From 04dcbdb8057827b043b3c71aa397c4c63e67d086 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thomas Gleixner Date: Mon, 18 Feb 2019 23:42:51 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] x86/speculation/mds: Clear CPU buffers on exit to user Add a static key which controls the invocation of the CPU buffer clear mechanism on exit to user space and add the call into prepare_exit_to_usermode() and do_nmi() right before actually returning. Add documentation which kernel to user space transition this covers and explain why some corner cases are not mitigated. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker Reviewed-by: Jon Masters Tested-by: Jon Masters --- Documentation/x86/mds.rst | 52 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/entry/common.c | 3 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 13 +++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 3 ++ arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c | 4 +++ arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 8 +++++ 6 files changed, 83 insertions(+) diff --git a/Documentation/x86/mds.rst b/Documentation/x86/mds.rst index 1096738d50f2..54d935bf283b 100644 --- a/Documentation/x86/mds.rst +++ b/Documentation/x86/mds.rst @@ -97,3 +97,55 @@ According to current knowledge additional mitigations inside the kernel itself are not required because the necessary gadgets to expose the leaked data cannot be controlled in a way which allows exploitation from malicious user space or VM guests. + +Mitigation points +----------------- + +1. Return to user space +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ + + When transitioning from kernel to user space the CPU buffers are flushed + on affected CPUs when the mitigation is not disabled on the kernel + command line. The migitation is enabled through the static key + mds_user_clear. + + The mitigation is invoked in prepare_exit_to_usermode() which covers + most of the kernel to user space transitions. There are a few exceptions + which are not invoking prepare_exit_to_usermode() on return to user + space. These exceptions use the paranoid exit code. + + - Non Maskable Interrupt (NMI): + + Access to sensible data like keys, credentials in the NMI context is + mostly theoretical: The CPU can do prefetching or execute a + misspeculated code path and thereby fetching data which might end up + leaking through a buffer. + + But for mounting other attacks the kernel stack address of the task is + already valuable information. So in full mitigation mode, the NMI is + mitigated on the return from do_nmi() to provide almost complete + coverage. + + - Double fault (#DF): + + A double fault is usually fatal, but the ESPFIX workaround, which can + be triggered from user space through modify_ldt(2) is a recoverable + double fault. #DF uses the paranoid exit path, so explicit mitigation + in the double fault handler is required. + + - Machine Check Exception (#MC): + + Another corner case is a #MC which hits between the CPU buffer clear + invocation and the actual return to user. As this still is in kernel + space it takes the paranoid exit path which does not clear the CPU + buffers. So the #MC handler repopulates the buffers to some + extent. Machine checks are not reliably controllable and the window is + extremly small so mitigation would just tick a checkbox that this + theoretical corner case is covered. To keep the amount of special + cases small, ignore #MC. + + - Debug Exception (#DB): + + This takes the paranoid exit path only when the INT1 breakpoint is in + kernel space. #DB on a user space address takes the regular exit path, + so no extra mitigation required. diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/common.c b/arch/x86/entry/common.c index 7bc105f47d21..19f650d729f5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/entry/common.c @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS #include @@ -212,6 +213,8 @@ __visible inline void prepare_exit_to_usermode(struct pt_regs *regs) #endif user_enter_irqoff(); + + mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers(); } #define SYSCALL_EXIT_WORK_FLAGS \ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index 67cb9b2082b1..65b747286d96 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -318,6 +318,8 @@ DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_to_cond_stibp); DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_ibpb); DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_always_ibpb); +DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_user_clear); + #include /** @@ -343,6 +345,17 @@ static inline void mds_clear_cpu_buffers(void) asm volatile("verw %[ds]" : : [ds] "m" (ds) : "cc"); } +/** + * mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS vulnerability + * + * Clear CPU buffers if the corresponding static key is enabled + */ +static inline void mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers(void) +{ + if (static_branch_likely(&mds_user_clear)) + mds_clear_cpu_buffers(); +} + #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ /* diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 01874d54f4fd..dbb45014de1b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -63,6 +63,9 @@ DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_ibpb); /* Control unconditional IBPB in switch_mm() */ DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_always_ibpb); +/* Control MDS CPU buffer clear before returning to user space */ +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_user_clear); + void __init check_bugs(void) { identify_boot_cpu(); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c b/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c index 18bc9b51ac9b..086cf1d1d71d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS #include @@ -533,6 +534,9 @@ nmi_restart: write_cr2(this_cpu_read(nmi_cr2)); if (this_cpu_dec_return(nmi_state)) goto nmi_restart; + + if (user_mode(regs)) + mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers(); } NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(do_nmi); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c index 9b7c4ca8f0a7..85fe1870f873 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c @@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -366,6 +367,13 @@ dotraplinkage void do_double_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code) regs->ip = (unsigned long)general_protection; regs->sp = (unsigned long)&gpregs->orig_ax; + /* + * This situation can be triggered by userspace via + * modify_ldt(2) and the return does not take the regular + * user space exit, so a CPU buffer clear is required when + * MDS mitigation is enabled. + */ + mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers(); return; } #endif