struct file *file, char __user * buffer,
size_t size, loff_t * pos)
{
int ret;
struct spu_context *ctx = file->private_data;
ret = spu_acquire_saved(ctx);
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = __spufs_fpcr_read(ctx, buffer, size, pos);
spu_release_saved(ctx);
return ret;
}
static ssize_t
spufs_fpcr_write(struct file *file, const char __user * buffer,
size_t size, loff_t * pos)
{
struct spu_context *ctx = file->private_data;
struct spu_lscsa *lscsa = ctx->csa.lscsa;
int ret;
if (*pos >= sizeof(lscsa->fpcr))
return -EFBIG;
ret = spu_acquire_saved(ctx);
if (ret)
return ret;
size = simple_write_to_buffer(&lscsa->fpcr, sizeof(lscsa->fpcr), pos,
buffer, size);
spu_release_saved(ctx);
return size;
}
static const struct file_operations spufs_fpcr_fops = {
.open = spufs_regs_open,
.read = spufs_fpcr_read,
.write = spufs_fpcr_write,
.llseek = generic_file_llseek,
};
/* generic open function for all pipe-like files */
static int spufs_pipe_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct spufs_inode_info *i = SPUFS_I(inode);
file->private_data = i->i_ctx;
*: convert stream-like files from nonseekable_open -> stream_open Using scripts/coccinelle/api/stream_open.cocci added in 10dce8af3422 ("fs: stream_open - opener for stream-like files so that read and write can run simultaneously without deadlock"), search and convert to stream_open all in-kernel nonseekable_open users for which read and write actually do not depend on ppos and where there is no other methods in file_operations which assume @offset access. I've verified each generated change manually - that it is correct to convert - and each other nonseekable_open instance left - that it is either not correct to convert there, or that it is not converted due to current stream_open.cocci limitations. The script also does not convert files that should be valid to convert, but that currently have .llseek = noop_llseek or generic_file_llseek for unknown reason despite file being opened with nonseekable_open (e.g. drivers/input/mousedev.c) Among cases converted 14 were potentially vulnerable to read vs write deadlock (see details in 10dce8af3422): drivers/char/pcmcia/cm4000_cs.c:1685:7-23: ERROR: cm4000_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. drivers/gnss/core.c:45:1-17: ERROR: gnss_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. drivers/hid/uhid.c:635:1-17: ERROR: uhid_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c:988:1-17: ERROR: umad_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. drivers/input/evdev.c:527:1-17: ERROR: evdev_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. drivers/input/misc/uinput.c:401:1-17: ERROR: uinput_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. drivers/isdn/capi/capi.c:963:8-24: ERROR: capi_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. drivers/leds/uleds.c:77:1-17: ERROR: uleds_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. drivers/media/rc/lirc_dev.c:198:1-17: ERROR: lirc_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. drivers/s390/char/fs3270.c:488:1-17: ERROR: fs3270_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. drivers/usb/misc/ldusb.c:310:1-17: ERROR: ld_usb_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. drivers/xen/evtchn.c:667:8-24: ERROR: evtchn_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. net/batman-adv/icmp_socket.c:80:1-17: ERROR: batadv_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. net/rfkill/core.c:1146:8-24: ERROR: rfkill_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. and the rest were just safe to convert to stream_open because their read and write do not use ppos at all and corresponding file_operations do not have methods that assume @offset file access(*): arch/powerpc/platforms/52xx/mpc52xx_gpt.c:631:8-24: WARNING: mpc52xx_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. arch/powerpc/platforms/cell/spufs/file.c:591:8-24: WARNING: spufs_ibox_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. arch/powerpc/platforms/cell/spufs/file.c:591:8-24: WARNING: spufs_ibox_stat_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. arch/powerpc/platforms/cell/spufs/file.c:591:8-24: WARNING: spufs_mbox_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. arch/powerpc/platforms/cell/spufs/file.c:591:8-24: WARNING: spufs_mbox_stat_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. arch/powerpc/platforms/cell/spufs/file.c:591:8-24: WARNING: spufs_wbox_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. arch/powerpc/platforms/cell/spufs/file.c:591:8-24: WARNING: spufs_wbox_stat_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. arch/um/drivers/harddog_kern.c:88:8-24: WARNING: harddog_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c:430:33-49: WARNING: microcode_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/char/ds1620.c:215:8-24: WARNING: ds1620_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/char/dtlk.c:301:1-17: WARNING: dtlk_fops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_watchdog.c:840:9-25: WARNING: ipmi_wdog_fops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/char/pcmcia/scr24x_cs.c:95:8-24: WARNING: scr24x_fops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/char/tb0219.c:246:9-25: WARNING: tb0219_fops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/firewire/nosy.c:306:8-24: WARNING: nosy_ops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/hwmon/fschmd.c:840:8-24: WARNING: watchdog_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/hwmon/w83793.c:1344:8-24: WARNING: watchdog_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c:1747:8-24: WARNING: ucma_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/infiniband/core/ucm.c:1178:8-24: WARNING: ucm_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_main.c:1086:8-24: WARNING: uverbs_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/input/joydev.c:282:1-17: WARNING: joydev_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/pci/switch/switchtec.c:393:1-17: WARNING: switchtec_fops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/platform/chrome/cros_ec_debugfs.c:135:8-24: WARNING: cros_ec_console_log_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/rtc/rtc-ds1374.c:470:9-25: WARNING: ds1374_wdt_fops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/rtc/rtc-m41t80.c:805:9-25: WARNING: wdt_fops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/s390/char/tape_char.c:293:2-18: WARNING: tape_fops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/s390/char/zcore.c:194:8-24: WARNING: zcore_reipl_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_api.c:528:8-24: WARNING: zcrypt_fops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/spi/spidev.c:594:1-17: WARNING: spidev_fops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/staging/pi433/pi433_if.c:974:1-17: WARNING: pi433_fops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/acquirewdt.c:203:8-24: WARNING: acq_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/advantechwdt.c:202:8-24: WARNING: advwdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/alim1535_wdt.c:252:8-24: WARNING: ali_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/alim7101_wdt.c:217:8-24: WARNING: wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/ar7_wdt.c:166:8-24: WARNING: ar7_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/at91rm9200_wdt.c:113:8-24: WARNING: at91wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/ath79_wdt.c:135:8-24: WARNING: ath79_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/bcm63xx_wdt.c:119:8-24: WARNING: bcm63xx_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/cpu5wdt.c:143:8-24: WARNING: cpu5wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/cpwd.c:397:8-24: WARNING: cpwd_fops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/eurotechwdt.c:319:8-24: WARNING: eurwdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/f71808e_wdt.c:528:8-24: WARNING: watchdog_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/gef_wdt.c:232:8-24: WARNING: gef_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/geodewdt.c:95:8-24: WARNING: geodewdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/ib700wdt.c:241:8-24: WARNING: ibwdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/ibmasr.c:326:8-24: WARNING: asr_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/indydog.c:80:8-24: WARNING: indydog_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/intel_scu_watchdog.c:307:8-24: WARNING: intel_scu_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/iop_wdt.c:104:8-24: WARNING: iop_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/it8712f_wdt.c:330:8-24: WARNING: it8712f_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/ixp4xx_wdt.c:68:8-24: WARNING: ixp4xx_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/ks8695_wdt.c:145:8-24: WARNING: ks8695wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/m54xx_wdt.c:88:8-24: WARNING: m54xx_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/machzwd.c:336:8-24: WARNING: zf_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/mixcomwd.c:153:8-24: WARNING: mixcomwd_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/mtx-1_wdt.c:121:8-24: WARNING: mtx1_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/mv64x60_wdt.c:136:8-24: WARNING: mv64x60_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/nuc900_wdt.c:134:8-24: WARNING: nuc900wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/nv_tco.c:164:8-24: WARNING: nv_tco_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/pc87413_wdt.c:289:8-24: WARNING: pc87413_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/pcwd.c:698:8-24: WARNING: pcwd_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/pcwd.c:737:8-24: WARNING: pcwd_temp_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/pcwd_pci.c:581:8-24: WARNING: pcipcwd_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/pcwd_pci.c:623:8-24: WARNING: pcipcwd_temp_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/pcwd_usb.c:488:8-24: WARNING: usb_pcwd_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/pcwd_usb.c:527:8-24: WARNING: usb_pcwd_temperature_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/pika_wdt.c:121:8-24: WARNING: pikawdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/pnx833x_wdt.c:119:8-24: WARNING: pnx833x_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/rc32434_wdt.c:153:8-24: WARNING: rc32434_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/rdc321x_wdt.c:145:8-24: WARNING: rdc321x_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/riowd.c:79:1-17: WARNING: riowd_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/sa1100_wdt.c:62:8-24: WARNING: sa1100dog_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/sbc60xxwdt.c:211:8-24: WARNING: wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/sbc7240_wdt.c:139:8-24: WARNING: wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/sbc8360.c:274:8-24: WARNING: sbc8360_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/sbc_epx_c3.c:81:8-24: WARNING: epx_c3_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/sbc_fitpc2_wdt.c:78:8-24: WARNING: fitpc2_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/sb_wdog.c:108:1-17: WARNING: sbwdog_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/sc1200wdt.c:181:8-24: WARNING: sc1200wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/sc520_wdt.c:261:8-24: WARNING: wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/sch311x_wdt.c:319:8-24: WARNING: sch311x_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/scx200_wdt.c:105:8-24: WARNING: scx200_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/smsc37b787_wdt.c:369:8-24: WARNING: wb_smsc_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/w83877f_wdt.c:227:8-24: WARNING: wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/w83977f_wdt.c:301:8-24: WARNING: wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/wafer5823wdt.c:200:8-24: WARNING: wafwdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/watchdog_dev.c:828:8-24: WARNING: watchdog_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/wdrtas.c:379:8-24: WARNING: wdrtas_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/wdrtas.c:445:8-24: WARNING: wdrtas_temp_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/wdt285.c:104:1-17: WARNING: watchdog_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/wdt977.c:276:8-24: WARNING: wdt977_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/wdt.c:424:8-24: WARNING: wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/wdt.c:484:8-24: WARNING: wdt_temp_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/wdt_pci.c:464:8-24: WARNING: wdtpci_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/wdt_pci.c:527:8-24: WARNING: wdtpci_temp_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. net/batman-adv/log.c:105:1-17: WARNING: batadv_log_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. sound/core/control.c:57:7-23: WARNING: snd_ctl_f_ops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. sound/core/rawmidi.c:385:7-23: WARNING: snd_rawmidi_f_ops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c:310:7-23: WARNING: snd_seq_f_ops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. sound/core/timer.c:1428:7-23: WARNING: snd_timer_f_ops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. One can also recheck/review the patch via generating it with explanation comments included via $ make coccicheck MODE=patch COCCI=scripts/coccinelle/api/stream_open.cocci SPFLAGS="-D explain" (*) This second group also contains cases with read/write deadlocks that stream_open.cocci don't yet detect, but which are still valid to convert to stream_open since ppos is not used. For example drivers/pci/switch/switchtec.c calls wait_for_completion_interruptible() in its .read, but stream_open.cocci currently detects only "wait_event*" as blocking. Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Yongzhi Pan <panyongzhi@gmail.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Julia Lawall <Julia.Lawall@lip6.fr> Cc: Nikolaus Rath <Nikolaus@rath.org> Cc: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com> Cc: Anatolij Gustschin <agust@denx.de> Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: Anton Ivanov <anton.ivanov@cambridgegreys.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "James R. Van Zandt" <jrv@vanzandt.mv.com> Cc: Corey Minyard <minyard@acm.org> Cc: Harald Welte <laforge@gnumonks.org> Acked-by: Lubomir Rintel <lkundrak@v3.sk> [scr24x_cs] Cc: Stefan Richter <stefanr@s5r6.in-berlin.de> Cc: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org> Cc: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@googlemail.com> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com> Cc: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.com> Acked-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> [watchdog/* hwmon/*] Cc: Rudolf Marek <r.marek@assembler.cz> Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> Cc: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de> Cc: Jacek Anaszewski <jacek.anaszewski@gmail.com> Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org> Cc: Kurt Schwemmer <kurt.schwemmer@microsemi.com> Acked-by: Logan Gunthorpe <logang@deltatee.com> [drivers/pci/switch/switchtec] Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> [drivers/pci/switch/switchtec] Cc: Benson Leung <bleung@chromium.org> Acked-by: Enric Balletbo i Serra <enric.balletbo@collabora.com> [platform/chrome] Cc: Alessandro Zummo <a.zummo@towertech.it> Acked-by: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com> [rtc/*] Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Cc: Wim Van Sebroeck <wim@linux-watchdog.org> Cc: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com> Cc: bcm-kernel-feedback-list@broadcom.com Cc: Wan ZongShun <mcuos.com@gmail.com> Cc: Zwane Mwaikambo <zwanem@gmail.com> Cc: Marek Lindner <mareklindner@neomailbox.ch> Cc: Simon Wunderlich <sw@simonwunderlich.de> Cc: Antonio Quartulli <a@unstable.cc> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Cc: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz> Cc: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Kirill Smelkov <kirr@nexedi.com>
2019-03-26 14:51:19 -06:00
return stream_open(inode, file);
}
/*
* Read as many bytes from the mailbox as possible, until
* one of the conditions becomes true:
*
* - no more data available in the mailbox
* - end of the user provided buffer
* - end of the mapped area
*/
static ssize_t spufs_mbox_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
size_t len, loff_t *pos)
{
struct spu_context *ctx = file->private_data;
u32 mbox_data, __user *udata;
ssize_t count;
if (len < 4)
return -EINVAL;
Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand. It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact. A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's just get this done once and for all. This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form. There were a couple of notable cases: - csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias. - the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing really used it) - microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch. I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-03 19:57:57 -07:00
if (!access_ok(buf, len))
return -EFAULT;
udata = (void __user *)buf;
count = spu_acquire(ctx);
if (count)
return count;
for (count = 0; (count + 4) <= len; count += 4, udata++) {
int ret;
ret = ctx->ops->mbox_read(ctx, &mbox_data);
if (ret == 0)
break;
/*
* at the end of the mapped area, we can fault
* but still need to return the data we have
* read successfully so far.
*/
ret = __put_user(mbox_data, udata);
if (ret) {
if (!count)
count = -EFAULT;
break;
}
}
spu_release(ctx);
if (!count)
count = -EAGAIN;
return count;
}
static const struct file_operations spufs_mbox_fops = {
.open = spufs_pipe_open,
.read = spufs_mbox_read,
.llseek = no_llseek,
};
static ssize_t spufs_mbox_stat_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
size_t len, loff_t *pos)
{
struct spu_context *ctx = file->private_data;
ssize_t ret;
u32 mbox_stat;
if (len < 4)
return -EINVAL;
ret = spu_acquire(ctx);
if (ret)
return ret;
mbox_stat = ctx->ops->mbox_stat_read(ctx) & 0xff;
spu_release(ctx);
if (copy_to_user(buf, &mbox_stat, sizeof mbox_stat))
return -EFAULT;
return 4;
}
static const struct file_operations spufs_mbox_stat_fops = {
.open = spufs_pipe_open,
.read = spufs_mbox_stat_read,
.llseek = no_llseek,
};
/* low-level ibox access function */
size_t spu_ibox_read(struct spu_context *ctx, u32 *data)
{
return ctx->ops->ibox_read(ctx, data);
}
/* interrupt-level ibox callback function. */
void spufs_ibox_callback(struct spu *spu)
{
struct spu_context *ctx = spu->ctx;
if (ctx)
wake_up_all(&ctx->ibox_wq);
}
/*
* Read as many bytes from the interrupt mailbox as possible, until
* one of the conditions becomes true:
*
* - no more data available in the mailbox
* - end of the user provided buffer
* - end of the mapped area
*
* If the file is opened without O_NONBLOCK, we wait here until
* any data is available, but return when we have been able to
* read something.
*/
static ssize_t spufs_ibox_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
size_t len, loff_t *pos)
{
struct spu_context *ctx = file->private_data;
u32 ibox_data, __user *udata;
ssize_t count;
if (len < 4)
return -EINVAL;
Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand. It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact. A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's just get this done once and for all. This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form. There were a couple of notable cases: - csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias. - the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing really used it) - microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch. I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-03 19:57:57 -07:00
if (!access_ok(buf, len))
return -EFAULT;
udata = (void __user *)buf;
count = spu_acquire(ctx);
if (count)
goto out;
/* wait only for the first element */
count = 0;
if (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) {
if (!spu_ibox_read(ctx, &ibox_data)) {
count = -EAGAIN;
goto out_unlock;
}
} else {
count = spufs_wait(ctx->ibox_wq, spu_ibox_read(ctx, &ibox_data));
if (count)
goto out;
}
/* if we can't write at all, return -EFAULT */
count = __put_user(ibox_data, udata);
if (count)
goto out_unlock;
for (count = 4, udata++; (count + 4) <= len; count += 4, udata++) {
int ret;
ret = ctx->ops->ibox_read(ctx, &ibox_data);
if (ret == 0)
break;
/*
* at the end of the mapped area, we can fault
* but still need to return the data we have
* read successfully so far.
*/
ret = __put_user(ibox_data, udata);
if (ret)
break;
}
out_unlock:
spu_release(ctx);
out:
return count;
}
static __poll_t spufs_ibox_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
{
struct spu_context *ctx = file->private_data;
__poll_t mask;
poll_wait(file, &ctx->ibox_wq, wait);
/*
* For now keep this uninterruptible and also ignore the rule
* that poll should not sleep. Will be fixed later.
*/
mutex_lock(&ctx->state_mutex);
mask = ctx->ops->mbox_stat_poll(ctx, EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM);
spu_release(ctx);
return mask;
}
static const struct file_operations spufs_ibox_fops = {
.open = spufs_pipe_open,
.read = spufs_ibox_read,
.poll = spufs_ibox_poll,
.llseek = no_llseek,
};
static ssize_t spufs_ibox_stat_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
size_t len, loff_t *pos)
{
struct spu_context *ctx = file->private_data;
ssize_t ret;
u32 ibox_stat;
if (len < 4)
return -EINVAL;
ret = spu_acquire(ctx);
if (ret)
return ret;
ibox_stat = (ctx->ops->mbox_stat_read(ctx) >> 16) & 0xff;
spu_release(ctx);
if (copy_to_user(buf, &ibox_stat, sizeof ibox_stat))
return -EFAULT;
return 4;
}
static const struct file_operations spufs_ibox_stat_fops = {
.open = spufs_pipe_open,
.read = spufs_ibox_stat_read,
.llseek = no_llseek,
};
/* low-level mailbox write */
size_t spu_wbox_write(struct spu_context *ctx, u32 data)
{
return ctx->ops->wbox_write(ctx, data);
}
/* interrupt-level wbox callback function. */
void spufs_wbox_callback(struct spu *spu)
{
struct spu_context *ctx = spu->ctx;
if (ctx)
wake_up_all(&ctx->wbox_wq);
}
/*
* Write as many bytes to the interrupt mailbox as possible, until
* one of the conditions becomes true:
*
* - the mailbox is full
* - end of the user provided buffer
* - end of the mapped area
*
* If the file is opened without O_NONBLOCK, we wait here until
* space is available, but return when we have been able to
* write something.
*/
static ssize_t spufs_wbox_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t len, loff_t *pos)
{
struct spu_context *ctx = file->private_data;
u32 wbox_data, __user *udata;
ssize_t count;
if (len < 4)
return -EINVAL;
udata = (void __user *)buf;
Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand. It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact. A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's just get this done once and for all. This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form. There were a couple of notable cases: - csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias. - the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing really used it) - microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch. I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-03 19:57:57 -07:00
if (!access_ok(buf, len))
return -EFAULT;
if (__get_user(wbox_data, udata))
return -EFAULT;
count = spu_acquire(ctx);
if (count)
goto out;
/*
* make sure we can at least write one element, by waiting
* in case of !O_NONBLOCK
*/
count = 0;
if (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) {
if (!spu_wbox_write(ctx, wbox_data)) {
count = -EAGAIN;
goto out_unlock;
}
} else {
count = spufs_wait(ctx->wbox_wq, spu_wbox_write(ctx, wbox_data));
if (count)
goto out;
}
/* write as much as possible */
for (count = 4, udata++; (count + 4) <= len; count += 4, udata++) {
int ret;
ret = __get_user(wbox_data, udata);
if (ret)
break;
ret = spu_wbox_write(ctx, wbox_data);
if (ret == 0)
break;
}
out_unlock:
spu_release(ctx);
out:
return count;
}
static __poll_t spufs_wbox_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
{
struct spu_context *ctx = file->private_data;
__poll_t mask;
poll_wait(file, &ctx->wbox_wq, wait);
/*
* For now keep this uninterruptible and also ignore the rule
* that poll should not sleep. Will be fixed later.
*/
mutex_lock(&ctx->state_mutex);
mask = ctx->ops->mbox_stat_poll(ctx, EPOLLOUT | EPOLLWRNORM);
spu_release(ctx);
return mask;
}
static const struct file_operations spufs_wbox_fops = {
.open = spufs_pipe_open,
.write = spufs_wbox_write,
.poll = spufs_wbox_poll,
.llseek = no_llseek,
};
static ssize_t spufs_wbox_stat_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
size_t len, loff_t *pos)
{
struct spu_context *ctx = file->private_data;
ssize_t ret;
u32 wbox_stat;
if (len < 4)
return -EINVAL;
ret = spu_acquire(ctx);
if (ret)
return ret;
wbox_stat = (ctx->ops->mbox_stat_read(ctx) >> 8) & 0xff;
spu_release(ctx);
if (copy_to_user(buf, &wbox_stat, sizeof wbox_stat))
return -EFAULT;
return 4;
}
static const struct file_operations spufs_wbox_stat_fops = {
.open = spufs_pipe_open,
.read = spufs_wbox_stat_read,
.llseek = no_llseek,
};
static int spufs_signal1_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct spufs_inode_info *i = SPUFS_I(inode);
struct spu_context *ctx = i->i_ctx;
mutex_lock(&ctx->mapping_lock);
file->private_data = ctx;
if (!i->i_openers++)
ctx->signal1 = inode->i_mapping;
mutex_unlock(&ctx->mapping_lock);
return nonseekable_open(inode, file);
}
static int
spufs_signal1_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct spufs_inode_info *i = SPUFS_I(inode);
struct spu_context *ctx = i->i_ctx;
mutex_lock(&ctx->mapping_lock);
if (!--i->i_openers)
ctx->signal1 = NULL;
mutex_unlock(&ctx->mapping_lock);
return 0;
}
static ssize_t __spufs_signal1_read(struct spu_context *ctx, char __user *buf,
size_t len, loff_t *pos)
{
int ret = 0;
u32 data;
if (len < 4)
return -EINVAL;
if (ctx->csa.spu_chnlcnt_RW[3]) {
data = ctx->csa.spu_chnldata_RW[3];
ret = 4;
}
if (!ret)
goto out;
if (copy_to_user(buf, &data, 4))
return -EFAULT;
out:
return ret;
}
static ssize_t spufs_signal1_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
size_t len, loff_t *pos)
{
int ret;
struct spu_context *ctx = file->private_data;
ret = spu_acquire_saved(ctx);
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = __spufs_signal1_read(ctx, buf, len, pos);
spu_release_saved(ctx);
return ret;
}
static ssize_t spufs_signal1_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t len, loff_t *pos)
{
struct spu_context *ctx;
ssize_t ret;
u32 data;
ctx = file->private_data;
if (len < 4)
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&data, buf, 4))
return -EFAULT;
ret = spu_acquire(ctx);
if (ret)
return ret;
ctx->ops->signal1_write(ctx, data);
spu_release(ctx);
return 4;
}
static vm_fault_t
spufs_signal1_mmap_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
{
#if SPUFS_SIGNAL_MAP_SIZE == 0x1000
return spufs_ps_fault(vmf, 0x14000, SPUFS_SIGNAL_MAP_SIZE);
#elif SPUFS_SIGNAL_MAP_SIZE == 0x10000
/* For 64k pages, both signal1 and signal2 can be used to mmap the whole
* signal 1 and 2 area
*/
return spufs_ps_fault(vmf, 0x10000, SPUFS_SIGNAL_MAP_SIZE);
#else
#error unsupported page size
#endif
}
static const struct vm_operations_struct spufs_signal1_mmap_vmops = {
.fault = spufs_signal1_mmap_fault,
};
static int spufs_signal1_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED))
return -EINVAL;
vma->vm_flags |= VM_IO | VM_PFNMAP;
vma->vm_page_prot = pgprot_noncached(vma->vm_page_prot);
vma->vm_ops = &spufs_signal1_mmap_vmops;
return 0;
}
static const struct file_operations spufs_signal1_fops = {
.open = spufs_signal1_open,
.release = spufs_signal1_release,
.read = spufs_signal1_read,
.write = spufs_signal1_write,
.mmap = spufs_signal1_mmap,
.llseek = no_llseek,
};
static const struct file_operations spufs_signal1_nosched_fops = {
.open = spufs_signal1_open,
.release = spufs_signal1_release,
.write = spufs_signal1_write,
.mmap = spufs_signal1_mmap,
.llseek = no_llseek,
};
static int spufs_signal2_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct spufs_inode_info *i = SPUFS_I(inode);
struct spu_context *ctx = i->i_ctx;
mutex_lock(&ctx->mapping_lock);
file->private_data = ctx;
if (!i->i_openers++)
ctx->signal2 = inode->i_mapping;
mutex_unlock(&ctx->mapping_lock);
return nonseekable_open(inode, file);
}
static int
spufs_signal2_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct spufs_inode_info *i = SPUFS_I(inode);
struct spu_context *ctx = i->i_ctx;
mutex_lock(&ctx->mapping_lock);
if (!--i->i_openers)
ctx->signal2 = NULL;
mutex_unlock(&ctx->mapping_lock);
return 0;
}
static ssize_t __spufs_signal2_read(struct spu_context *ctx, char __user *buf,
size_t len, loff_t *pos)
{
int ret = 0;
u32 data;
if (len < 4)
return -EINVAL;
if (ctx->csa.spu_chnlcnt_RW[4]) {
data = ctx->csa.spu_chnldata_RW[4];
ret = 4;
}
if (!ret)
goto out;
if (copy_to_user(buf, &data, 4))
return -EFAULT;
out:
return ret;
}
static ssize_t spufs_signal2_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
size_t len, loff_t *pos)
{
struct spu_context *ctx = file->private_data;
int ret;
ret = spu_acquire_saved(ctx);
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = __spufs_signal2_read(ctx, buf, len, pos);
spu_release_saved(ctx);
return ret;
}
static ssize_t spufs_signal2_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t len, loff_t *pos)
{
struct spu_context *ctx;
ssize_t ret;
u32 data;
ctx = file->private_data;
if (len < 4)
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&data, buf, 4))
return -EFAULT;
ret = spu_acquire(ctx);
if (ret)
return ret;
ctx->ops->signal2_write(ctx, data);
spu_release(ctx);
return 4;
}
#if SPUFS_MMAP_4K
static vm_fault_t
spufs_signal2_mmap_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
{
#if SPUFS_SIGNAL_MAP_SIZE == 0x1000
return spufs_ps_fault(vmf, 0x1c000, SPUFS_SIGNAL_MAP_SIZE);
#elif SPUFS_SIGNAL_MAP_SIZE == 0x10000
/* For 64k pages, both signal1 and signal2 can be used to mmap the whole
* signal 1 and 2 area
*/
return spufs_ps_fault(vmf, 0x10000, SPUFS_SIGNAL_MAP_SIZE);
#else
#error unsupported page size
#endif
}
static const struct vm_operations_struct spufs_signal2_mmap_vmops = {
.fault = spufs_signal2_mmap_fault,
};
static int spufs_signal2_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED))
return -EINVAL;
vma->vm_flags |= VM_IO | VM_PFNMAP;
vma->vm_page_prot = pgprot_noncached(vma->vm_page_prot);
vma->vm_ops = &spufs_signal2_mmap_vmops;
return 0;
}
#else /* SPUFS_MMAP_4K */
#define spufs_signal2_mmap NULL
#endif /* !SPUFS_MMAP_4K */
static const struct file_operations spufs_signal2_fops = {
.open = spufs_signal2_open,
.release = spufs_signal2_release,
.read = spufs_signal2_read,
.write = spufs_signal2_write,
.mmap = spufs_signal2_mmap,
.llseek = no_llseek,
};
static const struct file_operations spufs_signal2_nosched_fops = {
.open = spufs_signal2_open,
.release = spufs_signal2_release,
.write = spufs_signal2_write,
.mmap = spufs_signal2_mmap,
.llseek = no_llseek,
};
/*
* This is a wrapper around DEFINE_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE which does the
* work of acquiring (or not) the SPU context before calling through
* to the actual get routine. The set routine is called directly.
*/
#define SPU_ATTR_NOACQUIRE 0
#define SPU_ATTR_ACQUIRE 1
#define SPU_ATTR_ACQUIRE_SAVED 2
#define DEFINE_SPUFS_ATTRIBUTE(__name, __get, __set, __fmt, __acquire) \
static int __##__get(void *data, u64 *val) \
{ \
struct spu_context *ctx = data; \
int ret = 0; \
\
if (__acquire == SPU_ATTR_ACQUIRE) { \
ret = spu_acquire(ctx); \
if (ret) \
return ret; \
*val = __get(ctx); \
spu_release(ctx); \
} else if (__acquire == SPU_ATTR_ACQUIRE_SAVED) { \
ret = spu_acquire_saved(ctx); \
if (ret) \
return ret; \
*val = __get(ctx); \
spu_release_saved(ctx); \
} else \
*val = __get(ctx); \
\
return 0; \
} \
DEFINE_SPUFS_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE(__name, __##__get, __set, __fmt);
static int spufs_signal1_type_set(void *data, u64 val)
{
struct spu_context *ctx = data;
int ret;
ret = spu_acquire(ctx);
if (ret)
return ret;
ctx->ops->signal1_type_set(ctx, val);
spu_release(ctx);
return 0;
}
static u64 spufs_signal1_type_get(struct spu_context *ctx)
{
return ctx->ops->signal1_type_get(ctx);
}
DEFINE_SPUFS_ATTRIBUTE(spufs_signal1_type, spufs_signal1_type_get,
spufs_signal1_type_set, "%llu\n", SPU_ATTR_ACQUIRE);
static int spufs_signal2_type_set(void *data, u64 val)
{
struct spu_context *ctx = data;
int ret;
ret = spu_acquire(ctx);
if (ret)
return ret;
ctx->ops->signal2_type_set(ctx, val);
spu_release(ctx);
return 0;
}
static u64 spufs_signal2_type_get(struct spu_context *ctx)
{
return ctx->ops->signal2_type_get(ctx);
}
DEFINE_SPUFS_ATTRIBUTE(spufs_signal2_type, spufs_signal2_type_get,
spufs_signal2_type_set, "%llu\n", SPU_ATTR_ACQUIRE);
#if SPUFS_MMAP_4K
static vm_fault_t
spufs_mss_mmap_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
{
return spufs_ps_fault(vmf, 0x0000, SPUFS_MSS_MAP_SIZE);
}
static const struct vm_operations_struct spufs_mss_mmap_vmops = {
.fault = spufs_mss_mmap_fault,
};
/*
* mmap support for problem state MFC DMA area [0x0000 - 0x0fff].
*/
static int spufs_mss_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED))
return -EINVAL;
vma->vm_flags |= VM_IO | VM_PFNMAP;
vma->vm_page_prot = pgprot_noncached(vma->vm_page_prot);
vma->vm_ops = &spufs_mss_mmap_vmops;
return 0;
}
#else /* SPUFS_MMAP_4K */
#define spufs_mss_mmap NULL
#endif /* !SPUFS_MMAP_4K */
static int spufs_mss_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct spufs_inode_info *i = SPUFS_I(inode);
struct spu_context *ctx = i->i_ctx;
file->private_data = i->i_ctx;
mutex_lock(&ctx->mapping_lock);
if (!i->i_openers++)
ctx->mss = inode->i_mapping;
mutex_unlock(&ctx->mapping_lock);
return nonseekable_open(inode, file);
}
static int
spufs_mss_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct spufs_inode_info *i = SPUFS_I(inode);
struct spu_context *ctx = i->i_ctx;
mutex_lock(&ctx->mapping_lock);
if (!--i->i_openers)
ctx->mss = NULL;
mutex_unlock(&ctx->mapping_lock);
return 0;
}
static const struct file_operations spufs_mss_fops = {
.open = spufs_mss_open,
.release = spufs_mss_release,
.mmap = spufs_mss_mmap,
.llseek = no_llseek,
};
static vm_fault_t
spufs_psmap_mmap_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
{
return spufs_ps_fault(vmf, 0x0000, SPUFS_PS_MAP_SIZE);
}
static const struct vm_operations_struct spufs_psmap_mmap_vmops = {
.fault = spufs_psmap_mmap_fault,
};
/*
* mmap support for full problem state area [0x00000 - 0x1ffff].
*/
static int spufs_psmap_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED))
return -EINVAL;
vma->vm_flags |= VM_IO | VM_PFNMAP;
vma->vm_page_prot = pgprot_noncached(vma->vm_page_prot);
vma->vm_ops = &spufs_psmap_mmap_vmops;
return 0;
}
static int spufs_psmap_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct spufs_inode_info *i = SPUFS_I(inode);
struct spu_context *ctx = i->i_ctx;
mutex_lock(&ctx->mapping_lock);
file->private_data = i->i_ctx;
if (!i->i_openers++)
ctx->psmap = inode->i_mapping;
mutex_unlock(&ctx->mapping_lock);
return nonseekable_open(inode, file);
}
static int
spufs_psmap_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct spufs_inode_info *i = SPUFS_I(inode);
struct spu_context *ctx = i->i_ctx;
mutex_lock(&ctx->mapping_lock);
if (!--i->i_openers)
ctx->psmap = NULL;
mutex_unlock(&ctx->mapping_lock);
return 0;
}
static const struct file_operations spufs_psmap_fops = {
.open = spufs_psmap_open,
.release = spufs_psmap_release,
.mmap = spufs_psmap_mmap,
.llseek = no_llseek,
};
#if SPUFS_MMAP_4K
static vm_fault_t
spufs_mfc_mmap_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
{
return spufs_ps_fault(vmf, 0x3000, SPUFS_MFC_MAP_SIZE);
}
static const struct vm_operations_struct spufs_mfc_mmap_vmops = {
.fault = spufs_mfc_mmap_fault,
};
/*
* mmap support for problem state MFC DMA area [0x0000 - 0x0fff].
*/
static int spufs_mfc_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED))
return -EINVAL;
vma->vm_flags |= VM_IO | VM_PFNMAP;
vma->vm_page_prot = pgprot_noncached(vma->vm_page_prot);
vma->vm_ops = &spufs_mfc_mmap_vmops;
return 0;
}
#else /* SPUFS_MMAP_4K */
#define spufs_mfc_mmap NULL
#endif /* !SPUFS_MMAP_4K */
static int spufs_mfc_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct spufs_inode_info *i = SPUFS_I(inode);
struct spu_context *ctx = i->i_ctx;
/* we don't want to deal with DMA into other processes */
if (ctx->owner != current->mm)
return -EINVAL;
if (atomic_read(&inode->i_count) != 1)
return -EBUSY;
mutex_lock(&ctx->mapping_lock);
file->private_data = ctx;
if (!i->i_openers++)
ctx->mfc = inode->i_mapping;
mutex_unlock(&ctx->mapping_lock);
return nonseekable_open(inode, file);
}
static int
spufs_mfc_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct spufs_inode_info *i = SPUFS_I(inode);
struct spu_context *ctx = i->i_ctx;
mutex_lock(&ctx->mapping_lock);
if (!--i->i_openers)
ctx->mfc = NULL;
mutex_unlock(&ctx->mapping_lock);
return 0;
}
/* interrupt-level mfc callback function. */
void spufs_mfc_callback(struct spu *spu)
{
struct spu_context *ctx = spu->ctx;
if (ctx)
wake_up_all(&ctx->mfc_wq);
}
static int spufs_read_mfc_tagstatus(struct spu_context *ctx, u32 *status)
{
/* See if there is one tag group is complete */
/* FIXME we need locking around tagwait */
*status = ctx->ops->read_mfc_tagstatus(ctx) & ctx->tagwait;
ctx->tagwait &= ~*status;
if (*status)
return 1;
/* enable interrupt waiting for any tag group,
may silently fail if interrupts are already enabled */
ctx->ops->set_mfc_query(ctx, ctx->tagwait, 1);
return 0;
}
static ssize_t spufs_mfc_read(struct file *file, char __user *buffer,
size_t size, loff_t *pos)
{
struct spu_context *ctx = file->private_data;
int ret = -EINVAL;
u32 status;
if (size != 4)
goto out;
ret = spu_acquire(ctx);
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = -EINVAL;
if (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) {
status = ctx->ops->read_mfc_tagstatus(ctx);
if (!(status & ctx->tagwait))
ret = -EAGAIN;
else
/* XXX(hch): shouldn't we clear ret here? */
ctx->tagwait &= ~status;
} else {
ret = spufs_wait(ctx->mfc_wq,
spufs_read_mfc_tagstatus(ctx, &status));
if (ret)
goto out;
}
spu_release(ctx);
ret = 4;
if (copy_to_user(buffer, &status, 4))
ret = -EFAULT;
out:
return ret;
}
static int spufs_check_valid_dma(struct mfc_dma_command *cmd)
{
pr_debug("queueing DMA %x %llx %x %x %x\n", cmd->lsa,
cmd->ea, cmd->size, cmd->tag, cmd->cmd);
switch (cmd->cmd) {
case MFC_PUT_CMD:
case MFC_PUTF_CMD:
case MFC_PUTB_CMD:
case MFC_GET_CMD:
case MFC_GETF_CMD:
case MFC_GETB_CMD:
break;
default:
pr_debug("invalid DMA opcode %x\n", cmd->cmd);
return -EIO;
}
if ((cmd->lsa & 0xf) != (cmd->ea &0xf)) {
pr_debug("invalid DMA alignment, ea %llx lsa %x\n",
cmd->ea, cmd->lsa);
return -EIO;
}
switch (cmd->size & 0xf) {
case 1:
break;
case 2:
if (cmd->lsa & 1)
goto error;
break;
case 4:
if (cmd->lsa & 3)
goto error;
break;
case 8:
if (cmd->lsa & 7)
goto error;
break;
case 0:
if (cmd->lsa & 15)
goto error;
break;
error:
default:
pr_debug("invalid DMA alignment %x for size %x\n",
cmd->lsa & 0xf, cmd->size);
return -EIO;
}
if (cmd->size > 16 * 1024) {
pr_debug("invalid DMA size %x\n", cmd->size);
return -EIO;
}
if (cmd->tag & 0xfff0) {
/* we reserve the higher tag numbers for kernel use */
pr_debug("invalid DMA tag\n");
return -EIO;
}
if (cmd->class) {
/* not supported in this version */
pr_debug("invalid DMA class\n");
return -EIO;
}
return 0;
}
static int spu_send_mfc_command(struct spu_context *ctx,
struct mfc_dma_command cmd,
int *error)
{
*error = ctx->ops->send_mfc_command(ctx, &cmd);
if (*error == -EAGAIN) {
/* wait for any tag group to complete
so we have space for the new command */
ctx->ops->set_mfc_query(ctx, ctx->tagwait, 1);
/* try again, because the queue might be
empty again */
*error = ctx->ops->send_mfc_command(ctx, &cmd);
if (*error == -EAGAIN)
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static ssize_t spufs_mfc_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,
size_t size, loff_t *pos)
{
struct spu_context *ctx = file->private_data;
struct mfc_dma_command cmd;
int ret = -EINVAL;
if (size != sizeof cmd)
goto out;
ret = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&cmd, buffer, sizeof cmd))
goto out;
ret = spufs_check_valid_dma(&cmd);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = spu_acquire(ctx);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = spufs_wait(ctx->run_wq, ctx->state == SPU_STATE_RUNNABLE);
if (ret)
goto out;
if (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) {
ret = ctx->ops->send_mfc_command(ctx, &cmd);
} else {
int status;
ret = spufs_wait(ctx->mfc_wq,
spu_send_mfc_command(ctx, cmd, &status));
if (ret)
goto out;
if (status)
ret = status;
}
if (ret)
goto out_unlock;
ctx->tagwait |= 1 << cmd.tag;
ret = size;
out_unlock:
spu_release(ctx);
out:
return ret;
}
static __poll_t spufs_mfc_poll(struct file *file,poll_table *wait)
{
struct spu_context *ctx = file->private_data;
u32 free_elements, tagstatus;
__poll_t mask;
poll_wait(file, &ctx->mfc_wq, wait);
/*
* For now keep this uninterruptible and also ignore the rule
* that poll should not sleep. Will be fixed later.
*/
mutex_lock(&ctx->state_mutex);
ctx->ops->set_mfc_query(ctx, ctx->tagwait, 2);
free_elements = ctx->ops->get_mfc_free_elements(ctx);
tagstatus = ctx->ops->read_mfc_tagstatus(ctx);
spu_release(ctx);
mask = 0;
if (free_elements & 0xffff)
mask |= EPOLLOUT | EPOLLWRNORM;
if (tagstatus & ctx->tagwait)
mask |= EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM;
pr_debug("%s: free %d tagstatus %d tagwait %d\n", __func__,
free_elements, tagstatus, ctx->tagwait);
return mask;
}
static int spufs_mfc_flush(struct file *file, fl_owner_t id)
{
struct spu_context *ctx = file->private_data;
int ret;
ret = spu_acquire(ctx);
if (ret)
goto out;
#if 0
/* this currently hangs */
ret = spufs_wait(ctx->mfc_wq,
ctx->ops->set_mfc_query(ctx, ctx->tagwait, 2));
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = spufs_wait(ctx->mfc_wq,
ctx->ops->read_mfc_tagstatus(ctx) == ctx->tagwait);
if (ret)
goto out;
#else
ret = 0;
#endif
spu_release(ctx);
out:
return ret;
}
static int spufs_mfc_fsync(struct file *file, loff_t start, loff_t end, int datasync)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
int err = file_write_and_wait_range(file, start, end);
if (!err) {
inode_lock(inode);
err = spufs_mfc_flush(file, NULL);
inode_unlock(inode);
}
return err;
}
static const struct file_operations spufs_mfc_fops = {
.open = spufs_mfc_open,
.release = spufs_mfc_release,
.read = spufs_mfc_read,
.write = spufs_mfc_write,
.poll = spufs_mfc_poll,
.flush = spufs_mfc_flush,
.fsync = spufs_mfc_fsync,
.mmap = spufs_mfc_mmap,
.llseek = no_llseek,
};
static int spufs_npc_set(void *data, u64 val)
{
struct spu_context *ctx = data;
int ret;
ret = spu_acquire(ctx);
if (ret)
return ret;
ctx->ops->npc_write(ctx, val);
spu_release(ctx);
return 0;
}
static u64 spufs_npc_get(struct spu_context *ctx)
{
return ctx->ops->npc_read(ctx);
}
DEFINE_SPUFS_ATTRIBUTE(spufs_npc_ops, spufs_npc_get, spufs_npc_set,
"0x%llx\n", SPU_ATTR_ACQUIRE);
static int spufs_decr_set(void *data, u64 val)
{
struct spu_context *ctx = data;
struct spu_lscsa *lscsa = ctx->csa.lscsa;
int ret;
ret = spu_acquire_saved(ctx);
if (ret)
return ret;
lscsa->decr.slot[0] = (u32) val;
spu_release_saved(ctx);
return 0;
}
static u64 spufs_decr_get(struct spu_context *ctx)
{
struct spu_lscsa *lscsa = ctx->csa.lscsa;
return lscsa->decr.slot[0];
}
DEFINE_SPUFS_ATTRIBUTE(spufs_decr_ops, spufs_decr_get, spufs_decr_set,
"0x%llx\n", SPU_ATTR_ACQUIRE_SAVED);
static int spufs_decr_status_set(void *data, u64 val)
{
struct spu_context *ctx = data;
int ret;
ret = spu_acquire_saved(ctx);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (val)
ctx->csa.priv2.mfc_control_RW |= MFC_CNTL_DECREMENTER_RUNNING;
else
ctx->csa.priv2.mfc_control_RW &= ~MFC_CNTL_DECREMENTER_RUNNING;
spu_release_saved(ctx);
return 0;
}
static u64 spufs_decr_status_get(struct spu_context *ctx)
{
if (ctx->csa.priv2.mfc_control_RW & MFC_CNTL_DECREMENTER_RUNNING)
return SPU_DECR_STATUS_RUNNING;
else
return 0;
}
DEFINE_SPUFS_ATTRIBUTE(spufs_decr_status_ops, spufs_decr_status_get,
spufs_decr_status_set, "0x%llx\n",
SPU_ATTR_ACQUIRE_SAVED);
static int spufs_event_mask_set(void *data, u64 val)
{
struct spu_context *ctx = data;
struct spu_lscsa *lscsa = ctx->csa.lscsa;
int ret;
ret = spu_acquire_saved(ctx);
if (ret)
return ret;
lscsa->event_mask.slot[0] = (u32) val;
spu_release_saved(ctx);
return 0;
}
static u64 spufs_event_mask_get(struct spu_context *ctx)
{
struct spu_lscsa *lscsa = ctx->csa.lscsa;
return lscsa->event_mask.slot[0];
}
DEFINE_SPUFS_ATTRIBUTE(spufs_event_mask_ops, spufs_event_mask_get,
spufs_event_mask_set, "0x%llx\n",
SPU_ATTR_ACQUIRE_SAVED);
static u64 spufs_event_status_get(struct spu_context *ctx)
{
struct spu_state *state = &ctx->csa;
u64 stat;
stat = state->spu_chnlcnt_RW[0];
if (stat)
return state->spu_chnldata_RW[0];
return 0;
}
DEFINE_SPUFS_ATTRIBUTE(spufs_event_status_ops, spufs_event_status_get,
NULL, "0x%llx\n", SPU_ATTR_ACQUIRE_SAVED)
static int spufs_srr0_set(void *data, u64 val)
{
struct spu_context *ctx = data;
struct spu_lscsa *lscsa = ctx->csa.lscsa;
int ret;
ret = spu_acquire_saved(ctx);
if (ret)
return ret;
lscsa->srr0.slot[0] = (u32) val;
spu_release_saved(ctx);
return 0;
}
static u64 spufs_srr0_get(struct spu_context *ctx)
{
struct spu_lscsa *lscsa = ctx->csa.lscsa;
return lscsa->srr0.slot[0];
}
DEFINE_SPUFS_ATTRIBUTE(spufs_srr0_ops, spufs_srr0_get, spufs_srr0_set,
"0x%llx\n", SPU_ATTR_ACQUIRE_SAVED)
static u64 spufs_id_get(struct spu_context *ctx)
{
u64 num;
if (ctx->state == SPU_STATE_RUNNABLE)
num = ctx->spu->number;
else
num = (unsigned int)-1;
return num;
}
DEFINE_SPUFS_ATTRIBUTE(spufs_id_ops, spufs_id_get, NULL, "0x%llx\n",
SPU_ATTR_ACQUIRE)
static u64 spufs_object_id_get(struct spu_context *ctx)
{
/* FIXME: Should there really be no locking here? */
return ctx->object_id;
}
static int spufs_object_id_set(void *data, u64 id)
{
struct spu_context *ctx = data;
ctx->object_id = id;
return 0;
}
DEFINE_SPUFS_ATTRIBUTE(spufs_object_id_ops, spufs_object_id_get,
spufs_object_id_set, "0x%llx\n", SPU_ATTR_NOACQUIRE);
static u64 spufs_lslr_get(struct spu_context *ctx)
{
return ctx->csa.priv2.spu_lslr_RW;
}
DEFINE_SPUFS_ATTRIBUTE(spufs_lslr_ops, spufs_lslr_get, NULL, "0x%llx\n",
SPU_ATTR_ACQUIRE_SAVED);
static int spufs_info_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct spufs_inode_info *i = SPUFS_I(inode);
struct spu_context *ctx = i->i_ctx;
file->private_data = ctx;
return 0;
}
static int spufs_caps_show(struct seq_file *s, void *private)
{
struct spu_context *ctx = s->private;
if (!(ctx->flags & SPU_CREATE_NOSCHED))
seq_puts(s, "sched\n");
if (!(ctx->flags & SPU_CREATE_ISOLATE))
seq_puts(s, "step\n");
return 0;
}
static int spufs_caps_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
return single_open(file, spufs_caps_show, SPUFS_I(inode)->i_ctx);
}
static const struct file_operations spufs_caps_fops = {
.open = spufs_caps_open,
.read = seq_read,
.llseek = seq_lseek,
.release = single_release,
};
static ssize_t __spufs_mbox_info_read(struct spu_context *ctx,
char __user *buf, size_t len, loff_t *pos)
{
u32 data;
/* EOF if there's no entry in the mbox */
if (!(ctx->csa.prob.mb_stat_R & 0x0000ff))
return 0;
data = ctx->csa.prob.pu_mb_R;
return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, len, pos, &data, sizeof data);
}
static ssize_t spufs_mbox_info_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
size_t len, loff_t *pos)
{
int ret;
struct spu_context *ctx = file->private_data;
Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand. It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact. A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's just get this done once and for all. This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form. There were a couple of notable cases: - csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias. - the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing really used it) - microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch. I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-03 19:57:57 -07:00
if (!access_ok(buf, len))
return -EFAULT;
ret = spu_acquire_saved(ctx);
if (ret)
return ret;
spin_lock(&ctx->csa.register_lock);
ret = __spufs_mbox_info_read(ctx, buf, len, pos);
spin_unlock(&ctx->csa.register_lock);
spu_release_saved(ctx);
return ret;
}
static const struct file_operations spufs_mbox_info_fops = {
.open = spufs_info_open,
.read = spufs_mbox_info_read,
.llseek = generic_file_llseek,
};
static ssize_t __spufs_ibox_info_read(struct spu_context *ctx,
char __user *buf, size_t len, loff_t *pos)
{
u32 data;
/* EOF if there's no entry in the ibox */
if (!(ctx->csa.prob.mb_stat_R & 0xff0000))
return 0;
data = ctx->csa.priv2.puint_mb_R;
return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, len, pos, &data, sizeof data);
}
static ssize_t spufs_ibox_info_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
size_t len, loff_t *pos)
{
struct spu_context *ctx = file->private_data;
int ret;
Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand. It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact. A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's just get this done once and for all. This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form. There were a couple of notable cases: - csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias. - the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing really used it) - microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch. I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-03 19:57:57 -07:00
if (!access_ok(buf, len))
return -EFAULT;
ret = spu_acquire_saved(ctx);
if (ret)
return ret;
spin_lock(&ctx->csa.register_lock);
ret = __spufs_ibox_info_read(ctx, buf, len, pos);
spin_unlock(&ctx->csa.register_lock);
spu_release_saved(ctx);
return ret;
}
static const struct file_operations spufs_ibox_info_fops = {
.open = spufs_info_open,
.read = spufs_ibox_info_read,
.llseek = generic_file_llseek,
};
static ssize_t __spufs_wbox_info_read(struct spu_context *ctx,
char __user *buf, size_t len, loff_t *pos)
{
int i, cnt;
u32 data[4];
u32 wbox_stat;
wbox_stat = ctx->csa.prob.mb_stat_R;
cnt = 4 - ((wbox_stat & 0x00ff00) >> 8);
for (i = 0; i < cnt; i++) {
data[i] = ctx->csa.spu_mailbox_data[i];
}
return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, len, pos, &data,
cnt * sizeof(u32));
}
static ssize_t spufs_wbox_info_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
size_t len, loff_t *pos)
{
struct spu_context *ctx = file->private_data;
int ret;
Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand. It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact. A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's just get this done once and for all. This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form. There were a couple of notable cases: - csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias. - the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing really used it) - microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch. I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-03 19:57:57 -07:00
if (!access_ok(buf, len))
return -EFAULT;
ret = spu_acquire_saved(ctx);
if (ret)
return ret;
spin_lock(&ctx->csa.register_lock);
ret = __spufs_wbox_info_read(ctx, buf, len, pos);
spin_unlock(&ctx->csa.register_lock);
spu_release_saved(ctx);
return ret;
}
static const struct file_operations spufs_wbox_info_fops = {
.open = spufs_info_open,
.read = spufs_wbox_info_read,
.llseek = generic_file_llseek,
};
static ssize_t __spufs_dma_info_read(struct spu_context *ctx,
char __user *buf, size_t len, loff_t *pos)
{
struct spu_dma_info info;
struct mfc_cq_sr *qp, *spuqp;
int i;
info.dma_info_type = ctx->csa.priv2.spu_tag_status_query_RW;
info.dma_info_mask = ctx->csa.lscsa->tag_mask.slot[0];
info.dma_info_status = ctx->csa.spu_chnldata_RW[24];
info.dma_info_stall_and_notify = ctx->csa.spu_chnldata_RW[25];
info.dma_info_atomic_command_status = ctx->csa.spu_chnldata_RW[27];
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
qp = &info.dma_info_command_data[i];
spuqp = &ctx->csa.priv2.spuq[i];
qp->mfc_cq_data0_RW = spuqp->mfc_cq_data0_RW;
qp->mfc_cq_data1_RW = spuqp->mfc_cq_data1_RW;
qp->mfc_cq_data2_RW = spuqp->mfc_cq_data2_RW;
qp->mfc_cq_data3_RW = spuqp->mfc_cq_data3_RW;
}
return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, len, pos, &info,
sizeof info);
}
static ssize_t spufs_dma_info_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
size_t len, loff_t *pos)
{
struct spu_context *ctx = file->private_data;
int ret;
Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand. It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact. A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's just get this done once and for all. This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form. There were a couple of notable cases: - csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias. - the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing really used it) - microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch. I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-03 19:57:57 -07:00
if (!access_ok(buf, len))
return -EFAULT;
ret = spu_acquire_saved(ctx);
if (ret)
return ret;
spin_lock(&ctx->csa.register_lock);
ret = __spufs_dma_info_read(ctx, buf, len, pos);
spin_unlock(&ctx->csa.register_lock);
spu_release_saved(ctx);
return ret;
}
static const struct file_operations spufs_dma_info_fops = {
.open = spufs_info_open,
.read = spufs_dma_info_read,
.llseek = no_llseek,
};
static ssize_t __spufs_proxydma_info_read(struct spu_context *ctx,
char __user *buf, size_t len, loff_t *pos)
{
struct spu_proxydma_info info;
struct mfc_cq_sr *qp, *puqp;
int ret = sizeof info;
int i;
if (len < ret)
return -EINVAL;
Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand. It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact. A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's just get this done once and for all. This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form. There were a couple of notable cases: - csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias. - the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing really used it) - microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch. I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-03 19:57:57 -07:00
if (!access_ok(buf, len))
return -EFAULT;
info.proxydma_info_type = ctx->csa.prob.dma_querytype_RW;
info.proxydma_info_mask = ctx->csa.prob.dma_querymask_RW;
info.proxydma_info_status = ctx->csa.prob.dma_tagstatus_R;
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
qp = &info.proxydma_info_command_data[i];
puqp = &ctx->csa.priv2.puq[i];
qp->mfc_cq_data0_RW = puqp->mfc_cq_data0_RW;
qp->mfc_cq_data1_RW = puqp->mfc_cq_data1_RW;
qp->mfc_cq_data2_RW = puqp->mfc_cq_data2_RW;
qp->mfc_cq_data3_RW = puqp->mfc_cq_data3_RW;
}
return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, len, pos, &info,
sizeof info);
}
static ssize_t spufs_proxydma_info_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
size_t len, loff_t *pos)
{
struct spu_context *ctx = file->private_data;
int ret;
ret = spu_acquire_saved(ctx);
if (ret)
return ret;
spin_lock(&ctx->csa.register_lock);
ret = __spufs_proxydma_info_read(ctx, buf, len, pos);
spin_unlock(&ctx->csa.register_lock);
spu_release_saved(ctx);
return ret;
}
static const struct file_operations spufs_proxydma_info_fops = {
.open = spufs_info_open,
.read = spufs_proxydma_info_read,
.llseek = no_llseek,
};
static int spufs_show_tid(struct seq_file *s, void *private)
{
struct spu_context *ctx = s->private;
seq_printf(s, "%d\n", ctx->tid);
return 0;
}
static int spufs_tid_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
return single_open(file, spufs_show_tid, SPUFS_I(inode)->i_ctx);
}
static const struct file_operations spufs_tid_fops = {
.open = spufs_tid_open,
.read = seq_read,
.llseek = seq_lseek,
.release = single_release,
};
static const char *ctx_state_names[] = {
"user", "system", "iowait", "loaded"
};
static unsigned long long spufs_acct_time(struct spu_context *ctx,
enum spu_utilization_state state)
{
unsigned long long time = ctx->stats.times[state];
/*
* In general, utilization statistics are updated by the controlling
* thread as the spu context moves through various well defined
* state transitions, but if the context is lazily loaded its
* utilization statistics are not updated as the controlling thread
* is not tightly coupled with the execution of the spu context. We
* calculate and apply the time delta from the last recorded state
* of the spu context.
*/
if (ctx->spu && ctx->stats.util_state == state) {
time += ktime_get_ns() - ctx->stats.tstamp;
}
return time / NSEC_PER_MSEC;
}
static unsigned long long spufs_slb_flts(struct spu_context *ctx)
{
unsigned long long slb_flts = ctx->stats.slb_flt;
if (ctx->state == SPU_STATE_RUNNABLE) {
slb_flts += (ctx->spu->stats.slb_flt -
ctx->stats.slb_flt_base);
}
return slb_flts;
}
static unsigned long long spufs_class2_intrs(struct spu_context *ctx)
{
unsigned long long class2_intrs = ctx->stats.class2_intr;
if (ctx->state == SPU_STATE_RUNNABLE) {
class2_intrs += (ctx->spu->stats.class2_intr -
ctx->stats.class2_intr_base);
}
return class2_intrs;
}
static int spufs_show_stat(struct seq_file *s, void *private)
{
struct spu_context *ctx = s->private;
int ret;
ret = spu_acquire(ctx);
if (ret)
return ret;
seq_printf(s, "%s %llu %llu %llu %llu "
"%llu %llu %llu %llu %llu %llu %llu %llu\n",
ctx_state_names[ctx->stats.util_state],
spufs_acct_time(ctx, SPU_UTIL_USER),
spufs_acct_time(ctx, SPU_UTIL_SYSTEM),
spufs_acct_time(ctx, SPU_UTIL_IOWAIT),
spufs_acct_time(ctx, SPU_UTIL_IDLE_LOADED),
ctx->stats.vol_ctx_switch,
ctx->stats.invol_ctx_switch,
spufs_slb_flts(ctx),
ctx->stats.hash_flt,
ctx->stats.min_flt,
ctx->stats.maj_flt,
spufs_class2_intrs(ctx),
ctx->stats.libassist);
spu_release(ctx);
return 0;
}
static int spufs_stat_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
return single_open(file, spufs_show_stat, SPUFS_I(inode)->i_ctx);
}
static const struct file_operations spufs_stat_fops = {
.open = spufs_stat_open,
.read = seq_read,
.llseek = seq_lseek,
.release = single_release,
};
static inline int spufs_switch_log_used(struct spu_context *ctx)
{
return (ctx->switch_log->head - ctx->switch_log->tail) %
SWITCH_LOG_BUFSIZE;
}
static inline int spufs_switch_log_avail(struct spu_context *ctx)
{
return SWITCH_LOG_BUFSIZE - spufs_switch_log_used(ctx);
}
static int spufs_switch_log_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct spu_context *ctx = SPUFS_I(inode)->i_ctx;
int rc;
rc = spu_acquire(ctx);
if (rc)
return rc;
if (ctx->switch_log) {
rc = -EBUSY;
goto out;
}
ctx->switch_log = kmalloc(struct_size(ctx->switch_log, log,
SWITCH_LOG_BUFSIZE), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ctx->switch_log) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
ctx->switch_log->head = ctx->switch_log->tail = 0;
init_waitqueue_head(&ctx->switch_log->wait);
rc = 0;
out:
spu_release(ctx);
return rc;
}
static int spufs_switch_log_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct spu_context *ctx = SPUFS_I(inode)->i_ctx;
int rc;
rc = spu_acquire(ctx);
if (rc)
return rc;
kfree(ctx->switch_log);
ctx->switch_log = NULL;
spu_release(ctx);
return 0;
}
static int switch_log_sprint(struct spu_context *ctx, char *tbuf, int n)
{
struct switch_log_entry *p;
p = ctx->switch_log->log + ctx->switch_log->tail % SWITCH_LOG_BUFSIZE;
return snprintf(tbuf, n, "%llu.%09u %d %u %u %llu\n",
(unsigned long long) p->tstamp.tv_sec,
(unsigned int) p->tstamp.tv_nsec,
p->spu_id,
(unsigned int) p->type,
(unsigned int) p->val,
(unsigned long long) p->timebase);
}
static ssize_t spufs_switch_log_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
size_t len, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct spu_context *ctx = SPUFS_I(inode)->i_ctx;
int error = 0, cnt = 0;
if (!buf)
return -EINVAL;
error = spu_acquire(ctx);
if (error)
return error;
while (cnt < len) {
char tbuf[128];
int width;
if (spufs_switch_log_used(ctx) == 0) {
if (cnt > 0) {
/* If there's data ready to go, we can
* just return straight away */
break;
} else if (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) {
error = -EAGAIN;
break;
} else {
/* spufs_wait will drop the mutex and
* re-acquire, but since we're in read(), the
* file cannot be _released (and so
* ctx->switch_log is stable).
*/
error = spufs_wait(ctx->switch_log->wait,
spufs_switch_log_used(ctx) > 0);
/* On error, spufs_wait returns without the
* state mutex held */
if (error)
return error;
/* We may have had entries read from underneath
* us while we dropped the mutex in spufs_wait,
* so re-check */
if (spufs_switch_log_used(ctx) == 0)
continue;
}
}
width = switch_log_sprint(ctx, tbuf, sizeof(tbuf));
if (width < len)
ctx->switch_log->tail =
(ctx->switch_log->tail + 1) %
SWITCH_LOG_BUFSIZE;
else
/* If the record is greater than space available return
* partial buffer (so far) */
break;
error = copy_to_user(buf + cnt, tbuf, width);
if (error)
break;
cnt += width;
}
spu_release(ctx);
return cnt == 0 ? error : cnt;
}
static __poll_t spufs_switch_log_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct spu_context *ctx = SPUFS_I(inode)->i_ctx;
__poll_t mask = 0;
int rc;
poll_wait(file, &ctx->switch_log->wait, wait);
rc = spu_acquire(ctx);
if (rc)
return rc;
if (spufs_switch_log_used(ctx) > 0)
mask |= EPOLLIN;
spu_release(ctx);
return mask;
}
static const struct file_operations spufs_switch_log_fops = {
.open = spufs_switch_log_open,
.read = spufs_switch_log_read,
.poll = spufs_switch_log_poll,
.release = spufs_switch_log_release,
.llseek = no_llseek,
};
/**
* Log a context switch event to a switch log reader.
*
* Must be called with ctx->state_mutex held.
*/
void spu_switch_log_notify(struct spu *spu, struct spu_context *ctx,
u32 type, u32 val)
{
if (!ctx->switch_log)
return;
if (spufs_switch_log_avail(ctx) > 1) {
struct switch_log_entry *p;
p = ctx->switch_log->log + ctx->switch_log->head;
ktime_get_ts64(&p->tstamp);
p->timebase = get_tb();
p->spu_id = spu ? spu->number : -1;
p->type = type;
p->val = val;
ctx->switch_log->head =
(ctx->switch_log->head + 1) % SWITCH_LOG_BUFSIZE;
}
wake_up(&ctx->switch_log->wait);
}
static int spufs_show_ctx(struct seq_file *s, void *private)
{
struct spu_context *ctx = s->private;
u64 mfc_control_RW;
mutex_lock(&ctx->state_mutex);
if (ctx->spu) {
struct spu *spu = ctx->spu;
struct spu_priv2 __iomem *priv2 = spu->priv2;
spin_lock_irq(&spu->register_lock);
mfc_control_RW = in_be64(&priv2->mfc_control_RW);
spin_unlock_irq(&spu->register_lock);
} else {
struct spu_state *csa = &ctx->csa;
mfc_control_RW = csa->priv2.mfc_control_RW;
}
seq_printf(s, "%c flgs(%lx) sflgs(%lx) pri(%d) ts(%d) spu(%02d)"
" %c %llx %llx %llx %llx %x %x\n",
ctx->state == SPU_STATE_SAVED ? 'S' : 'R',
ctx->flags,
ctx->sched_flags,
ctx->prio,
ctx->time_slice,
ctx->spu ? ctx->spu->number : -1,
!list_empty(&ctx->rq) ? 'q' : ' ',
ctx->csa.class_0_pending,
ctx->csa.class_0_dar,
ctx->csa.class_1_dsisr,
mfc_control_RW,
ctx->ops->runcntl_read(ctx),
ctx->ops->status_read(ctx));
mutex_unlock(&ctx->state_mutex);
return 0;
}
static int spufs_ctx_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
return single_open(file, spufs_show_ctx, SPUFS_I(inode)->i_ctx);
}
static const struct file_operations spufs_ctx_fops = {
.open = spufs_ctx_open,
.read = seq_read,
.llseek = seq_lseek,
.release = single_release,
};
const struct spufs_tree_descr spufs_dir_contents[] = {
{ "capabilities", &spufs_caps_fops, 0444, },
{ "mem", &spufs_mem_fops, 0666, LS_SIZE, },
{ "regs", &spufs_regs_fops, 0666, sizeof(struct spu_reg128[128]), },
{ "mbox", &spufs_mbox_fops, 0444, },
{ "ibox", &spufs_ibox_fops, 0444, },
{ "wbox", &spufs_wbox_fops, 0222, },
{ "mbox_stat", &spufs_mbox_stat_fops, 0444, sizeof(u32), },
{ "ibox_stat", &spufs_ibox_stat_fops, 0444, sizeof(u32), },
{ "wbox_stat", &spufs_wbox_stat_fops, 0444, sizeof(u32), },
{ "signal1", &spufs_signal1_fops, 0666, },
{ "signal2", &spufs_signal2_fops, 0666, },
{ "signal1_type", &spufs_signal1_type, 0666, },
{ "signal2_type", &spufs_signal2_type, 0666, },
{ "cntl", &spufs_cntl_fops, 0666, },
{ "fpcr", &spufs_fpcr_fops, 0666, sizeof(struct spu_reg128), },
{ "lslr", &spufs_lslr_ops, 0444, },
{ "mfc", &spufs_mfc_fops, 0666, },
{ "mss", &spufs_mss_fops, 0666, },
{ "npc", &spufs_npc_ops, 0666, },
{ "srr0", &spufs_srr0_ops, 0666, },
{ "decr", &spufs_decr_ops, 0666, },
{ "decr_status", &spufs_decr_status_ops, 0666, },
{ "event_mask", &spufs_event_mask_ops, 0666, },
{ "event_status", &spufs_event_status_ops, 0444, },
{ "psmap", &spufs_psmap_fops, 0666, SPUFS_PS_MAP_SIZE, },
{ "phys-id", &spufs_id_ops, 0666, },
{ "object-id", &spufs_object_id_ops, 0666, },
{ "mbox_info", &spufs_mbox_info_fops, 0444, sizeof(u32), },
{ "ibox_info", &spufs_ibox_info_fops, 0444, sizeof(u32), },
{ "wbox_info", &spufs_wbox_info_fops, 0444, sizeof(u32), },
{ "dma_info", &spufs_dma_info_fops, 0444,
sizeof(struct spu_dma_info), },
{ "proxydma_info", &spufs_proxydma_info_fops, 0444,
sizeof(struct spu_proxydma_info)},
{ "tid", &spufs_tid_fops, 0444, },
{ "stat", &spufs_stat_fops, 0444, },
{ "switch_log", &spufs_switch_log_fops, 0444 },
{},
};
const struct spufs_tree_descr spufs_dir_nosched_contents[] = {
{ "capabilities", &spufs_caps_fops, 0444, },
{ "mem", &spufs_mem_fops, 0666, LS_SIZE, },
{ "mbox", &spufs_mbox_fops, 0444, },
{ "ibox", &spufs_ibox_fops, 0444, },
{ "wbox", &spufs_wbox_fops, 0222, },
{ "mbox_stat", &spufs_mbox_stat_fops, 0444, sizeof(u32), },
{ "ibox_stat", &spufs_ibox_stat_fops, 0444, sizeof(u32), },
{ "wbox_stat", &spufs_wbox_stat_fops, 0444, sizeof(u32), },
{ "signal1", &spufs_signal1_nosched_fops, 0222, },
{ "signal2", &spufs_signal2_nosched_fops, 0222, },
{ "signal1_type", &spufs_signal1_type, 0666, },
{ "signal2_type", &spufs_signal2_type, 0666, },
{ "mss", &spufs_mss_fops, 0666, },
{ "mfc", &spufs_mfc_fops, 0666, },
{ "cntl", &spufs_cntl_fops, 0666, },
{ "npc", &spufs_npc_ops, 0666, },
{ "psmap", &spufs_psmap_fops, 0666, SPUFS_PS_MAP_SIZE, },
{ "phys-id", &spufs_id_ops, 0666, },
{ "object-id", &spufs_object_id_ops, 0666, },
{ "tid", &spufs_tid_fops, 0444, },
{ "stat", &spufs_stat_fops, 0444, },
{},
};
const struct spufs_tree_descr spufs_dir_debug_contents[] = {
{ ".ctx", &spufs_ctx_fops, 0444, },
{},
};
const struct spufs_coredump_reader spufs_coredump_read[] = {
{ "regs", __spufs_regs_read, NULL, sizeof(struct spu_reg128[128])},
{ "fpcr", __spufs_fpcr_read, NULL, sizeof(struct spu_reg128) },
{ "lslr", NULL, spufs_lslr_get, 19 },
{ "decr", NULL, spufs_decr_get, 19 },
{ "decr_status", NULL, spufs_decr_status_get, 19 },
{ "mem", __spufs_mem_read, NULL, LS_SIZE, },
{ "signal1", __spufs_signal1_read, NULL, sizeof(u32) },
{ "signal1_type", NULL, spufs_signal1_type_get, 19 },
{ "signal2", __spufs_signal2_read, NULL, sizeof(u32) },
{ "signal2_type", NULL, spufs_signal2_type_get, 19 },
{ "event_mask", NULL, spufs_event_mask_get, 19 },
{ "event_status", NULL, spufs_event_status_get, 19 },
{ "mbox_info", __spufs_mbox_info_read, NULL, sizeof(u32) },
{ "ibox_info", __spufs_ibox_info_read, NULL, sizeof(u32) },
{ "wbox_info", __spufs_wbox_info_read, NULL, 4 * sizeof(u32)},
{ "dma_info", __spufs_dma_info_read, NULL, sizeof(struct spu_dma_info)},
{ "proxydma_info", __spufs_proxydma_info_read,
NULL, sizeof(struct spu_proxydma_info)},
{ "object-id", NULL, spufs_object_id_get, 19 },
{ "npc", NULL, spufs_npc_get, 19 },
{ NULL },
};