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alistair23-linux/drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c

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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* pkey device driver
*
* Copyright IBM Corp. 2017,2019
* Author(s): Harald Freudenberger
*/
#define KMSG_COMPONENT "pkey"
#define pr_fmt(fmt) KMSG_COMPONENT ": " fmt
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/miscdevice.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/kallsyms.h>
#include <linux/debugfs.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
#include <linux/cpufeature.h>
#include <asm/zcrypt.h>
#include <asm/cpacf.h>
#include <asm/pkey.h>
#include <crypto/aes.h>
#include "zcrypt_api.h"
#include "zcrypt_ccamisc.h"
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
MODULE_AUTHOR("IBM Corporation");
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("s390 protected key interface");
s390/pkey: add CCA AES cipher key support Introduce new ioctls and structs to be used with these new ioctls which are able to handle CCA AES secure keys and CCA AES cipher keys: PKEY_GENSECK2: Generate secure key, version 2. Generate either a CCA AES secure key or a CCA AES cipher key. PKEY_CLR2SECK2: Generate secure key from clear key value, version 2. Construct a CCA AES secure key or CCA AES cipher key from a given clear key value. PKEY_VERIFYKEY2: Verify the given secure key, version 2. Check for correct key type. If cardnr and domain are given, also check if this apqn is able to handle this type of key. If cardnr and domain are 0xFFFF, on return these values are filled with an apqn able to handle this key. The function also checks for the master key verification patterns of the key matching to the current or alternate mkvp of the apqn. CCA AES cipher keys are also checked for CPACF export allowed (CPRTCPAC flag). Currently CCA AES secure keys and CCA AES cipher keys are supported (may get extended in the future). PKEY_KBLOB2PROTK2: Transform a key blob (of any type) into a protected key, version 2. Difference to version 1 is only that this new ioctl has additional parameters to provide a list of apqns to be used for the transformation. PKEY_APQNS4K: Generate a list of APQNs based on the key blob given. Is able to find out which type of secure key is given (CCA AES secure key or CCA AES cipher key) and tries to find all matching crypto cards based on the MKVP and maybe other criterias (like CCA AES cipher keys need a CEX6C or higher). The list of APQNs is further filtered by the key's mkvp which needs to match to either the current mkvp or the alternate mkvp (which is the old mkvp on CCA adapters) of the apqns. The flags argument may be used to limit the matching apqns. If the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP is given, only the current mkvp of each apqn is compared. Likewise with the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP. If both are given it is assumed to return apqns where either the current or the alternate mkvp matches. If no matching APQN is found, the ioctl returns with 0 but the apqn_entries value is 0. PKEY_APQNS4KT: Generate a list of APQNs based on the key type given. Build a list of APQNs based on the given key type and maybe further restrict the list by given master key verification patterns. For different key types there may be different ways to match the master key verification patterns. For CCA keys (CCA data key and CCA cipher key) the first 8 bytes of cur_mkvp refer to the current mkvp value of the apqn and the first 8 bytes of the alt_mkvp refer to the old mkvp. The flags argument controls if the apqns current and/or alternate mkvp should match. If the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP is given, only the current mkvp of each apqn is compared. Likewise with the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP. If both are given, it is assumed to return apqns where either the current or the alternate mkvp matches. If no matching APQN is found, the ioctl returns with 0 but the apqn_entries value is 0. These new ioctls are now prepared for another new type of secure key blob which may come in the future. They all use a pointer to the key blob and a key blob length information instead of some hardcoded byte array. They all use the new enums pkey_key_type, pkey_key_size and pkey_key_info for getting/setting key type, key size and additional info about the key. All but the PKEY_VERIFY2 ioctl now work based on a list of apqns. This list is walked through trying to perform the operation on exactly this apqn without any further checking (like card type or online state). If the apqn fails, simple the next one in the list is tried until success (return 0) or the end of the list is reached (return -1 with errno ENODEV). All apqns in the list need to be exact apqns (0xFFFF as any card or domain is not allowed). There are two new ioctls which can be used to build a list of apqns based on a key or key type and maybe restricted by match to a current or alternate master key verifcation pattern. Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
2019-06-19 06:26:05 -06:00
#define KEYBLOBBUFSIZE 8192 /* key buffer size used for internal processing */
#define MAXAPQNSINLIST 64 /* max 64 apqns within a apqn list */
/*
* debug feature data and functions
*/
static debug_info_t *debug_info;
#define DEBUG_DBG(...) debug_sprintf_event(debug_info, 6, ##__VA_ARGS__)
#define DEBUG_INFO(...) debug_sprintf_event(debug_info, 5, ##__VA_ARGS__)
#define DEBUG_WARN(...) debug_sprintf_event(debug_info, 4, ##__VA_ARGS__)
#define DEBUG_ERR(...) debug_sprintf_event(debug_info, 3, ##__VA_ARGS__)
static void __init pkey_debug_init(void)
{
/* 5 arguments per dbf entry (including the format string ptr) */
debug_info = debug_register("pkey", 1, 1, 5 * sizeof(long));
debug_register_view(debug_info, &debug_sprintf_view);
debug_set_level(debug_info, 3);
}
static void __exit pkey_debug_exit(void)
{
debug_unregister(debug_info);
}
/* inside view of a protected key token (only type 0x00 version 0x01) */
struct protaeskeytoken {
u8 type; /* 0x00 for PAES specific key tokens */
u8 res0[3];
u8 version; /* should be 0x01 for protected AES key token */
u8 res1[3];
u32 keytype; /* key type, one of the PKEY_KEYTYPE values */
u32 len; /* bytes actually stored in protkey[] */
u8 protkey[MAXPROTKEYSIZE]; /* the protected key blob */
} __packed;
/*
* Create a protected key from a clear key value.
*/
static int pkey_clr2protkey(u32 keytype,
const struct pkey_clrkey *clrkey,
struct pkey_protkey *protkey)
{
/* mask of available pckmo subfunctions */
static cpacf_mask_t pckmo_functions;
long fc;
int keysize;
u8 paramblock[64];
switch (keytype) {
case PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128:
keysize = 16;
fc = CPACF_PCKMO_ENC_AES_128_KEY;
break;
case PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_192:
keysize = 24;
fc = CPACF_PCKMO_ENC_AES_192_KEY;
break;
case PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_256:
keysize = 32;
fc = CPACF_PCKMO_ENC_AES_256_KEY;
break;
default:
DEBUG_ERR("%s unknown/unsupported keytype %d\n",
__func__, keytype);
return -EINVAL;
}
/* Did we already check for PCKMO ? */
if (!pckmo_functions.bytes[0]) {
/* no, so check now */
if (!cpacf_query(CPACF_PCKMO, &pckmo_functions))
return -ENODEV;
}
/* check for the pckmo subfunction we need now */
if (!cpacf_test_func(&pckmo_functions, fc)) {
DEBUG_ERR("%s pckmo functions not available\n", __func__);
return -ENODEV;
}
/* prepare param block */
memset(paramblock, 0, sizeof(paramblock));
memcpy(paramblock, clrkey->clrkey, keysize);
/* call the pckmo instruction */
cpacf_pckmo(fc, paramblock);
/* copy created protected key */
protkey->type = keytype;
protkey->len = keysize + 32;
memcpy(protkey->protkey, paramblock, keysize + 32);
return 0;
}
/*
* Find card and transform secure key into protected key.
*/
s390/pkey: add CCA AES cipher key support Introduce new ioctls and structs to be used with these new ioctls which are able to handle CCA AES secure keys and CCA AES cipher keys: PKEY_GENSECK2: Generate secure key, version 2. Generate either a CCA AES secure key or a CCA AES cipher key. PKEY_CLR2SECK2: Generate secure key from clear key value, version 2. Construct a CCA AES secure key or CCA AES cipher key from a given clear key value. PKEY_VERIFYKEY2: Verify the given secure key, version 2. Check for correct key type. If cardnr and domain are given, also check if this apqn is able to handle this type of key. If cardnr and domain are 0xFFFF, on return these values are filled with an apqn able to handle this key. The function also checks for the master key verification patterns of the key matching to the current or alternate mkvp of the apqn. CCA AES cipher keys are also checked for CPACF export allowed (CPRTCPAC flag). Currently CCA AES secure keys and CCA AES cipher keys are supported (may get extended in the future). PKEY_KBLOB2PROTK2: Transform a key blob (of any type) into a protected key, version 2. Difference to version 1 is only that this new ioctl has additional parameters to provide a list of apqns to be used for the transformation. PKEY_APQNS4K: Generate a list of APQNs based on the key blob given. Is able to find out which type of secure key is given (CCA AES secure key or CCA AES cipher key) and tries to find all matching crypto cards based on the MKVP and maybe other criterias (like CCA AES cipher keys need a CEX6C or higher). The list of APQNs is further filtered by the key's mkvp which needs to match to either the current mkvp or the alternate mkvp (which is the old mkvp on CCA adapters) of the apqns. The flags argument may be used to limit the matching apqns. If the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP is given, only the current mkvp of each apqn is compared. Likewise with the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP. If both are given it is assumed to return apqns where either the current or the alternate mkvp matches. If no matching APQN is found, the ioctl returns with 0 but the apqn_entries value is 0. PKEY_APQNS4KT: Generate a list of APQNs based on the key type given. Build a list of APQNs based on the given key type and maybe further restrict the list by given master key verification patterns. For different key types there may be different ways to match the master key verification patterns. For CCA keys (CCA data key and CCA cipher key) the first 8 bytes of cur_mkvp refer to the current mkvp value of the apqn and the first 8 bytes of the alt_mkvp refer to the old mkvp. The flags argument controls if the apqns current and/or alternate mkvp should match. If the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP is given, only the current mkvp of each apqn is compared. Likewise with the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP. If both are given, it is assumed to return apqns where either the current or the alternate mkvp matches. If no matching APQN is found, the ioctl returns with 0 but the apqn_entries value is 0. These new ioctls are now prepared for another new type of secure key blob which may come in the future. They all use a pointer to the key blob and a key blob length information instead of some hardcoded byte array. They all use the new enums pkey_key_type, pkey_key_size and pkey_key_info for getting/setting key type, key size and additional info about the key. All but the PKEY_VERIFY2 ioctl now work based on a list of apqns. This list is walked through trying to perform the operation on exactly this apqn without any further checking (like card type or online state). If the apqn fails, simple the next one in the list is tried until success (return 0) or the end of the list is reached (return -1 with errno ENODEV). All apqns in the list need to be exact apqns (0xFFFF as any card or domain is not allowed). There are two new ioctls which can be used to build a list of apqns based on a key or key type and maybe restricted by match to a current or alternate master key verifcation pattern. Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
2019-06-19 06:26:05 -06:00
static int pkey_skey2pkey(const u8 *key, struct pkey_protkey *pkey)
{
int rc, verify;
s390/pkey: add CCA AES cipher key support Introduce new ioctls and structs to be used with these new ioctls which are able to handle CCA AES secure keys and CCA AES cipher keys: PKEY_GENSECK2: Generate secure key, version 2. Generate either a CCA AES secure key or a CCA AES cipher key. PKEY_CLR2SECK2: Generate secure key from clear key value, version 2. Construct a CCA AES secure key or CCA AES cipher key from a given clear key value. PKEY_VERIFYKEY2: Verify the given secure key, version 2. Check for correct key type. If cardnr and domain are given, also check if this apqn is able to handle this type of key. If cardnr and domain are 0xFFFF, on return these values are filled with an apqn able to handle this key. The function also checks for the master key verification patterns of the key matching to the current or alternate mkvp of the apqn. CCA AES cipher keys are also checked for CPACF export allowed (CPRTCPAC flag). Currently CCA AES secure keys and CCA AES cipher keys are supported (may get extended in the future). PKEY_KBLOB2PROTK2: Transform a key blob (of any type) into a protected key, version 2. Difference to version 1 is only that this new ioctl has additional parameters to provide a list of apqns to be used for the transformation. PKEY_APQNS4K: Generate a list of APQNs based on the key blob given. Is able to find out which type of secure key is given (CCA AES secure key or CCA AES cipher key) and tries to find all matching crypto cards based on the MKVP and maybe other criterias (like CCA AES cipher keys need a CEX6C or higher). The list of APQNs is further filtered by the key's mkvp which needs to match to either the current mkvp or the alternate mkvp (which is the old mkvp on CCA adapters) of the apqns. The flags argument may be used to limit the matching apqns. If the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP is given, only the current mkvp of each apqn is compared. Likewise with the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP. If both are given it is assumed to return apqns where either the current or the alternate mkvp matches. If no matching APQN is found, the ioctl returns with 0 but the apqn_entries value is 0. PKEY_APQNS4KT: Generate a list of APQNs based on the key type given. Build a list of APQNs based on the given key type and maybe further restrict the list by given master key verification patterns. For different key types there may be different ways to match the master key verification patterns. For CCA keys (CCA data key and CCA cipher key) the first 8 bytes of cur_mkvp refer to the current mkvp value of the apqn and the first 8 bytes of the alt_mkvp refer to the old mkvp. The flags argument controls if the apqns current and/or alternate mkvp should match. If the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP is given, only the current mkvp of each apqn is compared. Likewise with the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP. If both are given, it is assumed to return apqns where either the current or the alternate mkvp matches. If no matching APQN is found, the ioctl returns with 0 but the apqn_entries value is 0. These new ioctls are now prepared for another new type of secure key blob which may come in the future. They all use a pointer to the key blob and a key blob length information instead of some hardcoded byte array. They all use the new enums pkey_key_type, pkey_key_size and pkey_key_info for getting/setting key type, key size and additional info about the key. All but the PKEY_VERIFY2 ioctl now work based on a list of apqns. This list is walked through trying to perform the operation on exactly this apqn without any further checking (like card type or online state). If the apqn fails, simple the next one in the list is tried until success (return 0) or the end of the list is reached (return -1 with errno ENODEV). All apqns in the list need to be exact apqns (0xFFFF as any card or domain is not allowed). There are two new ioctls which can be used to build a list of apqns based on a key or key type and maybe restricted by match to a current or alternate master key verifcation pattern. Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
2019-06-19 06:26:05 -06:00
u16 cardnr, domain;
struct keytoken_header *hdr = (struct keytoken_header *)key;
/*
s390/pkey: add CCA AES cipher key support Introduce new ioctls and structs to be used with these new ioctls which are able to handle CCA AES secure keys and CCA AES cipher keys: PKEY_GENSECK2: Generate secure key, version 2. Generate either a CCA AES secure key or a CCA AES cipher key. PKEY_CLR2SECK2: Generate secure key from clear key value, version 2. Construct a CCA AES secure key or CCA AES cipher key from a given clear key value. PKEY_VERIFYKEY2: Verify the given secure key, version 2. Check for correct key type. If cardnr and domain are given, also check if this apqn is able to handle this type of key. If cardnr and domain are 0xFFFF, on return these values are filled with an apqn able to handle this key. The function also checks for the master key verification patterns of the key matching to the current or alternate mkvp of the apqn. CCA AES cipher keys are also checked for CPACF export allowed (CPRTCPAC flag). Currently CCA AES secure keys and CCA AES cipher keys are supported (may get extended in the future). PKEY_KBLOB2PROTK2: Transform a key blob (of any type) into a protected key, version 2. Difference to version 1 is only that this new ioctl has additional parameters to provide a list of apqns to be used for the transformation. PKEY_APQNS4K: Generate a list of APQNs based on the key blob given. Is able to find out which type of secure key is given (CCA AES secure key or CCA AES cipher key) and tries to find all matching crypto cards based on the MKVP and maybe other criterias (like CCA AES cipher keys need a CEX6C or higher). The list of APQNs is further filtered by the key's mkvp which needs to match to either the current mkvp or the alternate mkvp (which is the old mkvp on CCA adapters) of the apqns. The flags argument may be used to limit the matching apqns. If the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP is given, only the current mkvp of each apqn is compared. Likewise with the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP. If both are given it is assumed to return apqns where either the current or the alternate mkvp matches. If no matching APQN is found, the ioctl returns with 0 but the apqn_entries value is 0. PKEY_APQNS4KT: Generate a list of APQNs based on the key type given. Build a list of APQNs based on the given key type and maybe further restrict the list by given master key verification patterns. For different key types there may be different ways to match the master key verification patterns. For CCA keys (CCA data key and CCA cipher key) the first 8 bytes of cur_mkvp refer to the current mkvp value of the apqn and the first 8 bytes of the alt_mkvp refer to the old mkvp. The flags argument controls if the apqns current and/or alternate mkvp should match. If the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP is given, only the current mkvp of each apqn is compared. Likewise with the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP. If both are given, it is assumed to return apqns where either the current or the alternate mkvp matches. If no matching APQN is found, the ioctl returns with 0 but the apqn_entries value is 0. These new ioctls are now prepared for another new type of secure key blob which may come in the future. They all use a pointer to the key blob and a key blob length information instead of some hardcoded byte array. They all use the new enums pkey_key_type, pkey_key_size and pkey_key_info for getting/setting key type, key size and additional info about the key. All but the PKEY_VERIFY2 ioctl now work based on a list of apqns. This list is walked through trying to perform the operation on exactly this apqn without any further checking (like card type or online state). If the apqn fails, simple the next one in the list is tried until success (return 0) or the end of the list is reached (return -1 with errno ENODEV). All apqns in the list need to be exact apqns (0xFFFF as any card or domain is not allowed). There are two new ioctls which can be used to build a list of apqns based on a key or key type and maybe restricted by match to a current or alternate master key verifcation pattern. Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
2019-06-19 06:26:05 -06:00
* The cca_xxx2protkey call may fail when a card has been
* addressed where the master key was changed after last fetch
* of the mkvp into the cache. Try 3 times: First witout verify
* then with verify and last round with verify and old master
* key verification pattern match not ignored.
*/
for (verify = 0; verify < 3; verify++) {
s390/pkey: add CCA AES cipher key support Introduce new ioctls and structs to be used with these new ioctls which are able to handle CCA AES secure keys and CCA AES cipher keys: PKEY_GENSECK2: Generate secure key, version 2. Generate either a CCA AES secure key or a CCA AES cipher key. PKEY_CLR2SECK2: Generate secure key from clear key value, version 2. Construct a CCA AES secure key or CCA AES cipher key from a given clear key value. PKEY_VERIFYKEY2: Verify the given secure key, version 2. Check for correct key type. If cardnr and domain are given, also check if this apqn is able to handle this type of key. If cardnr and domain are 0xFFFF, on return these values are filled with an apqn able to handle this key. The function also checks for the master key verification patterns of the key matching to the current or alternate mkvp of the apqn. CCA AES cipher keys are also checked for CPACF export allowed (CPRTCPAC flag). Currently CCA AES secure keys and CCA AES cipher keys are supported (may get extended in the future). PKEY_KBLOB2PROTK2: Transform a key blob (of any type) into a protected key, version 2. Difference to version 1 is only that this new ioctl has additional parameters to provide a list of apqns to be used for the transformation. PKEY_APQNS4K: Generate a list of APQNs based on the key blob given. Is able to find out which type of secure key is given (CCA AES secure key or CCA AES cipher key) and tries to find all matching crypto cards based on the MKVP and maybe other criterias (like CCA AES cipher keys need a CEX6C or higher). The list of APQNs is further filtered by the key's mkvp which needs to match to either the current mkvp or the alternate mkvp (which is the old mkvp on CCA adapters) of the apqns. The flags argument may be used to limit the matching apqns. If the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP is given, only the current mkvp of each apqn is compared. Likewise with the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP. If both are given it is assumed to return apqns where either the current or the alternate mkvp matches. If no matching APQN is found, the ioctl returns with 0 but the apqn_entries value is 0. PKEY_APQNS4KT: Generate a list of APQNs based on the key type given. Build a list of APQNs based on the given key type and maybe further restrict the list by given master key verification patterns. For different key types there may be different ways to match the master key verification patterns. For CCA keys (CCA data key and CCA cipher key) the first 8 bytes of cur_mkvp refer to the current mkvp value of the apqn and the first 8 bytes of the alt_mkvp refer to the old mkvp. The flags argument controls if the apqns current and/or alternate mkvp should match. If the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP is given, only the current mkvp of each apqn is compared. Likewise with the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP. If both are given, it is assumed to return apqns where either the current or the alternate mkvp matches. If no matching APQN is found, the ioctl returns with 0 but the apqn_entries value is 0. These new ioctls are now prepared for another new type of secure key blob which may come in the future. They all use a pointer to the key blob and a key blob length information instead of some hardcoded byte array. They all use the new enums pkey_key_type, pkey_key_size and pkey_key_info for getting/setting key type, key size and additional info about the key. All but the PKEY_VERIFY2 ioctl now work based on a list of apqns. This list is walked through trying to perform the operation on exactly this apqn without any further checking (like card type or online state). If the apqn fails, simple the next one in the list is tried until success (return 0) or the end of the list is reached (return -1 with errno ENODEV). All apqns in the list need to be exact apqns (0xFFFF as any card or domain is not allowed). There are two new ioctls which can be used to build a list of apqns based on a key or key type and maybe restricted by match to a current or alternate master key verifcation pattern. Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
2019-06-19 06:26:05 -06:00
rc = cca_findcard(key, &cardnr, &domain, verify);
if (rc < 0)
continue;
if (rc > 0 && verify < 2)
continue;
s390/pkey: add CCA AES cipher key support Introduce new ioctls and structs to be used with these new ioctls which are able to handle CCA AES secure keys and CCA AES cipher keys: PKEY_GENSECK2: Generate secure key, version 2. Generate either a CCA AES secure key or a CCA AES cipher key. PKEY_CLR2SECK2: Generate secure key from clear key value, version 2. Construct a CCA AES secure key or CCA AES cipher key from a given clear key value. PKEY_VERIFYKEY2: Verify the given secure key, version 2. Check for correct key type. If cardnr and domain are given, also check if this apqn is able to handle this type of key. If cardnr and domain are 0xFFFF, on return these values are filled with an apqn able to handle this key. The function also checks for the master key verification patterns of the key matching to the current or alternate mkvp of the apqn. CCA AES cipher keys are also checked for CPACF export allowed (CPRTCPAC flag). Currently CCA AES secure keys and CCA AES cipher keys are supported (may get extended in the future). PKEY_KBLOB2PROTK2: Transform a key blob (of any type) into a protected key, version 2. Difference to version 1 is only that this new ioctl has additional parameters to provide a list of apqns to be used for the transformation. PKEY_APQNS4K: Generate a list of APQNs based on the key blob given. Is able to find out which type of secure key is given (CCA AES secure key or CCA AES cipher key) and tries to find all matching crypto cards based on the MKVP and maybe other criterias (like CCA AES cipher keys need a CEX6C or higher). The list of APQNs is further filtered by the key's mkvp which needs to match to either the current mkvp or the alternate mkvp (which is the old mkvp on CCA adapters) of the apqns. The flags argument may be used to limit the matching apqns. If the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP is given, only the current mkvp of each apqn is compared. Likewise with the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP. If both are given it is assumed to return apqns where either the current or the alternate mkvp matches. If no matching APQN is found, the ioctl returns with 0 but the apqn_entries value is 0. PKEY_APQNS4KT: Generate a list of APQNs based on the key type given. Build a list of APQNs based on the given key type and maybe further restrict the list by given master key verification patterns. For different key types there may be different ways to match the master key verification patterns. For CCA keys (CCA data key and CCA cipher key) the first 8 bytes of cur_mkvp refer to the current mkvp value of the apqn and the first 8 bytes of the alt_mkvp refer to the old mkvp. The flags argument controls if the apqns current and/or alternate mkvp should match. If the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP is given, only the current mkvp of each apqn is compared. Likewise with the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP. If both are given, it is assumed to return apqns where either the current or the alternate mkvp matches. If no matching APQN is found, the ioctl returns with 0 but the apqn_entries value is 0. These new ioctls are now prepared for another new type of secure key blob which may come in the future. They all use a pointer to the key blob and a key blob length information instead of some hardcoded byte array. They all use the new enums pkey_key_type, pkey_key_size and pkey_key_info for getting/setting key type, key size and additional info about the key. All but the PKEY_VERIFY2 ioctl now work based on a list of apqns. This list is walked through trying to perform the operation on exactly this apqn without any further checking (like card type or online state). If the apqn fails, simple the next one in the list is tried until success (return 0) or the end of the list is reached (return -1 with errno ENODEV). All apqns in the list need to be exact apqns (0xFFFF as any card or domain is not allowed). There are two new ioctls which can be used to build a list of apqns based on a key or key type and maybe restricted by match to a current or alternate master key verifcation pattern. Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
2019-06-19 06:26:05 -06:00
switch (hdr->version) {
case TOKVER_CCA_AES:
rc = cca_sec2protkey(cardnr, domain,
key, pkey->protkey,
&pkey->len, &pkey->type);
break;
case TOKVER_CCA_VLSC:
rc = cca_cipher2protkey(cardnr, domain,
key, pkey->protkey,
&pkey->len, &pkey->type);
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
if (rc == 0)
break;
}
if (rc)
DEBUG_DBG("%s failed rc=%d\n", __func__, rc);
return rc;
}
/*
* Verify key and give back some info about the key.
*/
static int pkey_verifykey(const struct pkey_seckey *seckey,
u16 *pcardnr, u16 *pdomain,
u16 *pkeysize, u32 *pattributes)
{
struct secaeskeytoken *t = (struct secaeskeytoken *) seckey;
u16 cardnr, domain;
int rc;
/* check the secure key for valid AES secure key */
rc = cca_check_secaeskeytoken(debug_info, 3, (u8 *) seckey, 0);
if (rc)
goto out;
if (pattributes)
*pattributes = PKEY_VERIFY_ATTR_AES;
if (pkeysize)
*pkeysize = t->bitsize;
/* try to find a card which can handle this key */
rc = cca_findcard(seckey->seckey, &cardnr, &domain, 1);
if (rc < 0)
goto out;
if (rc > 0) {
/* key mkvp matches to old master key mkvp */
DEBUG_DBG("%s secure key has old mkvp\n", __func__);
if (pattributes)
*pattributes |= PKEY_VERIFY_ATTR_OLD_MKVP;
rc = 0;
}
if (pcardnr)
*pcardnr = cardnr;
if (pdomain)
*pdomain = domain;
out:
DEBUG_DBG("%s rc=%d\n", __func__, rc);
return rc;
}
/*
* Generate a random protected key
*/
static int pkey_genprotkey(u32 keytype, struct pkey_protkey *protkey)
{
struct pkey_clrkey clrkey;
int keysize;
int rc;
switch (keytype) {
case PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128:
keysize = 16;
break;
case PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_192:
keysize = 24;
break;
case PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_256:
keysize = 32;
break;
default:
DEBUG_ERR("%s unknown/unsupported keytype %d\n", __func__,
keytype);
return -EINVAL;
}
/* generate a dummy random clear key */
get_random_bytes(clrkey.clrkey, keysize);
/* convert it to a dummy protected key */
rc = pkey_clr2protkey(keytype, &clrkey, protkey);
if (rc)
return rc;
/* replace the key part of the protected key with random bytes */
get_random_bytes(protkey->protkey, keysize);
return 0;
}
/*
* Verify if a protected key is still valid
*/
static int pkey_verifyprotkey(const struct pkey_protkey *protkey)
{
unsigned long fc;
struct {
u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
u8 key[MAXPROTKEYSIZE];
} param;
u8 null_msg[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
u8 dest_buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
unsigned int k;
switch (protkey->type) {
case PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128:
fc = CPACF_KMC_PAES_128;
break;
case PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_192:
fc = CPACF_KMC_PAES_192;
break;
case PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_256:
fc = CPACF_KMC_PAES_256;
break;
default:
DEBUG_ERR("%s unknown/unsupported keytype %d\n", __func__,
protkey->type);
return -EINVAL;
}
memset(null_msg, 0, sizeof(null_msg));
memset(param.iv, 0, sizeof(param.iv));
memcpy(param.key, protkey->protkey, sizeof(param.key));
k = cpacf_kmc(fc | CPACF_ENCRYPT, &param, null_msg, dest_buf,
sizeof(null_msg));
if (k != sizeof(null_msg)) {
DEBUG_ERR("%s protected key is not valid\n", __func__);
return -EKEYREJECTED;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Transform a non-CCA key token into a protected key
*/
static int pkey_nonccatok2pkey(const u8 *key, u32 keylen,
struct pkey_protkey *protkey)
{
struct keytoken_header *hdr = (struct keytoken_header *)key;
struct protaeskeytoken *t;
switch (hdr->version) {
case TOKVER_PROTECTED_KEY:
if (keylen != sizeof(struct protaeskeytoken))
return -EINVAL;
t = (struct protaeskeytoken *)key;
protkey->len = t->len;
protkey->type = t->keytype;
memcpy(protkey->protkey, t->protkey,
sizeof(protkey->protkey));
return pkey_verifyprotkey(protkey);
default:
DEBUG_ERR("%s unknown/unsupported non-CCA token version %d\n",
__func__, hdr->version);
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/*
* Transform a CCA internal key token into a protected key
*/
static int pkey_ccainttok2pkey(const u8 *key, u32 keylen,
struct pkey_protkey *protkey)
{
struct keytoken_header *hdr = (struct keytoken_header *)key;
switch (hdr->version) {
case TOKVER_CCA_AES:
if (keylen != sizeof(struct secaeskeytoken))
return -EINVAL;
s390/pkey: add CCA AES cipher key support Introduce new ioctls and structs to be used with these new ioctls which are able to handle CCA AES secure keys and CCA AES cipher keys: PKEY_GENSECK2: Generate secure key, version 2. Generate either a CCA AES secure key or a CCA AES cipher key. PKEY_CLR2SECK2: Generate secure key from clear key value, version 2. Construct a CCA AES secure key or CCA AES cipher key from a given clear key value. PKEY_VERIFYKEY2: Verify the given secure key, version 2. Check for correct key type. If cardnr and domain are given, also check if this apqn is able to handle this type of key. If cardnr and domain are 0xFFFF, on return these values are filled with an apqn able to handle this key. The function also checks for the master key verification patterns of the key matching to the current or alternate mkvp of the apqn. CCA AES cipher keys are also checked for CPACF export allowed (CPRTCPAC flag). Currently CCA AES secure keys and CCA AES cipher keys are supported (may get extended in the future). PKEY_KBLOB2PROTK2: Transform a key blob (of any type) into a protected key, version 2. Difference to version 1 is only that this new ioctl has additional parameters to provide a list of apqns to be used for the transformation. PKEY_APQNS4K: Generate a list of APQNs based on the key blob given. Is able to find out which type of secure key is given (CCA AES secure key or CCA AES cipher key) and tries to find all matching crypto cards based on the MKVP and maybe other criterias (like CCA AES cipher keys need a CEX6C or higher). The list of APQNs is further filtered by the key's mkvp which needs to match to either the current mkvp or the alternate mkvp (which is the old mkvp on CCA adapters) of the apqns. The flags argument may be used to limit the matching apqns. If the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP is given, only the current mkvp of each apqn is compared. Likewise with the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP. If both are given it is assumed to return apqns where either the current or the alternate mkvp matches. If no matching APQN is found, the ioctl returns with 0 but the apqn_entries value is 0. PKEY_APQNS4KT: Generate a list of APQNs based on the key type given. Build a list of APQNs based on the given key type and maybe further restrict the list by given master key verification patterns. For different key types there may be different ways to match the master key verification patterns. For CCA keys (CCA data key and CCA cipher key) the first 8 bytes of cur_mkvp refer to the current mkvp value of the apqn and the first 8 bytes of the alt_mkvp refer to the old mkvp. The flags argument controls if the apqns current and/or alternate mkvp should match. If the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP is given, only the current mkvp of each apqn is compared. Likewise with the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP. If both are given, it is assumed to return apqns where either the current or the alternate mkvp matches. If no matching APQN is found, the ioctl returns with 0 but the apqn_entries value is 0. These new ioctls are now prepared for another new type of secure key blob which may come in the future. They all use a pointer to the key blob and a key blob length information instead of some hardcoded byte array. They all use the new enums pkey_key_type, pkey_key_size and pkey_key_info for getting/setting key type, key size and additional info about the key. All but the PKEY_VERIFY2 ioctl now work based on a list of apqns. This list is walked through trying to perform the operation on exactly this apqn without any further checking (like card type or online state). If the apqn fails, simple the next one in the list is tried until success (return 0) or the end of the list is reached (return -1 with errno ENODEV). All apqns in the list need to be exact apqns (0xFFFF as any card or domain is not allowed). There are two new ioctls which can be used to build a list of apqns based on a key or key type and maybe restricted by match to a current or alternate master key verifcation pattern. Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
2019-06-19 06:26:05 -06:00
break;
case TOKVER_CCA_VLSC:
if (keylen < hdr->len || keylen > MAXCCAVLSCTOKENSIZE)
return -EINVAL;
break;
default:
DEBUG_ERR("%s unknown/unsupported CCA internal token version %d\n",
__func__, hdr->version);
return -EINVAL;
}
s390/pkey: add CCA AES cipher key support Introduce new ioctls and structs to be used with these new ioctls which are able to handle CCA AES secure keys and CCA AES cipher keys: PKEY_GENSECK2: Generate secure key, version 2. Generate either a CCA AES secure key or a CCA AES cipher key. PKEY_CLR2SECK2: Generate secure key from clear key value, version 2. Construct a CCA AES secure key or CCA AES cipher key from a given clear key value. PKEY_VERIFYKEY2: Verify the given secure key, version 2. Check for correct key type. If cardnr and domain are given, also check if this apqn is able to handle this type of key. If cardnr and domain are 0xFFFF, on return these values are filled with an apqn able to handle this key. The function also checks for the master key verification patterns of the key matching to the current or alternate mkvp of the apqn. CCA AES cipher keys are also checked for CPACF export allowed (CPRTCPAC flag). Currently CCA AES secure keys and CCA AES cipher keys are supported (may get extended in the future). PKEY_KBLOB2PROTK2: Transform a key blob (of any type) into a protected key, version 2. Difference to version 1 is only that this new ioctl has additional parameters to provide a list of apqns to be used for the transformation. PKEY_APQNS4K: Generate a list of APQNs based on the key blob given. Is able to find out which type of secure key is given (CCA AES secure key or CCA AES cipher key) and tries to find all matching crypto cards based on the MKVP and maybe other criterias (like CCA AES cipher keys need a CEX6C or higher). The list of APQNs is further filtered by the key's mkvp which needs to match to either the current mkvp or the alternate mkvp (which is the old mkvp on CCA adapters) of the apqns. The flags argument may be used to limit the matching apqns. If the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP is given, only the current mkvp of each apqn is compared. Likewise with the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP. If both are given it is assumed to return apqns where either the current or the alternate mkvp matches. If no matching APQN is found, the ioctl returns with 0 but the apqn_entries value is 0. PKEY_APQNS4KT: Generate a list of APQNs based on the key type given. Build a list of APQNs based on the given key type and maybe further restrict the list by given master key verification patterns. For different key types there may be different ways to match the master key verification patterns. For CCA keys (CCA data key and CCA cipher key) the first 8 bytes of cur_mkvp refer to the current mkvp value of the apqn and the first 8 bytes of the alt_mkvp refer to the old mkvp. The flags argument controls if the apqns current and/or alternate mkvp should match. If the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP is given, only the current mkvp of each apqn is compared. Likewise with the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP. If both are given, it is assumed to return apqns where either the current or the alternate mkvp matches. If no matching APQN is found, the ioctl returns with 0 but the apqn_entries value is 0. These new ioctls are now prepared for another new type of secure key blob which may come in the future. They all use a pointer to the key blob and a key blob length information instead of some hardcoded byte array. They all use the new enums pkey_key_type, pkey_key_size and pkey_key_info for getting/setting key type, key size and additional info about the key. All but the PKEY_VERIFY2 ioctl now work based on a list of apqns. This list is walked through trying to perform the operation on exactly this apqn without any further checking (like card type or online state). If the apqn fails, simple the next one in the list is tried until success (return 0) or the end of the list is reached (return -1 with errno ENODEV). All apqns in the list need to be exact apqns (0xFFFF as any card or domain is not allowed). There are two new ioctls which can be used to build a list of apqns based on a key or key type and maybe restricted by match to a current or alternate master key verifcation pattern. Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
2019-06-19 06:26:05 -06:00
return pkey_skey2pkey(key, protkey);
}
/*
* Transform a key blob (of any type) into a protected key
*/
int pkey_keyblob2pkey(const u8 *key, u32 keylen,
struct pkey_protkey *protkey)
{
s390/pkey: add CCA AES cipher key support Introduce new ioctls and structs to be used with these new ioctls which are able to handle CCA AES secure keys and CCA AES cipher keys: PKEY_GENSECK2: Generate secure key, version 2. Generate either a CCA AES secure key or a CCA AES cipher key. PKEY_CLR2SECK2: Generate secure key from clear key value, version 2. Construct a CCA AES secure key or CCA AES cipher key from a given clear key value. PKEY_VERIFYKEY2: Verify the given secure key, version 2. Check for correct key type. If cardnr and domain are given, also check if this apqn is able to handle this type of key. If cardnr and domain are 0xFFFF, on return these values are filled with an apqn able to handle this key. The function also checks for the master key verification patterns of the key matching to the current or alternate mkvp of the apqn. CCA AES cipher keys are also checked for CPACF export allowed (CPRTCPAC flag). Currently CCA AES secure keys and CCA AES cipher keys are supported (may get extended in the future). PKEY_KBLOB2PROTK2: Transform a key blob (of any type) into a protected key, version 2. Difference to version 1 is only that this new ioctl has additional parameters to provide a list of apqns to be used for the transformation. PKEY_APQNS4K: Generate a list of APQNs based on the key blob given. Is able to find out which type of secure key is given (CCA AES secure key or CCA AES cipher key) and tries to find all matching crypto cards based on the MKVP and maybe other criterias (like CCA AES cipher keys need a CEX6C or higher). The list of APQNs is further filtered by the key's mkvp which needs to match to either the current mkvp or the alternate mkvp (which is the old mkvp on CCA adapters) of the apqns. The flags argument may be used to limit the matching apqns. If the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP is given, only the current mkvp of each apqn is compared. Likewise with the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP. If both are given it is assumed to return apqns where either the current or the alternate mkvp matches. If no matching APQN is found, the ioctl returns with 0 but the apqn_entries value is 0. PKEY_APQNS4KT: Generate a list of APQNs based on the key type given. Build a list of APQNs based on the given key type and maybe further restrict the list by given master key verification patterns. For different key types there may be different ways to match the master key verification patterns. For CCA keys (CCA data key and CCA cipher key) the first 8 bytes of cur_mkvp refer to the current mkvp value of the apqn and the first 8 bytes of the alt_mkvp refer to the old mkvp. The flags argument controls if the apqns current and/or alternate mkvp should match. If the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP is given, only the current mkvp of each apqn is compared. Likewise with the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP. If both are given, it is assumed to return apqns where either the current or the alternate mkvp matches. If no matching APQN is found, the ioctl returns with 0 but the apqn_entries value is 0. These new ioctls are now prepared for another new type of secure key blob which may come in the future. They all use a pointer to the key blob and a key blob length information instead of some hardcoded byte array. They all use the new enums pkey_key_type, pkey_key_size and pkey_key_info for getting/setting key type, key size and additional info about the key. All but the PKEY_VERIFY2 ioctl now work based on a list of apqns. This list is walked through trying to perform the operation on exactly this apqn without any further checking (like card type or online state). If the apqn fails, simple the next one in the list is tried until success (return 0) or the end of the list is reached (return -1 with errno ENODEV). All apqns in the list need to be exact apqns (0xFFFF as any card or domain is not allowed). There are two new ioctls which can be used to build a list of apqns based on a key or key type and maybe restricted by match to a current or alternate master key verifcation pattern. Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
2019-06-19 06:26:05 -06:00
int rc;
struct keytoken_header *hdr = (struct keytoken_header *)key;
s390/pkey: add CCA AES cipher key support Introduce new ioctls and structs to be used with these new ioctls which are able to handle CCA AES secure keys and CCA AES cipher keys: PKEY_GENSECK2: Generate secure key, version 2. Generate either a CCA AES secure key or a CCA AES cipher key. PKEY_CLR2SECK2: Generate secure key from clear key value, version 2. Construct a CCA AES secure key or CCA AES cipher key from a given clear key value. PKEY_VERIFYKEY2: Verify the given secure key, version 2. Check for correct key type. If cardnr and domain are given, also check if this apqn is able to handle this type of key. If cardnr and domain are 0xFFFF, on return these values are filled with an apqn able to handle this key. The function also checks for the master key verification patterns of the key matching to the current or alternate mkvp of the apqn. CCA AES cipher keys are also checked for CPACF export allowed (CPRTCPAC flag). Currently CCA AES secure keys and CCA AES cipher keys are supported (may get extended in the future). PKEY_KBLOB2PROTK2: Transform a key blob (of any type) into a protected key, version 2. Difference to version 1 is only that this new ioctl has additional parameters to provide a list of apqns to be used for the transformation. PKEY_APQNS4K: Generate a list of APQNs based on the key blob given. Is able to find out which type of secure key is given (CCA AES secure key or CCA AES cipher key) and tries to find all matching crypto cards based on the MKVP and maybe other criterias (like CCA AES cipher keys need a CEX6C or higher). The list of APQNs is further filtered by the key's mkvp which needs to match to either the current mkvp or the alternate mkvp (which is the old mkvp on CCA adapters) of the apqns. The flags argument may be used to limit the matching apqns. If the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP is given, only the current mkvp of each apqn is compared. Likewise with the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP. If both are given it is assumed to return apqns where either the current or the alternate mkvp matches. If no matching APQN is found, the ioctl returns with 0 but the apqn_entries value is 0. PKEY_APQNS4KT: Generate a list of APQNs based on the key type given. Build a list of APQNs based on the given key type and maybe further restrict the list by given master key verification patterns. For different key types there may be different ways to match the master key verification patterns. For CCA keys (CCA data key and CCA cipher key) the first 8 bytes of cur_mkvp refer to the current mkvp value of the apqn and the first 8 bytes of the alt_mkvp refer to the old mkvp. The flags argument controls if the apqns current and/or alternate mkvp should match. If the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP is given, only the current mkvp of each apqn is compared. Likewise with the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP. If both are given, it is assumed to return apqns where either the current or the alternate mkvp matches. If no matching APQN is found, the ioctl returns with 0 but the apqn_entries value is 0. These new ioctls are now prepared for another new type of secure key blob which may come in the future. They all use a pointer to the key blob and a key blob length information instead of some hardcoded byte array. They all use the new enums pkey_key_type, pkey_key_size and pkey_key_info for getting/setting key type, key size and additional info about the key. All but the PKEY_VERIFY2 ioctl now work based on a list of apqns. This list is walked through trying to perform the operation on exactly this apqn without any further checking (like card type or online state). If the apqn fails, simple the next one in the list is tried until success (return 0) or the end of the list is reached (return -1 with errno ENODEV). All apqns in the list need to be exact apqns (0xFFFF as any card or domain is not allowed). There are two new ioctls which can be used to build a list of apqns based on a key or key type and maybe restricted by match to a current or alternate master key verifcation pattern. Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
2019-06-19 06:26:05 -06:00
if (keylen < sizeof(struct keytoken_header)) {
DEBUG_ERR("%s invalid keylen %d\n", __func__, keylen);
return -EINVAL;
s390/pkey: add CCA AES cipher key support Introduce new ioctls and structs to be used with these new ioctls which are able to handle CCA AES secure keys and CCA AES cipher keys: PKEY_GENSECK2: Generate secure key, version 2. Generate either a CCA AES secure key or a CCA AES cipher key. PKEY_CLR2SECK2: Generate secure key from clear key value, version 2. Construct a CCA AES secure key or CCA AES cipher key from a given clear key value. PKEY_VERIFYKEY2: Verify the given secure key, version 2. Check for correct key type. If cardnr and domain are given, also check if this apqn is able to handle this type of key. If cardnr and domain are 0xFFFF, on return these values are filled with an apqn able to handle this key. The function also checks for the master key verification patterns of the key matching to the current or alternate mkvp of the apqn. CCA AES cipher keys are also checked for CPACF export allowed (CPRTCPAC flag). Currently CCA AES secure keys and CCA AES cipher keys are supported (may get extended in the future). PKEY_KBLOB2PROTK2: Transform a key blob (of any type) into a protected key, version 2. Difference to version 1 is only that this new ioctl has additional parameters to provide a list of apqns to be used for the transformation. PKEY_APQNS4K: Generate a list of APQNs based on the key blob given. Is able to find out which type of secure key is given (CCA AES secure key or CCA AES cipher key) and tries to find all matching crypto cards based on the MKVP and maybe other criterias (like CCA AES cipher keys need a CEX6C or higher). The list of APQNs is further filtered by the key's mkvp which needs to match to either the current mkvp or the alternate mkvp (which is the old mkvp on CCA adapters) of the apqns. The flags argument may be used to limit the matching apqns. If the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP is given, only the current mkvp of each apqn is compared. Likewise with the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP. If both are given it is assumed to return apqns where either the current or the alternate mkvp matches. If no matching APQN is found, the ioctl returns with 0 but the apqn_entries value is 0. PKEY_APQNS4KT: Generate a list of APQNs based on the key type given. Build a list of APQNs based on the given key type and maybe further restrict the list by given master key verification patterns. For different key types there may be different ways to match the master key verification patterns. For CCA keys (CCA data key and CCA cipher key) the first 8 bytes of cur_mkvp refer to the current mkvp value of the apqn and the first 8 bytes of the alt_mkvp refer to the old mkvp. The flags argument controls if the apqns current and/or alternate mkvp should match. If the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP is given, only the current mkvp of each apqn is compared. Likewise with the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP. If both are given, it is assumed to return apqns where either the current or the alternate mkvp matches. If no matching APQN is found, the ioctl returns with 0 but the apqn_entries value is 0. These new ioctls are now prepared for another new type of secure key blob which may come in the future. They all use a pointer to the key blob and a key blob length information instead of some hardcoded byte array. They all use the new enums pkey_key_type, pkey_key_size and pkey_key_info for getting/setting key type, key size and additional info about the key. All but the PKEY_VERIFY2 ioctl now work based on a list of apqns. This list is walked through trying to perform the operation on exactly this apqn without any further checking (like card type or online state). If the apqn fails, simple the next one in the list is tried until success (return 0) or the end of the list is reached (return -1 with errno ENODEV). All apqns in the list need to be exact apqns (0xFFFF as any card or domain is not allowed). There are two new ioctls which can be used to build a list of apqns based on a key or key type and maybe restricted by match to a current or alternate master key verifcation pattern. Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
2019-06-19 06:26:05 -06:00
}
switch (hdr->type) {
case TOKTYPE_NON_CCA:
s390/pkey: add CCA AES cipher key support Introduce new ioctls and structs to be used with these new ioctls which are able to handle CCA AES secure keys and CCA AES cipher keys: PKEY_GENSECK2: Generate secure key, version 2. Generate either a CCA AES secure key or a CCA AES cipher key. PKEY_CLR2SECK2: Generate secure key from clear key value, version 2. Construct a CCA AES secure key or CCA AES cipher key from a given clear key value. PKEY_VERIFYKEY2: Verify the given secure key, version 2. Check for correct key type. If cardnr and domain are given, also check if this apqn is able to handle this type of key. If cardnr and domain are 0xFFFF, on return these values are filled with an apqn able to handle this key. The function also checks for the master key verification patterns of the key matching to the current or alternate mkvp of the apqn. CCA AES cipher keys are also checked for CPACF export allowed (CPRTCPAC flag). Currently CCA AES secure keys and CCA AES cipher keys are supported (may get extended in the future). PKEY_KBLOB2PROTK2: Transform a key blob (of any type) into a protected key, version 2. Difference to version 1 is only that this new ioctl has additional parameters to provide a list of apqns to be used for the transformation. PKEY_APQNS4K: Generate a list of APQNs based on the key blob given. Is able to find out which type of secure key is given (CCA AES secure key or CCA AES cipher key) and tries to find all matching crypto cards based on the MKVP and maybe other criterias (like CCA AES cipher keys need a CEX6C or higher). The list of APQNs is further filtered by the key's mkvp which needs to match to either the current mkvp or the alternate mkvp (which is the old mkvp on CCA adapters) of the apqns. The flags argument may be used to limit the matching apqns. If the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP is given, only the current mkvp of each apqn is compared. Likewise with the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP. If both are given it is assumed to return apqns where either the current or the alternate mkvp matches. If no matching APQN is found, the ioctl returns with 0 but the apqn_entries value is 0. PKEY_APQNS4KT: Generate a list of APQNs based on the key type given. Build a list of APQNs based on the given key type and maybe further restrict the list by given master key verification patterns. For different key types there may be different ways to match the master key verification patterns. For CCA keys (CCA data key and CCA cipher key) the first 8 bytes of cur_mkvp refer to the current mkvp value of the apqn and the first 8 bytes of the alt_mkvp refer to the old mkvp. The flags argument controls if the apqns current and/or alternate mkvp should match. If the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP is given, only the current mkvp of each apqn is compared. Likewise with the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP. If both are given, it is assumed to return apqns where either the current or the alternate mkvp matches. If no matching APQN is found, the ioctl returns with 0 but the apqn_entries value is 0. These new ioctls are now prepared for another new type of secure key blob which may come in the future. They all use a pointer to the key blob and a key blob length information instead of some hardcoded byte array. They all use the new enums pkey_key_type, pkey_key_size and pkey_key_info for getting/setting key type, key size and additional info about the key. All but the PKEY_VERIFY2 ioctl now work based on a list of apqns. This list is walked through trying to perform the operation on exactly this apqn without any further checking (like card type or online state). If the apqn fails, simple the next one in the list is tried until success (return 0) or the end of the list is reached (return -1 with errno ENODEV). All apqns in the list need to be exact apqns (0xFFFF as any card or domain is not allowed). There are two new ioctls which can be used to build a list of apqns based on a key or key type and maybe restricted by match to a current or alternate master key verifcation pattern. Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
2019-06-19 06:26:05 -06:00
rc = pkey_nonccatok2pkey(key, keylen, protkey);
break;
case TOKTYPE_CCA_INTERNAL:
s390/pkey: add CCA AES cipher key support Introduce new ioctls and structs to be used with these new ioctls which are able to handle CCA AES secure keys and CCA AES cipher keys: PKEY_GENSECK2: Generate secure key, version 2. Generate either a CCA AES secure key or a CCA AES cipher key. PKEY_CLR2SECK2: Generate secure key from clear key value, version 2. Construct a CCA AES secure key or CCA AES cipher key from a given clear key value. PKEY_VERIFYKEY2: Verify the given secure key, version 2. Check for correct key type. If cardnr and domain are given, also check if this apqn is able to handle this type of key. If cardnr and domain are 0xFFFF, on return these values are filled with an apqn able to handle this key. The function also checks for the master key verification patterns of the key matching to the current or alternate mkvp of the apqn. CCA AES cipher keys are also checked for CPACF export allowed (CPRTCPAC flag). Currently CCA AES secure keys and CCA AES cipher keys are supported (may get extended in the future). PKEY_KBLOB2PROTK2: Transform a key blob (of any type) into a protected key, version 2. Difference to version 1 is only that this new ioctl has additional parameters to provide a list of apqns to be used for the transformation. PKEY_APQNS4K: Generate a list of APQNs based on the key blob given. Is able to find out which type of secure key is given (CCA AES secure key or CCA AES cipher key) and tries to find all matching crypto cards based on the MKVP and maybe other criterias (like CCA AES cipher keys need a CEX6C or higher). The list of APQNs is further filtered by the key's mkvp which needs to match to either the current mkvp or the alternate mkvp (which is the old mkvp on CCA adapters) of the apqns. The flags argument may be used to limit the matching apqns. If the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP is given, only the current mkvp of each apqn is compared. Likewise with the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP. If both are given it is assumed to return apqns where either the current or the alternate mkvp matches. If no matching APQN is found, the ioctl returns with 0 but the apqn_entries value is 0. PKEY_APQNS4KT: Generate a list of APQNs based on the key type given. Build a list of APQNs based on the given key type and maybe further restrict the list by given master key verification patterns. For different key types there may be different ways to match the master key verification patterns. For CCA keys (CCA data key and CCA cipher key) the first 8 bytes of cur_mkvp refer to the current mkvp value of the apqn and the first 8 bytes of the alt_mkvp refer to the old mkvp. The flags argument controls if the apqns current and/or alternate mkvp should match. If the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP is given, only the current mkvp of each apqn is compared. Likewise with the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP. If both are given, it is assumed to return apqns where either the current or the alternate mkvp matches. If no matching APQN is found, the ioctl returns with 0 but the apqn_entries value is 0. These new ioctls are now prepared for another new type of secure key blob which may come in the future. They all use a pointer to the key blob and a key blob length information instead of some hardcoded byte array. They all use the new enums pkey_key_type, pkey_key_size and pkey_key_info for getting/setting key type, key size and additional info about the key. All but the PKEY_VERIFY2 ioctl now work based on a list of apqns. This list is walked through trying to perform the operation on exactly this apqn without any further checking (like card type or online state). If the apqn fails, simple the next one in the list is tried until success (return 0) or the end of the list is reached (return -1 with errno ENODEV). All apqns in the list need to be exact apqns (0xFFFF as any card or domain is not allowed). There are two new ioctls which can be used to build a list of apqns based on a key or key type and maybe restricted by match to a current or alternate master key verifcation pattern. Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
2019-06-19 06:26:05 -06:00
rc = pkey_ccainttok2pkey(key, keylen, protkey);
break;
default:
s390/pkey: add CCA AES cipher key support Introduce new ioctls and structs to be used with these new ioctls which are able to handle CCA AES secure keys and CCA AES cipher keys: PKEY_GENSECK2: Generate secure key, version 2. Generate either a CCA AES secure key or a CCA AES cipher key. PKEY_CLR2SECK2: Generate secure key from clear key value, version 2. Construct a CCA AES secure key or CCA AES cipher key from a given clear key value. PKEY_VERIFYKEY2: Verify the given secure key, version 2. Check for correct key type. If cardnr and domain are given, also check if this apqn is able to handle this type of key. If cardnr and domain are 0xFFFF, on return these values are filled with an apqn able to handle this key. The function also checks for the master key verification patterns of the key matching to the current or alternate mkvp of the apqn. CCA AES cipher keys are also checked for CPACF export allowed (CPRTCPAC flag). Currently CCA AES secure keys and CCA AES cipher keys are supported (may get extended in the future). PKEY_KBLOB2PROTK2: Transform a key blob (of any type) into a protected key, version 2. Difference to version 1 is only that this new ioctl has additional parameters to provide a list of apqns to be used for the transformation. PKEY_APQNS4K: Generate a list of APQNs based on the key blob given. Is able to find out which type of secure key is given (CCA AES secure key or CCA AES cipher key) and tries to find all matching crypto cards based on the MKVP and maybe other criterias (like CCA AES cipher keys need a CEX6C or higher). The list of APQNs is further filtered by the key's mkvp which needs to match to either the current mkvp or the alternate mkvp (which is the old mkvp on CCA adapters) of the apqns. The flags argument may be used to limit the matching apqns. If the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP is given, only the current mkvp of each apqn is compared. Likewise with the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP. If both are given it is assumed to return apqns where either the current or the alternate mkvp matches. If no matching APQN is found, the ioctl returns with 0 but the apqn_entries value is 0. PKEY_APQNS4KT: Generate a list of APQNs based on the key type given. Build a list of APQNs based on the given key type and maybe further restrict the list by given master key verification patterns. For different key types there may be different ways to match the master key verification patterns. For CCA keys (CCA data key and CCA cipher key) the first 8 bytes of cur_mkvp refer to the current mkvp value of the apqn and the first 8 bytes of the alt_mkvp refer to the old mkvp. The flags argument controls if the apqns current and/or alternate mkvp should match. If the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP is given, only the current mkvp of each apqn is compared. Likewise with the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP. If both are given, it is assumed to return apqns where either the current or the alternate mkvp matches. If no matching APQN is found, the ioctl returns with 0 but the apqn_entries value is 0. These new ioctls are now prepared for another new type of secure key blob which may come in the future. They all use a pointer to the key blob and a key blob length information instead of some hardcoded byte array. They all use the new enums pkey_key_type, pkey_key_size and pkey_key_info for getting/setting key type, key size and additional info about the key. All but the PKEY_VERIFY2 ioctl now work based on a list of apqns. This list is walked through trying to perform the operation on exactly this apqn without any further checking (like card type or online state). If the apqn fails, simple the next one in the list is tried until success (return 0) or the end of the list is reached (return -1 with errno ENODEV). All apqns in the list need to be exact apqns (0xFFFF as any card or domain is not allowed). There are two new ioctls which can be used to build a list of apqns based on a key or key type and maybe restricted by match to a current or alternate master key verifcation pattern. Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
2019-06-19 06:26:05 -06:00
DEBUG_ERR("%s unknown/unsupported blob type %d\n",
__func__, hdr->type);
return -EINVAL;
}
s390/pkey: add CCA AES cipher key support Introduce new ioctls and structs to be used with these new ioctls which are able to handle CCA AES secure keys and CCA AES cipher keys: PKEY_GENSECK2: Generate secure key, version 2. Generate either a CCA AES secure key or a CCA AES cipher key. PKEY_CLR2SECK2: Generate secure key from clear key value, version 2. Construct a CCA AES secure key or CCA AES cipher key from a given clear key value. PKEY_VERIFYKEY2: Verify the given secure key, version 2. Check for correct key type. If cardnr and domain are given, also check if this apqn is able to handle this type of key. If cardnr and domain are 0xFFFF, on return these values are filled with an apqn able to handle this key. The function also checks for the master key verification patterns of the key matching to the current or alternate mkvp of the apqn. CCA AES cipher keys are also checked for CPACF export allowed (CPRTCPAC flag). Currently CCA AES secure keys and CCA AES cipher keys are supported (may get extended in the future). PKEY_KBLOB2PROTK2: Transform a key blob (of any type) into a protected key, version 2. Difference to version 1 is only that this new ioctl has additional parameters to provide a list of apqns to be used for the transformation. PKEY_APQNS4K: Generate a list of APQNs based on the key blob given. Is able to find out which type of secure key is given (CCA AES secure key or CCA AES cipher key) and tries to find all matching crypto cards based on the MKVP and maybe other criterias (like CCA AES cipher keys need a CEX6C or higher). The list of APQNs is further filtered by the key's mkvp which needs to match to either the current mkvp or the alternate mkvp (which is the old mkvp on CCA adapters) of the apqns. The flags argument may be used to limit the matching apqns. If the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP is given, only the current mkvp of each apqn is compared. Likewise with the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP. If both are given it is assumed to return apqns where either the current or the alternate mkvp matches. If no matching APQN is found, the ioctl returns with 0 but the apqn_entries value is 0. PKEY_APQNS4KT: Generate a list of APQNs based on the key type given. Build a list of APQNs based on the given key type and maybe further restrict the list by given master key verification patterns. For different key types there may be different ways to match the master key verification patterns. For CCA keys (CCA data key and CCA cipher key) the first 8 bytes of cur_mkvp refer to the current mkvp value of the apqn and the first 8 bytes of the alt_mkvp refer to the old mkvp. The flags argument controls if the apqns current and/or alternate mkvp should match. If the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP is given, only the current mkvp of each apqn is compared. Likewise with the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP. If both are given, it is assumed to return apqns where either the current or the alternate mkvp matches. If no matching APQN is found, the ioctl returns with 0 but the apqn_entries value is 0. These new ioctls are now prepared for another new type of secure key blob which may come in the future. They all use a pointer to the key blob and a key blob length information instead of some hardcoded byte array. They all use the new enums pkey_key_type, pkey_key_size and pkey_key_info for getting/setting key type, key size and additional info about the key. All but the PKEY_VERIFY2 ioctl now work based on a list of apqns. This list is walked through trying to perform the operation on exactly this apqn without any further checking (like card type or online state). If the apqn fails, simple the next one in the list is tried until success (return 0) or the end of the list is reached (return -1 with errno ENODEV). All apqns in the list need to be exact apqns (0xFFFF as any card or domain is not allowed). There are two new ioctls which can be used to build a list of apqns based on a key or key type and maybe restricted by match to a current or alternate master key verifcation pattern. Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
2019-06-19 06:26:05 -06:00
DEBUG_DBG("%s rc=%d\n", __func__, rc);
return rc;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(pkey_keyblob2pkey);
s390/pkey: add CCA AES cipher key support Introduce new ioctls and structs to be used with these new ioctls which are able to handle CCA AES secure keys and CCA AES cipher keys: PKEY_GENSECK2: Generate secure key, version 2. Generate either a CCA AES secure key or a CCA AES cipher key. PKEY_CLR2SECK2: Generate secure key from clear key value, version 2. Construct a CCA AES secure key or CCA AES cipher key from a given clear key value. PKEY_VERIFYKEY2: Verify the given secure key, version 2. Check for correct key type. If cardnr and domain are given, also check if this apqn is able to handle this type of key. If cardnr and domain are 0xFFFF, on return these values are filled with an apqn able to handle this key. The function also checks for the master key verification patterns of the key matching to the current or alternate mkvp of the apqn. CCA AES cipher keys are also checked for CPACF export allowed (CPRTCPAC flag). Currently CCA AES secure keys and CCA AES cipher keys are supported (may get extended in the future). PKEY_KBLOB2PROTK2: Transform a key blob (of any type) into a protected key, version 2. Difference to version 1 is only that this new ioctl has additional parameters to provide a list of apqns to be used for the transformation. PKEY_APQNS4K: Generate a list of APQNs based on the key blob given. Is able to find out which type of secure key is given (CCA AES secure key or CCA AES cipher key) and tries to find all matching crypto cards based on the MKVP and maybe other criterias (like CCA AES cipher keys need a CEX6C or higher). The list of APQNs is further filtered by the key's mkvp which needs to match to either the current mkvp or the alternate mkvp (which is the old mkvp on CCA adapters) of the apqns. The flags argument may be used to limit the matching apqns. If the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP is given, only the current mkvp of each apqn is compared. Likewise with the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP. If both are given it is assumed to return apqns where either the current or the alternate mkvp matches. If no matching APQN is found, the ioctl returns with 0 but the apqn_entries value is 0. PKEY_APQNS4KT: Generate a list of APQNs based on the key type given. Build a list of APQNs based on the given key type and maybe further restrict the list by given master key verification patterns. For different key types there may be different ways to match the master key verification patterns. For CCA keys (CCA data key and CCA cipher key) the first 8 bytes of cur_mkvp refer to the current mkvp value of the apqn and the first 8 bytes of the alt_mkvp refer to the old mkvp. The flags argument controls if the apqns current and/or alternate mkvp should match. If the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP is given, only the current mkvp of each apqn is compared. Likewise with the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP. If both are given, it is assumed to return apqns where either the current or the alternate mkvp matches. If no matching APQN is found, the ioctl returns with 0 but the apqn_entries value is 0. These new ioctls are now prepared for another new type of secure key blob which may come in the future. They all use a pointer to the key blob and a key blob length information instead of some hardcoded byte array. They all use the new enums pkey_key_type, pkey_key_size and pkey_key_info for getting/setting key type, key size and additional info about the key. All but the PKEY_VERIFY2 ioctl now work based on a list of apqns. This list is walked through trying to perform the operation on exactly this apqn without any further checking (like card type or online state). If the apqn fails, simple the next one in the list is tried until success (return 0) or the end of the list is reached (return -1 with errno ENODEV). All apqns in the list need to be exact apqns (0xFFFF as any card or domain is not allowed). There are two new ioctls which can be used to build a list of apqns based on a key or key type and maybe restricted by match to a current or alternate master key verifcation pattern. Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
2019-06-19 06:26:05 -06:00
static int pkey_genseckey2(const struct pkey_apqn *apqns, size_t nr_apqns,
enum pkey_key_type ktype, enum pkey_key_size ksize,
u32 kflags, u8 *keybuf, size_t *keybufsize)
{
int i, card, dom, rc;
/* check for at least one apqn given */
if (!apqns || !nr_apqns)
return -EINVAL;
/* check key type and size */
switch (ktype) {
case PKEY_TYPE_CCA_DATA:
case PKEY_TYPE_CCA_CIPHER:
if (*keybufsize < SECKEYBLOBSIZE)
return -EINVAL;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
switch (ksize) {
case PKEY_SIZE_AES_128:
case PKEY_SIZE_AES_192:
case PKEY_SIZE_AES_256:
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
/* simple try all apqns from the list */
for (i = 0, rc = -ENODEV; i < nr_apqns; i++) {
card = apqns[i].card;
dom = apqns[i].domain;
if (ktype == PKEY_TYPE_CCA_DATA) {
rc = cca_genseckey(card, dom, ksize, keybuf);
*keybufsize = (rc ? 0 : SECKEYBLOBSIZE);
} else /* TOKVER_CCA_VLSC */
rc = cca_gencipherkey(card, dom, ksize, kflags,
keybuf, keybufsize);
if (rc == 0)
break;
}
return rc;
}
static int pkey_clr2seckey2(const struct pkey_apqn *apqns, size_t nr_apqns,
enum pkey_key_type ktype, enum pkey_key_size ksize,
u32 kflags, const u8 *clrkey,
u8 *keybuf, size_t *keybufsize)
{
int i, card, dom, rc;
/* check for at least one apqn given */
if (!apqns || !nr_apqns)
return -EINVAL;
/* check key type and size */
switch (ktype) {
case PKEY_TYPE_CCA_DATA:
case PKEY_TYPE_CCA_CIPHER:
if (*keybufsize < SECKEYBLOBSIZE)
return -EINVAL;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
switch (ksize) {
case PKEY_SIZE_AES_128:
case PKEY_SIZE_AES_192:
case PKEY_SIZE_AES_256:
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
/* simple try all apqns from the list */
for (i = 0, rc = -ENODEV; i < nr_apqns; i++) {
card = apqns[i].card;
dom = apqns[i].domain;
if (ktype == PKEY_TYPE_CCA_DATA) {
rc = cca_clr2seckey(card, dom, ksize,
clrkey, keybuf);
*keybufsize = (rc ? 0 : SECKEYBLOBSIZE);
} else /* TOKVER_CCA_VLSC */
rc = cca_clr2cipherkey(card, dom, ksize, kflags,
clrkey, keybuf, keybufsize);
if (rc == 0)
break;
}
return rc;
}
static int pkey_verifykey2(const u8 *key, size_t keylen,
u16 *cardnr, u16 *domain,
enum pkey_key_type *ktype,
enum pkey_key_size *ksize, u32 *flags)
{
int rc;
u32 _nr_apqns, *_apqns = NULL;
struct keytoken_header *hdr = (struct keytoken_header *)key;
if (keylen < sizeof(struct keytoken_header) ||
hdr->type != TOKTYPE_CCA_INTERNAL)
return -EINVAL;
if (hdr->version == TOKVER_CCA_AES) {
struct secaeskeytoken *t = (struct secaeskeytoken *)key;
rc = cca_check_secaeskeytoken(debug_info, 3, key, 0);
if (rc)
goto out;
if (ktype)
*ktype = PKEY_TYPE_CCA_DATA;
if (ksize)
*ksize = (enum pkey_key_size) t->bitsize;
rc = cca_findcard2(&_apqns, &_nr_apqns, *cardnr, *domain,
ZCRYPT_CEX3C, t->mkvp, 0, 1);
if (rc == 0 && flags)
*flags = PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP;
if (rc == -ENODEV) {
rc = cca_findcard2(&_apqns, &_nr_apqns,
*cardnr, *domain,
ZCRYPT_CEX3C, 0, t->mkvp, 1);
if (rc == 0 && flags)
*flags = PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP;
}
if (rc)
goto out;
*cardnr = ((struct pkey_apqn *)_apqns)->card;
*domain = ((struct pkey_apqn *)_apqns)->domain;
} else if (hdr->version == TOKVER_CCA_VLSC) {
struct cipherkeytoken *t = (struct cipherkeytoken *)key;
rc = cca_check_secaescipherkey(debug_info, 3, key, 0, 1);
if (rc)
goto out;
if (ktype)
*ktype = PKEY_TYPE_CCA_CIPHER;
if (ksize) {
*ksize = PKEY_SIZE_UNKNOWN;
if (!t->plfver && t->wpllen == 512)
*ksize = PKEY_SIZE_AES_128;
else if (!t->plfver && t->wpllen == 576)
*ksize = PKEY_SIZE_AES_192;
else if (!t->plfver && t->wpllen == 640)
*ksize = PKEY_SIZE_AES_256;
}
rc = cca_findcard2(&_apqns, &_nr_apqns, *cardnr, *domain,
ZCRYPT_CEX6, t->mkvp0, 0, 1);
if (rc == 0 && flags)
*flags = PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP;
if (rc == -ENODEV) {
rc = cca_findcard2(&_apqns, &_nr_apqns,
*cardnr, *domain,
ZCRYPT_CEX6, 0, t->mkvp0, 1);
if (rc == 0 && flags)
*flags = PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP;
}
if (rc)
goto out;
*cardnr = ((struct pkey_apqn *)_apqns)->card;
*domain = ((struct pkey_apqn *)_apqns)->domain;
} else
rc = -EINVAL;
out:
kfree(_apqns);
return rc;
}
static int pkey_keyblob2pkey2(const struct pkey_apqn *apqns, size_t nr_apqns,
const u8 *key, size_t keylen,
struct pkey_protkey *pkey)
{
int i, card, dom, rc;
struct keytoken_header *hdr = (struct keytoken_header *)key;
/* check for at least one apqn given */
if (!apqns || !nr_apqns)
return -EINVAL;
if (keylen < sizeof(struct keytoken_header))
return -EINVAL;
switch (hdr->type) {
case TOKTYPE_NON_CCA:
return pkey_nonccatok2pkey(key, keylen, pkey);
case TOKTYPE_CCA_INTERNAL:
switch (hdr->version) {
case TOKVER_CCA_AES:
if (keylen != sizeof(struct secaeskeytoken))
return -EINVAL;
if (cca_check_secaeskeytoken(debug_info, 3, key, 0))
return -EINVAL;
break;
case TOKVER_CCA_VLSC:
if (keylen < hdr->len || keylen > MAXCCAVLSCTOKENSIZE)
return -EINVAL;
if (cca_check_secaescipherkey(debug_info, 3, key, 0, 1))
return -EINVAL;
break;
default:
DEBUG_ERR("%s unknown CCA internal token version %d\n",
__func__, hdr->version);
return -EINVAL;
}
break;
default:
DEBUG_ERR("%s unknown/unsupported blob type %d\n",
__func__, hdr->type);
return -EINVAL;
}
/* simple try all apqns from the list */
for (i = 0, rc = -ENODEV; i < nr_apqns; i++) {
card = apqns[i].card;
dom = apqns[i].domain;
if (hdr->version == TOKVER_CCA_AES)
rc = cca_sec2protkey(card, dom, key, pkey->protkey,
&pkey->len, &pkey->type);
else /* TOKVER_CCA_VLSC */
rc = cca_cipher2protkey(card, dom, key, pkey->protkey,
&pkey->len, &pkey->type);
if (rc == 0)
break;
}
return rc;
}
static int pkey_apqns4key(const u8 *key, size_t keylen, u32 flags,
struct pkey_apqn *apqns, size_t *nr_apqns)
{
int rc = EINVAL;
u32 _nr_apqns, *_apqns = NULL;
struct keytoken_header *hdr = (struct keytoken_header *)key;
if (keylen < sizeof(struct keytoken_header) ||
hdr->type != TOKTYPE_CCA_INTERNAL ||
flags == 0)
return -EINVAL;
if (hdr->version == TOKVER_CCA_AES || hdr->version == TOKVER_CCA_VLSC) {
int minhwtype = ZCRYPT_CEX3C;
u64 cur_mkvp = 0, old_mkvp = 0;
if (hdr->version == TOKVER_CCA_AES) {
struct secaeskeytoken *t = (struct secaeskeytoken *)key;
if (flags & PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP)
cur_mkvp = t->mkvp;
if (flags & PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP)
old_mkvp = t->mkvp;
} else {
struct cipherkeytoken *t = (struct cipherkeytoken *)key;
minhwtype = ZCRYPT_CEX6;
if (flags & PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP)
cur_mkvp = t->mkvp0;
if (flags & PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP)
old_mkvp = t->mkvp0;
}
rc = cca_findcard2(&_apqns, &_nr_apqns, 0xFFFF, 0xFFFF,
minhwtype, cur_mkvp, old_mkvp, 1);
if (rc)
goto out;
if (apqns) {
if (*nr_apqns < _nr_apqns)
rc = -ENOSPC;
else
memcpy(apqns, _apqns, _nr_apqns * sizeof(u32));
}
*nr_apqns = _nr_apqns;
}
out:
kfree(_apqns);
return rc;
}
static int pkey_apqns4keytype(enum pkey_key_type ktype,
u8 cur_mkvp[32], u8 alt_mkvp[32], u32 flags,
struct pkey_apqn *apqns, size_t *nr_apqns)
{
int rc = -EINVAL;
u32 _nr_apqns, *_apqns = NULL;
if (ktype == PKEY_TYPE_CCA_DATA || ktype == PKEY_TYPE_CCA_CIPHER) {
u64 cur_mkvp = 0, old_mkvp = 0;
int minhwtype = ZCRYPT_CEX3C;
if (flags & PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP)
cur_mkvp = *((u64 *) cur_mkvp);
if (flags & PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP)
old_mkvp = *((u64 *) alt_mkvp);
if (ktype == PKEY_TYPE_CCA_CIPHER)
minhwtype = ZCRYPT_CEX6;
rc = cca_findcard2(&_apqns, &_nr_apqns, 0xFFFF, 0xFFFF,
minhwtype, cur_mkvp, old_mkvp, 1);
if (rc)
goto out;
if (apqns) {
if (*nr_apqns < _nr_apqns)
rc = -ENOSPC;
else
memcpy(apqns, _apqns, _nr_apqns * sizeof(u32));
}
*nr_apqns = _nr_apqns;
}
out:
kfree(_apqns);
return rc;
}
/*
* File io functions
*/
s390/pkey: add CCA AES cipher key support Introduce new ioctls and structs to be used with these new ioctls which are able to handle CCA AES secure keys and CCA AES cipher keys: PKEY_GENSECK2: Generate secure key, version 2. Generate either a CCA AES secure key or a CCA AES cipher key. PKEY_CLR2SECK2: Generate secure key from clear key value, version 2. Construct a CCA AES secure key or CCA AES cipher key from a given clear key value. PKEY_VERIFYKEY2: Verify the given secure key, version 2. Check for correct key type. If cardnr and domain are given, also check if this apqn is able to handle this type of key. If cardnr and domain are 0xFFFF, on return these values are filled with an apqn able to handle this key. The function also checks for the master key verification patterns of the key matching to the current or alternate mkvp of the apqn. CCA AES cipher keys are also checked for CPACF export allowed (CPRTCPAC flag). Currently CCA AES secure keys and CCA AES cipher keys are supported (may get extended in the future). PKEY_KBLOB2PROTK2: Transform a key blob (of any type) into a protected key, version 2. Difference to version 1 is only that this new ioctl has additional parameters to provide a list of apqns to be used for the transformation. PKEY_APQNS4K: Generate a list of APQNs based on the key blob given. Is able to find out which type of secure key is given (CCA AES secure key or CCA AES cipher key) and tries to find all matching crypto cards based on the MKVP and maybe other criterias (like CCA AES cipher keys need a CEX6C or higher). The list of APQNs is further filtered by the key's mkvp which needs to match to either the current mkvp or the alternate mkvp (which is the old mkvp on CCA adapters) of the apqns. The flags argument may be used to limit the matching apqns. If the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP is given, only the current mkvp of each apqn is compared. Likewise with the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP. If both are given it is assumed to return apqns where either the current or the alternate mkvp matches. If no matching APQN is found, the ioctl returns with 0 but the apqn_entries value is 0. PKEY_APQNS4KT: Generate a list of APQNs based on the key type given. Build a list of APQNs based on the given key type and maybe further restrict the list by given master key verification patterns. For different key types there may be different ways to match the master key verification patterns. For CCA keys (CCA data key and CCA cipher key) the first 8 bytes of cur_mkvp refer to the current mkvp value of the apqn and the first 8 bytes of the alt_mkvp refer to the old mkvp. The flags argument controls if the apqns current and/or alternate mkvp should match. If the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP is given, only the current mkvp of each apqn is compared. Likewise with the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP. If both are given, it is assumed to return apqns where either the current or the alternate mkvp matches. If no matching APQN is found, the ioctl returns with 0 but the apqn_entries value is 0. These new ioctls are now prepared for another new type of secure key blob which may come in the future. They all use a pointer to the key blob and a key blob length information instead of some hardcoded byte array. They all use the new enums pkey_key_type, pkey_key_size and pkey_key_info for getting/setting key type, key size and additional info about the key. All but the PKEY_VERIFY2 ioctl now work based on a list of apqns. This list is walked through trying to perform the operation on exactly this apqn without any further checking (like card type or online state). If the apqn fails, simple the next one in the list is tried until success (return 0) or the end of the list is reached (return -1 with errno ENODEV). All apqns in the list need to be exact apqns (0xFFFF as any card or domain is not allowed). There are two new ioctls which can be used to build a list of apqns based on a key or key type and maybe restricted by match to a current or alternate master key verifcation pattern. Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
2019-06-19 06:26:05 -06:00
static void *_copy_key_from_user(void __user *ukey, size_t keylen)
{
void *kkey;
if (!ukey || keylen < MINKEYBLOBSIZE || keylen > KEYBLOBBUFSIZE)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
kkey = kmalloc(keylen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!kkey)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
if (copy_from_user(kkey, ukey, keylen)) {
kfree(kkey);
return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
}
return kkey;
}
static void *_copy_apqns_from_user(void __user *uapqns, size_t nr_apqns)
{
void *kapqns = NULL;
size_t nbytes;
if (uapqns && nr_apqns > 0) {
nbytes = nr_apqns * sizeof(struct pkey_apqn);
kapqns = kmalloc(nbytes, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!kapqns)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
if (copy_from_user(kapqns, uapqns, nbytes)) {
kfree(kapqns);
s390/pkey: add CCA AES cipher key support Introduce new ioctls and structs to be used with these new ioctls which are able to handle CCA AES secure keys and CCA AES cipher keys: PKEY_GENSECK2: Generate secure key, version 2. Generate either a CCA AES secure key or a CCA AES cipher key. PKEY_CLR2SECK2: Generate secure key from clear key value, version 2. Construct a CCA AES secure key or CCA AES cipher key from a given clear key value. PKEY_VERIFYKEY2: Verify the given secure key, version 2. Check for correct key type. If cardnr and domain are given, also check if this apqn is able to handle this type of key. If cardnr and domain are 0xFFFF, on return these values are filled with an apqn able to handle this key. The function also checks for the master key verification patterns of the key matching to the current or alternate mkvp of the apqn. CCA AES cipher keys are also checked for CPACF export allowed (CPRTCPAC flag). Currently CCA AES secure keys and CCA AES cipher keys are supported (may get extended in the future). PKEY_KBLOB2PROTK2: Transform a key blob (of any type) into a protected key, version 2. Difference to version 1 is only that this new ioctl has additional parameters to provide a list of apqns to be used for the transformation. PKEY_APQNS4K: Generate a list of APQNs based on the key blob given. Is able to find out which type of secure key is given (CCA AES secure key or CCA AES cipher key) and tries to find all matching crypto cards based on the MKVP and maybe other criterias (like CCA AES cipher keys need a CEX6C or higher). The list of APQNs is further filtered by the key's mkvp which needs to match to either the current mkvp or the alternate mkvp (which is the old mkvp on CCA adapters) of the apqns. The flags argument may be used to limit the matching apqns. If the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP is given, only the current mkvp of each apqn is compared. Likewise with the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP. If both are given it is assumed to return apqns where either the current or the alternate mkvp matches. If no matching APQN is found, the ioctl returns with 0 but the apqn_entries value is 0. PKEY_APQNS4KT: Generate a list of APQNs based on the key type given. Build a list of APQNs based on the given key type and maybe further restrict the list by given master key verification patterns. For different key types there may be different ways to match the master key verification patterns. For CCA keys (CCA data key and CCA cipher key) the first 8 bytes of cur_mkvp refer to the current mkvp value of the apqn and the first 8 bytes of the alt_mkvp refer to the old mkvp. The flags argument controls if the apqns current and/or alternate mkvp should match. If the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP is given, only the current mkvp of each apqn is compared. Likewise with the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP. If both are given, it is assumed to return apqns where either the current or the alternate mkvp matches. If no matching APQN is found, the ioctl returns with 0 but the apqn_entries value is 0. These new ioctls are now prepared for another new type of secure key blob which may come in the future. They all use a pointer to the key blob and a key blob length information instead of some hardcoded byte array. They all use the new enums pkey_key_type, pkey_key_size and pkey_key_info for getting/setting key type, key size and additional info about the key. All but the PKEY_VERIFY2 ioctl now work based on a list of apqns. This list is walked through trying to perform the operation on exactly this apqn without any further checking (like card type or online state). If the apqn fails, simple the next one in the list is tried until success (return 0) or the end of the list is reached (return -1 with errno ENODEV). All apqns in the list need to be exact apqns (0xFFFF as any card or domain is not allowed). There are two new ioctls which can be used to build a list of apqns based on a key or key type and maybe restricted by match to a current or alternate master key verifcation pattern. Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
2019-06-19 06:26:05 -06:00
return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
}
s390/pkey: add CCA AES cipher key support Introduce new ioctls and structs to be used with these new ioctls which are able to handle CCA AES secure keys and CCA AES cipher keys: PKEY_GENSECK2: Generate secure key, version 2. Generate either a CCA AES secure key or a CCA AES cipher key. PKEY_CLR2SECK2: Generate secure key from clear key value, version 2. Construct a CCA AES secure key or CCA AES cipher key from a given clear key value. PKEY_VERIFYKEY2: Verify the given secure key, version 2. Check for correct key type. If cardnr and domain are given, also check if this apqn is able to handle this type of key. If cardnr and domain are 0xFFFF, on return these values are filled with an apqn able to handle this key. The function also checks for the master key verification patterns of the key matching to the current or alternate mkvp of the apqn. CCA AES cipher keys are also checked for CPACF export allowed (CPRTCPAC flag). Currently CCA AES secure keys and CCA AES cipher keys are supported (may get extended in the future). PKEY_KBLOB2PROTK2: Transform a key blob (of any type) into a protected key, version 2. Difference to version 1 is only that this new ioctl has additional parameters to provide a list of apqns to be used for the transformation. PKEY_APQNS4K: Generate a list of APQNs based on the key blob given. Is able to find out which type of secure key is given (CCA AES secure key or CCA AES cipher key) and tries to find all matching crypto cards based on the MKVP and maybe other criterias (like CCA AES cipher keys need a CEX6C or higher). The list of APQNs is further filtered by the key's mkvp which needs to match to either the current mkvp or the alternate mkvp (which is the old mkvp on CCA adapters) of the apqns. The flags argument may be used to limit the matching apqns. If the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP is given, only the current mkvp of each apqn is compared. Likewise with the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP. If both are given it is assumed to return apqns where either the current or the alternate mkvp matches. If no matching APQN is found, the ioctl returns with 0 but the apqn_entries value is 0. PKEY_APQNS4KT: Generate a list of APQNs based on the key type given. Build a list of APQNs based on the given key type and maybe further restrict the list by given master key verification patterns. For different key types there may be different ways to match the master key verification patterns. For CCA keys (CCA data key and CCA cipher key) the first 8 bytes of cur_mkvp refer to the current mkvp value of the apqn and the first 8 bytes of the alt_mkvp refer to the old mkvp. The flags argument controls if the apqns current and/or alternate mkvp should match. If the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP is given, only the current mkvp of each apqn is compared. Likewise with the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP. If both are given, it is assumed to return apqns where either the current or the alternate mkvp matches. If no matching APQN is found, the ioctl returns with 0 but the apqn_entries value is 0. These new ioctls are now prepared for another new type of secure key blob which may come in the future. They all use a pointer to the key blob and a key blob length information instead of some hardcoded byte array. They all use the new enums pkey_key_type, pkey_key_size and pkey_key_info for getting/setting key type, key size and additional info about the key. All but the PKEY_VERIFY2 ioctl now work based on a list of apqns. This list is walked through trying to perform the operation on exactly this apqn without any further checking (like card type or online state). If the apqn fails, simple the next one in the list is tried until success (return 0) or the end of the list is reached (return -1 with errno ENODEV). All apqns in the list need to be exact apqns (0xFFFF as any card or domain is not allowed). There are two new ioctls which can be used to build a list of apqns based on a key or key type and maybe restricted by match to a current or alternate master key verifcation pattern. Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
2019-06-19 06:26:05 -06:00
}
return kapqns;
}
static long pkey_unlocked_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
{
int rc;
switch (cmd) {
case PKEY_GENSECK: {
struct pkey_genseck __user *ugs = (void __user *) arg;
struct pkey_genseck kgs;
if (copy_from_user(&kgs, ugs, sizeof(kgs)))
return -EFAULT;
rc = cca_genseckey(kgs.cardnr, kgs.domain,
kgs.keytype, kgs.seckey.seckey);
DEBUG_DBG("%s cca_genseckey()=%d\n", __func__, rc);
if (rc)
break;
if (copy_to_user(ugs, &kgs, sizeof(kgs)))
return -EFAULT;
break;
}
case PKEY_CLR2SECK: {
struct pkey_clr2seck __user *ucs = (void __user *) arg;
struct pkey_clr2seck kcs;
if (copy_from_user(&kcs, ucs, sizeof(kcs)))
return -EFAULT;
rc = cca_clr2seckey(kcs.cardnr, kcs.domain, kcs.keytype,
kcs.clrkey.clrkey, kcs.seckey.seckey);
DEBUG_DBG("%s cca_clr2seckey()=%d\n", __func__, rc);
if (rc)
break;
if (copy_to_user(ucs, &kcs, sizeof(kcs)))
return -EFAULT;
memzero_explicit(&kcs, sizeof(kcs));
break;
}
case PKEY_SEC2PROTK: {
struct pkey_sec2protk __user *usp = (void __user *) arg;
struct pkey_sec2protk ksp;
if (copy_from_user(&ksp, usp, sizeof(ksp)))
return -EFAULT;
rc = cca_sec2protkey(ksp.cardnr, ksp.domain,
ksp.seckey.seckey, ksp.protkey.protkey,
&ksp.protkey.len, &ksp.protkey.type);
DEBUG_DBG("%s cca_sec2protkey()=%d\n", __func__, rc);
if (rc)
break;
if (copy_to_user(usp, &ksp, sizeof(ksp)))
return -EFAULT;
break;
}
case PKEY_CLR2PROTK: {
struct pkey_clr2protk __user *ucp = (void __user *) arg;
struct pkey_clr2protk kcp;
if (copy_from_user(&kcp, ucp, sizeof(kcp)))
return -EFAULT;
rc = pkey_clr2protkey(kcp.keytype,
&kcp.clrkey, &kcp.protkey);
DEBUG_DBG("%s pkey_clr2protkey()=%d\n", __func__, rc);
if (rc)
break;
if (copy_to_user(ucp, &kcp, sizeof(kcp)))
return -EFAULT;
memzero_explicit(&kcp, sizeof(kcp));
break;
}
case PKEY_FINDCARD: {
struct pkey_findcard __user *ufc = (void __user *) arg;
struct pkey_findcard kfc;
if (copy_from_user(&kfc, ufc, sizeof(kfc)))
return -EFAULT;
rc = cca_findcard(kfc.seckey.seckey,
&kfc.cardnr, &kfc.domain, 1);
DEBUG_DBG("%s cca_findcard()=%d\n", __func__, rc);
if (rc < 0)
break;
if (copy_to_user(ufc, &kfc, sizeof(kfc)))
return -EFAULT;
break;
}
case PKEY_SKEY2PKEY: {
struct pkey_skey2pkey __user *usp = (void __user *) arg;
struct pkey_skey2pkey ksp;
if (copy_from_user(&ksp, usp, sizeof(ksp)))
return -EFAULT;
s390/pkey: add CCA AES cipher key support Introduce new ioctls and structs to be used with these new ioctls which are able to handle CCA AES secure keys and CCA AES cipher keys: PKEY_GENSECK2: Generate secure key, version 2. Generate either a CCA AES secure key or a CCA AES cipher key. PKEY_CLR2SECK2: Generate secure key from clear key value, version 2. Construct a CCA AES secure key or CCA AES cipher key from a given clear key value. PKEY_VERIFYKEY2: Verify the given secure key, version 2. Check for correct key type. If cardnr and domain are given, also check if this apqn is able to handle this type of key. If cardnr and domain are 0xFFFF, on return these values are filled with an apqn able to handle this key. The function also checks for the master key verification patterns of the key matching to the current or alternate mkvp of the apqn. CCA AES cipher keys are also checked for CPACF export allowed (CPRTCPAC flag). Currently CCA AES secure keys and CCA AES cipher keys are supported (may get extended in the future). PKEY_KBLOB2PROTK2: Transform a key blob (of any type) into a protected key, version 2. Difference to version 1 is only that this new ioctl has additional parameters to provide a list of apqns to be used for the transformation. PKEY_APQNS4K: Generate a list of APQNs based on the key blob given. Is able to find out which type of secure key is given (CCA AES secure key or CCA AES cipher key) and tries to find all matching crypto cards based on the MKVP and maybe other criterias (like CCA AES cipher keys need a CEX6C or higher). The list of APQNs is further filtered by the key's mkvp which needs to match to either the current mkvp or the alternate mkvp (which is the old mkvp on CCA adapters) of the apqns. The flags argument may be used to limit the matching apqns. If the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP is given, only the current mkvp of each apqn is compared. Likewise with the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP. If both are given it is assumed to return apqns where either the current or the alternate mkvp matches. If no matching APQN is found, the ioctl returns with 0 but the apqn_entries value is 0. PKEY_APQNS4KT: Generate a list of APQNs based on the key type given. Build a list of APQNs based on the given key type and maybe further restrict the list by given master key verification patterns. For different key types there may be different ways to match the master key verification patterns. For CCA keys (CCA data key and CCA cipher key) the first 8 bytes of cur_mkvp refer to the current mkvp value of the apqn and the first 8 bytes of the alt_mkvp refer to the old mkvp. The flags argument controls if the apqns current and/or alternate mkvp should match. If the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP is given, only the current mkvp of each apqn is compared. Likewise with the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP. If both are given, it is assumed to return apqns where either the current or the alternate mkvp matches. If no matching APQN is found, the ioctl returns with 0 but the apqn_entries value is 0. These new ioctls are now prepared for another new type of secure key blob which may come in the future. They all use a pointer to the key blob and a key blob length information instead of some hardcoded byte array. They all use the new enums pkey_key_type, pkey_key_size and pkey_key_info for getting/setting key type, key size and additional info about the key. All but the PKEY_VERIFY2 ioctl now work based on a list of apqns. This list is walked through trying to perform the operation on exactly this apqn without any further checking (like card type or online state). If the apqn fails, simple the next one in the list is tried until success (return 0) or the end of the list is reached (return -1 with errno ENODEV). All apqns in the list need to be exact apqns (0xFFFF as any card or domain is not allowed). There are two new ioctls which can be used to build a list of apqns based on a key or key type and maybe restricted by match to a current or alternate master key verifcation pattern. Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
2019-06-19 06:26:05 -06:00
rc = pkey_skey2pkey(ksp.seckey.seckey, &ksp.protkey);
DEBUG_DBG("%s pkey_skey2pkey()=%d\n", __func__, rc);
if (rc)
break;
if (copy_to_user(usp, &ksp, sizeof(ksp)))
return -EFAULT;
break;
}
case PKEY_VERIFYKEY: {
struct pkey_verifykey __user *uvk = (void __user *) arg;
struct pkey_verifykey kvk;
if (copy_from_user(&kvk, uvk, sizeof(kvk)))
return -EFAULT;
rc = pkey_verifykey(&kvk.seckey, &kvk.cardnr, &kvk.domain,
&kvk.keysize, &kvk.attributes);
DEBUG_DBG("%s pkey_verifykey()=%d\n", __func__, rc);
if (rc)
break;
if (copy_to_user(uvk, &kvk, sizeof(kvk)))
return -EFAULT;
break;
}
case PKEY_GENPROTK: {
struct pkey_genprotk __user *ugp = (void __user *) arg;
struct pkey_genprotk kgp;
if (copy_from_user(&kgp, ugp, sizeof(kgp)))
return -EFAULT;
rc = pkey_genprotkey(kgp.keytype, &kgp.protkey);
DEBUG_DBG("%s pkey_genprotkey()=%d\n", __func__, rc);
if (rc)
break;
if (copy_to_user(ugp, &kgp, sizeof(kgp)))
return -EFAULT;
break;
}
case PKEY_VERIFYPROTK: {
struct pkey_verifyprotk __user *uvp = (void __user *) arg;
struct pkey_verifyprotk kvp;
if (copy_from_user(&kvp, uvp, sizeof(kvp)))
return -EFAULT;
rc = pkey_verifyprotkey(&kvp.protkey);
DEBUG_DBG("%s pkey_verifyprotkey()=%d\n", __func__, rc);
break;
}
case PKEY_KBLOB2PROTK: {
struct pkey_kblob2pkey __user *utp = (void __user *) arg;
struct pkey_kblob2pkey ktp;
u8 *kkey;
if (copy_from_user(&ktp, utp, sizeof(ktp)))
return -EFAULT;
s390/pkey: add CCA AES cipher key support Introduce new ioctls and structs to be used with these new ioctls which are able to handle CCA AES secure keys and CCA AES cipher keys: PKEY_GENSECK2: Generate secure key, version 2. Generate either a CCA AES secure key or a CCA AES cipher key. PKEY_CLR2SECK2: Generate secure key from clear key value, version 2. Construct a CCA AES secure key or CCA AES cipher key from a given clear key value. PKEY_VERIFYKEY2: Verify the given secure key, version 2. Check for correct key type. If cardnr and domain are given, also check if this apqn is able to handle this type of key. If cardnr and domain are 0xFFFF, on return these values are filled with an apqn able to handle this key. The function also checks for the master key verification patterns of the key matching to the current or alternate mkvp of the apqn. CCA AES cipher keys are also checked for CPACF export allowed (CPRTCPAC flag). Currently CCA AES secure keys and CCA AES cipher keys are supported (may get extended in the future). PKEY_KBLOB2PROTK2: Transform a key blob (of any type) into a protected key, version 2. Difference to version 1 is only that this new ioctl has additional parameters to provide a list of apqns to be used for the transformation. PKEY_APQNS4K: Generate a list of APQNs based on the key blob given. Is able to find out which type of secure key is given (CCA AES secure key or CCA AES cipher key) and tries to find all matching crypto cards based on the MKVP and maybe other criterias (like CCA AES cipher keys need a CEX6C or higher). The list of APQNs is further filtered by the key's mkvp which needs to match to either the current mkvp or the alternate mkvp (which is the old mkvp on CCA adapters) of the apqns. The flags argument may be used to limit the matching apqns. If the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP is given, only the current mkvp of each apqn is compared. Likewise with the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP. If both are given it is assumed to return apqns where either the current or the alternate mkvp matches. If no matching APQN is found, the ioctl returns with 0 but the apqn_entries value is 0. PKEY_APQNS4KT: Generate a list of APQNs based on the key type given. Build a list of APQNs based on the given key type and maybe further restrict the list by given master key verification patterns. For different key types there may be different ways to match the master key verification patterns. For CCA keys (CCA data key and CCA cipher key) the first 8 bytes of cur_mkvp refer to the current mkvp value of the apqn and the first 8 bytes of the alt_mkvp refer to the old mkvp. The flags argument controls if the apqns current and/or alternate mkvp should match. If the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP is given, only the current mkvp of each apqn is compared. Likewise with the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP. If both are given, it is assumed to return apqns where either the current or the alternate mkvp matches. If no matching APQN is found, the ioctl returns with 0 but the apqn_entries value is 0. These new ioctls are now prepared for another new type of secure key blob which may come in the future. They all use a pointer to the key blob and a key blob length information instead of some hardcoded byte array. They all use the new enums pkey_key_type, pkey_key_size and pkey_key_info for getting/setting key type, key size and additional info about the key. All but the PKEY_VERIFY2 ioctl now work based on a list of apqns. This list is walked through trying to perform the operation on exactly this apqn without any further checking (like card type or online state). If the apqn fails, simple the next one in the list is tried until success (return 0) or the end of the list is reached (return -1 with errno ENODEV). All apqns in the list need to be exact apqns (0xFFFF as any card or domain is not allowed). There are two new ioctls which can be used to build a list of apqns based on a key or key type and maybe restricted by match to a current or alternate master key verifcation pattern. Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
2019-06-19 06:26:05 -06:00
kkey = _copy_key_from_user(ktp.key, ktp.keylen);
if (IS_ERR(kkey))
return PTR_ERR(kkey);
rc = pkey_keyblob2pkey(kkey, ktp.keylen, &ktp.protkey);
DEBUG_DBG("%s pkey_keyblob2pkey()=%d\n", __func__, rc);
kfree(kkey);
if (rc)
break;
if (copy_to_user(utp, &ktp, sizeof(ktp)))
return -EFAULT;
break;
}
case PKEY_GENSECK2: {
struct pkey_genseck2 __user *ugs = (void __user *) arg;
struct pkey_genseck2 kgs;
struct pkey_apqn *apqns;
size_t klen = KEYBLOBBUFSIZE;
u8 *kkey;
if (copy_from_user(&kgs, ugs, sizeof(kgs)))
return -EFAULT;
apqns = _copy_apqns_from_user(kgs.apqns, kgs.apqn_entries);
if (IS_ERR(apqns))
return PTR_ERR(apqns);
kkey = kmalloc(klen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!kkey) {
kfree(apqns);
return -ENOMEM;
s390/pkey: add CCA AES cipher key support Introduce new ioctls and structs to be used with these new ioctls which are able to handle CCA AES secure keys and CCA AES cipher keys: PKEY_GENSECK2: Generate secure key, version 2. Generate either a CCA AES secure key or a CCA AES cipher key. PKEY_CLR2SECK2: Generate secure key from clear key value, version 2. Construct a CCA AES secure key or CCA AES cipher key from a given clear key value. PKEY_VERIFYKEY2: Verify the given secure key, version 2. Check for correct key type. If cardnr and domain are given, also check if this apqn is able to handle this type of key. If cardnr and domain are 0xFFFF, on return these values are filled with an apqn able to handle this key. The function also checks for the master key verification patterns of the key matching to the current or alternate mkvp of the apqn. CCA AES cipher keys are also checked for CPACF export allowed (CPRTCPAC flag). Currently CCA AES secure keys and CCA AES cipher keys are supported (may get extended in the future). PKEY_KBLOB2PROTK2: Transform a key blob (of any type) into a protected key, version 2. Difference to version 1 is only that this new ioctl has additional parameters to provide a list of apqns to be used for the transformation. PKEY_APQNS4K: Generate a list of APQNs based on the key blob given. Is able to find out which type of secure key is given (CCA AES secure key or CCA AES cipher key) and tries to find all matching crypto cards based on the MKVP and maybe other criterias (like CCA AES cipher keys need a CEX6C or higher). The list of APQNs is further filtered by the key's mkvp which needs to match to either the current mkvp or the alternate mkvp (which is the old mkvp on CCA adapters) of the apqns. The flags argument may be used to limit the matching apqns. If the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP is given, only the current mkvp of each apqn is compared. Likewise with the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP. If both are given it is assumed to return apqns where either the current or the alternate mkvp matches. If no matching APQN is found, the ioctl returns with 0 but the apqn_entries value is 0. PKEY_APQNS4KT: Generate a list of APQNs based on the key type given. Build a list of APQNs based on the given key type and maybe further restrict the list by given master key verification patterns. For different key types there may be different ways to match the master key verification patterns. For CCA keys (CCA data key and CCA cipher key) the first 8 bytes of cur_mkvp refer to the current mkvp value of the apqn and the first 8 bytes of the alt_mkvp refer to the old mkvp. The flags argument controls if the apqns current and/or alternate mkvp should match. If the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP is given, only the current mkvp of each apqn is compared. Likewise with the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP. If both are given, it is assumed to return apqns where either the current or the alternate mkvp matches. If no matching APQN is found, the ioctl returns with 0 but the apqn_entries value is 0. These new ioctls are now prepared for another new type of secure key blob which may come in the future. They all use a pointer to the key blob and a key blob length information instead of some hardcoded byte array. They all use the new enums pkey_key_type, pkey_key_size and pkey_key_info for getting/setting key type, key size and additional info about the key. All but the PKEY_VERIFY2 ioctl now work based on a list of apqns. This list is walked through trying to perform the operation on exactly this apqn without any further checking (like card type or online state). If the apqn fails, simple the next one in the list is tried until success (return 0) or the end of the list is reached (return -1 with errno ENODEV). All apqns in the list need to be exact apqns (0xFFFF as any card or domain is not allowed). There are two new ioctls which can be used to build a list of apqns based on a key or key type and maybe restricted by match to a current or alternate master key verifcation pattern. Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
2019-06-19 06:26:05 -06:00
}
rc = pkey_genseckey2(apqns, kgs.apqn_entries,
kgs.type, kgs.size, kgs.keygenflags,
kkey, &klen);
DEBUG_DBG("%s pkey_genseckey2()=%d\n", __func__, rc);
kfree(apqns);
if (rc) {
kfree(kkey);
s390/pkey: add CCA AES cipher key support Introduce new ioctls and structs to be used with these new ioctls which are able to handle CCA AES secure keys and CCA AES cipher keys: PKEY_GENSECK2: Generate secure key, version 2. Generate either a CCA AES secure key or a CCA AES cipher key. PKEY_CLR2SECK2: Generate secure key from clear key value, version 2. Construct a CCA AES secure key or CCA AES cipher key from a given clear key value. PKEY_VERIFYKEY2: Verify the given secure key, version 2. Check for correct key type. If cardnr and domain are given, also check if this apqn is able to handle this type of key. If cardnr and domain are 0xFFFF, on return these values are filled with an apqn able to handle this key. The function also checks for the master key verification patterns of the key matching to the current or alternate mkvp of the apqn. CCA AES cipher keys are also checked for CPACF export allowed (CPRTCPAC flag). Currently CCA AES secure keys and CCA AES cipher keys are supported (may get extended in the future). PKEY_KBLOB2PROTK2: Transform a key blob (of any type) into a protected key, version 2. Difference to version 1 is only that this new ioctl has additional parameters to provide a list of apqns to be used for the transformation. PKEY_APQNS4K: Generate a list of APQNs based on the key blob given. Is able to find out which type of secure key is given (CCA AES secure key or CCA AES cipher key) and tries to find all matching crypto cards based on the MKVP and maybe other criterias (like CCA AES cipher keys need a CEX6C or higher). The list of APQNs is further filtered by the key's mkvp which needs to match to either the current mkvp or the alternate mkvp (which is the old mkvp on CCA adapters) of the apqns. The flags argument may be used to limit the matching apqns. If the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP is given, only the current mkvp of each apqn is compared. Likewise with the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP. If both are given it is assumed to return apqns where either the current or the alternate mkvp matches. If no matching APQN is found, the ioctl returns with 0 but the apqn_entries value is 0. PKEY_APQNS4KT: Generate a list of APQNs based on the key type given. Build a list of APQNs based on the given key type and maybe further restrict the list by given master key verification patterns. For different key types there may be different ways to match the master key verification patterns. For CCA keys (CCA data key and CCA cipher key) the first 8 bytes of cur_mkvp refer to the current mkvp value of the apqn and the first 8 bytes of the alt_mkvp refer to the old mkvp. The flags argument controls if the apqns current and/or alternate mkvp should match. If the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP is given, only the current mkvp of each apqn is compared. Likewise with the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP. If both are given, it is assumed to return apqns where either the current or the alternate mkvp matches. If no matching APQN is found, the ioctl returns with 0 but the apqn_entries value is 0. These new ioctls are now prepared for another new type of secure key blob which may come in the future. They all use a pointer to the key blob and a key blob length information instead of some hardcoded byte array. They all use the new enums pkey_key_type, pkey_key_size and pkey_key_info for getting/setting key type, key size and additional info about the key. All but the PKEY_VERIFY2 ioctl now work based on a list of apqns. This list is walked through trying to perform the operation on exactly this apqn without any further checking (like card type or online state). If the apqn fails, simple the next one in the list is tried until success (return 0) or the end of the list is reached (return -1 with errno ENODEV). All apqns in the list need to be exact apqns (0xFFFF as any card or domain is not allowed). There are two new ioctls which can be used to build a list of apqns based on a key or key type and maybe restricted by match to a current or alternate master key verifcation pattern. Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
2019-06-19 06:26:05 -06:00
break;
}
if (kgs.key) {
if (kgs.keylen < klen) {
kfree(kkey);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (copy_to_user(kgs.key, kkey, klen)) {
kfree(kkey);
return -EFAULT;
}
}
kgs.keylen = klen;
if (copy_to_user(ugs, &kgs, sizeof(kgs)))
rc = -EFAULT;
kfree(kkey);
break;
}
case PKEY_CLR2SECK2: {
struct pkey_clr2seck2 __user *ucs = (void __user *) arg;
struct pkey_clr2seck2 kcs;
struct pkey_apqn *apqns;
size_t klen = KEYBLOBBUFSIZE;
u8 *kkey;
if (copy_from_user(&kcs, ucs, sizeof(kcs)))
return -EFAULT;
s390/pkey: add CCA AES cipher key support Introduce new ioctls and structs to be used with these new ioctls which are able to handle CCA AES secure keys and CCA AES cipher keys: PKEY_GENSECK2: Generate secure key, version 2. Generate either a CCA AES secure key or a CCA AES cipher key. PKEY_CLR2SECK2: Generate secure key from clear key value, version 2. Construct a CCA AES secure key or CCA AES cipher key from a given clear key value. PKEY_VERIFYKEY2: Verify the given secure key, version 2. Check for correct key type. If cardnr and domain are given, also check if this apqn is able to handle this type of key. If cardnr and domain are 0xFFFF, on return these values are filled with an apqn able to handle this key. The function also checks for the master key verification patterns of the key matching to the current or alternate mkvp of the apqn. CCA AES cipher keys are also checked for CPACF export allowed (CPRTCPAC flag). Currently CCA AES secure keys and CCA AES cipher keys are supported (may get extended in the future). PKEY_KBLOB2PROTK2: Transform a key blob (of any type) into a protected key, version 2. Difference to version 1 is only that this new ioctl has additional parameters to provide a list of apqns to be used for the transformation. PKEY_APQNS4K: Generate a list of APQNs based on the key blob given. Is able to find out which type of secure key is given (CCA AES secure key or CCA AES cipher key) and tries to find all matching crypto cards based on the MKVP and maybe other criterias (like CCA AES cipher keys need a CEX6C or higher). The list of APQNs is further filtered by the key's mkvp which needs to match to either the current mkvp or the alternate mkvp (which is the old mkvp on CCA adapters) of the apqns. The flags argument may be used to limit the matching apqns. If the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP is given, only the current mkvp of each apqn is compared. Likewise with the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP. If both are given it is assumed to return apqns where either the current or the alternate mkvp matches. If no matching APQN is found, the ioctl returns with 0 but the apqn_entries value is 0. PKEY_APQNS4KT: Generate a list of APQNs based on the key type given. Build a list of APQNs based on the given key type and maybe further restrict the list by given master key verification patterns. For different key types there may be different ways to match the master key verification patterns. For CCA keys (CCA data key and CCA cipher key) the first 8 bytes of cur_mkvp refer to the current mkvp value of the apqn and the first 8 bytes of the alt_mkvp refer to the old mkvp. The flags argument controls if the apqns current and/or alternate mkvp should match. If the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP is given, only the current mkvp of each apqn is compared. Likewise with the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP. If both are given, it is assumed to return apqns where either the current or the alternate mkvp matches. If no matching APQN is found, the ioctl returns with 0 but the apqn_entries value is 0. These new ioctls are now prepared for another new type of secure key blob which may come in the future. They all use a pointer to the key blob and a key blob length information instead of some hardcoded byte array. They all use the new enums pkey_key_type, pkey_key_size and pkey_key_info for getting/setting key type, key size and additional info about the key. All but the PKEY_VERIFY2 ioctl now work based on a list of apqns. This list is walked through trying to perform the operation on exactly this apqn without any further checking (like card type or online state). If the apqn fails, simple the next one in the list is tried until success (return 0) or the end of the list is reached (return -1 with errno ENODEV). All apqns in the list need to be exact apqns (0xFFFF as any card or domain is not allowed). There are two new ioctls which can be used to build a list of apqns based on a key or key type and maybe restricted by match to a current or alternate master key verifcation pattern. Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
2019-06-19 06:26:05 -06:00
apqns = _copy_apqns_from_user(kcs.apqns, kcs.apqn_entries);
if (IS_ERR(apqns))
return PTR_ERR(apqns);
kkey = kmalloc(klen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!kkey) {
kfree(apqns);
return -ENOMEM;
}
s390/pkey: add CCA AES cipher key support Introduce new ioctls and structs to be used with these new ioctls which are able to handle CCA AES secure keys and CCA AES cipher keys: PKEY_GENSECK2: Generate secure key, version 2. Generate either a CCA AES secure key or a CCA AES cipher key. PKEY_CLR2SECK2: Generate secure key from clear key value, version 2. Construct a CCA AES secure key or CCA AES cipher key from a given clear key value. PKEY_VERIFYKEY2: Verify the given secure key, version 2. Check for correct key type. If cardnr and domain are given, also check if this apqn is able to handle this type of key. If cardnr and domain are 0xFFFF, on return these values are filled with an apqn able to handle this key. The function also checks for the master key verification patterns of the key matching to the current or alternate mkvp of the apqn. CCA AES cipher keys are also checked for CPACF export allowed (CPRTCPAC flag). Currently CCA AES secure keys and CCA AES cipher keys are supported (may get extended in the future). PKEY_KBLOB2PROTK2: Transform a key blob (of any type) into a protected key, version 2. Difference to version 1 is only that this new ioctl has additional parameters to provide a list of apqns to be used for the transformation. PKEY_APQNS4K: Generate a list of APQNs based on the key blob given. Is able to find out which type of secure key is given (CCA AES secure key or CCA AES cipher key) and tries to find all matching crypto cards based on the MKVP and maybe other criterias (like CCA AES cipher keys need a CEX6C or higher). The list of APQNs is further filtered by the key's mkvp which needs to match to either the current mkvp or the alternate mkvp (which is the old mkvp on CCA adapters) of the apqns. The flags argument may be used to limit the matching apqns. If the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP is given, only the current mkvp of each apqn is compared. Likewise with the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP. If both are given it is assumed to return apqns where either the current or the alternate mkvp matches. If no matching APQN is found, the ioctl returns with 0 but the apqn_entries value is 0. PKEY_APQNS4KT: Generate a list of APQNs based on the key type given. Build a list of APQNs based on the given key type and maybe further restrict the list by given master key verification patterns. For different key types there may be different ways to match the master key verification patterns. For CCA keys (CCA data key and CCA cipher key) the first 8 bytes of cur_mkvp refer to the current mkvp value of the apqn and the first 8 bytes of the alt_mkvp refer to the old mkvp. The flags argument controls if the apqns current and/or alternate mkvp should match. If the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP is given, only the current mkvp of each apqn is compared. Likewise with the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP. If both are given, it is assumed to return apqns where either the current or the alternate mkvp matches. If no matching APQN is found, the ioctl returns with 0 but the apqn_entries value is 0. These new ioctls are now prepared for another new type of secure key blob which may come in the future. They all use a pointer to the key blob and a key blob length information instead of some hardcoded byte array. They all use the new enums pkey_key_type, pkey_key_size and pkey_key_info for getting/setting key type, key size and additional info about the key. All but the PKEY_VERIFY2 ioctl now work based on a list of apqns. This list is walked through trying to perform the operation on exactly this apqn without any further checking (like card type or online state). If the apqn fails, simple the next one in the list is tried until success (return 0) or the end of the list is reached (return -1 with errno ENODEV). All apqns in the list need to be exact apqns (0xFFFF as any card or domain is not allowed). There are two new ioctls which can be used to build a list of apqns based on a key or key type and maybe restricted by match to a current or alternate master key verifcation pattern. Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
2019-06-19 06:26:05 -06:00
rc = pkey_clr2seckey2(apqns, kcs.apqn_entries,
kcs.type, kcs.size, kcs.keygenflags,
kcs.clrkey.clrkey, kkey, &klen);
DEBUG_DBG("%s pkey_clr2seckey2()=%d\n", __func__, rc);
kfree(apqns);
if (rc) {
kfree(kkey);
break;
}
if (kcs.key) {
if (kcs.keylen < klen) {
kfree(kkey);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (copy_to_user(kcs.key, kkey, klen)) {
kfree(kkey);
return -EFAULT;
}
}
kcs.keylen = klen;
if (copy_to_user(ucs, &kcs, sizeof(kcs)))
rc = -EFAULT;
memzero_explicit(&kcs, sizeof(kcs));
kfree(kkey);
break;
}
case PKEY_VERIFYKEY2: {
struct pkey_verifykey2 __user *uvk = (void __user *) arg;
struct pkey_verifykey2 kvk;
u8 *kkey;
if (copy_from_user(&kvk, uvk, sizeof(kvk)))
return -EFAULT;
kkey = _copy_key_from_user(kvk.key, kvk.keylen);
if (IS_ERR(kkey))
return PTR_ERR(kkey);
rc = pkey_verifykey2(kkey, kvk.keylen,
&kvk.cardnr, &kvk.domain,
&kvk.type, &kvk.size, &kvk.flags);
DEBUG_DBG("%s pkey_verifykey2()=%d\n", __func__, rc);
kfree(kkey);
if (rc)
break;
if (copy_to_user(uvk, &kvk, sizeof(kvk)))
return -EFAULT;
break;
}
case PKEY_KBLOB2PROTK2: {
struct pkey_kblob2pkey2 __user *utp = (void __user *) arg;
struct pkey_kblob2pkey2 ktp;
struct pkey_apqn *apqns = NULL;
u8 *kkey;
if (copy_from_user(&ktp, utp, sizeof(ktp)))
return -EFAULT;
apqns = _copy_apqns_from_user(ktp.apqns, ktp.apqn_entries);
if (IS_ERR(apqns))
return PTR_ERR(apqns);
kkey = _copy_key_from_user(ktp.key, ktp.keylen);
if (IS_ERR(kkey)) {
kfree(apqns);
return PTR_ERR(kkey);
}
rc = pkey_keyblob2pkey2(apqns, ktp.apqn_entries,
kkey, ktp.keylen, &ktp.protkey);
DEBUG_DBG("%s pkey_keyblob2pkey2()=%d\n", __func__, rc);
kfree(apqns);
kfree(kkey);
if (rc)
break;
if (copy_to_user(utp, &ktp, sizeof(ktp)))
return -EFAULT;
break;
}
s390/pkey: add CCA AES cipher key support Introduce new ioctls and structs to be used with these new ioctls which are able to handle CCA AES secure keys and CCA AES cipher keys: PKEY_GENSECK2: Generate secure key, version 2. Generate either a CCA AES secure key or a CCA AES cipher key. PKEY_CLR2SECK2: Generate secure key from clear key value, version 2. Construct a CCA AES secure key or CCA AES cipher key from a given clear key value. PKEY_VERIFYKEY2: Verify the given secure key, version 2. Check for correct key type. If cardnr and domain are given, also check if this apqn is able to handle this type of key. If cardnr and domain are 0xFFFF, on return these values are filled with an apqn able to handle this key. The function also checks for the master key verification patterns of the key matching to the current or alternate mkvp of the apqn. CCA AES cipher keys are also checked for CPACF export allowed (CPRTCPAC flag). Currently CCA AES secure keys and CCA AES cipher keys are supported (may get extended in the future). PKEY_KBLOB2PROTK2: Transform a key blob (of any type) into a protected key, version 2. Difference to version 1 is only that this new ioctl has additional parameters to provide a list of apqns to be used for the transformation. PKEY_APQNS4K: Generate a list of APQNs based on the key blob given. Is able to find out which type of secure key is given (CCA AES secure key or CCA AES cipher key) and tries to find all matching crypto cards based on the MKVP and maybe other criterias (like CCA AES cipher keys need a CEX6C or higher). The list of APQNs is further filtered by the key's mkvp which needs to match to either the current mkvp or the alternate mkvp (which is the old mkvp on CCA adapters) of the apqns. The flags argument may be used to limit the matching apqns. If the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP is given, only the current mkvp of each apqn is compared. Likewise with the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP. If both are given it is assumed to return apqns where either the current or the alternate mkvp matches. If no matching APQN is found, the ioctl returns with 0 but the apqn_entries value is 0. PKEY_APQNS4KT: Generate a list of APQNs based on the key type given. Build a list of APQNs based on the given key type and maybe further restrict the list by given master key verification patterns. For different key types there may be different ways to match the master key verification patterns. For CCA keys (CCA data key and CCA cipher key) the first 8 bytes of cur_mkvp refer to the current mkvp value of the apqn and the first 8 bytes of the alt_mkvp refer to the old mkvp. The flags argument controls if the apqns current and/or alternate mkvp should match. If the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_CUR_MKVP is given, only the current mkvp of each apqn is compared. Likewise with the PKEY_FLAGS_MATCH_ALT_MKVP. If both are given, it is assumed to return apqns where either the current or the alternate mkvp matches. If no matching APQN is found, the ioctl returns with 0 but the apqn_entries value is 0. These new ioctls are now prepared for another new type of secure key blob which may come in the future. They all use a pointer to the key blob and a key blob length information instead of some hardcoded byte array. They all use the new enums pkey_key_type, pkey_key_size and pkey_key_info for getting/setting key type, key size and additional info about the key. All but the PKEY_VERIFY2 ioctl now work based on a list of apqns. This list is walked through trying to perform the operation on exactly this apqn without any further checking (like card type or online state). If the apqn fails, simple the next one in the list is tried until success (return 0) or the end of the list is reached (return -1 with errno ENODEV). All apqns in the list need to be exact apqns (0xFFFF as any card or domain is not allowed). There are two new ioctls which can be used to build a list of apqns based on a key or key type and maybe restricted by match to a current or alternate master key verifcation pattern. Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
2019-06-19 06:26:05 -06:00
case PKEY_APQNS4K: {
struct pkey_apqns4key __user *uak = (void __user *) arg;
struct pkey_apqns4key kak;
struct pkey_apqn *apqns = NULL;
size_t nr_apqns, len;
u8 *kkey;
if (copy_from_user(&kak, uak, sizeof(kak)))
return -EFAULT;
nr_apqns = kak.apqn_entries;
if (nr_apqns) {
apqns = kmalloc_array(nr_apqns,
sizeof(struct pkey_apqn),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!apqns)
return -ENOMEM;
}
kkey = _copy_key_from_user(kak.key, kak.keylen);
if (IS_ERR(kkey)) {
kfree(apqns);
return PTR_ERR(kkey);
}
rc = pkey_apqns4key(kkey, kak.keylen, kak.flags,
apqns, &nr_apqns);
DEBUG_DBG("%s pkey_apqns4key()=%d\n", __func__, rc);
kfree(kkey);
if (rc && rc != -ENOSPC) {
kfree(apqns);
break;
}
if (!rc && kak.apqns) {
if (nr_apqns > kak.apqn_entries) {
kfree(apqns);
return -EINVAL;
}
len = nr_apqns * sizeof(struct pkey_apqn);
if (len) {
if (copy_to_user(kak.apqns, apqns, len)) {
kfree(apqns);
return -EFAULT;
}
}
}
kak.apqn_entries = nr_apqns;
if (copy_to_user(uak, &kak, sizeof(kak)))
rc = -EFAULT;
kfree(apqns);
break;
}
case PKEY_APQNS4KT: {
struct pkey_apqns4keytype __user *uat = (void __user *) arg;
struct pkey_apqns4keytype kat;
struct pkey_apqn *apqns = NULL;
size_t nr_apqns, len;
if (copy_from_user(&kat, uat, sizeof(kat)))
return -EFAULT;
nr_apqns = kat.apqn_entries;
if (nr_apqns) {
apqns = kmalloc_array(nr_apqns,
sizeof(struct pkey_apqn),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!apqns)
return -ENOMEM;
}
rc = pkey_apqns4keytype(kat.type, kat.cur_mkvp, kat.alt_mkvp,
kat.flags, apqns, &nr_apqns);
DEBUG_DBG("%s pkey_apqns4keytype()=%d\n", __func__, rc);
if (rc && rc != -ENOSPC) {
kfree(apqns);
break;
}
if (!rc && kat.apqns) {
if (nr_apqns > kat.apqn_entries) {
kfree(apqns);
return -EINVAL;
}
len = nr_apqns * sizeof(struct pkey_apqn);
if (len) {
if (copy_to_user(kat.apqns, apqns, len)) {
kfree(apqns);
return -EFAULT;
}
}
}
kat.apqn_entries = nr_apqns;
if (copy_to_user(uat, &kat, sizeof(kat)))
rc = -EFAULT;
kfree(apqns);
break;
}
default:
/* unknown/unsupported ioctl cmd */
return -ENOTTY;
}
return rc;
}
/*
* Sysfs and file io operations
*/
/*
* Sysfs attribute read function for all protected key binary attributes.
* The implementation can not deal with partial reads, because a new random
* protected key blob is generated with each read. In case of partial reads
* (i.e. off != 0 or count < key blob size) -EINVAL is returned.
*/
static ssize_t pkey_protkey_aes_attr_read(u32 keytype, bool is_xts, char *buf,
loff_t off, size_t count)
{
struct protaeskeytoken protkeytoken;
struct pkey_protkey protkey;
int rc;
if (off != 0 || count < sizeof(protkeytoken))
return -EINVAL;
if (is_xts)
if (count < 2 * sizeof(protkeytoken))
return -EINVAL;
memset(&protkeytoken, 0, sizeof(protkeytoken));
protkeytoken.type = TOKTYPE_NON_CCA;
protkeytoken.version = TOKVER_PROTECTED_KEY;
protkeytoken.keytype = keytype;
rc = pkey_genprotkey(protkeytoken.keytype, &protkey);
if (rc)
return rc;
protkeytoken.len = protkey.len;
memcpy(&protkeytoken.protkey, &protkey.protkey, protkey.len);
memcpy(buf, &protkeytoken, sizeof(protkeytoken));
if (is_xts) {
rc = pkey_genprotkey(protkeytoken.keytype, &protkey);
if (rc)
return rc;
protkeytoken.len = protkey.len;
memcpy(&protkeytoken.protkey, &protkey.protkey, protkey.len);
memcpy(buf + sizeof(protkeytoken), &protkeytoken,
sizeof(protkeytoken));
return 2 * sizeof(protkeytoken);
}
return sizeof(protkeytoken);
}
static ssize_t protkey_aes_128_read(struct file *filp,
struct kobject *kobj,
struct bin_attribute *attr,
char *buf, loff_t off,
size_t count)
{
return pkey_protkey_aes_attr_read(PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128, false, buf,
off, count);
}
static ssize_t protkey_aes_192_read(struct file *filp,
struct kobject *kobj,
struct bin_attribute *attr,
char *buf, loff_t off,
size_t count)
{
return pkey_protkey_aes_attr_read(PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_192, false, buf,
off, count);
}
static ssize_t protkey_aes_256_read(struct file *filp,
struct kobject *kobj,
struct bin_attribute *attr,
char *buf, loff_t off,
size_t count)
{
return pkey_protkey_aes_attr_read(PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_256, false, buf,
off, count);
}
static ssize_t protkey_aes_128_xts_read(struct file *filp,
struct kobject *kobj,
struct bin_attribute *attr,
char *buf, loff_t off,
size_t count)
{
return pkey_protkey_aes_attr_read(PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128, true, buf,
off, count);
}
static ssize_t protkey_aes_256_xts_read(struct file *filp,
struct kobject *kobj,
struct bin_attribute *attr,
char *buf, loff_t off,
size_t count)
{
return pkey_protkey_aes_attr_read(PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_256, true, buf,
off, count);
}
static BIN_ATTR_RO(protkey_aes_128, sizeof(struct protaeskeytoken));
static BIN_ATTR_RO(protkey_aes_192, sizeof(struct protaeskeytoken));
static BIN_ATTR_RO(protkey_aes_256, sizeof(struct protaeskeytoken));
static BIN_ATTR_RO(protkey_aes_128_xts, 2 * sizeof(struct protaeskeytoken));
static BIN_ATTR_RO(protkey_aes_256_xts, 2 * sizeof(struct protaeskeytoken));
static struct bin_attribute *protkey_attrs[] = {
&bin_attr_protkey_aes_128,
&bin_attr_protkey_aes_192,
&bin_attr_protkey_aes_256,
&bin_attr_protkey_aes_128_xts,
&bin_attr_protkey_aes_256_xts,
NULL
};
static struct attribute_group protkey_attr_group = {
.name = "protkey",
.bin_attrs = protkey_attrs,
};
/*
* Sysfs attribute read function for all secure key ccadata binary attributes.
* The implementation can not deal with partial reads, because a new random
* protected key blob is generated with each read. In case of partial reads
* (i.e. off != 0 or count < key blob size) -EINVAL is returned.
*/
static ssize_t pkey_ccadata_aes_attr_read(u32 keytype, bool is_xts, char *buf,
loff_t off, size_t count)
{
int rc;
struct pkey_seckey *seckey = (struct pkey_seckey *) buf;
if (off != 0 || count < sizeof(struct secaeskeytoken))
return -EINVAL;
if (is_xts)
if (count < 2 * sizeof(struct secaeskeytoken))
return -EINVAL;
rc = cca_genseckey(-1, -1, keytype, seckey->seckey);
if (rc)
return rc;
if (is_xts) {
seckey++;
rc = cca_genseckey(-1, -1, keytype, seckey->seckey);
if (rc)
return rc;
return 2 * sizeof(struct secaeskeytoken);
}
return sizeof(struct secaeskeytoken);
}
static ssize_t ccadata_aes_128_read(struct file *filp,
struct kobject *kobj,
struct bin_attribute *attr,
char *buf, loff_t off,
size_t count)
{
return pkey_ccadata_aes_attr_read(PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128, false, buf,
off, count);
}
static ssize_t ccadata_aes_192_read(struct file *filp,
struct kobject *kobj,
struct bin_attribute *attr,
char *buf, loff_t off,
size_t count)
{
return pkey_ccadata_aes_attr_read(PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_192, false, buf,
off, count);
}
static ssize_t ccadata_aes_256_read(struct file *filp,
struct kobject *kobj,
struct bin_attribute *attr,
char *buf, loff_t off,
size_t count)
{
return pkey_ccadata_aes_attr_read(PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_256, false, buf,
off, count);
}
static ssize_t ccadata_aes_128_xts_read(struct file *filp,
struct kobject *kobj,
struct bin_attribute *attr,
char *buf, loff_t off,
size_t count)
{
return pkey_ccadata_aes_attr_read(PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128, true, buf,
off, count);
}
static ssize_t ccadata_aes_256_xts_read(struct file *filp,
struct kobject *kobj,
struct bin_attribute *attr,
char *buf, loff_t off,
size_t count)
{
return pkey_ccadata_aes_attr_read(PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_256, true, buf,
off, count);
}
static BIN_ATTR_RO(ccadata_aes_128, sizeof(struct secaeskeytoken));
static BIN_ATTR_RO(ccadata_aes_192, sizeof(struct secaeskeytoken));
static BIN_ATTR_RO(ccadata_aes_256, sizeof(struct secaeskeytoken));
static BIN_ATTR_RO(ccadata_aes_128_xts, 2 * sizeof(struct secaeskeytoken));
static BIN_ATTR_RO(ccadata_aes_256_xts, 2 * sizeof(struct secaeskeytoken));
static struct bin_attribute *ccadata_attrs[] = {
&bin_attr_ccadata_aes_128,
&bin_attr_ccadata_aes_192,
&bin_attr_ccadata_aes_256,
&bin_attr_ccadata_aes_128_xts,
&bin_attr_ccadata_aes_256_xts,
NULL
};
static struct attribute_group ccadata_attr_group = {
.name = "ccadata",
.bin_attrs = ccadata_attrs,
};
#define CCACIPHERTOKENSIZE (sizeof(struct cipherkeytoken) + 80)
/*
* Sysfs attribute read function for all secure key ccacipher binary attributes.
* The implementation can not deal with partial reads, because a new random
* secure key blob is generated with each read. In case of partial reads
* (i.e. off != 0 or count < key blob size) -EINVAL is returned.
*/
static ssize_t pkey_ccacipher_aes_attr_read(enum pkey_key_size keybits,
bool is_xts, char *buf, loff_t off,
size_t count)
{
size_t keysize;
int rc;
if (off != 0 || count < CCACIPHERTOKENSIZE)
return -EINVAL;
if (is_xts)
if (count < 2 * CCACIPHERTOKENSIZE)
return -EINVAL;
keysize = CCACIPHERTOKENSIZE;
rc = cca_gencipherkey(-1, -1, keybits, 0, buf, &keysize);
if (rc)
return rc;
memset(buf + keysize, 0, CCACIPHERTOKENSIZE - keysize);
if (is_xts) {
keysize = CCACIPHERTOKENSIZE;
rc = cca_gencipherkey(-1, -1, keybits, 0,
buf + CCACIPHERTOKENSIZE, &keysize);
if (rc)
return rc;
memset(buf + CCACIPHERTOKENSIZE + keysize, 0,
CCACIPHERTOKENSIZE - keysize);
return 2 * CCACIPHERTOKENSIZE;
}
return CCACIPHERTOKENSIZE;
}
static ssize_t ccacipher_aes_128_read(struct file *filp,
struct kobject *kobj,
struct bin_attribute *attr,
char *buf, loff_t off,
size_t count)
{
return pkey_ccacipher_aes_attr_read(PKEY_SIZE_AES_128, false, buf,
off, count);
}
static ssize_t ccacipher_aes_192_read(struct file *filp,
struct kobject *kobj,
struct bin_attribute *attr,
char *buf, loff_t off,
size_t count)
{
return pkey_ccacipher_aes_attr_read(PKEY_SIZE_AES_192, false, buf,
off, count);
}
static ssize_t ccacipher_aes_256_read(struct file *filp,
struct kobject *kobj,
struct bin_attribute *attr,
char *buf, loff_t off,
size_t count)
{
return pkey_ccacipher_aes_attr_read(PKEY_SIZE_AES_256, false, buf,
off, count);
}
static ssize_t ccacipher_aes_128_xts_read(struct file *filp,
struct kobject *kobj,
struct bin_attribute *attr,
char *buf, loff_t off,
size_t count)
{
return pkey_ccacipher_aes_attr_read(PKEY_SIZE_AES_128, true, buf,
off, count);
}
static ssize_t ccacipher_aes_256_xts_read(struct file *filp,
struct kobject *kobj,
struct bin_attribute *attr,
char *buf, loff_t off,
size_t count)
{
return pkey_ccacipher_aes_attr_read(PKEY_SIZE_AES_256, true, buf,
off, count);
}
static BIN_ATTR_RO(ccacipher_aes_128, CCACIPHERTOKENSIZE);
static BIN_ATTR_RO(ccacipher_aes_192, CCACIPHERTOKENSIZE);
static BIN_ATTR_RO(ccacipher_aes_256, CCACIPHERTOKENSIZE);
static BIN_ATTR_RO(ccacipher_aes_128_xts, 2 * CCACIPHERTOKENSIZE);
static BIN_ATTR_RO(ccacipher_aes_256_xts, 2 * CCACIPHERTOKENSIZE);
static struct bin_attribute *ccacipher_attrs[] = {
&bin_attr_ccacipher_aes_128,
&bin_attr_ccacipher_aes_192,
&bin_attr_ccacipher_aes_256,
&bin_attr_ccacipher_aes_128_xts,
&bin_attr_ccacipher_aes_256_xts,
NULL
};
static struct attribute_group ccacipher_attr_group = {
.name = "ccacipher",
.bin_attrs = ccacipher_attrs,
};
static const struct attribute_group *pkey_attr_groups[] = {
&protkey_attr_group,
&ccadata_attr_group,
&ccacipher_attr_group,
NULL,
};
static const struct file_operations pkey_fops = {
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
.open = nonseekable_open,
.llseek = no_llseek,
.unlocked_ioctl = pkey_unlocked_ioctl,
};
static struct miscdevice pkey_dev = {
.name = "pkey",
.minor = MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR,
.mode = 0666,
.fops = &pkey_fops,
.groups = pkey_attr_groups,
};
/*
* Module init
*/
static int __init pkey_init(void)
{
cpacf_mask_t func_mask;
/*
* The pckmo instruction should be available - even if we don't
* actually invoke it. This instruction comes with MSA 3 which
* is also the minimum level for the kmc instructions which
* are able to work with protected keys.
*/
if (!cpacf_query(CPACF_PCKMO, &func_mask))
return -ENODEV;
/* check for kmc instructions available */
if (!cpacf_query(CPACF_KMC, &func_mask))
return -ENODEV;
if (!cpacf_test_func(&func_mask, CPACF_KMC_PAES_128) ||
!cpacf_test_func(&func_mask, CPACF_KMC_PAES_192) ||
!cpacf_test_func(&func_mask, CPACF_KMC_PAES_256))
return -ENODEV;
pkey_debug_init();
return misc_register(&pkey_dev);
}
/*
* Module exit
*/
static void __exit pkey_exit(void)
{
misc_deregister(&pkey_dev);
pkey_debug_exit();
}
module_cpu_feature_match(MSA, pkey_init);
module_exit(pkey_exit);