alistair23-linux/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h

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/*
BlueZ - Bluetooth protocol stack for Linux
Copyright (c) 2000-2001, 2010, Code Aurora Forum. All rights reserved.
Written 2000,2001 by Maxim Krasnyansky <maxk@qualcomm.com>
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
published by the Free Software Foundation;
THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS
OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT OF THIRD PARTY RIGHTS.
IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER(S) AND AUTHOR(S) BE LIABLE FOR ANY
CLAIM, OR ANY SPECIAL INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, OR ANY DAMAGES
WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
ALL LIABILITY, INCLUDING LIABILITY FOR INFRINGEMENT OF ANY PATENTS,
COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS OR OTHER RIGHTS, RELATING TO USE OF THIS
SOFTWARE IS DISCLAIMED.
*/
#ifndef __HCI_CORE_H
#define __HCI_CORE_H
#include <net/bluetooth/hci.h>
/* HCI upper protocols */
#define HCI_PROTO_L2CAP 0
#define HCI_PROTO_SCO 1
/* HCI Core structures */
struct inquiry_data {
bdaddr_t bdaddr;
__u8 pscan_rep_mode;
__u8 pscan_period_mode;
__u8 pscan_mode;
__u8 dev_class[3];
__le16 clock_offset;
__s8 rssi;
__u8 ssp_mode;
};
struct inquiry_entry {
struct inquiry_entry *next;
__u32 timestamp;
struct inquiry_data data;
};
struct inquiry_cache {
spinlock_t lock;
__u32 timestamp;
struct inquiry_entry *list;
};
struct hci_conn_hash {
struct list_head list;
spinlock_t lock;
unsigned int acl_num;
unsigned int sco_num;
unsigned int le_num;
};
struct bdaddr_list {
struct list_head list;
bdaddr_t bdaddr;
};
struct bt_uuid {
struct list_head list;
u8 uuid[16];
u8 svc_hint;
};
struct link_key {
struct list_head list;
bdaddr_t bdaddr;
u8 type;
u8 val[16];
u8 pin_len;
};
#define NUM_REASSEMBLY 4
struct hci_dev {
struct list_head list;
spinlock_t lock;
atomic_t refcnt;
char name[8];
unsigned long flags;
__u16 id;
__u8 bus;
__u8 dev_type;
bdaddr_t bdaddr;
__u8 dev_name[248];
__u8 dev_class[3];
__u8 major_class;
__u8 minor_class;
__u8 features[8];
__u8 commands[64];
__u8 ssp_mode;
__u8 hci_ver;
__u16 hci_rev;
__u8 lmp_ver;
__u16 manufacturer;
__le16 lmp_subver;
__u16 voice_setting;
__u8 io_capability;
__u16 pkt_type;
__u16 esco_type;
__u16 link_policy;
__u16 link_mode;
__u32 idle_timeout;
__u16 sniff_min_interval;
__u16 sniff_max_interval;
unsigned long quirks;
atomic_t cmd_cnt;
unsigned int acl_cnt;
unsigned int sco_cnt;
unsigned int acl_mtu;
unsigned int sco_mtu;
unsigned int acl_pkts;
unsigned int sco_pkts;
unsigned long cmd_last_tx;
unsigned long acl_last_tx;
unsigned long sco_last_tx;
struct workqueue_struct *workqueue;
struct work_struct power_on;
struct work_struct power_off;
struct timer_list off_timer;
struct tasklet_struct cmd_task;
struct tasklet_struct rx_task;
struct tasklet_struct tx_task;
struct sk_buff_head rx_q;
struct sk_buff_head raw_q;
struct sk_buff_head cmd_q;
struct sk_buff *sent_cmd;
struct sk_buff *reassembly[NUM_REASSEMBLY];
struct mutex req_lock;
wait_queue_head_t req_wait_q;
__u32 req_status;
__u32 req_result;
__u16 init_last_cmd;
struct inquiry_cache inq_cache;
struct hci_conn_hash conn_hash;
struct list_head blacklist;
struct list_head uuids;
struct list_head link_keys;
struct hci_dev_stats stat;
struct sk_buff_head driver_init;
void *driver_data;
void *core_data;
atomic_t promisc;
struct dentry *debugfs;
struct device *parent;
struct device dev;
struct rfkill *rfkill;
struct module *owner;
int (*open)(struct hci_dev *hdev);
int (*close)(struct hci_dev *hdev);
int (*flush)(struct hci_dev *hdev);
int (*send)(struct sk_buff *skb);
void (*destruct)(struct hci_dev *hdev);
void (*notify)(struct hci_dev *hdev, unsigned int evt);
int (*ioctl)(struct hci_dev *hdev, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg);
};
struct hci_conn {
struct list_head list;
atomic_t refcnt;
spinlock_t lock;
bdaddr_t dst;
__u16 handle;
__u16 state;
__u8 mode;
__u8 type;
__u8 out;
__u8 attempt;
__u8 dev_class[3];
__u8 features[8];
__u8 ssp_mode;
__u16 interval;
__u16 pkt_type;
__u16 link_policy;
__u32 link_mode;
__u8 auth_type;
Bluetooth: Add enhanced security model for Simple Pairing The current security model is based around the flags AUTH, ENCRYPT and SECURE. Starting with support for the Bluetooth 2.1 specification this is no longer sufficient. The different security levels are now defined as SDP, LOW, MEDIUM and SECURE. Previously it was possible to set each security independently, but this actually doesn't make a lot of sense. For Bluetooth the encryption depends on a previous successful authentication. Also you can only update your existing link key if you successfully created at least one before. And of course the update of link keys without having proper encryption in place is a security issue. The new security levels from the Bluetooth 2.1 specification are now used internally. All old settings are mapped to the new values and this way it ensures that old applications still work. The only limitation is that it is no longer possible to set authentication without also enabling encryption. No application should have done this anyway since this is actually a security issue. Without encryption the integrity of the authentication can't be guaranteed. As default for a new L2CAP or RFCOMM connection, the LOW security level is used. The only exception here are the service discovery sessions on PSM 1 where SDP level is used. To have similar security strength as with a Bluetooth 2.0 and before combination key, the MEDIUM level should be used. This is according to the Bluetooth specification. The MEDIUM level will not require any kind of man-in-the-middle (MITM) protection. Only the HIGH security level will require this. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2009-01-15 13:58:04 -07:00
__u8 sec_level;
__u8 pending_sec_level;
__u8 pin_length;
__u8 io_capability;
__u8 power_save;
Bluetooth: Add different pairing timeout for Legacy Pairing The Bluetooth stack uses a reference counting for all established ACL links and if no user (L2CAP connection) is present, the link will be terminated to save power. The problem part is the dedicated pairing when using Legacy Pairing (Bluetooth 2.0 and before). At that point no user is present and pairing attempts will be disconnected within 10 seconds or less. In previous kernel version this was not a problem since the disconnect timeout wasn't triggered on incoming connections for the first time. However this caused issues with broken host stacks that kept the connections around after dedicated pairing. When the support for Simple Pairing got added, the link establishment procedure needed to be changed and now causes issues when using Legacy Pairing When using Simple Pairing it is possible to do a proper reference counting of ACL link users. With Legacy Pairing this is not possible since the specification is unclear in some areas and too many broken Bluetooth devices have already been deployed. So instead of trying to deal with all the broken devices, a special pairing timeout will be introduced that increases the timeout to 60 seconds when pairing is triggered. If a broken devices now puts the stack into an unforeseen state, the worst that happens is the disconnect timeout triggers after 120 seconds instead of 4 seconds. This allows successful pairings with legacy and broken devices now. Based on a report by Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@nokia.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2009-04-26 12:01:22 -06:00
__u16 disc_timeout;
unsigned long pend;
__u8 remote_cap;
__u8 remote_oob;
__u8 remote_auth;
unsigned int sent;
struct sk_buff_head data_q;
struct timer_list disc_timer;
struct timer_list idle_timer;
struct work_struct work_add;
struct work_struct work_del;
struct device dev;
atomic_t devref;
struct hci_dev *hdev;
void *l2cap_data;
void *sco_data;
void *priv;
struct hci_conn *link;
};
extern struct hci_proto *hci_proto[];
extern struct list_head hci_dev_list;
extern struct list_head hci_cb_list;
extern rwlock_t hci_dev_list_lock;
extern rwlock_t hci_cb_list_lock;
/* ----- Inquiry cache ----- */
#define INQUIRY_CACHE_AGE_MAX (HZ*30) /* 30 seconds */
#define INQUIRY_ENTRY_AGE_MAX (HZ*60) /* 60 seconds */
#define inquiry_cache_lock(c) spin_lock(&c->lock)
#define inquiry_cache_unlock(c) spin_unlock(&c->lock)
#define inquiry_cache_lock_bh(c) spin_lock_bh(&c->lock)
#define inquiry_cache_unlock_bh(c) spin_unlock_bh(&c->lock)
static inline void inquiry_cache_init(struct hci_dev *hdev)
{
struct inquiry_cache *c = &hdev->inq_cache;
spin_lock_init(&c->lock);
c->list = NULL;
}
static inline int inquiry_cache_empty(struct hci_dev *hdev)
{
struct inquiry_cache *c = &hdev->inq_cache;
return c->list == NULL;
}
static inline long inquiry_cache_age(struct hci_dev *hdev)
{
struct inquiry_cache *c = &hdev->inq_cache;
return jiffies - c->timestamp;
}
static inline long inquiry_entry_age(struct inquiry_entry *e)
{
return jiffies - e->timestamp;
}
struct inquiry_entry *hci_inquiry_cache_lookup(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr);
void hci_inquiry_cache_update(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct inquiry_data *data);
/* ----- HCI Connections ----- */
enum {
HCI_CONN_AUTH_PEND,
HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND,
HCI_CONN_RSWITCH_PEND,
HCI_CONN_MODE_CHANGE_PEND,
HCI_CONN_SCO_SETUP_PEND,
};
static inline void hci_conn_hash_init(struct hci_dev *hdev)
{
struct hci_conn_hash *h = &hdev->conn_hash;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&h->list);
spin_lock_init(&h->lock);
h->acl_num = 0;
h->sco_num = 0;
}
static inline void hci_conn_hash_add(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct hci_conn *c)
{
struct hci_conn_hash *h = &hdev->conn_hash;
list_add(&c->list, &h->list);
switch (c->type) {
case ACL_LINK:
h->acl_num++;
break;
case LE_LINK:
h->le_num++;
break;
case SCO_LINK:
case ESCO_LINK:
h->sco_num++;
break;
}
}
static inline void hci_conn_hash_del(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct hci_conn *c)
{
struct hci_conn_hash *h = &hdev->conn_hash;
list_del(&c->list);
switch (c->type) {
case ACL_LINK:
h->acl_num--;
break;
case LE_LINK:
h->le_num--;
break;
case SCO_LINK:
case ESCO_LINK:
h->sco_num--;
break;
}
}
static inline struct hci_conn *hci_conn_hash_lookup_handle(struct hci_dev *hdev,
__u16 handle)
{
struct hci_conn_hash *h = &hdev->conn_hash;
struct list_head *p;
struct hci_conn *c;
list_for_each(p, &h->list) {
c = list_entry(p, struct hci_conn, list);
if (c->handle == handle)
return c;
}
return NULL;
}
static inline struct hci_conn *hci_conn_hash_lookup_ba(struct hci_dev *hdev,
__u8 type, bdaddr_t *ba)
{
struct hci_conn_hash *h = &hdev->conn_hash;
struct list_head *p;
struct hci_conn *c;
list_for_each(p, &h->list) {
c = list_entry(p, struct hci_conn, list);
if (c->type == type && !bacmp(&c->dst, ba))
return c;
}
return NULL;
}
static inline struct hci_conn *hci_conn_hash_lookup_state(struct hci_dev *hdev,
__u8 type, __u16 state)
{
struct hci_conn_hash *h = &hdev->conn_hash;
struct list_head *p;
struct hci_conn *c;
list_for_each(p, &h->list) {
c = list_entry(p, struct hci_conn, list);
if (c->type == type && c->state == state)
return c;
}
return NULL;
}
void hci_acl_connect(struct hci_conn *conn);
void hci_acl_disconn(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 reason);
void hci_add_sco(struct hci_conn *conn, __u16 handle);
void hci_setup_sync(struct hci_conn *conn, __u16 handle);
void hci_sco_setup(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 status);
struct hci_conn *hci_conn_add(struct hci_dev *hdev, int type, bdaddr_t *dst);
int hci_conn_del(struct hci_conn *conn);
void hci_conn_hash_flush(struct hci_dev *hdev);
void hci_conn_check_pending(struct hci_dev *hdev);
Bluetooth: Add enhanced security model for Simple Pairing The current security model is based around the flags AUTH, ENCRYPT and SECURE. Starting with support for the Bluetooth 2.1 specification this is no longer sufficient. The different security levels are now defined as SDP, LOW, MEDIUM and SECURE. Previously it was possible to set each security independently, but this actually doesn't make a lot of sense. For Bluetooth the encryption depends on a previous successful authentication. Also you can only update your existing link key if you successfully created at least one before. And of course the update of link keys without having proper encryption in place is a security issue. The new security levels from the Bluetooth 2.1 specification are now used internally. All old settings are mapped to the new values and this way it ensures that old applications still work. The only limitation is that it is no longer possible to set authentication without also enabling encryption. No application should have done this anyway since this is actually a security issue. Without encryption the integrity of the authentication can't be guaranteed. As default for a new L2CAP or RFCOMM connection, the LOW security level is used. The only exception here are the service discovery sessions on PSM 1 where SDP level is used. To have similar security strength as with a Bluetooth 2.0 and before combination key, the MEDIUM level should be used. This is according to the Bluetooth specification. The MEDIUM level will not require any kind of man-in-the-middle (MITM) protection. Only the HIGH security level will require this. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2009-01-15 13:58:04 -07:00
struct hci_conn *hci_connect(struct hci_dev *hdev, int type, bdaddr_t *dst, __u8 sec_level, __u8 auth_type);
int hci_conn_check_link_mode(struct hci_conn *conn);
int hci_conn_security(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 sec_level, __u8 auth_type);
int hci_conn_change_link_key(struct hci_conn *conn);
Bluetooth: Add enhanced security model for Simple Pairing The current security model is based around the flags AUTH, ENCRYPT and SECURE. Starting with support for the Bluetooth 2.1 specification this is no longer sufficient. The different security levels are now defined as SDP, LOW, MEDIUM and SECURE. Previously it was possible to set each security independently, but this actually doesn't make a lot of sense. For Bluetooth the encryption depends on a previous successful authentication. Also you can only update your existing link key if you successfully created at least one before. And of course the update of link keys without having proper encryption in place is a security issue. The new security levels from the Bluetooth 2.1 specification are now used internally. All old settings are mapped to the new values and this way it ensures that old applications still work. The only limitation is that it is no longer possible to set authentication without also enabling encryption. No application should have done this anyway since this is actually a security issue. Without encryption the integrity of the authentication can't be guaranteed. As default for a new L2CAP or RFCOMM connection, the LOW security level is used. The only exception here are the service discovery sessions on PSM 1 where SDP level is used. To have similar security strength as with a Bluetooth 2.0 and before combination key, the MEDIUM level should be used. This is according to the Bluetooth specification. The MEDIUM level will not require any kind of man-in-the-middle (MITM) protection. Only the HIGH security level will require this. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2009-01-15 13:58:04 -07:00
int hci_conn_switch_role(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 role);
void hci_conn_enter_active_mode(struct hci_conn *conn);
void hci_conn_enter_sniff_mode(struct hci_conn *conn);
void hci_conn_hold_device(struct hci_conn *conn);
void hci_conn_put_device(struct hci_conn *conn);
static inline void hci_conn_hold(struct hci_conn *conn)
{
atomic_inc(&conn->refcnt);
del_timer(&conn->disc_timer);
}
static inline void hci_conn_put(struct hci_conn *conn)
{
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&conn->refcnt)) {
unsigned long timeo;
if (conn->type == ACL_LINK) {
del_timer(&conn->idle_timer);
if (conn->state == BT_CONNECTED) {
Bluetooth: Add different pairing timeout for Legacy Pairing The Bluetooth stack uses a reference counting for all established ACL links and if no user (L2CAP connection) is present, the link will be terminated to save power. The problem part is the dedicated pairing when using Legacy Pairing (Bluetooth 2.0 and before). At that point no user is present and pairing attempts will be disconnected within 10 seconds or less. In previous kernel version this was not a problem since the disconnect timeout wasn't triggered on incoming connections for the first time. However this caused issues with broken host stacks that kept the connections around after dedicated pairing. When the support for Simple Pairing got added, the link establishment procedure needed to be changed and now causes issues when using Legacy Pairing When using Simple Pairing it is possible to do a proper reference counting of ACL link users. With Legacy Pairing this is not possible since the specification is unclear in some areas and too many broken Bluetooth devices have already been deployed. So instead of trying to deal with all the broken devices, a special pairing timeout will be introduced that increases the timeout to 60 seconds when pairing is triggered. If a broken devices now puts the stack into an unforeseen state, the worst that happens is the disconnect timeout triggers after 120 seconds instead of 4 seconds. This allows successful pairings with legacy and broken devices now. Based on a report by Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@nokia.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2009-04-26 12:01:22 -06:00
timeo = msecs_to_jiffies(conn->disc_timeout);
if (!conn->out)
Bluetooth: Add different pairing timeout for Legacy Pairing The Bluetooth stack uses a reference counting for all established ACL links and if no user (L2CAP connection) is present, the link will be terminated to save power. The problem part is the dedicated pairing when using Legacy Pairing (Bluetooth 2.0 and before). At that point no user is present and pairing attempts will be disconnected within 10 seconds or less. In previous kernel version this was not a problem since the disconnect timeout wasn't triggered on incoming connections for the first time. However this caused issues with broken host stacks that kept the connections around after dedicated pairing. When the support for Simple Pairing got added, the link establishment procedure needed to be changed and now causes issues when using Legacy Pairing When using Simple Pairing it is possible to do a proper reference counting of ACL link users. With Legacy Pairing this is not possible since the specification is unclear in some areas and too many broken Bluetooth devices have already been deployed. So instead of trying to deal with all the broken devices, a special pairing timeout will be introduced that increases the timeout to 60 seconds when pairing is triggered. If a broken devices now puts the stack into an unforeseen state, the worst that happens is the disconnect timeout triggers after 120 seconds instead of 4 seconds. This allows successful pairings with legacy and broken devices now. Based on a report by Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@nokia.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2009-04-26 12:01:22 -06:00
timeo *= 2;
} else
timeo = msecs_to_jiffies(10);
} else
timeo = msecs_to_jiffies(10);
mod_timer(&conn->disc_timer, jiffies + timeo);
}
}
/* ----- HCI Devices ----- */
static inline void __hci_dev_put(struct hci_dev *d)
{
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&d->refcnt))
d->destruct(d);
}
static inline void hci_dev_put(struct hci_dev *d)
{
__hci_dev_put(d);
module_put(d->owner);
}
static inline struct hci_dev *__hci_dev_hold(struct hci_dev *d)
{
atomic_inc(&d->refcnt);
return d;
}
static inline struct hci_dev *hci_dev_hold(struct hci_dev *d)
{
if (try_module_get(d->owner))
return __hci_dev_hold(d);
return NULL;
}
#define hci_dev_lock(d) spin_lock(&d->lock)
#define hci_dev_unlock(d) spin_unlock(&d->lock)
#define hci_dev_lock_bh(d) spin_lock_bh(&d->lock)
#define hci_dev_unlock_bh(d) spin_unlock_bh(&d->lock)
struct hci_dev *hci_dev_get(int index);
struct hci_dev *hci_get_route(bdaddr_t *src, bdaddr_t *dst);
struct hci_dev *hci_alloc_dev(void);
void hci_free_dev(struct hci_dev *hdev);
int hci_register_dev(struct hci_dev *hdev);
int hci_unregister_dev(struct hci_dev *hdev);
int hci_suspend_dev(struct hci_dev *hdev);
int hci_resume_dev(struct hci_dev *hdev);
int hci_dev_open(__u16 dev);
int hci_dev_close(__u16 dev);
int hci_dev_reset(__u16 dev);
int hci_dev_reset_stat(__u16 dev);
int hci_dev_cmd(unsigned int cmd, void __user *arg);
int hci_get_dev_list(void __user *arg);
int hci_get_dev_info(void __user *arg);
int hci_get_conn_list(void __user *arg);
int hci_get_conn_info(struct hci_dev *hdev, void __user *arg);
int hci_get_auth_info(struct hci_dev *hdev, void __user *arg);
int hci_inquiry(void __user *arg);
struct bdaddr_list *hci_blacklist_lookup(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr);
int hci_blacklist_clear(struct hci_dev *hdev);
int hci_uuids_clear(struct hci_dev *hdev);
int hci_link_keys_clear(struct hci_dev *hdev);
struct link_key *hci_find_link_key(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr);
int hci_add_link_key(struct hci_dev *hdev, int new_key, bdaddr_t *bdaddr,
u8 *key, u8 type, u8 pin_len);
int hci_remove_link_key(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr);
void hci_del_off_timer(struct hci_dev *hdev);
void hci_event_packet(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb);
int hci_recv_frame(struct sk_buff *skb);
int hci_recv_fragment(struct hci_dev *hdev, int type, void *data, int count);
int hci_recv_stream_fragment(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data, int count);
int hci_register_sysfs(struct hci_dev *hdev);
void hci_unregister_sysfs(struct hci_dev *hdev);
Bluetooth: Fix issue with sysfs handling for connections Due to a semantic changes in flush_workqueue() the current approach of synchronizing the sysfs handling for connections doesn't work anymore. The whole approach is actually fully broken and based on assumptions that are no longer valid. With the introduction of Simple Pairing support, the creation of low-level ACL links got changed. This change invalidates the reason why in the past two independent work queues have been used for adding/removing sysfs devices. The adding of the actual sysfs device is now postponed until the host controller successfully assigns an unique handle to that link. So the real synchronization happens inside the controller and not the host. The only left-over problem is that some internals of the sysfs device handling are not initialized ahead of time. This leaves potential access to invalid data and can cause various NULL pointer dereferences. To fix this a new function makes sure that all sysfs details are initialized when an connection attempt is made. The actual sysfs device is only registered when the connection has been successfully established. To avoid a race condition with the registration, the check if a device is registered has been moved into the removal work. As an extra protection two flush_work() calls are left in place to make sure a previous add/del work has been completed first. Based on a report by Marc Pignat <marc.pignat@hevs.ch> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Tested-by: Justin P. Mattock <justinmattock@gmail.com> Tested-by: Roger Quadros <ext-roger.quadros@nokia.com> Tested-by: Marc Pignat <marc.pignat@hevs.ch>
2009-05-02 19:24:06 -06:00
void hci_conn_init_sysfs(struct hci_conn *conn);
void hci_conn_add_sysfs(struct hci_conn *conn);
void hci_conn_del_sysfs(struct hci_conn *conn);
#define SET_HCIDEV_DEV(hdev, pdev) ((hdev)->parent = (pdev))
/* ----- LMP capabilities ----- */
#define lmp_rswitch_capable(dev) ((dev)->features[0] & LMP_RSWITCH)
#define lmp_encrypt_capable(dev) ((dev)->features[0] & LMP_ENCRYPT)
#define lmp_sniff_capable(dev) ((dev)->features[0] & LMP_SNIFF)
#define lmp_sniffsubr_capable(dev) ((dev)->features[5] & LMP_SNIFF_SUBR)
#define lmp_esco_capable(dev) ((dev)->features[3] & LMP_ESCO)
#define lmp_ssp_capable(dev) ((dev)->features[6] & LMP_SIMPLE_PAIR)
Bluetooth: Use non-flushable by default L2CAP data packets Modification of Nick Pelly <npelly@google.com> patch. With Bluetooth 2.1 ACL packets can be flushable or non-flushable. This commit makes ACL data packets non-flushable by default on compatible chipsets, and adds the BT_FLUSHABLE socket option to explicitly request flushable ACL data packets for a given L2CAP socket. This is useful for A2DP data which can be safely discarded if it can not be delivered within a short time (while other ACL data should not be discarded). Note that making ACL data flushable has no effect unless the automatic flush timeout for that ACL link is changed from its default of 0 (infinite). Default packet types (for compatible chipsets): Frame 34: 13 bytes on wire (104 bits), 13 bytes captured (104 bits) Bluetooth HCI H4 Bluetooth HCI ACL Packet .... 0000 0000 0010 = Connection Handle: 0x0002 ..00 .... .... .... = PB Flag: First Non-automatically Flushable Packet (0) 00.. .... .... .... = BC Flag: Point-To-Point (0) Data Total Length: 8 Bluetooth L2CAP Packet After setting BT_FLUSHABLE (sock.setsockopt(274 /*SOL_BLUETOOTH*/, 8 /* BT_FLUSHABLE */, 1 /* flush */)) Frame 34: 13 bytes on wire (104 bits), 13 bytes captured (104 bits) Bluetooth HCI H4 Bluetooth HCI ACL Packet .... 0000 0000 0010 = Connection Handle: 0x0002 ..10 .... .... .... = PB Flag: First Automatically Flushable Packet (2) 00.. .... .... .... = BC Flag: Point-To-Point (0) Data Total Length: 8 Bluetooth L2CAP Packet Signed-off-by: Andrei Emeltchenko <andrei.emeltchenko@nokia.com> Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <padovan@profusion.mobi>
2011-01-03 02:14:36 -07:00
#define lmp_no_flush_capable(dev) ((dev)->features[6] & LMP_NO_FLUSH)
/* ----- HCI protocols ----- */
struct hci_proto {
Bluetooth: Add enhanced security model for Simple Pairing The current security model is based around the flags AUTH, ENCRYPT and SECURE. Starting with support for the Bluetooth 2.1 specification this is no longer sufficient. The different security levels are now defined as SDP, LOW, MEDIUM and SECURE. Previously it was possible to set each security independently, but this actually doesn't make a lot of sense. For Bluetooth the encryption depends on a previous successful authentication. Also you can only update your existing link key if you successfully created at least one before. And of course the update of link keys without having proper encryption in place is a security issue. The new security levels from the Bluetooth 2.1 specification are now used internally. All old settings are mapped to the new values and this way it ensures that old applications still work. The only limitation is that it is no longer possible to set authentication without also enabling encryption. No application should have done this anyway since this is actually a security issue. Without encryption the integrity of the authentication can't be guaranteed. As default for a new L2CAP or RFCOMM connection, the LOW security level is used. The only exception here are the service discovery sessions on PSM 1 where SDP level is used. To have similar security strength as with a Bluetooth 2.0 and before combination key, the MEDIUM level should be used. This is according to the Bluetooth specification. The MEDIUM level will not require any kind of man-in-the-middle (MITM) protection. Only the HIGH security level will require this. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2009-01-15 13:58:04 -07:00
char *name;
unsigned int id;
unsigned long flags;
void *priv;
Bluetooth: Add enhanced security model for Simple Pairing The current security model is based around the flags AUTH, ENCRYPT and SECURE. Starting with support for the Bluetooth 2.1 specification this is no longer sufficient. The different security levels are now defined as SDP, LOW, MEDIUM and SECURE. Previously it was possible to set each security independently, but this actually doesn't make a lot of sense. For Bluetooth the encryption depends on a previous successful authentication. Also you can only update your existing link key if you successfully created at least one before. And of course the update of link keys without having proper encryption in place is a security issue. The new security levels from the Bluetooth 2.1 specification are now used internally. All old settings are mapped to the new values and this way it ensures that old applications still work. The only limitation is that it is no longer possible to set authentication without also enabling encryption. No application should have done this anyway since this is actually a security issue. Without encryption the integrity of the authentication can't be guaranteed. As default for a new L2CAP or RFCOMM connection, the LOW security level is used. The only exception here are the service discovery sessions on PSM 1 where SDP level is used. To have similar security strength as with a Bluetooth 2.0 and before combination key, the MEDIUM level should be used. This is according to the Bluetooth specification. The MEDIUM level will not require any kind of man-in-the-middle (MITM) protection. Only the HIGH security level will require this. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2009-01-15 13:58:04 -07:00
int (*connect_ind) (struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, __u8 type);
int (*connect_cfm) (struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 status);
Bluetooth: Ask upper layers for HCI disconnect reason Some of the qualification tests demand that in case of failures in L2CAP the HCI disconnect should indicate a reason why L2CAP fails. This is a bluntly layer violation since multiple L2CAP connections could be using the same ACL and thus forcing a disconnect reason is not a good idea. To comply with the Bluetooth test specification, the disconnect reason is now stored in the L2CAP connection structure and every time a new L2CAP channel is added it will set back to its default. So only in the case where the L2CAP channel with the disconnect reason is really the last one, it will propagated to the HCI layer. The HCI layer has been extended with a disconnect indication that allows it to ask upper layers for a disconnect reason. The upper layer must not support this callback and in that case it will nicely default to the existing behavior. If an upper layer like L2CAP can provide a disconnect reason that one will be used to disconnect the ACL or SCO link. No modification to the ACL disconnect timeout have been made. So in case of Linux to Linux connection the initiator will disconnect the ACL link before the acceptor side can signal the specific disconnect reason. That is perfectly fine since Linux doesn't make use of this value anyway. The L2CAP layer has a perfect valid error code for rejecting connection due to a security violation. It is unclear why the Bluetooth specification insists on having specific HCI disconnect reason. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2009-02-12 06:02:50 -07:00
int (*disconn_ind) (struct hci_conn *conn);
int (*disconn_cfm) (struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 reason);
int (*recv_acldata) (struct hci_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb, __u16 flags);
int (*recv_scodata) (struct hci_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb);
Bluetooth: Add enhanced security model for Simple Pairing The current security model is based around the flags AUTH, ENCRYPT and SECURE. Starting with support for the Bluetooth 2.1 specification this is no longer sufficient. The different security levels are now defined as SDP, LOW, MEDIUM and SECURE. Previously it was possible to set each security independently, but this actually doesn't make a lot of sense. For Bluetooth the encryption depends on a previous successful authentication. Also you can only update your existing link key if you successfully created at least one before. And of course the update of link keys without having proper encryption in place is a security issue. The new security levels from the Bluetooth 2.1 specification are now used internally. All old settings are mapped to the new values and this way it ensures that old applications still work. The only limitation is that it is no longer possible to set authentication without also enabling encryption. No application should have done this anyway since this is actually a security issue. Without encryption the integrity of the authentication can't be guaranteed. As default for a new L2CAP or RFCOMM connection, the LOW security level is used. The only exception here are the service discovery sessions on PSM 1 where SDP level is used. To have similar security strength as with a Bluetooth 2.0 and before combination key, the MEDIUM level should be used. This is according to the Bluetooth specification. The MEDIUM level will not require any kind of man-in-the-middle (MITM) protection. Only the HIGH security level will require this. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2009-01-15 13:58:04 -07:00
int (*security_cfm) (struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 status, __u8 encrypt);
};
static inline int hci_proto_connect_ind(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, __u8 type)
{
register struct hci_proto *hp;
int mask = 0;
Bluetooth: Add enhanced security model for Simple Pairing The current security model is based around the flags AUTH, ENCRYPT and SECURE. Starting with support for the Bluetooth 2.1 specification this is no longer sufficient. The different security levels are now defined as SDP, LOW, MEDIUM and SECURE. Previously it was possible to set each security independently, but this actually doesn't make a lot of sense. For Bluetooth the encryption depends on a previous successful authentication. Also you can only update your existing link key if you successfully created at least one before. And of course the update of link keys without having proper encryption in place is a security issue. The new security levels from the Bluetooth 2.1 specification are now used internally. All old settings are mapped to the new values and this way it ensures that old applications still work. The only limitation is that it is no longer possible to set authentication without also enabling encryption. No application should have done this anyway since this is actually a security issue. Without encryption the integrity of the authentication can't be guaranteed. As default for a new L2CAP or RFCOMM connection, the LOW security level is used. The only exception here are the service discovery sessions on PSM 1 where SDP level is used. To have similar security strength as with a Bluetooth 2.0 and before combination key, the MEDIUM level should be used. This is according to the Bluetooth specification. The MEDIUM level will not require any kind of man-in-the-middle (MITM) protection. Only the HIGH security level will require this. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2009-01-15 13:58:04 -07:00
hp = hci_proto[HCI_PROTO_L2CAP];
if (hp && hp->connect_ind)
mask |= hp->connect_ind(hdev, bdaddr, type);
hp = hci_proto[HCI_PROTO_SCO];
if (hp && hp->connect_ind)
mask |= hp->connect_ind(hdev, bdaddr, type);
return mask;
}
static inline void hci_proto_connect_cfm(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 status)
{
register struct hci_proto *hp;
hp = hci_proto[HCI_PROTO_L2CAP];
if (hp && hp->connect_cfm)
hp->connect_cfm(conn, status);
hp = hci_proto[HCI_PROTO_SCO];
if (hp && hp->connect_cfm)
hp->connect_cfm(conn, status);
}
Bluetooth: Ask upper layers for HCI disconnect reason Some of the qualification tests demand that in case of failures in L2CAP the HCI disconnect should indicate a reason why L2CAP fails. This is a bluntly layer violation since multiple L2CAP connections could be using the same ACL and thus forcing a disconnect reason is not a good idea. To comply with the Bluetooth test specification, the disconnect reason is now stored in the L2CAP connection structure and every time a new L2CAP channel is added it will set back to its default. So only in the case where the L2CAP channel with the disconnect reason is really the last one, it will propagated to the HCI layer. The HCI layer has been extended with a disconnect indication that allows it to ask upper layers for a disconnect reason. The upper layer must not support this callback and in that case it will nicely default to the existing behavior. If an upper layer like L2CAP can provide a disconnect reason that one will be used to disconnect the ACL or SCO link. No modification to the ACL disconnect timeout have been made. So in case of Linux to Linux connection the initiator will disconnect the ACL link before the acceptor side can signal the specific disconnect reason. That is perfectly fine since Linux doesn't make use of this value anyway. The L2CAP layer has a perfect valid error code for rejecting connection due to a security violation. It is unclear why the Bluetooth specification insists on having specific HCI disconnect reason. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2009-02-12 06:02:50 -07:00
static inline int hci_proto_disconn_ind(struct hci_conn *conn)
{
register struct hci_proto *hp;
Bluetooth: Ask upper layers for HCI disconnect reason Some of the qualification tests demand that in case of failures in L2CAP the HCI disconnect should indicate a reason why L2CAP fails. This is a bluntly layer violation since multiple L2CAP connections could be using the same ACL and thus forcing a disconnect reason is not a good idea. To comply with the Bluetooth test specification, the disconnect reason is now stored in the L2CAP connection structure and every time a new L2CAP channel is added it will set back to its default. So only in the case where the L2CAP channel with the disconnect reason is really the last one, it will propagated to the HCI layer. The HCI layer has been extended with a disconnect indication that allows it to ask upper layers for a disconnect reason. The upper layer must not support this callback and in that case it will nicely default to the existing behavior. If an upper layer like L2CAP can provide a disconnect reason that one will be used to disconnect the ACL or SCO link. No modification to the ACL disconnect timeout have been made. So in case of Linux to Linux connection the initiator will disconnect the ACL link before the acceptor side can signal the specific disconnect reason. That is perfectly fine since Linux doesn't make use of this value anyway. The L2CAP layer has a perfect valid error code for rejecting connection due to a security violation. It is unclear why the Bluetooth specification insists on having specific HCI disconnect reason. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2009-02-12 06:02:50 -07:00
int reason = 0x13;
hp = hci_proto[HCI_PROTO_L2CAP];
if (hp && hp->disconn_ind)
Bluetooth: Ask upper layers for HCI disconnect reason Some of the qualification tests demand that in case of failures in L2CAP the HCI disconnect should indicate a reason why L2CAP fails. This is a bluntly layer violation since multiple L2CAP connections could be using the same ACL and thus forcing a disconnect reason is not a good idea. To comply with the Bluetooth test specification, the disconnect reason is now stored in the L2CAP connection structure and every time a new L2CAP channel is added it will set back to its default. So only in the case where the L2CAP channel with the disconnect reason is really the last one, it will propagated to the HCI layer. The HCI layer has been extended with a disconnect indication that allows it to ask upper layers for a disconnect reason. The upper layer must not support this callback and in that case it will nicely default to the existing behavior. If an upper layer like L2CAP can provide a disconnect reason that one will be used to disconnect the ACL or SCO link. No modification to the ACL disconnect timeout have been made. So in case of Linux to Linux connection the initiator will disconnect the ACL link before the acceptor side can signal the specific disconnect reason. That is perfectly fine since Linux doesn't make use of this value anyway. The L2CAP layer has a perfect valid error code for rejecting connection due to a security violation. It is unclear why the Bluetooth specification insists on having specific HCI disconnect reason. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2009-02-12 06:02:50 -07:00
reason = hp->disconn_ind(conn);
hp = hci_proto[HCI_PROTO_SCO];
if (hp && hp->disconn_ind)
Bluetooth: Ask upper layers for HCI disconnect reason Some of the qualification tests demand that in case of failures in L2CAP the HCI disconnect should indicate a reason why L2CAP fails. This is a bluntly layer violation since multiple L2CAP connections could be using the same ACL and thus forcing a disconnect reason is not a good idea. To comply with the Bluetooth test specification, the disconnect reason is now stored in the L2CAP connection structure and every time a new L2CAP channel is added it will set back to its default. So only in the case where the L2CAP channel with the disconnect reason is really the last one, it will propagated to the HCI layer. The HCI layer has been extended with a disconnect indication that allows it to ask upper layers for a disconnect reason. The upper layer must not support this callback and in that case it will nicely default to the existing behavior. If an upper layer like L2CAP can provide a disconnect reason that one will be used to disconnect the ACL or SCO link. No modification to the ACL disconnect timeout have been made. So in case of Linux to Linux connection the initiator will disconnect the ACL link before the acceptor side can signal the specific disconnect reason. That is perfectly fine since Linux doesn't make use of this value anyway. The L2CAP layer has a perfect valid error code for rejecting connection due to a security violation. It is unclear why the Bluetooth specification insists on having specific HCI disconnect reason. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2009-02-12 06:02:50 -07:00
reason = hp->disconn_ind(conn);
return reason;
}
static inline void hci_proto_disconn_cfm(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 reason)
{
register struct hci_proto *hp;
hp = hci_proto[HCI_PROTO_L2CAP];
if (hp && hp->disconn_cfm)
hp->disconn_cfm(conn, reason);
hp = hci_proto[HCI_PROTO_SCO];
if (hp && hp->disconn_cfm)
hp->disconn_cfm(conn, reason);
}
static inline void hci_proto_auth_cfm(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 status)
{
register struct hci_proto *hp;
Bluetooth: Add enhanced security model for Simple Pairing The current security model is based around the flags AUTH, ENCRYPT and SECURE. Starting with support for the Bluetooth 2.1 specification this is no longer sufficient. The different security levels are now defined as SDP, LOW, MEDIUM and SECURE. Previously it was possible to set each security independently, but this actually doesn't make a lot of sense. For Bluetooth the encryption depends on a previous successful authentication. Also you can only update your existing link key if you successfully created at least one before. And of course the update of link keys without having proper encryption in place is a security issue. The new security levels from the Bluetooth 2.1 specification are now used internally. All old settings are mapped to the new values and this way it ensures that old applications still work. The only limitation is that it is no longer possible to set authentication without also enabling encryption. No application should have done this anyway since this is actually a security issue. Without encryption the integrity of the authentication can't be guaranteed. As default for a new L2CAP or RFCOMM connection, the LOW security level is used. The only exception here are the service discovery sessions on PSM 1 where SDP level is used. To have similar security strength as with a Bluetooth 2.0 and before combination key, the MEDIUM level should be used. This is according to the Bluetooth specification. The MEDIUM level will not require any kind of man-in-the-middle (MITM) protection. Only the HIGH security level will require this. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2009-01-15 13:58:04 -07:00
__u8 encrypt;
if (test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &conn->pend))
return;
encrypt = (conn->link_mode & HCI_LM_ENCRYPT) ? 0x01 : 0x00;
hp = hci_proto[HCI_PROTO_L2CAP];
Bluetooth: Add enhanced security model for Simple Pairing The current security model is based around the flags AUTH, ENCRYPT and SECURE. Starting with support for the Bluetooth 2.1 specification this is no longer sufficient. The different security levels are now defined as SDP, LOW, MEDIUM and SECURE. Previously it was possible to set each security independently, but this actually doesn't make a lot of sense. For Bluetooth the encryption depends on a previous successful authentication. Also you can only update your existing link key if you successfully created at least one before. And of course the update of link keys without having proper encryption in place is a security issue. The new security levels from the Bluetooth 2.1 specification are now used internally. All old settings are mapped to the new values and this way it ensures that old applications still work. The only limitation is that it is no longer possible to set authentication without also enabling encryption. No application should have done this anyway since this is actually a security issue. Without encryption the integrity of the authentication can't be guaranteed. As default for a new L2CAP or RFCOMM connection, the LOW security level is used. The only exception here are the service discovery sessions on PSM 1 where SDP level is used. To have similar security strength as with a Bluetooth 2.0 and before combination key, the MEDIUM level should be used. This is according to the Bluetooth specification. The MEDIUM level will not require any kind of man-in-the-middle (MITM) protection. Only the HIGH security level will require this. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2009-01-15 13:58:04 -07:00
if (hp && hp->security_cfm)
hp->security_cfm(conn, status, encrypt);
hp = hci_proto[HCI_PROTO_SCO];
Bluetooth: Add enhanced security model for Simple Pairing The current security model is based around the flags AUTH, ENCRYPT and SECURE. Starting with support for the Bluetooth 2.1 specification this is no longer sufficient. The different security levels are now defined as SDP, LOW, MEDIUM and SECURE. Previously it was possible to set each security independently, but this actually doesn't make a lot of sense. For Bluetooth the encryption depends on a previous successful authentication. Also you can only update your existing link key if you successfully created at least one before. And of course the update of link keys without having proper encryption in place is a security issue. The new security levels from the Bluetooth 2.1 specification are now used internally. All old settings are mapped to the new values and this way it ensures that old applications still work. The only limitation is that it is no longer possible to set authentication without also enabling encryption. No application should have done this anyway since this is actually a security issue. Without encryption the integrity of the authentication can't be guaranteed. As default for a new L2CAP or RFCOMM connection, the LOW security level is used. The only exception here are the service discovery sessions on PSM 1 where SDP level is used. To have similar security strength as with a Bluetooth 2.0 and before combination key, the MEDIUM level should be used. This is according to the Bluetooth specification. The MEDIUM level will not require any kind of man-in-the-middle (MITM) protection. Only the HIGH security level will require this. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2009-01-15 13:58:04 -07:00
if (hp && hp->security_cfm)
hp->security_cfm(conn, status, encrypt);
}
static inline void hci_proto_encrypt_cfm(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 status, __u8 encrypt)
{
register struct hci_proto *hp;
hp = hci_proto[HCI_PROTO_L2CAP];
Bluetooth: Add enhanced security model for Simple Pairing The current security model is based around the flags AUTH, ENCRYPT and SECURE. Starting with support for the Bluetooth 2.1 specification this is no longer sufficient. The different security levels are now defined as SDP, LOW, MEDIUM and SECURE. Previously it was possible to set each security independently, but this actually doesn't make a lot of sense. For Bluetooth the encryption depends on a previous successful authentication. Also you can only update your existing link key if you successfully created at least one before. And of course the update of link keys without having proper encryption in place is a security issue. The new security levels from the Bluetooth 2.1 specification are now used internally. All old settings are mapped to the new values and this way it ensures that old applications still work. The only limitation is that it is no longer possible to set authentication without also enabling encryption. No application should have done this anyway since this is actually a security issue. Without encryption the integrity of the authentication can't be guaranteed. As default for a new L2CAP or RFCOMM connection, the LOW security level is used. The only exception here are the service discovery sessions on PSM 1 where SDP level is used. To have similar security strength as with a Bluetooth 2.0 and before combination key, the MEDIUM level should be used. This is according to the Bluetooth specification. The MEDIUM level will not require any kind of man-in-the-middle (MITM) protection. Only the HIGH security level will require this. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2009-01-15 13:58:04 -07:00
if (hp && hp->security_cfm)
hp->security_cfm(conn, status, encrypt);
hp = hci_proto[HCI_PROTO_SCO];
Bluetooth: Add enhanced security model for Simple Pairing The current security model is based around the flags AUTH, ENCRYPT and SECURE. Starting with support for the Bluetooth 2.1 specification this is no longer sufficient. The different security levels are now defined as SDP, LOW, MEDIUM and SECURE. Previously it was possible to set each security independently, but this actually doesn't make a lot of sense. For Bluetooth the encryption depends on a previous successful authentication. Also you can only update your existing link key if you successfully created at least one before. And of course the update of link keys without having proper encryption in place is a security issue. The new security levels from the Bluetooth 2.1 specification are now used internally. All old settings are mapped to the new values and this way it ensures that old applications still work. The only limitation is that it is no longer possible to set authentication without also enabling encryption. No application should have done this anyway since this is actually a security issue. Without encryption the integrity of the authentication can't be guaranteed. As default for a new L2CAP or RFCOMM connection, the LOW security level is used. The only exception here are the service discovery sessions on PSM 1 where SDP level is used. To have similar security strength as with a Bluetooth 2.0 and before combination key, the MEDIUM level should be used. This is according to the Bluetooth specification. The MEDIUM level will not require any kind of man-in-the-middle (MITM) protection. Only the HIGH security level will require this. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2009-01-15 13:58:04 -07:00
if (hp && hp->security_cfm)
hp->security_cfm(conn, status, encrypt);
}
int hci_register_proto(struct hci_proto *hproto);
int hci_unregister_proto(struct hci_proto *hproto);
/* ----- HCI callbacks ----- */
struct hci_cb {
struct list_head list;
char *name;
Bluetooth: Add enhanced security model for Simple Pairing The current security model is based around the flags AUTH, ENCRYPT and SECURE. Starting with support for the Bluetooth 2.1 specification this is no longer sufficient. The different security levels are now defined as SDP, LOW, MEDIUM and SECURE. Previously it was possible to set each security independently, but this actually doesn't make a lot of sense. For Bluetooth the encryption depends on a previous successful authentication. Also you can only update your existing link key if you successfully created at least one before. And of course the update of link keys without having proper encryption in place is a security issue. The new security levels from the Bluetooth 2.1 specification are now used internally. All old settings are mapped to the new values and this way it ensures that old applications still work. The only limitation is that it is no longer possible to set authentication without also enabling encryption. No application should have done this anyway since this is actually a security issue. Without encryption the integrity of the authentication can't be guaranteed. As default for a new L2CAP or RFCOMM connection, the LOW security level is used. The only exception here are the service discovery sessions on PSM 1 where SDP level is used. To have similar security strength as with a Bluetooth 2.0 and before combination key, the MEDIUM level should be used. This is according to the Bluetooth specification. The MEDIUM level will not require any kind of man-in-the-middle (MITM) protection. Only the HIGH security level will require this. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2009-01-15 13:58:04 -07:00
void (*security_cfm) (struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 status, __u8 encrypt);
void (*key_change_cfm) (struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 status);
void (*role_switch_cfm) (struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 status, __u8 role);
};
static inline void hci_auth_cfm(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 status)
{
struct list_head *p;
Bluetooth: Add enhanced security model for Simple Pairing The current security model is based around the flags AUTH, ENCRYPT and SECURE. Starting with support for the Bluetooth 2.1 specification this is no longer sufficient. The different security levels are now defined as SDP, LOW, MEDIUM and SECURE. Previously it was possible to set each security independently, but this actually doesn't make a lot of sense. For Bluetooth the encryption depends on a previous successful authentication. Also you can only update your existing link key if you successfully created at least one before. And of course the update of link keys without having proper encryption in place is a security issue. The new security levels from the Bluetooth 2.1 specification are now used internally. All old settings are mapped to the new values and this way it ensures that old applications still work. The only limitation is that it is no longer possible to set authentication without also enabling encryption. No application should have done this anyway since this is actually a security issue. Without encryption the integrity of the authentication can't be guaranteed. As default for a new L2CAP or RFCOMM connection, the LOW security level is used. The only exception here are the service discovery sessions on PSM 1 where SDP level is used. To have similar security strength as with a Bluetooth 2.0 and before combination key, the MEDIUM level should be used. This is according to the Bluetooth specification. The MEDIUM level will not require any kind of man-in-the-middle (MITM) protection. Only the HIGH security level will require this. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2009-01-15 13:58:04 -07:00
__u8 encrypt;
hci_proto_auth_cfm(conn, status);
Bluetooth: Add enhanced security model for Simple Pairing The current security model is based around the flags AUTH, ENCRYPT and SECURE. Starting with support for the Bluetooth 2.1 specification this is no longer sufficient. The different security levels are now defined as SDP, LOW, MEDIUM and SECURE. Previously it was possible to set each security independently, but this actually doesn't make a lot of sense. For Bluetooth the encryption depends on a previous successful authentication. Also you can only update your existing link key if you successfully created at least one before. And of course the update of link keys without having proper encryption in place is a security issue. The new security levels from the Bluetooth 2.1 specification are now used internally. All old settings are mapped to the new values and this way it ensures that old applications still work. The only limitation is that it is no longer possible to set authentication without also enabling encryption. No application should have done this anyway since this is actually a security issue. Without encryption the integrity of the authentication can't be guaranteed. As default for a new L2CAP or RFCOMM connection, the LOW security level is used. The only exception here are the service discovery sessions on PSM 1 where SDP level is used. To have similar security strength as with a Bluetooth 2.0 and before combination key, the MEDIUM level should be used. This is according to the Bluetooth specification. The MEDIUM level will not require any kind of man-in-the-middle (MITM) protection. Only the HIGH security level will require this. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2009-01-15 13:58:04 -07:00
if (test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &conn->pend))
return;
encrypt = (conn->link_mode & HCI_LM_ENCRYPT) ? 0x01 : 0x00;
read_lock_bh(&hci_cb_list_lock);
list_for_each(p, &hci_cb_list) {
struct hci_cb *cb = list_entry(p, struct hci_cb, list);
Bluetooth: Add enhanced security model for Simple Pairing The current security model is based around the flags AUTH, ENCRYPT and SECURE. Starting with support for the Bluetooth 2.1 specification this is no longer sufficient. The different security levels are now defined as SDP, LOW, MEDIUM and SECURE. Previously it was possible to set each security independently, but this actually doesn't make a lot of sense. For Bluetooth the encryption depends on a previous successful authentication. Also you can only update your existing link key if you successfully created at least one before. And of course the update of link keys without having proper encryption in place is a security issue. The new security levels from the Bluetooth 2.1 specification are now used internally. All old settings are mapped to the new values and this way it ensures that old applications still work. The only limitation is that it is no longer possible to set authentication without also enabling encryption. No application should have done this anyway since this is actually a security issue. Without encryption the integrity of the authentication can't be guaranteed. As default for a new L2CAP or RFCOMM connection, the LOW security level is used. The only exception here are the service discovery sessions on PSM 1 where SDP level is used. To have similar security strength as with a Bluetooth 2.0 and before combination key, the MEDIUM level should be used. This is according to the Bluetooth specification. The MEDIUM level will not require any kind of man-in-the-middle (MITM) protection. Only the HIGH security level will require this. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2009-01-15 13:58:04 -07:00
if (cb->security_cfm)
cb->security_cfm(conn, status, encrypt);
}
read_unlock_bh(&hci_cb_list_lock);
}
static inline void hci_encrypt_cfm(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 status, __u8 encrypt)
{
struct list_head *p;
if (conn->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_SDP)
conn->sec_level = BT_SECURITY_LOW;
hci_proto_encrypt_cfm(conn, status, encrypt);
read_lock_bh(&hci_cb_list_lock);
list_for_each(p, &hci_cb_list) {
struct hci_cb *cb = list_entry(p, struct hci_cb, list);
Bluetooth: Add enhanced security model for Simple Pairing The current security model is based around the flags AUTH, ENCRYPT and SECURE. Starting with support for the Bluetooth 2.1 specification this is no longer sufficient. The different security levels are now defined as SDP, LOW, MEDIUM and SECURE. Previously it was possible to set each security independently, but this actually doesn't make a lot of sense. For Bluetooth the encryption depends on a previous successful authentication. Also you can only update your existing link key if you successfully created at least one before. And of course the update of link keys without having proper encryption in place is a security issue. The new security levels from the Bluetooth 2.1 specification are now used internally. All old settings are mapped to the new values and this way it ensures that old applications still work. The only limitation is that it is no longer possible to set authentication without also enabling encryption. No application should have done this anyway since this is actually a security issue. Without encryption the integrity of the authentication can't be guaranteed. As default for a new L2CAP or RFCOMM connection, the LOW security level is used. The only exception here are the service discovery sessions on PSM 1 where SDP level is used. To have similar security strength as with a Bluetooth 2.0 and before combination key, the MEDIUM level should be used. This is according to the Bluetooth specification. The MEDIUM level will not require any kind of man-in-the-middle (MITM) protection. Only the HIGH security level will require this. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
2009-01-15 13:58:04 -07:00
if (cb->security_cfm)
cb->security_cfm(conn, status, encrypt);
}
read_unlock_bh(&hci_cb_list_lock);
}
static inline void hci_key_change_cfm(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 status)
{
struct list_head *p;
read_lock_bh(&hci_cb_list_lock);
list_for_each(p, &hci_cb_list) {
struct hci_cb *cb = list_entry(p, struct hci_cb, list);
if (cb->key_change_cfm)
cb->key_change_cfm(conn, status);
}
read_unlock_bh(&hci_cb_list_lock);
}
static inline void hci_role_switch_cfm(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 status, __u8 role)
{
struct list_head *p;
read_lock_bh(&hci_cb_list_lock);
list_for_each(p, &hci_cb_list) {
struct hci_cb *cb = list_entry(p, struct hci_cb, list);
if (cb->role_switch_cfm)
cb->role_switch_cfm(conn, status, role);
}
read_unlock_bh(&hci_cb_list_lock);
}
int hci_register_cb(struct hci_cb *hcb);
int hci_unregister_cb(struct hci_cb *hcb);
int hci_register_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb);
int hci_unregister_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb);
int hci_send_cmd(struct hci_dev *hdev, __u16 opcode, __u32 plen, void *param);
void hci_send_acl(struct hci_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb, __u16 flags);
void hci_send_sco(struct hci_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb);
void *hci_sent_cmd_data(struct hci_dev *hdev, __u16 opcode);
void hci_si_event(struct hci_dev *hdev, int type, int dlen, void *data);
/* ----- HCI Sockets ----- */
void hci_send_to_sock(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct sock *skip_sk);
/* Management interface */
int mgmt_control(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len);
int mgmt_index_added(u16 index);
int mgmt_index_removed(u16 index);
int mgmt_powered(u16 index, u8 powered);
int mgmt_discoverable(u16 index, u8 discoverable);
int mgmt_connectable(u16 index, u8 connectable);
int mgmt_new_key(u16 index, struct link_key *key, u8 old_key_type);
int mgmt_connected(u16 index, bdaddr_t *bdaddr);
int mgmt_disconnected(u16 index, bdaddr_t *bdaddr);
int mgmt_disconnect_failed(u16 index);
int mgmt_connect_failed(u16 index, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 status);
int mgmt_pin_code_request(u16 index, bdaddr_t *bdaddr);
int mgmt_pin_code_reply_complete(u16 index, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 status);
int mgmt_pin_code_neg_reply_complete(u16 index, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 status);
/* HCI info for socket */
#define hci_pi(sk) ((struct hci_pinfo *) sk)
struct hci_pinfo {
struct bt_sock bt;
struct hci_dev *hdev;
struct hci_filter filter;
__u32 cmsg_mask;
unsigned short channel;
};
/* HCI security filter */
#define HCI_SFLT_MAX_OGF 5
struct hci_sec_filter {
__u32 type_mask;
__u32 event_mask[2];
__u32 ocf_mask[HCI_SFLT_MAX_OGF + 1][4];
};
/* ----- HCI requests ----- */
#define HCI_REQ_DONE 0
#define HCI_REQ_PEND 1
#define HCI_REQ_CANCELED 2
#define hci_req_lock(d) mutex_lock(&d->req_lock)
#define hci_req_unlock(d) mutex_unlock(&d->req_lock)
void hci_req_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, __u16 cmd, int result);
#endif /* __HCI_CORE_H */