Staging: rtxxx0: remove unused code
Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <bzolnier@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
This commit is contained in:
parent
881abc9d22
commit
5b4df5c617
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@ -2017,119 +2017,6 @@ VOID RTMPHandleRxCoherentInterrupt(
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DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("<== RTMPHandleRxCoherentInterrupt \n"));
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}
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VOID DBGPRINT_TX_RING(
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IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
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IN UCHAR QueIdx)
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{
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UINT32 Ac0Base;
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UINT32 Ac0HwIdx = 0, Ac0SwIdx = 0, AC0freeIdx;
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int i;
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PULONG ptemp;
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DBGPRINT_RAW(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("=====================================================\n " ));
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switch (QueIdx)
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{
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case QID_AC_BE:
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RTMP_IO_READ32(pAd, TX_BASE_PTR0, &Ac0Base);
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RTMP_IO_READ32(pAd, TX_CTX_IDX0, &Ac0SwIdx);
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RTMP_IO_READ32(pAd, TX_DTX_IDX0, &Ac0HwIdx);
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DBGPRINT_RAW(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("All QID_AC_BE DESCRIPTOR \n " ));
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for (i=0;i<TX_RING_SIZE;i++)
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{
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ptemp= (PULONG)pAd->TxRing[QID_AC_BE].Cell[i].AllocVa;
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DBGPRINT_RAW(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("[%02d] %08lx: %08lx: %08lx: %08lx\n " , i, *ptemp,*(ptemp+1),*(ptemp+2),*(ptemp+3)));
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}
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DBGPRINT_RAW(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, (" \n " ));
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break;
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case QID_AC_BK:
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RTMP_IO_READ32(pAd, TX_BASE_PTR1, &Ac0Base);
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RTMP_IO_READ32(pAd, TX_CTX_IDX1, &Ac0SwIdx);
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RTMP_IO_READ32(pAd, TX_DTX_IDX1, &Ac0HwIdx);
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DBGPRINT_RAW(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("All QID_AC_BK DESCRIPTOR \n " ));
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for (i=0;i<TX_RING_SIZE;i++)
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{
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ptemp= (PULONG)pAd->TxRing[QID_AC_BK].Cell[i].AllocVa;
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DBGPRINT_RAW(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("[%02d] %08lx: %08lx: %08lx: %08lx\n " , i, *ptemp,*(ptemp+1),*(ptemp+2),*(ptemp+3)));
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}
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DBGPRINT_RAW(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, (" \n " ));
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break;
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case QID_AC_VI:
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RTMP_IO_READ32(pAd, TX_BASE_PTR2, &Ac0Base);
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RTMP_IO_READ32(pAd, TX_CTX_IDX2, &Ac0SwIdx);
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RTMP_IO_READ32(pAd, TX_DTX_IDX2, &Ac0HwIdx);
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DBGPRINT_RAW(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("All QID_AC_VI DESCRIPTOR \n " ));
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for (i=0;i<TX_RING_SIZE;i++)
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{
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ptemp= (PULONG)pAd->TxRing[QID_AC_VI].Cell[i].AllocVa;
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DBGPRINT_RAW(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("[%02d] %08lx: %08lx: %08lx: %08lx\n " , i, *ptemp,*(ptemp+1),*(ptemp+2),*(ptemp+3)));
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}
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DBGPRINT_RAW(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, (" \n " ));
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break;
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case QID_AC_VO:
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RTMP_IO_READ32(pAd, TX_BASE_PTR3, &Ac0Base);
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RTMP_IO_READ32(pAd, TX_CTX_IDX3, &Ac0SwIdx);
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RTMP_IO_READ32(pAd, TX_DTX_IDX3, &Ac0HwIdx);
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DBGPRINT_RAW(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("All QID_AC_VO DESCRIPTOR \n " ));
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for (i=0;i<TX_RING_SIZE;i++)
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{
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ptemp= (PULONG)pAd->TxRing[QID_AC_VO].Cell[i].AllocVa;
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DBGPRINT_RAW(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("[%02d] %08lx: %08lx: %08lx: %08lx\n " , i, *ptemp,*(ptemp+1),*(ptemp+2),*(ptemp+3)));
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}
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DBGPRINT_RAW(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, (" \n " ));
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break;
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case QID_MGMT:
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RTMP_IO_READ32(pAd, TX_BASE_PTR5, &Ac0Base);
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RTMP_IO_READ32(pAd, TX_CTX_IDX5, &Ac0SwIdx);
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RTMP_IO_READ32(pAd, TX_DTX_IDX5, &Ac0HwIdx);
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DBGPRINT_RAW(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, (" All QID_MGMT DESCRIPTOR \n " ));
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for (i=0;i<MGMT_RING_SIZE;i++)
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{
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ptemp= (PULONG)pAd->MgmtRing.Cell[i].AllocVa;
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DBGPRINT_RAW(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("[%02d] %08lx: %08lx: %08lx: %08lx\n " , i, *ptemp,*(ptemp+1),*(ptemp+2),*(ptemp+3)));
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}
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DBGPRINT_RAW(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, (" \n " ));
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break;
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default:
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DBGPRINT_ERR(("DBGPRINT_TX_RING(Ring %d) not supported\n", QueIdx));
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break;
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}
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AC0freeIdx = pAd->TxRing[QueIdx].TxSwFreeIdx;
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DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE,("TxRing%d, TX_DTX_IDX=%d, TX_CTX_IDX=%d\n", QueIdx, Ac0HwIdx, Ac0SwIdx));
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DBGPRINT_RAW(RT_DEBUG_TRACE,(" TxSwFreeIdx[%d]", AC0freeIdx));
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DBGPRINT_RAW(RT_DEBUG_TRACE,(" pending-NDIS=%ld\n", pAd->RalinkCounters.PendingNdisPacketCount));
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}
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VOID DBGPRINT_RX_RING(
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IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd)
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{
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UINT32 Ac0Base;
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UINT32 Ac0HwIdx = 0, Ac0SwIdx = 0, AC0freeIdx;
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int i;
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UINT32 *ptemp;
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DBGPRINT_RAW(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("=====================================================\n " ));
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RTMP_IO_READ32(pAd, RX_BASE_PTR, &Ac0Base);
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RTMP_IO_READ32(pAd, RX_CRX_IDX, &Ac0SwIdx);
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RTMP_IO_READ32(pAd, RX_DRX_IDX, &Ac0HwIdx);
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AC0freeIdx = pAd->RxRing.RxSwReadIdx;
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DBGPRINT_RAW(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("All RX DSP \n " ));
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for (i=0;i<RX_RING_SIZE;i++)
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{
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ptemp = (UINT32 *)pAd->RxRing.Cell[i].AllocVa;
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DBGPRINT_RAW(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("[%02d] %08x: %08x: %08x: %08x\n " , i, *ptemp,*(ptemp+1),*(ptemp+2),*(ptemp+3)));
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}
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DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE,("RxRing, RX_DRX_IDX=%d, RX_CRX_IDX=%d \n", Ac0HwIdx, Ac0SwIdx));
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DBGPRINT_RAW(RT_DEBUG_TRACE,(" RxSwReadIdx [%d]=", AC0freeIdx));
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DBGPRINT_RAW(RT_DEBUG_TRACE,(" pending-NDIS=%ld\n", pAd->RalinkCounters.PendingNdisPacketCount));
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}
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#endif /* RT2860 */
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/*
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@ -1052,187 +1052,3 @@ NDIS_802_11_NETWORK_TYPE NetworkTypeInUseSanity(
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return NetWorkType;
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}
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/*
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==========================================================================
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Description:
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WPA message sanity check
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Return:
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TRUE if all parameters are OK, FALSE otherwise
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==========================================================================
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*/
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BOOLEAN PeerWpaMessageSanity(
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IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
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IN PEAPOL_PACKET pMsg,
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IN ULONG MsgLen,
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IN UCHAR MsgType,
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IN MAC_TABLE_ENTRY *pEntry)
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{
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UCHAR mic[LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC], digest[80], KEYDATA[MAX_LEN_OF_RSNIE];
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BOOLEAN bReplayDiff = FALSE;
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BOOLEAN bWPA2 = FALSE;
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KEY_INFO EapolKeyInfo;
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UCHAR GroupKeyIndex = 0;
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NdisZeroMemory(mic, sizeof(mic));
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NdisZeroMemory(digest, sizeof(digest));
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NdisZeroMemory(KEYDATA, sizeof(KEYDATA));
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NdisZeroMemory((PUCHAR)&EapolKeyInfo, sizeof(EapolKeyInfo));
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NdisMoveMemory((PUCHAR)&EapolKeyInfo, (PUCHAR)&pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo, sizeof(KEY_INFO));
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*((USHORT *)&EapolKeyInfo) = cpu2le16(*((USHORT *)&EapolKeyInfo));
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// Choose WPA2 or not
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if ((pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2) || (pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK))
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bWPA2 = TRUE;
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// 0. Check MsgType
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if ((MsgType > EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_2) || (MsgType < EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1))
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{
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DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("The message type is invalid(%d)! \n", MsgType));
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return FALSE;
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}
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// 1. Replay counter check
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if (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1 || MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3 || MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1) // For supplicant
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{
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// First validate replay counter, only accept message with larger replay counter.
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// Let equal pass, some AP start with all zero replay counter
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UCHAR ZeroReplay[LEN_KEY_DESC_REPLAY];
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NdisZeroMemory(ZeroReplay, LEN_KEY_DESC_REPLAY);
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if ((RTMPCompareMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.ReplayCounter, pEntry->R_Counter, LEN_KEY_DESC_REPLAY) != 1) &&
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(RTMPCompareMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.ReplayCounter, ZeroReplay, LEN_KEY_DESC_REPLAY) != 0))
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{
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bReplayDiff = TRUE;
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}
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}
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else if (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_2 || MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_4 || MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_2) // For authenticator
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{
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// check Replay Counter coresponds to MSG from authenticator, otherwise discard
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if (!NdisEqualMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.ReplayCounter, pEntry->R_Counter, LEN_KEY_DESC_REPLAY))
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{
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bReplayDiff = TRUE;
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}
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}
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// Replay Counter different condition
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if (bReplayDiff)
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{
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// send wireless event - for replay counter different
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if (pAd->CommonCfg.bWirelessEvent)
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RTMPSendWirelessEvent(pAd, IW_REPLAY_COUNTER_DIFF_EVENT_FLAG, pEntry->Addr, pEntry->apidx, 0);
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if (MsgType < EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)
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{
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DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("Replay Counter Different in pairwise msg %d of 4-way handshake!\n", MsgType));
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}
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else
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{
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DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("Replay Counter Different in group msg %d of 2-way handshake!\n", (MsgType - EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_4)));
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}
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hex_dump("Receive replay counter ", pMsg->KeyDesc.ReplayCounter, LEN_KEY_DESC_REPLAY);
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hex_dump("Current replay counter ", pEntry->R_Counter, LEN_KEY_DESC_REPLAY);
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return FALSE;
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}
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// 2. Verify MIC except Pairwise Msg1
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if (MsgType != EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1)
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{
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UCHAR rcvd_mic[LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC];
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// Record the received MIC for check later
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NdisMoveMemory(rcvd_mic, pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyMic, LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC);
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NdisZeroMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyMic, LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC);
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if (pEntry->WepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled) // TKIP
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{
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hmac_md5(pEntry->PTK, LEN_EAP_MICK, (PUCHAR)pMsg, MsgLen, mic);
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}
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else if (pEntry->WepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled) // AES
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{
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HMAC_SHA1((PUCHAR)pMsg, MsgLen, pEntry->PTK, LEN_EAP_MICK, digest);
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NdisMoveMemory(mic, digest, LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC);
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}
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if (!NdisEqualMemory(rcvd_mic, mic, LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC))
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{
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// send wireless event - for MIC different
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if (pAd->CommonCfg.bWirelessEvent)
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RTMPSendWirelessEvent(pAd, IW_MIC_DIFF_EVENT_FLAG, pEntry->Addr, pEntry->apidx, 0);
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if (MsgType < EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)
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{
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DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("MIC Different in pairwise msg %d of 4-way handshake!\n", MsgType));
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}
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else
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{
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DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("MIC Different in group msg %d of 2-way handshake!\n", (MsgType - EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_4)));
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}
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hex_dump("Received MIC", rcvd_mic, LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC);
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hex_dump("Desired MIC", mic, LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC);
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return FALSE;
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}
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}
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// Extract the context of the Key Data field if it exist
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// The field in pairwise_msg_2_WPA1(WPA2) & pairwise_msg_3_WPA1 is un-encrypted.
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// The field in group_msg_1_WPA1(WPA2) & pairwise_msg_3_WPA2 is encrypted.
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if (pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyDataLen[1] > 0)
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{
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// Decrypt this field
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if ((MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3 && bWPA2) || (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1))
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{
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if(pEntry->WepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled)
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{
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// AES
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AES_GTK_KEY_UNWRAP(&pEntry->PTK[16], KEYDATA, pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyDataLen[1],pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyData);
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}
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else
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{
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INT i;
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UCHAR Key[32];
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// Decrypt TKIP GTK
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// Construct 32 bytes RC4 Key
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NdisMoveMemory(Key, pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyIv, 16);
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NdisMoveMemory(&Key[16], &pEntry->PTK[16], 16);
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ARCFOUR_INIT(&pAd->PrivateInfo.WEPCONTEXT, Key, 32);
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//discard first 256 bytes
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for(i = 0; i < 256; i++)
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ARCFOUR_BYTE(&pAd->PrivateInfo.WEPCONTEXT);
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// Decrypt GTK. Becareful, there is no ICV to check the result is correct or not
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ARCFOUR_DECRYPT(&pAd->PrivateInfo.WEPCONTEXT, KEYDATA, pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyData, pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyDataLen[1]);
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}
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if (!bWPA2 && (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1))
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GroupKeyIndex = EapolKeyInfo.KeyIndex;
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}
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else if ((MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_2) || (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3 && !bWPA2))
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{
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NdisMoveMemory(KEYDATA, pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyData, pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyDataLen[1]);
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}
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else
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{
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return TRUE;
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}
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// Parse Key Data field to
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// 1. verify RSN IE for pairwise_msg_2_WPA1(WPA2) ,pairwise_msg_3_WPA1(WPA2)
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// 2. verify KDE format for pairwise_msg_3_WPA2, group_msg_1_WPA2
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// 3. update shared key for pairwise_msg_3_WPA2, group_msg_1_WPA1(WPA2)
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if (!RTMPParseEapolKeyData(pAd, KEYDATA, pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyDataLen[1], GroupKeyIndex, MsgType, bWPA2, pEntry))
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{
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return FALSE;
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}
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}
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return TRUE;
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}
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@ -771,70 +771,6 @@ BOOLEAN RTMPCheckWPAframe(
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return TRUE;
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}
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/*
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==========================================================================
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Description:
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ENCRYPT AES GTK before sending in EAPOL frame.
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AES GTK length = 128 bit, so fix blocks for aes-key-wrap as 2 in this function.
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This function references to RFC 3394 for aes key wrap algorithm.
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Return:
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==========================================================================
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*/
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VOID AES_GTK_KEY_WRAP(
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IN UCHAR *key,
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IN UCHAR *plaintext,
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IN UCHAR p_len,
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OUT UCHAR *ciphertext)
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{
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UCHAR A[8], BIN[16], BOUT[16];
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UCHAR R[512];
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INT num_blocks = p_len/8; // unit:64bits
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INT i, j;
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aes_context aesctx;
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UCHAR xor;
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rtmp_aes_set_key(&aesctx, key, 128);
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// Init IA
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for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
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A[i] = 0xa6;
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//Input plaintext
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for (i = 0; i < num_blocks; i++)
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{
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for (j = 0 ; j < 8; j++)
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R[8 * (i + 1) + j] = plaintext[8 * i + j];
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}
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// Key Mix
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for (j = 0; j < 6; j++)
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{
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for(i = 1; i <= num_blocks; i++)
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{
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//phase 1
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NdisMoveMemory(BIN, A, 8);
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NdisMoveMemory(&BIN[8], &R[8 * i], 8);
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rtmp_aes_encrypt(&aesctx, BIN, BOUT);
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NdisMoveMemory(A, &BOUT[0], 8);
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xor = num_blocks * j + i;
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A[7] = BOUT[7] ^ xor;
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NdisMoveMemory(&R[8 * i], &BOUT[8], 8);
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}
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}
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// Output ciphertext
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NdisMoveMemory(ciphertext, A, 8);
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for (i = 1; i <= num_blocks; i++)
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{
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for (j = 0 ; j < 8; j++)
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ciphertext[8 * i + j] = R[8 * i + j];
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}
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}
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/*
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========================================================================
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@ -906,733 +842,3 @@ VOID AES_GTK_KEY_UNWRAP(
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os_free_mem(NULL, R);
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}
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/*
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==========================================================================
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Description:
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Report the EAP message type
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Arguments:
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msg - EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1
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EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_2
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EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3
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EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_4
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EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1
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EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_2
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Return:
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message type string
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==========================================================================
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*/
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CHAR *GetEapolMsgType(CHAR msg)
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||||
{
|
||||
if(msg == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1)
|
||||
return "Pairwise Message 1";
|
||||
else if(msg == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_2)
|
||||
return "Pairwise Message 2";
|
||||
else if(msg == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3)
|
||||
return "Pairwise Message 3";
|
||||
else if(msg == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_4)
|
||||
return "Pairwise Message 4";
|
||||
else if(msg == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)
|
||||
return "Group Message 1";
|
||||
else if(msg == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_2)
|
||||
return "Group Message 2";
|
||||
else
|
||||
return "Invalid Message";
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
========================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
Routine Description:
|
||||
Check Sanity RSN IE of EAPoL message
|
||||
|
||||
Arguments:
|
||||
|
||||
Return Value:
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
========================================================================
|
||||
*/
|
||||
BOOLEAN RTMPCheckRSNIE(
|
||||
IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
|
||||
IN PUCHAR pData,
|
||||
IN UCHAR DataLen,
|
||||
IN MAC_TABLE_ENTRY *pEntry,
|
||||
OUT UCHAR *Offset)
|
||||
{
|
||||
PUCHAR pVIE;
|
||||
UCHAR len;
|
||||
PEID_STRUCT pEid;
|
||||
BOOLEAN result = FALSE;
|
||||
|
||||
pVIE = pData;
|
||||
len = DataLen;
|
||||
*Offset = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
while (len > sizeof(RSNIE2))
|
||||
{
|
||||
pEid = (PEID_STRUCT) pVIE;
|
||||
// WPA RSN IE
|
||||
if ((pEid->Eid == IE_WPA) && (NdisEqualMemory(pEid->Octet, WPA_OUI, 4)))
|
||||
{
|
||||
if ((pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA || pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPAPSK) &&
|
||||
(NdisEqualMemory(pVIE, pEntry->RSN_IE, pEntry->RSNIE_Len)) &&
|
||||
(pEntry->RSNIE_Len == (pEid->Len + 2)))
|
||||
{
|
||||
result = TRUE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
*Offset += (pEid->Len + 2);
|
||||
}
|
||||
// WPA2 RSN IE
|
||||
else if ((pEid->Eid == IE_RSN) && (NdisEqualMemory(pEid->Octet + 2, RSN_OUI, 3)))
|
||||
{
|
||||
if ((pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2 || pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK) &&
|
||||
(NdisEqualMemory(pVIE, pEntry->RSN_IE, pEntry->RSNIE_Len)) &&
|
||||
(pEntry->RSNIE_Len == (pEid->Len + 2))/* ToDo-AlbertY for mesh*/)
|
||||
{
|
||||
result = TRUE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
*Offset += (pEid->Len + 2);
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
{
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pVIE += (pEid->Len + 2);
|
||||
len -= (pEid->Len + 2);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
return result;
|
||||
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
========================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
Routine Description:
|
||||
Parse KEYDATA field. KEYDATA[] May contain 2 RSN IE and optionally GTK.
|
||||
GTK is encaptulated in KDE format at p.83 802.11i D10
|
||||
|
||||
Arguments:
|
||||
|
||||
Return Value:
|
||||
|
||||
Note:
|
||||
802.11i D10
|
||||
|
||||
========================================================================
|
||||
*/
|
||||
BOOLEAN RTMPParseEapolKeyData(
|
||||
IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
|
||||
IN PUCHAR pKeyData,
|
||||
IN UCHAR KeyDataLen,
|
||||
IN UCHAR GroupKeyIndex,
|
||||
IN UCHAR MsgType,
|
||||
IN BOOLEAN bWPA2,
|
||||
IN MAC_TABLE_ENTRY *pEntry)
|
||||
{
|
||||
PKDE_ENCAP pKDE = NULL;
|
||||
PUCHAR pMyKeyData = pKeyData;
|
||||
UCHAR KeyDataLength = KeyDataLen;
|
||||
UCHAR GTKLEN = 0;
|
||||
UCHAR DefaultIdx = 0;
|
||||
UCHAR skip_offset;
|
||||
|
||||
// Verify The RSN IE contained in pairewise_msg_2 && pairewise_msg_3 and skip it
|
||||
if (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_2 || MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3)
|
||||
{
|
||||
// Check RSN IE whether it is WPA2/WPA2PSK
|
||||
if (!RTMPCheckRSNIE(pAd, pKeyData, KeyDataLen, pEntry, &skip_offset))
|
||||
{
|
||||
// send wireless event - for RSN IE different
|
||||
if (pAd->CommonCfg.bWirelessEvent)
|
||||
RTMPSendWirelessEvent(pAd, IW_RSNIE_DIFF_EVENT_FLAG, pEntry->Addr, pEntry->apidx, 0);
|
||||
|
||||
DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("RSN_IE Different in msg %d of 4-way handshake!\n", MsgType));
|
||||
hex_dump("Receive RSN_IE ", pKeyData, KeyDataLen);
|
||||
hex_dump("Desired RSN_IE ", pEntry->RSN_IE, pEntry->RSNIE_Len);
|
||||
|
||||
return FALSE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (bWPA2 && MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3)
|
||||
{
|
||||
// skip RSN IE
|
||||
pMyKeyData += skip_offset;
|
||||
KeyDataLength -= skip_offset;
|
||||
DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("RTMPParseEapolKeyData ==> WPA2/WPA2PSK RSN IE matched in Msg 3, Length(%d) \n", skip_offset));
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
return TRUE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE,("RTMPParseEapolKeyData ==> KeyDataLength %d without RSN_IE \n", KeyDataLength));
|
||||
|
||||
// Parse EKD format in pairwise_msg_3_WPA2 && group_msg_1_WPA2
|
||||
if (bWPA2 && (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3 || MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1))
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (KeyDataLength >= 8) // KDE format exclude GTK length
|
||||
{
|
||||
pKDE = (PKDE_ENCAP) pMyKeyData;
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
DefaultIdx = pKDE->GTKEncap.Kid;
|
||||
|
||||
// Sanity check - KED length
|
||||
if (KeyDataLength < (pKDE->Len + 2))
|
||||
{
|
||||
DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("ERROR: The len from KDE is too short \n"));
|
||||
return FALSE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Get GTK length - refer to IEEE 802.11i-2004 p.82
|
||||
GTKLEN = pKDE->Len -6;
|
||||
if (GTKLEN < LEN_AES_KEY)
|
||||
{
|
||||
DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("ERROR: GTK Key length is too short (%d) \n", GTKLEN));
|
||||
return FALSE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
{
|
||||
DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("ERROR: KDE format length is too short \n"));
|
||||
return FALSE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("GTK in KDE format ,DefaultKeyID=%d, KeyLen=%d \n", DefaultIdx, GTKLEN));
|
||||
// skip it
|
||||
pMyKeyData += 8;
|
||||
KeyDataLength -= 8;
|
||||
|
||||
}
|
||||
else if (!bWPA2 && MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)
|
||||
{
|
||||
DefaultIdx = GroupKeyIndex;
|
||||
DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("GTK DefaultKeyID=%d \n", DefaultIdx));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Sanity check - shared key index must be 1 ~ 3
|
||||
if (DefaultIdx < 1 || DefaultIdx > 3)
|
||||
{
|
||||
DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("ERROR: GTK Key index(%d) is invalid in %s %s \n", DefaultIdx, ((bWPA2) ? "WPA2" : "WPA"), GetEapolMsgType(MsgType)));
|
||||
return FALSE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return TRUE;
|
||||
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
========================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
Routine Description:
|
||||
Construct EAPoL message for WPA handshaking
|
||||
Its format is below,
|
||||
|
||||
+--------------------+
|
||||
| Protocol Version | 1 octet
|
||||
+--------------------+
|
||||
| Protocol Type | 1 octet
|
||||
+--------------------+
|
||||
| Body Length | 2 octets
|
||||
+--------------------+
|
||||
| Descriptor Type | 1 octet
|
||||
+--------------------+
|
||||
| Key Information | 2 octets
|
||||
+--------------------+
|
||||
| Key Length | 1 octet
|
||||
+--------------------+
|
||||
| Key Repaly Counter | 8 octets
|
||||
+--------------------+
|
||||
| Key Nonce | 32 octets
|
||||
+--------------------+
|
||||
| Key IV | 16 octets
|
||||
+--------------------+
|
||||
| Key RSC | 8 octets
|
||||
+--------------------+
|
||||
| Key ID or Reserved | 8 octets
|
||||
+--------------------+
|
||||
| Key MIC | 16 octets
|
||||
+--------------------+
|
||||
| Key Data Length | 2 octets
|
||||
+--------------------+
|
||||
| Key Data | n octets
|
||||
+--------------------+
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Arguments:
|
||||
pAd Pointer to our adapter
|
||||
|
||||
Return Value:
|
||||
None
|
||||
|
||||
Note:
|
||||
|
||||
========================================================================
|
||||
*/
|
||||
VOID ConstructEapolMsg(
|
||||
IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
|
||||
IN UCHAR AuthMode,
|
||||
IN UCHAR WepStatus,
|
||||
IN UCHAR GroupKeyWepStatus,
|
||||
IN UCHAR MsgType,
|
||||
IN UCHAR DefaultKeyIdx,
|
||||
IN UCHAR *ReplayCounter,
|
||||
IN UCHAR *KeyNonce,
|
||||
IN UCHAR *TxRSC,
|
||||
IN UCHAR *PTK,
|
||||
IN UCHAR *GTK,
|
||||
IN UCHAR *RSNIE,
|
||||
IN UCHAR RSNIE_Len,
|
||||
OUT PEAPOL_PACKET pMsg)
|
||||
{
|
||||
BOOLEAN bWPA2 = FALSE;
|
||||
|
||||
// Choose WPA2 or not
|
||||
if ((AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2) || (AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK))
|
||||
bWPA2 = TRUE;
|
||||
|
||||
// Init Packet and Fill header
|
||||
pMsg->ProVer = EAPOL_VER;
|
||||
pMsg->ProType = EAPOLKey;
|
||||
|
||||
// Default 95 bytes, the EAPoL-Key descriptor exclude Key-data field
|
||||
pMsg->Body_Len[1] = LEN_EAPOL_KEY_MSG;
|
||||
|
||||
// Fill in EAPoL descriptor
|
||||
if (bWPA2)
|
||||
pMsg->KeyDesc.Type = WPA2_KEY_DESC;
|
||||
else
|
||||
pMsg->KeyDesc.Type = WPA1_KEY_DESC;
|
||||
|
||||
// Fill in Key information, refer to IEEE Std 802.11i-2004 page 78
|
||||
// When either the pairwise or the group cipher is AES, the DESC_TYPE_AES(2) shall be used.
|
||||
pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyDescVer =
|
||||
(((WepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled) || (GroupKeyWepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled)) ? (DESC_TYPE_AES) : (DESC_TYPE_TKIP));
|
||||
|
||||
// Specify Key Type as Group(0) or Pairwise(1)
|
||||
if (MsgType >= EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)
|
||||
pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyType = GROUPKEY;
|
||||
else
|
||||
pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyType = PAIRWISEKEY;
|
||||
|
||||
// Specify Key Index, only group_msg1_WPA1
|
||||
if (!bWPA2 && (MsgType >= EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1))
|
||||
pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyIndex = DefaultKeyIdx;
|
||||
|
||||
if (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3)
|
||||
pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.Install = 1;
|
||||
|
||||
if ((MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1) || (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3) || (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1))
|
||||
pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyAck = 1;
|
||||
|
||||
if (MsgType != EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1)
|
||||
pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyMic = 1;
|
||||
|
||||
if ((bWPA2 && (MsgType >= EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3)) || (!bWPA2 && (MsgType >= EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)))
|
||||
{
|
||||
pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.Secure = 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (bWPA2 && ((MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3) || (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)))
|
||||
{
|
||||
pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.EKD_DL = 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// key Information element has done.
|
||||
*(USHORT *)(&pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo) = cpu2le16(*(USHORT *)(&pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo));
|
||||
|
||||
// Fill in Key Length
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (MsgType >= EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)
|
||||
{
|
||||
// the length of group key cipher
|
||||
pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyLength[1] = ((GroupKeyWepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled) ? TKIP_GTK_LENGTH : LEN_AES_KEY);
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
{
|
||||
// the length of pairwise key cipher
|
||||
pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyLength[1] = ((WepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled) ? LEN_TKIP_KEY : LEN_AES_KEY);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Fill in replay counter
|
||||
NdisMoveMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.ReplayCounter, ReplayCounter, LEN_KEY_DESC_REPLAY);
|
||||
|
||||
// Fill Key Nonce field
|
||||
// ANonce : pairwise_msg1 & pairwise_msg3
|
||||
// SNonce : pairwise_msg2
|
||||
// GNonce : group_msg1_wpa1
|
||||
if ((MsgType <= EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3) || ((!bWPA2 && (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1))))
|
||||
NdisMoveMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyNonce, KeyNonce, LEN_KEY_DESC_NONCE);
|
||||
|
||||
// Fill key IV - WPA2 as 0, WPA1 as random
|
||||
if (!bWPA2 && (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1))
|
||||
{
|
||||
// Suggest IV be random number plus some number,
|
||||
NdisMoveMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyIv, &KeyNonce[16], LEN_KEY_DESC_IV);
|
||||
pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyIv[15] += 2;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Fill Key RSC field
|
||||
// It contains the RSC for the GTK being installed.
|
||||
if ((MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3 && bWPA2) || (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1))
|
||||
{
|
||||
NdisMoveMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyRsc, TxRSC, 6);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Clear Key MIC field for MIC calculation later
|
||||
NdisZeroMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyMic, LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC);
|
||||
|
||||
ConstructEapolKeyData(pAd,
|
||||
AuthMode,
|
||||
WepStatus,
|
||||
GroupKeyWepStatus,
|
||||
MsgType,
|
||||
DefaultKeyIdx,
|
||||
bWPA2,
|
||||
PTK,
|
||||
GTK,
|
||||
RSNIE,
|
||||
RSNIE_Len,
|
||||
pMsg);
|
||||
|
||||
// Calculate MIC and fill in KeyMic Field except Pairwise Msg 1.
|
||||
if (MsgType != EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1)
|
||||
{
|
||||
CalculateMIC(pAd, WepStatus, PTK, pMsg);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("===> ConstructEapolMsg for %s %s\n", ((bWPA2) ? "WPA2" : "WPA"), GetEapolMsgType(MsgType)));
|
||||
DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, (" Body length = %d \n", pMsg->Body_Len[1]));
|
||||
DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, (" Key length = %d \n", pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyLength[1]));
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
========================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
Routine Description:
|
||||
Construct the Key Data field of EAPoL message
|
||||
|
||||
Arguments:
|
||||
pAd Pointer to our adapter
|
||||
Elem Message body
|
||||
|
||||
Return Value:
|
||||
None
|
||||
|
||||
Note:
|
||||
|
||||
========================================================================
|
||||
*/
|
||||
VOID ConstructEapolKeyData(
|
||||
IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
|
||||
IN UCHAR AuthMode,
|
||||
IN UCHAR WepStatus,
|
||||
IN UCHAR GroupKeyWepStatus,
|
||||
IN UCHAR MsgType,
|
||||
IN UCHAR DefaultKeyIdx,
|
||||
IN BOOLEAN bWPA2Capable,
|
||||
IN UCHAR *PTK,
|
||||
IN UCHAR *GTK,
|
||||
IN UCHAR *RSNIE,
|
||||
IN UCHAR RSNIE_LEN,
|
||||
OUT PEAPOL_PACKET pMsg)
|
||||
{
|
||||
UCHAR *mpool, *Key_Data, *Rc4GTK;
|
||||
UCHAR ekey[(LEN_KEY_DESC_IV+LEN_EAP_EK)];
|
||||
UCHAR data_offset;
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1 || MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_4 || MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_2)
|
||||
return;
|
||||
|
||||
// allocate memory pool
|
||||
os_alloc_mem(pAd, (PUCHAR *)&mpool, 1500);
|
||||
|
||||
if (mpool == NULL)
|
||||
return;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Rc4GTK Len = 512 */
|
||||
Rc4GTK = (UCHAR *) ROUND_UP(mpool, 4);
|
||||
/* Key_Data Len = 512 */
|
||||
Key_Data = (UCHAR *) ROUND_UP(Rc4GTK + 512, 4);
|
||||
|
||||
NdisZeroMemory(Key_Data, 512);
|
||||
pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyDataLen[1] = 0;
|
||||
data_offset = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
// Encapsulate RSNIE in pairwise_msg2 & pairwise_msg3
|
||||
if (RSNIE_LEN && ((MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_2) || (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3)))
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (bWPA2Capable)
|
||||
Key_Data[data_offset + 0] = IE_WPA2;
|
||||
else
|
||||
Key_Data[data_offset + 0] = IE_WPA;
|
||||
|
||||
Key_Data[data_offset + 1] = RSNIE_LEN;
|
||||
NdisMoveMemory(&Key_Data[data_offset + 2], RSNIE, RSNIE_LEN);
|
||||
data_offset += (2 + RSNIE_LEN);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Encapsulate KDE format in pairwise_msg3_WPA2 & group_msg1_WPA2
|
||||
if (bWPA2Capable && ((MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3) || (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)))
|
||||
{
|
||||
// Key Data Encapsulation (KDE) format - 802.11i-2004 Figure-43w and Table-20h
|
||||
Key_Data[data_offset + 0] = 0xDD;
|
||||
|
||||
if (GroupKeyWepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled)
|
||||
{
|
||||
Key_Data[data_offset + 1] = 0x16;// 4+2+16(OUI+DataType+DataField)
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
{
|
||||
Key_Data[data_offset + 1] = 0x26;// 4+2+32(OUI+DataType+DataField)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Key_Data[data_offset + 2] = 0x00;
|
||||
Key_Data[data_offset + 3] = 0x0F;
|
||||
Key_Data[data_offset + 4] = 0xAC;
|
||||
Key_Data[data_offset + 5] = 0x01;
|
||||
|
||||
// GTK KDE format - 802.11i-2004 Figure-43x
|
||||
Key_Data[data_offset + 6] = (DefaultKeyIdx & 0x03);
|
||||
Key_Data[data_offset + 7] = 0x00; // Reserved Byte
|
||||
|
||||
data_offset += 8;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
// Encapsulate GTK and encrypt the key-data field with KEK.
|
||||
// Only for pairwise_msg3_WPA2 and group_msg1
|
||||
if ((MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3 && bWPA2Capable) || (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1))
|
||||
{
|
||||
// Fill in GTK
|
||||
if (GroupKeyWepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled)
|
||||
{
|
||||
NdisMoveMemory(&Key_Data[data_offset], GTK, LEN_AES_KEY);
|
||||
data_offset += LEN_AES_KEY;
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
{
|
||||
NdisMoveMemory(&Key_Data[data_offset], GTK, TKIP_GTK_LENGTH);
|
||||
data_offset += TKIP_GTK_LENGTH;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Still dont know why, but if not append will occur "GTK not include in MSG3"
|
||||
// Patch for compatibility between zero config and funk
|
||||
if (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3 && bWPA2Capable)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (GroupKeyWepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled)
|
||||
{
|
||||
Key_Data[data_offset + 0] = 0xDD;
|
||||
Key_Data[data_offset + 1] = 0;
|
||||
data_offset += 2;
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
{
|
||||
Key_Data[data_offset + 0] = 0xDD;
|
||||
Key_Data[data_offset + 1] = 0;
|
||||
Key_Data[data_offset + 2] = 0;
|
||||
Key_Data[data_offset + 3] = 0;
|
||||
Key_Data[data_offset + 4] = 0;
|
||||
Key_Data[data_offset + 5] = 0;
|
||||
data_offset += 6;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Encrypt the data material in key data field
|
||||
if (WepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled)
|
||||
{
|
||||
AES_GTK_KEY_WRAP(&PTK[16], Key_Data, data_offset, Rc4GTK);
|
||||
// AES wrap function will grow 8 bytes in length
|
||||
data_offset += 8;
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
{
|
||||
// PREPARE Encrypted "Key DATA" field. (Encrypt GTK with RC4, usinf PTK[16]->[31] as Key, IV-field as IV)
|
||||
// put TxTsc in Key RSC field
|
||||
pAd->PrivateInfo.FCSCRC32 = PPPINITFCS32; //Init crc32.
|
||||
|
||||
// ekey is the contanetion of IV-field, and PTK[16]->PTK[31]
|
||||
NdisMoveMemory(ekey, pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyIv, LEN_KEY_DESC_IV);
|
||||
NdisMoveMemory(&ekey[LEN_KEY_DESC_IV], &PTK[16], LEN_EAP_EK);
|
||||
ARCFOUR_INIT(&pAd->PrivateInfo.WEPCONTEXT, ekey, sizeof(ekey)); //INIT SBOX, KEYLEN+3(IV)
|
||||
pAd->PrivateInfo.FCSCRC32 = RTMP_CALC_FCS32(pAd->PrivateInfo.FCSCRC32, Key_Data, data_offset);
|
||||
WPAARCFOUR_ENCRYPT(&pAd->PrivateInfo.WEPCONTEXT, Rc4GTK, Key_Data, data_offset);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
NdisMoveMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyData, Rc4GTK, data_offset);
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
{
|
||||
NdisMoveMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyData, Key_Data, data_offset);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// set key data length field and total length
|
||||
pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyDataLen[1] = data_offset;
|
||||
pMsg->Body_Len[1] += data_offset;
|
||||
|
||||
os_free_mem(pAd, mpool);
|
||||
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
========================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
Routine Description:
|
||||
Calcaulate MIC. It is used during 4-ways handsharking.
|
||||
|
||||
Arguments:
|
||||
pAd - pointer to our pAdapter context
|
||||
PeerWepStatus - indicate the encryption type
|
||||
|
||||
Return Value:
|
||||
|
||||
Note:
|
||||
|
||||
========================================================================
|
||||
*/
|
||||
VOID CalculateMIC(
|
||||
IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
|
||||
IN UCHAR PeerWepStatus,
|
||||
IN UCHAR *PTK,
|
||||
OUT PEAPOL_PACKET pMsg)
|
||||
{
|
||||
UCHAR *OutBuffer;
|
||||
ULONG FrameLen = 0;
|
||||
UCHAR mic[LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC];
|
||||
UCHAR digest[80];
|
||||
|
||||
// allocate memory for MIC calculation
|
||||
os_alloc_mem(pAd, (PUCHAR *)&OutBuffer, 512);
|
||||
|
||||
if (OutBuffer == NULL)
|
||||
{
|
||||
DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("!!!CalculateMIC: no memory!!!\n"));
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// make a frame for calculating MIC.
|
||||
MakeOutgoingFrame(OutBuffer, &FrameLen,
|
||||
pMsg->Body_Len[1] + 4, pMsg,
|
||||
END_OF_ARGS);
|
||||
|
||||
NdisZeroMemory(mic, sizeof(mic));
|
||||
|
||||
// Calculate MIC
|
||||
if (PeerWepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled)
|
||||
{
|
||||
HMAC_SHA1(OutBuffer, FrameLen, PTK, LEN_EAP_MICK, digest);
|
||||
NdisMoveMemory(mic, digest, LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC);
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
{
|
||||
hmac_md5(PTK, LEN_EAP_MICK, OutBuffer, FrameLen, mic);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// store the calculated MIC
|
||||
NdisMoveMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyMic, mic, LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC);
|
||||
|
||||
os_free_mem(pAd, OutBuffer);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
========================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
Routine Description:
|
||||
Some received frames can't decrypt by Asic, so decrypt them by software.
|
||||
|
||||
Arguments:
|
||||
pAd - pointer to our pAdapter context
|
||||
PeerWepStatus - indicate the encryption type
|
||||
|
||||
Return Value:
|
||||
NDIS_STATUS_SUCCESS - decryption successful
|
||||
NDIS_STATUS_FAILURE - decryption failure
|
||||
|
||||
========================================================================
|
||||
*/
|
||||
NDIS_STATUS RTMPSoftDecryptBroadCastData(
|
||||
IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
|
||||
IN RX_BLK *pRxBlk,
|
||||
IN NDIS_802_11_ENCRYPTION_STATUS GroupCipher,
|
||||
IN PCIPHER_KEY pShard_key)
|
||||
{
|
||||
PRXWI_STRUC pRxWI = pRxBlk->pRxWI;
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
// handle WEP decryption
|
||||
if (GroupCipher == Ndis802_11Encryption1Enabled)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (RTMPSoftDecryptWEP(pAd, pRxBlk->pData, pRxWI->MPDUtotalByteCount, pShard_key))
|
||||
{
|
||||
|
||||
//Minus IV[4] & ICV[4]
|
||||
pRxWI->MPDUtotalByteCount -= 8;
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
{
|
||||
DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("ERROR : Software decrypt WEP data fails.\n"));
|
||||
// give up this frame
|
||||
return NDIS_STATUS_FAILURE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
// handle TKIP decryption
|
||||
else if (GroupCipher == Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (RTMPSoftDecryptTKIP(pAd, pRxBlk->pData, pRxWI->MPDUtotalByteCount, 0, pShard_key))
|
||||
{
|
||||
|
||||
//Minus 8 bytes MIC, 8 bytes IV/EIV, 4 bytes ICV
|
||||
pRxWI->MPDUtotalByteCount -= 20;
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
{
|
||||
DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("ERROR : RTMPSoftDecryptTKIP Failed\n"));
|
||||
// give up this frame
|
||||
return NDIS_STATUS_FAILURE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
// handle AES decryption
|
||||
else if (GroupCipher == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (RTMPSoftDecryptAES(pAd, pRxBlk->pData, pRxWI->MPDUtotalByteCount , pShard_key))
|
||||
{
|
||||
|
||||
//8 bytes MIC, 8 bytes IV/EIV (CCMP Header)
|
||||
pRxWI->MPDUtotalByteCount -= 16;
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
{
|
||||
DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("ERROR : RTMPSoftDecryptAES Failed\n"));
|
||||
// give up this frame
|
||||
return NDIS_STATUS_FAILURE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
{
|
||||
// give up this frame
|
||||
return NDIS_STATUS_FAILURE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return NDIS_STATUS_SUCCESS;
|
||||
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -43,7 +43,6 @@ UCHAR CISCO_OUI[] = {0x00, 0x40, 0x96};
|
|||
|
||||
UCHAR WPA_OUI[] = {0x00, 0x50, 0xf2, 0x01};
|
||||
UCHAR RSN_OUI[] = {0x00, 0x0f, 0xac};
|
||||
UCHAR WAPI_OUI[] = {0x00, 0x14, 0x72};
|
||||
UCHAR WME_INFO_ELEM[] = {0x00, 0x50, 0xf2, 0x02, 0x00, 0x01};
|
||||
UCHAR WME_PARM_ELEM[] = {0x00, 0x50, 0xf2, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01};
|
||||
UCHAR Ccx2QosInfo[] = {0x00, 0x40, 0x96, 0x04};
|
||||
|
@ -338,9 +337,6 @@ UCHAR WpaIe = IE_WPA;
|
|||
UCHAR Wpa2Ie = IE_WPA2;
|
||||
UCHAR IbssIe = IE_IBSS_PARM;
|
||||
UCHAR Ccx2Ie = IE_CCX_V2;
|
||||
#ifdef RT2870
|
||||
UCHAR WapiIe = IE_WAPI;
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
extern UCHAR WPA_OUI[];
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -231,15 +231,9 @@ extern UCHAR WpaIe;
|
|||
extern UCHAR Wpa2Ie;
|
||||
extern UCHAR IbssIe;
|
||||
extern UCHAR Ccx2Ie;
|
||||
#ifdef RT30xx
|
||||
extern UCHAR WapiIe;
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
extern UCHAR WPA_OUI[];
|
||||
extern UCHAR RSN_OUI[];
|
||||
#ifdef RT30xx
|
||||
extern UCHAR WAPI_OUI[];
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
extern UCHAR WME_INFO_ELEM[];
|
||||
extern UCHAR WME_PARM_ELEM[];
|
||||
extern UCHAR Ccx2QosInfo[];
|
||||
|
@ -4554,13 +4548,6 @@ BOOLEAN PeerDisassocSanity(
|
|||
OUT PUCHAR pAddr2,
|
||||
OUT USHORT *Reason);
|
||||
|
||||
BOOLEAN PeerWpaMessageSanity(
|
||||
IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
|
||||
IN PEAPOL_PACKET pMsg,
|
||||
IN ULONG MsgLen,
|
||||
IN UCHAR MsgType,
|
||||
IN MAC_TABLE_ENTRY *pEntry);
|
||||
|
||||
BOOLEAN PeerDeauthSanity(
|
||||
IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
|
||||
IN VOID *Msg,
|
||||
|
@ -5082,13 +5069,6 @@ VOID AironetAddBeaconReport(
|
|||
VOID AironetCreateBeaconReportFromBssTable(
|
||||
IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd);
|
||||
|
||||
VOID DBGPRINT_TX_RING(
|
||||
IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
|
||||
IN UCHAR QueIdx);
|
||||
|
||||
VOID DBGPRINT_RX_RING(
|
||||
IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd);
|
||||
|
||||
CHAR ConvertToRssi(
|
||||
IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
|
||||
IN CHAR Rssi,
|
||||
|
@ -5110,64 +5090,6 @@ VOID AES_GTK_KEY_UNWRAP(
|
|||
IN UCHAR c_len,
|
||||
IN UCHAR *ciphertext);
|
||||
|
||||
BOOLEAN RTMPCheckRSNIE(
|
||||
IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
|
||||
IN PUCHAR pData,
|
||||
IN UCHAR DataLen,
|
||||
IN MAC_TABLE_ENTRY *pEntry,
|
||||
OUT UCHAR *Offset);
|
||||
|
||||
BOOLEAN RTMPParseEapolKeyData(
|
||||
IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
|
||||
IN PUCHAR pKeyData,
|
||||
IN UCHAR KeyDataLen,
|
||||
IN UCHAR GroupKeyIndex,
|
||||
IN UCHAR MsgType,
|
||||
IN BOOLEAN bWPA2,
|
||||
IN MAC_TABLE_ENTRY *pEntry);
|
||||
|
||||
VOID ConstructEapolMsg(
|
||||
IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
|
||||
IN UCHAR PeerAuthMode,
|
||||
IN UCHAR PeerWepStatus,
|
||||
IN UCHAR MyGroupKeyWepStatus,
|
||||
IN UCHAR MsgType,
|
||||
IN UCHAR DefaultKeyIdx,
|
||||
IN UCHAR *ReplayCounter,
|
||||
IN UCHAR *KeyNonce,
|
||||
IN UCHAR *TxRSC,
|
||||
IN UCHAR *PTK,
|
||||
IN UCHAR *GTK,
|
||||
IN UCHAR *RSNIE,
|
||||
IN UCHAR RSNIE_Len,
|
||||
OUT PEAPOL_PACKET pMsg);
|
||||
|
||||
VOID CalculateMIC(
|
||||
IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
|
||||
IN UCHAR PeerWepStatus,
|
||||
IN UCHAR *PTK,
|
||||
OUT PEAPOL_PACKET pMsg);
|
||||
|
||||
NDIS_STATUS RTMPSoftDecryptBroadCastData(
|
||||
IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
|
||||
IN RX_BLK *pRxBlk,
|
||||
IN NDIS_802_11_ENCRYPTION_STATUS GroupCipher,
|
||||
IN PCIPHER_KEY pShard_key);
|
||||
|
||||
VOID ConstructEapolKeyData(
|
||||
IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
|
||||
IN UCHAR PeerAuthMode,
|
||||
IN UCHAR PeerWepStatus,
|
||||
IN UCHAR GroupKeyWepStatus,
|
||||
IN UCHAR MsgType,
|
||||
IN UCHAR DefaultKeyIdx,
|
||||
IN BOOLEAN bWPA2Capable,
|
||||
IN UCHAR *PTK,
|
||||
IN UCHAR *GTK,
|
||||
IN UCHAR *RSNIE,
|
||||
IN UCHAR RSNIE_LEN,
|
||||
OUT PEAPOL_PACKET pMsg);
|
||||
|
||||
VOID RTMPMakeRSNIE(
|
||||
IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
|
||||
IN UINT AuthMode,
|
||||
|
@ -5182,12 +5104,6 @@ VOID HandleCounterMeasure(
|
|||
IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
|
||||
IN MAC_TABLE_ENTRY *pEntry);
|
||||
|
||||
VOID AES_GTK_KEY_WRAP(
|
||||
IN UCHAR *key,
|
||||
IN UCHAR *plaintext,
|
||||
IN UCHAR p_len,
|
||||
OUT UCHAR *ciphertext);
|
||||
|
||||
/* timeout -- ms */
|
||||
VOID RTMP_SetPeriodicTimer(
|
||||
IN NDIS_MINIPORT_TIMER *pTimer,
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -569,9 +569,6 @@
|
|||
// For 802.11n D3.03
|
||||
//#define IE_NEW_EXT_CHA_OFFSET 62 // 802.11n d1. New extension channel offset elemet
|
||||
#define IE_SECONDARY_CH_OFFSET 62 // 802.11n D3.03 Secondary Channel Offset element
|
||||
#ifdef RT2870
|
||||
#define IE_WAPI 68 // WAPI information element
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
#define IE_2040_BSS_COEXIST 72 // 802.11n D3.0.3
|
||||
#define IE_2040_BSS_INTOLERANT_REPORT 73 // 802.11n D3.03
|
||||
#define IE_OVERLAPBSS_SCAN_PARM 74 // 802.11n D3.03
|
||||
|
|
Loading…
Reference in a new issue