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vsprintf: don't obfuscate NULL and error pointers 

commit 7bd57fbc4a upstream.

I don't see what security concern is addressed by obfuscating NULL
and IS_ERR() error pointers, printed with %p/%pK.  Given the number
of sites where %p is used (over 10000) and the fact that NULL pointers
aren't uncommon, it probably wouldn't take long for an attacker to
find the hash that corresponds to 0.  Although harder, the same goes
for most common error values, such as -1, -2, -11, -14, etc.

The NULL part actually fixes a regression: NULL pointers weren't
obfuscated until commit 3e5903eb9c ("vsprintf: Prevent crash when
dereferencing invalid pointers") which went into 5.2.  I'm tacking
the IS_ERR() part on here because error pointers won't leak kernel
addresses and printing them as pointers shouldn't be any different
from e.g. %d with PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO().  Obfuscating them just makes
debugging based on existing pr_debug and friends excruciating.

Note that the "always print 0's for %pK when kptr_restrict == 2"
behaviour which goes way back is left as is.

Example output with the patch applied:

                             ptr         error-ptr              NULL
 %p:            0000000001f8cc5b  fffffffffffffff2  0000000000000000
 %pK, kptr = 0: 0000000001f8cc5b  fffffffffffffff2  0000000000000000
 %px:           ffff888048c04020  fffffffffffffff2  0000000000000000
 %pK, kptr = 1: ffff888048c04020  fffffffffffffff2  0000000000000000
 %pK, kptr = 2: 0000000000000000  0000000000000000  0000000000000000

Fixes: 3e5903eb9c ("vsprintf: Prevent crash when dereferencing invalid pointers")
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
5.4-rM2-2.2.x-imx-squashed
Ilya Dryomov 2020-05-19 13:26:57 +02:00 committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman
parent 4b1b346219
commit 0e1d5f6725
2 changed files with 25 additions and 1 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

19
lib/test_printf.c
View File

@ -212,6 +212,7 @@ test_string(void)
#define PTR_STR "ffff0123456789ab"
#define PTR_VAL_NO_CRNG "(____ptrval____)"
#define ZEROS "00000000" /* hex 32 zero bits */
#define ONES "ffffffff" /* hex 32 one bits */
static int __init
plain_format(void)
@ -243,6 +244,7 @@ plain_format(void)
#define PTR_STR "456789ab"
#define PTR_VAL_NO_CRNG "(ptrval)"
#define ZEROS ""
#define ONES ""
static int __init
plain_format(void)
@ -328,14 +330,28 @@ test_hashed(const char *fmt, const void *p)
test(buf, fmt, p);
}
/*
* NULL pointers aren't hashed.
*/
static void __init
null_pointer(void)
{
test_hashed("%p", NULL);
test(ZEROS "00000000", "%p", NULL);
test(ZEROS "00000000", "%px", NULL);
test("(null)", "%pE", NULL);
}
/*
* Error pointers aren't hashed.
*/
static void __init
error_pointer(void)
{
test(ONES "fffffff5", "%p", ERR_PTR(-11));
test(ONES "fffffff5", "%px", ERR_PTR(-11));
test("(efault)", "%pE", ERR_PTR(-11));
}
#define PTR_INVALID ((void *)0x000000ab)
static void __init
@ -598,6 +614,7 @@ test_pointer(void)
{
plain();
null_pointer();
error_pointer();
invalid_pointer();
symbol_ptr();
kernel_ptr();

7
lib/vsprintf.c
View File

@ -746,6 +746,13 @@ static char *ptr_to_id(char *buf, char *end, const void *ptr,
const char *str = sizeof(ptr) == 8 ? "(____ptrval____)" : "(ptrval)";
unsigned long hashval;
/*
* Print the real pointer value for NULL and error pointers,
* as they are not actual addresses.
*/
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(ptr))
return pointer_string(buf, end, ptr, spec);
/* When debugging early boot use non-cryptographically secure hash. */
if (unlikely(debug_boot_weak_hash)) {
hashval = hash_long((unsigned long)ptr, 32);