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ima: Simplify policy_func_show. 

If the func_tokens array uses the same indices as enum ima_hooks,
policy_func_show can be a lot simpler, and the func_* enum becomes
unnecessary.

Also, if we use the same macro trick used by kernel_read_file_id_str we can
use one hooks list for both the enum and the string array, making sure they
are always in sync (suggested by Mimi Zohar).

Finally, by using the printf pattern for the function token directly
instead of using the pt macro we can simplify policy_func_show even further
and avoid needing a temporary buffer.

Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
hifive-unleashed-5.1
Thiago Jung Bauermann 2017-06-07 22:49:11 -03:00 committed by Mimi Zohar
parent bb543e3959
commit 2663218ba6
2 changed files with 21 additions and 62 deletions
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25
security/integrity/ima/ima.h
View File

@ -172,17 +172,22 @@ static inline unsigned long ima_hash_key(u8 *digest)
return hash_long(*digest, IMA_HASH_BITS);
}
#define __ima_hooks(hook) \
hook(NONE) \
hook(FILE_CHECK) \
hook(MMAP_CHECK) \
hook(BPRM_CHECK) \
hook(POST_SETATTR) \
hook(MODULE_CHECK) \
hook(FIRMWARE_CHECK) \
hook(KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK) \
hook(KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK) \
hook(POLICY_CHECK) \
hook(MAX_CHECK)
#define __ima_hook_enumify(ENUM) ENUM,
enum ima_hooks {
FILE_CHECK = 1,
MMAP_CHECK,
BPRM_CHECK,
POST_SETATTR,
MODULE_CHECK,
FIRMWARE_CHECK,
KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK,
KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK,
POLICY_CHECK,
MAX_CHECK
__ima_hooks(__ima_hook_enumify)
};
/* LIM API function definitions */

58
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
View File

@ -972,23 +972,10 @@ static const char *const mask_tokens[] = {
"MAY_APPEND"
};
enum {
func_file = 0, func_mmap, func_bprm,
func_module, func_firmware, func_post,
func_kexec_kernel, func_kexec_initramfs,
func_policy
};
#define __ima_hook_stringify(str) (#str),
static const char *const func_tokens[] = {
"FILE_CHECK",
"MMAP_CHECK",
"BPRM_CHECK",
"MODULE_CHECK",
"FIRMWARE_CHECK",
"POST_SETATTR",
"KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK",
"KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK",
"POLICY_CHECK"
__ima_hooks(__ima_hook_stringify)
};
void *ima_policy_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)
@ -1025,49 +1012,16 @@ void ima_policy_stop(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
#define pt(token) policy_tokens[token + Opt_err].pattern
#define mt(token) mask_tokens[token]
#define ft(token) func_tokens[token]
/*
* policy_func_show - display the ima_hooks policy rule
*/
static void policy_func_show(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_hooks func)
{
char tbuf[64] = {0,};
switch (func) {
case FILE_CHECK:
seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_file));
break;
case MMAP_CHECK:
seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_mmap));
break;
case BPRM_CHECK:
seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_bprm));
break;
case MODULE_CHECK:
seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_module));
break;
case FIRMWARE_CHECK:
seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_firmware));
break;
case POST_SETATTR:
seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_post));
break;
case KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK:
seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_kexec_kernel));
break;
case KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK:
seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_kexec_initramfs));
break;
case POLICY_CHECK:
seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_policy));
break;
default:
snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", func);
seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), tbuf);
break;
}
seq_puts(m, " ");
if (func > 0 && func < MAX_CHECK)
seq_printf(m, "func=%s ", func_tokens[func]);
else
seq_printf(m, "func=%d ", func);
}
int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)