crypto: aesni - Add scatter/gather avx stubs, and use them in C
Add the appropriate scatter/gather stubs to the avx asm. In the C code, we can now always use crypt_by_sg, since both sse and asm code now support scatter/gather. Introduce a new struct, aesni_gcm_tfm, that is initialized on startup to point to either the SSE, AVX, or AVX2 versions of the four necessary encryption/decryption routines. GENX_OPTSIZE is still checked at the start of crypt_by_sg. The total size of the data is checked, since the additional overhead is in the init function, calculating additional HashKeys. Signed-off-by: Dave Watson <davejwatson@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>hifive-unleashed-5.1
Dave Watson
Herbert Xu
parent
e044d50563
commit
603f8c3b0d
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@ -518,14 +518,13 @@ _less_than_8_bytes_left\@:
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#############################
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_multiple_of_16_bytes\@:
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GCM_COMPLETE \GHASH_MUL \REP
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.endm
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# GCM_COMPLETE Finishes update of tag of last partial block
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# Output: Authorization Tag (AUTH_TAG)
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# Clobbers rax, r10-r12, and xmm0, xmm1, xmm5-xmm15
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.macro GCM_COMPLETE GHASH_MUL REP
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.macro GCM_COMPLETE GHASH_MUL REP AUTH_TAG AUTH_TAG_LEN
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vmovdqu AadHash(arg2), %xmm14
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vmovdqu HashKey(arg2), %xmm13
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@ -560,8 +559,8 @@ _partial_done\@:
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_return_T\@:
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mov arg9, %r10 # r10 = authTag
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mov arg10, %r11 # r11 = auth_tag_len
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mov \AUTH_TAG, %r10 # r10 = authTag
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mov \AUTH_TAG_LEN, %r11 # r11 = auth_tag_len
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cmp $16, %r11
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je _T_16\@
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@ -680,14 +679,14 @@ _get_AAD_done\@:
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mov %r11, PBlockLen(arg2) # ctx_data.partial_block_length = 0
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mov %r11, PBlockEncKey(arg2) # ctx_data.partial_block_enc_key = 0
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mov arg4, %rax
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mov arg3, %rax
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movdqu (%rax), %xmm0
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movdqu %xmm0, OrigIV(arg2) # ctx_data.orig_IV = iv
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vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm0, %xmm0
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movdqu %xmm0, CurCount(arg2) # ctx_data.current_counter = iv
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vmovdqu (arg3), %xmm6 # xmm6 = HashKey
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vmovdqu (arg4), %xmm6 # xmm6 = HashKey
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vpshufb SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm6, %xmm6
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############### PRECOMPUTATION of HashKey<<1 mod poly from the HashKey
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@ -1776,88 +1775,100 @@ _initial_blocks_done\@:
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# const u8 *aad, /* Additional Authentication Data (AAD)*/
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# u64 aad_len) /* Length of AAD in bytes. With RFC4106 this is going to be 8 or 12 Bytes */
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#############################################################
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ENTRY(aesni_gcm_precomp_avx_gen2)
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ENTRY(aesni_gcm_init_avx_gen2)
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FUNC_SAVE
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INIT GHASH_MUL_AVX, PRECOMPUTE_AVX
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FUNC_RESTORE
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ret
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ENDPROC(aesni_gcm_precomp_avx_gen2)
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ENDPROC(aesni_gcm_init_avx_gen2)
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###############################################################################
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#void aesni_gcm_enc_avx_gen2(
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#void aesni_gcm_enc_update_avx_gen2(
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# gcm_data *my_ctx_data, /* aligned to 16 Bytes */
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# gcm_context_data *data,
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# u8 *out, /* Ciphertext output. Encrypt in-place is allowed. */
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# const u8 *in, /* Plaintext input */
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# u64 plaintext_len, /* Length of data in Bytes for encryption. */
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# u8 *iv, /* Pre-counter block j0: 4 byte salt
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# (from Security Association) concatenated with 8 byte
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# Initialisation Vector (from IPSec ESP Payload)
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# concatenated with 0x00000001. 16-byte aligned pointer. */
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# const u8 *aad, /* Additional Authentication Data (AAD)*/
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# u64 aad_len, /* Length of AAD in bytes. With RFC4106 this is going to be 8 or 12 Bytes */
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# u8 *auth_tag, /* Authenticated Tag output. */
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# u64 auth_tag_len)# /* Authenticated Tag Length in bytes.
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# Valid values are 16 (most likely), 12 or 8. */
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# u64 plaintext_len) /* Length of data in Bytes for encryption. */
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###############################################################################
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ENTRY(aesni_gcm_enc_avx_gen2)
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ENTRY(aesni_gcm_enc_update_avx_gen2)
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FUNC_SAVE
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mov keysize, %eax
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cmp $32, %eax
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je key_256_enc
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je key_256_enc_update
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cmp $16, %eax
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je key_128_enc
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je key_128_enc_update
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# must be 192
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GCM_ENC_DEC INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX, GHASH_8_ENCRYPT_8_PARALLEL_AVX, GHASH_LAST_8_AVX, GHASH_MUL_AVX, ENC, 11
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FUNC_RESTORE
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ret
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key_128_enc:
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key_128_enc_update:
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GCM_ENC_DEC INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX, GHASH_8_ENCRYPT_8_PARALLEL_AVX, GHASH_LAST_8_AVX, GHASH_MUL_AVX, ENC, 9
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FUNC_RESTORE
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ret
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key_256_enc:
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key_256_enc_update:
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GCM_ENC_DEC INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX, GHASH_8_ENCRYPT_8_PARALLEL_AVX, GHASH_LAST_8_AVX, GHASH_MUL_AVX, ENC, 13
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FUNC_RESTORE
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ret
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ENDPROC(aesni_gcm_enc_avx_gen2)
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ENDPROC(aesni_gcm_enc_update_avx_gen2)
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###############################################################################
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#void aesni_gcm_dec_avx_gen2(
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#void aesni_gcm_dec_update_avx_gen2(
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# gcm_data *my_ctx_data, /* aligned to 16 Bytes */
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# gcm_context_data *data,
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# u8 *out, /* Plaintext output. Decrypt in-place is allowed. */
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# const u8 *in, /* Ciphertext input */
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# u64 plaintext_len, /* Length of data in Bytes for encryption. */
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# u8 *iv, /* Pre-counter block j0: 4 byte salt
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# (from Security Association) concatenated with 8 byte
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# Initialisation Vector (from IPSec ESP Payload)
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# concatenated with 0x00000001. 16-byte aligned pointer. */
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# const u8 *aad, /* Additional Authentication Data (AAD)*/
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# u64 aad_len, /* Length of AAD in bytes. With RFC4106 this is going to be 8 or 12 Bytes */
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# u8 *auth_tag, /* Authenticated Tag output. */
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# u64 auth_tag_len)# /* Authenticated Tag Length in bytes.
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# Valid values are 16 (most likely), 12 or 8. */
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# u64 plaintext_len) /* Length of data in Bytes for encryption. */
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###############################################################################
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ENTRY(aesni_gcm_dec_avx_gen2)
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ENTRY(aesni_gcm_dec_update_avx_gen2)
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FUNC_SAVE
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mov keysize,%eax
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cmp $32, %eax
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je key_256_dec
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je key_256_dec_update
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cmp $16, %eax
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je key_128_dec
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je key_128_dec_update
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# must be 192
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GCM_ENC_DEC INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX, GHASH_8_ENCRYPT_8_PARALLEL_AVX, GHASH_LAST_8_AVX, GHASH_MUL_AVX, DEC, 11
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FUNC_RESTORE
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ret
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key_128_dec:
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key_128_dec_update:
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GCM_ENC_DEC INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX, GHASH_8_ENCRYPT_8_PARALLEL_AVX, GHASH_LAST_8_AVX, GHASH_MUL_AVX, DEC, 9
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FUNC_RESTORE
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ret
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key_256_dec:
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key_256_dec_update:
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GCM_ENC_DEC INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX, GHASH_8_ENCRYPT_8_PARALLEL_AVX, GHASH_LAST_8_AVX, GHASH_MUL_AVX, DEC, 13
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FUNC_RESTORE
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ret
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ENDPROC(aesni_gcm_dec_avx_gen2)
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ENDPROC(aesni_gcm_dec_update_avx_gen2)
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###############################################################################
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#void aesni_gcm_finalize_avx_gen2(
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# gcm_data *my_ctx_data, /* aligned to 16 Bytes */
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# gcm_context_data *data,
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# u8 *auth_tag, /* Authenticated Tag output. */
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# u64 auth_tag_len)# /* Authenticated Tag Length in bytes.
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# Valid values are 16 (most likely), 12 or 8. */
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###############################################################################
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ENTRY(aesni_gcm_finalize_avx_gen2)
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FUNC_SAVE
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mov keysize,%eax
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cmp $32, %eax
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je key_256_finalize
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cmp $16, %eax
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je key_128_finalize
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# must be 192
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GCM_COMPLETE GHASH_MUL_AVX, 11, arg3, arg4
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FUNC_RESTORE
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ret
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key_128_finalize:
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GCM_COMPLETE GHASH_MUL_AVX, 9, arg3, arg4
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FUNC_RESTORE
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ret
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key_256_finalize:
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GCM_COMPLETE GHASH_MUL_AVX, 13, arg3, arg4
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FUNC_RESTORE
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ret
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ENDPROC(aesni_gcm_finalize_avx_gen2)
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#endif /* CONFIG_AS_AVX */
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#ifdef CONFIG_AS_AVX2
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@ -2724,24 +2735,23 @@ _initial_blocks_done\@:
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#############################################################
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#void aesni_gcm_precomp_avx_gen4
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#void aesni_gcm_init_avx_gen4
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# (gcm_data *my_ctx_data,
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# gcm_context_data *data,
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# u8 *hash_subkey# /* H, the Hash sub key input. Data starts on a 16-byte boundary. */
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# u8 *iv, /* Pre-counter block j0: 4 byte salt
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# (from Security Association) concatenated with 8 byte
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# Initialisation Vector (from IPSec ESP Payload)
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# concatenated with 0x00000001. 16-byte aligned pointer. */
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# u8 *hash_subkey# /* H, the Hash sub key input. Data starts on a 16-byte boundary. */
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# const u8 *aad, /* Additional Authentication Data (AAD)*/
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# u64 aad_len) /* Length of AAD in bytes. With RFC4106 this is going to be 8 or 12 Bytes */
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#############################################################
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ENTRY(aesni_gcm_precomp_avx_gen4)
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ENTRY(aesni_gcm_init_avx_gen4)
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FUNC_SAVE
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INIT GHASH_MUL_AVX2, PRECOMPUTE_AVX2
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FUNC_RESTORE
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ret
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ENDPROC(aesni_gcm_precomp_avx_gen4)
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ENDPROC(aesni_gcm_init_avx_gen4)
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###############################################################################
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#void aesni_gcm_enc_avx_gen4(
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@ -2749,74 +2759,85 @@ ENDPROC(aesni_gcm_precomp_avx_gen4)
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# gcm_context_data *data,
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# u8 *out, /* Ciphertext output. Encrypt in-place is allowed. */
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# const u8 *in, /* Plaintext input */
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# u64 plaintext_len, /* Length of data in Bytes for encryption. */
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# u8 *iv, /* Pre-counter block j0: 4 byte salt
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# (from Security Association) concatenated with 8 byte
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# Initialisation Vector (from IPSec ESP Payload)
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# concatenated with 0x00000001. 16-byte aligned pointer. */
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# const u8 *aad, /* Additional Authentication Data (AAD)*/
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# u64 aad_len, /* Length of AAD in bytes. With RFC4106 this is going to be 8 or 12 Bytes */
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# u8 *auth_tag, /* Authenticated Tag output. */
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# u64 auth_tag_len)# /* Authenticated Tag Length in bytes.
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# Valid values are 16 (most likely), 12 or 8. */
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# u64 plaintext_len) /* Length of data in Bytes for encryption. */
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###############################################################################
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ENTRY(aesni_gcm_enc_avx_gen4)
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ENTRY(aesni_gcm_enc_update_avx_gen4)
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FUNC_SAVE
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mov keysize,%eax
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cmp $32, %eax
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je key_256_enc4
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je key_256_enc_update4
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cmp $16, %eax
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je key_128_enc4
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je key_128_enc_update4
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# must be 192
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GCM_ENC_DEC INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX2, GHASH_8_ENCRYPT_8_PARALLEL_AVX2, GHASH_LAST_8_AVX2, GHASH_MUL_AVX2, ENC, 11
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FUNC_RESTORE
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ret
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key_128_enc4:
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key_128_enc_update4:
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GCM_ENC_DEC INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX2, GHASH_8_ENCRYPT_8_PARALLEL_AVX2, GHASH_LAST_8_AVX2, GHASH_MUL_AVX2, ENC, 9
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FUNC_RESTORE
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ret
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key_256_enc4:
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key_256_enc_update4:
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GCM_ENC_DEC INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX2, GHASH_8_ENCRYPT_8_PARALLEL_AVX2, GHASH_LAST_8_AVX2, GHASH_MUL_AVX2, ENC, 13
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FUNC_RESTORE
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ret
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ENDPROC(aesni_gcm_enc_avx_gen4)
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ENDPROC(aesni_gcm_enc_update_avx_gen4)
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###############################################################################
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#void aesni_gcm_dec_avx_gen4(
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#void aesni_gcm_dec_update_avx_gen4(
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# gcm_data *my_ctx_data, /* aligned to 16 Bytes */
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# gcm_context_data *data,
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# u8 *out, /* Plaintext output. Decrypt in-place is allowed. */
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# const u8 *in, /* Ciphertext input */
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# u64 plaintext_len, /* Length of data in Bytes for encryption. */
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# u8 *iv, /* Pre-counter block j0: 4 byte salt
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# (from Security Association) concatenated with 8 byte
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# Initialisation Vector (from IPSec ESP Payload)
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# concatenated with 0x00000001. 16-byte aligned pointer. */
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# const u8 *aad, /* Additional Authentication Data (AAD)*/
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# u64 aad_len, /* Length of AAD in bytes. With RFC4106 this is going to be 8 or 12 Bytes */
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# u8 *auth_tag, /* Authenticated Tag output. */
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# u64 auth_tag_len)# /* Authenticated Tag Length in bytes.
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# Valid values are 16 (most likely), 12 or 8. */
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# u64 plaintext_len) /* Length of data in Bytes for encryption. */
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###############################################################################
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ENTRY(aesni_gcm_dec_avx_gen4)
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ENTRY(aesni_gcm_dec_update_avx_gen4)
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FUNC_SAVE
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mov keysize,%eax
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cmp $32, %eax
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je key_256_dec4
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je key_256_dec_update4
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cmp $16, %eax
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je key_128_dec4
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je key_128_dec_update4
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# must be 192
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GCM_ENC_DEC INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX2, GHASH_8_ENCRYPT_8_PARALLEL_AVX2, GHASH_LAST_8_AVX2, GHASH_MUL_AVX2, DEC, 11
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FUNC_RESTORE
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ret
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key_128_dec4:
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key_128_dec_update4:
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GCM_ENC_DEC INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX2, GHASH_8_ENCRYPT_8_PARALLEL_AVX2, GHASH_LAST_8_AVX2, GHASH_MUL_AVX2, DEC, 9
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FUNC_RESTORE
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ret
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key_256_dec4:
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key_256_dec_update4:
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GCM_ENC_DEC INITIAL_BLOCKS_AVX2, GHASH_8_ENCRYPT_8_PARALLEL_AVX2, GHASH_LAST_8_AVX2, GHASH_MUL_AVX2, DEC, 13
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FUNC_RESTORE
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ret
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ENDPROC(aesni_gcm_dec_avx_gen4)
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ENDPROC(aesni_gcm_dec_update_avx_gen4)
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###############################################################################
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#void aesni_gcm_finalize_avx_gen4(
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# gcm_data *my_ctx_data, /* aligned to 16 Bytes */
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# gcm_context_data *data,
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# u8 *auth_tag, /* Authenticated Tag output. */
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# u64 auth_tag_len)# /* Authenticated Tag Length in bytes.
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# Valid values are 16 (most likely), 12 or 8. */
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###############################################################################
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ENTRY(aesni_gcm_finalize_avx_gen4)
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FUNC_SAVE
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mov keysize,%eax
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cmp $32, %eax
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je key_256_finalize4
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cmp $16, %eax
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je key_128_finalize4
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# must be 192
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GCM_COMPLETE GHASH_MUL_AVX2, 11, arg3, arg4
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FUNC_RESTORE
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ret
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key_128_finalize4:
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GCM_COMPLETE GHASH_MUL_AVX2, 9, arg3, arg4
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FUNC_RESTORE
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ret
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key_256_finalize4:
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GCM_COMPLETE GHASH_MUL_AVX2, 13, arg3, arg4
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FUNC_RESTORE
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ret
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ENDPROC(aesni_gcm_finalize_avx_gen4)
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#endif /* CONFIG_AS_AVX2 */
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@ -175,6 +175,32 @@ asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_finalize(void *ctx,
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struct gcm_context_data *gdata,
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u8 *auth_tag, unsigned long auth_tag_len);
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static struct aesni_gcm_tfm_s {
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void (*init)(void *ctx,
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struct gcm_context_data *gdata,
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u8 *iv,
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u8 *hash_subkey, const u8 *aad,
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unsigned long aad_len);
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void (*enc_update)(void *ctx,
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struct gcm_context_data *gdata, u8 *out,
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const u8 *in,
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unsigned long plaintext_len);
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void (*dec_update)(void *ctx,
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struct gcm_context_data *gdata, u8 *out,
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const u8 *in,
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unsigned long ciphertext_len);
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void (*finalize)(void *ctx,
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struct gcm_context_data *gdata,
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u8 *auth_tag, unsigned long auth_tag_len);
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} *aesni_gcm_tfm;
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struct aesni_gcm_tfm_s aesni_gcm_tfm_sse = {
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.init = &aesni_gcm_init,
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.enc_update = &aesni_gcm_enc_update,
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.dec_update = &aesni_gcm_dec_update,
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.finalize = &aesni_gcm_finalize,
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};
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#ifdef CONFIG_AS_AVX
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asmlinkage void aes_ctr_enc_128_avx_by8(const u8 *in, u8 *iv,
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void *keys, u8 *out, unsigned int num_bytes);
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@ -183,16 +209,27 @@ asmlinkage void aes_ctr_enc_192_avx_by8(const u8 *in, u8 *iv,
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asmlinkage void aes_ctr_enc_256_avx_by8(const u8 *in, u8 *iv,
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void *keys, u8 *out, unsigned int num_bytes);
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/*
|
||||
* asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_precomp_avx_gen2()
|
||||
* asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_init_avx_gen2()
|
||||
* gcm_data *my_ctx_data, context data
|
||||
* u8 *hash_subkey, the Hash sub key input. Data starts on a 16-byte boundary.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_precomp_avx_gen2(void *my_ctx_data,
|
||||
struct gcm_context_data *gdata,
|
||||
u8 *hash_subkey,
|
||||
u8 *iv,
|
||||
const u8 *aad,
|
||||
unsigned long aad_len);
|
||||
asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_init_avx_gen2(void *my_ctx_data,
|
||||
struct gcm_context_data *gdata,
|
||||
u8 *iv,
|
||||
u8 *hash_subkey,
|
||||
const u8 *aad,
|
||||
unsigned long aad_len);
|
||||
|
||||
asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_enc_update_avx_gen2(void *ctx,
|
||||
struct gcm_context_data *gdata, u8 *out,
|
||||
const u8 *in, unsigned long plaintext_len);
|
||||
asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_dec_update_avx_gen2(void *ctx,
|
||||
struct gcm_context_data *gdata, u8 *out,
|
||||
const u8 *in,
|
||||
unsigned long ciphertext_len);
|
||||
asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_finalize_avx_gen2(void *ctx,
|
||||
struct gcm_context_data *gdata,
|
||||
u8 *auth_tag, unsigned long auth_tag_len);
|
||||
|
||||
asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_enc_avx_gen2(void *ctx,
|
||||
struct gcm_context_data *gdata, u8 *out,
|
||||
|
|
@ -206,55 +243,38 @@ asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_dec_avx_gen2(void *ctx,
|
|||
const u8 *aad, unsigned long aad_len,
|
||||
u8 *auth_tag, unsigned long auth_tag_len);
|
||||
|
||||
static void aesni_gcm_enc_avx(void *ctx,
|
||||
struct gcm_context_data *data, u8 *out,
|
||||
const u8 *in, unsigned long plaintext_len, u8 *iv,
|
||||
u8 *hash_subkey, const u8 *aad, unsigned long aad_len,
|
||||
u8 *auth_tag, unsigned long auth_tag_len)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (plaintext_len < AVX_GEN2_OPTSIZE) {
|
||||
aesni_gcm_enc(ctx, data, out, in,
|
||||
plaintext_len, iv, hash_subkey, aad,
|
||||
aad_len, auth_tag, auth_tag_len);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
aesni_gcm_precomp_avx_gen2(ctx, data, hash_subkey, iv,
|
||||
aad, aad_len);
|
||||
aesni_gcm_enc_avx_gen2(ctx, data, out, in, plaintext_len, iv,
|
||||
aad, aad_len, auth_tag, auth_tag_len);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
struct aesni_gcm_tfm_s aesni_gcm_tfm_avx_gen2 = {
|
||||
.init = &aesni_gcm_init_avx_gen2,
|
||||
.enc_update = &aesni_gcm_enc_update_avx_gen2,
|
||||
.dec_update = &aesni_gcm_dec_update_avx_gen2,
|
||||
.finalize = &aesni_gcm_finalize_avx_gen2,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
static void aesni_gcm_dec_avx(void *ctx,
|
||||
struct gcm_context_data *data, u8 *out,
|
||||
const u8 *in, unsigned long ciphertext_len, u8 *iv,
|
||||
u8 *hash_subkey, const u8 *aad, unsigned long aad_len,
|
||||
u8 *auth_tag, unsigned long auth_tag_len)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (ciphertext_len < AVX_GEN2_OPTSIZE) {
|
||||
aesni_gcm_dec(ctx, data, out, in,
|
||||
ciphertext_len, iv, hash_subkey, aad,
|
||||
aad_len, auth_tag, auth_tag_len);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
aesni_gcm_precomp_avx_gen2(ctx, data, hash_subkey, iv,
|
||||
aad, aad_len);
|
||||
aesni_gcm_dec_avx_gen2(ctx, data, out, in, ciphertext_len, iv,
|
||||
aad, aad_len, auth_tag, auth_tag_len);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef CONFIG_AS_AVX2
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_precomp_avx_gen4()
|
||||
* asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_init_avx_gen4()
|
||||
* gcm_data *my_ctx_data, context data
|
||||
* u8 *hash_subkey, the Hash sub key input. Data starts on a 16-byte boundary.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_precomp_avx_gen4(void *my_ctx_data,
|
||||
struct gcm_context_data *gdata,
|
||||
u8 *hash_subkey,
|
||||
u8 *iv,
|
||||
const u8 *aad,
|
||||
unsigned long aad_len);
|
||||
asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_init_avx_gen4(void *my_ctx_data,
|
||||
struct gcm_context_data *gdata,
|
||||
u8 *iv,
|
||||
u8 *hash_subkey,
|
||||
const u8 *aad,
|
||||
unsigned long aad_len);
|
||||
|
||||
asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_enc_update_avx_gen4(void *ctx,
|
||||
struct gcm_context_data *gdata, u8 *out,
|
||||
const u8 *in, unsigned long plaintext_len);
|
||||
asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_dec_update_avx_gen4(void *ctx,
|
||||
struct gcm_context_data *gdata, u8 *out,
|
||||
const u8 *in,
|
||||
unsigned long ciphertext_len);
|
||||
asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_finalize_avx_gen4(void *ctx,
|
||||
struct gcm_context_data *gdata,
|
||||
u8 *auth_tag, unsigned long auth_tag_len);
|
||||
|
||||
asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_enc_avx_gen4(void *ctx,
|
||||
struct gcm_context_data *gdata, u8 *out,
|
||||
|
|
@ -268,67 +288,15 @@ asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_dec_avx_gen4(void *ctx,
|
|||
const u8 *aad, unsigned long aad_len,
|
||||
u8 *auth_tag, unsigned long auth_tag_len);
|
||||
|
||||
static void aesni_gcm_enc_avx2(void *ctx,
|
||||
struct gcm_context_data *data, u8 *out,
|
||||
const u8 *in, unsigned long plaintext_len, u8 *iv,
|
||||
u8 *hash_subkey, const u8 *aad, unsigned long aad_len,
|
||||
u8 *auth_tag, unsigned long auth_tag_len)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (plaintext_len < AVX_GEN2_OPTSIZE) {
|
||||
aesni_gcm_enc(ctx, data, out, in,
|
||||
plaintext_len, iv, hash_subkey, aad,
|
||||
aad_len, auth_tag, auth_tag_len);
|
||||
} else if (plaintext_len < AVX_GEN4_OPTSIZE) {
|
||||
aesni_gcm_precomp_avx_gen2(ctx, data, hash_subkey, iv,
|
||||
aad, aad_len);
|
||||
aesni_gcm_enc_avx_gen2(ctx, data, out, in, plaintext_len, iv,
|
||||
aad, aad_len, auth_tag, auth_tag_len);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
aesni_gcm_precomp_avx_gen4(ctx, data, hash_subkey, iv,
|
||||
aad, aad_len);
|
||||
aesni_gcm_enc_avx_gen4(ctx, data, out, in, plaintext_len, iv,
|
||||
aad, aad_len, auth_tag, auth_tag_len);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
struct aesni_gcm_tfm_s aesni_gcm_tfm_avx_gen4 = {
|
||||
.init = &aesni_gcm_init_avx_gen4,
|
||||
.enc_update = &aesni_gcm_enc_update_avx_gen4,
|
||||
.dec_update = &aesni_gcm_dec_update_avx_gen4,
|
||||
.finalize = &aesni_gcm_finalize_avx_gen4,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
static void aesni_gcm_dec_avx2(void *ctx,
|
||||
struct gcm_context_data *data, u8 *out,
|
||||
const u8 *in, unsigned long ciphertext_len, u8 *iv,
|
||||
u8 *hash_subkey, const u8 *aad, unsigned long aad_len,
|
||||
u8 *auth_tag, unsigned long auth_tag_len)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (ciphertext_len < AVX_GEN2_OPTSIZE) {
|
||||
aesni_gcm_dec(ctx, data, out, in,
|
||||
ciphertext_len, iv, hash_subkey,
|
||||
aad, aad_len, auth_tag, auth_tag_len);
|
||||
} else if (ciphertext_len < AVX_GEN4_OPTSIZE) {
|
||||
aesni_gcm_precomp_avx_gen2(ctx, data, hash_subkey, iv,
|
||||
aad, aad_len);
|
||||
aesni_gcm_dec_avx_gen2(ctx, data, out, in, ciphertext_len, iv,
|
||||
aad, aad_len, auth_tag, auth_tag_len);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
aesni_gcm_precomp_avx_gen4(ctx, data, hash_subkey, iv,
|
||||
aad, aad_len);
|
||||
aesni_gcm_dec_avx_gen4(ctx, data, out, in, ciphertext_len, iv,
|
||||
aad, aad_len, auth_tag, auth_tag_len);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
static void (*aesni_gcm_enc_tfm)(void *ctx,
|
||||
struct gcm_context_data *data, u8 *out,
|
||||
const u8 *in, unsigned long plaintext_len,
|
||||
u8 *iv, u8 *hash_subkey, const u8 *aad,
|
||||
unsigned long aad_len, u8 *auth_tag,
|
||||
unsigned long auth_tag_len);
|
||||
|
||||
static void (*aesni_gcm_dec_tfm)(void *ctx,
|
||||
struct gcm_context_data *data, u8 *out,
|
||||
const u8 *in, unsigned long ciphertext_len,
|
||||
u8 *iv, u8 *hash_subkey, const u8 *aad,
|
||||
unsigned long aad_len, u8 *auth_tag,
|
||||
unsigned long auth_tag_len);
|
||||
|
||||
static inline struct
|
||||
aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx *aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx_get(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
|
||||
{
|
||||
|
|
@ -810,6 +778,7 @@ static int gcmaes_crypt_by_sg(bool enc, struct aead_request *req,
|
|||
{
|
||||
struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
|
||||
unsigned long auth_tag_len = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm);
|
||||
struct aesni_gcm_tfm_s *gcm_tfm = aesni_gcm_tfm;
|
||||
struct gcm_context_data data AESNI_ALIGN_ATTR;
|
||||
struct scatter_walk dst_sg_walk = {};
|
||||
unsigned long left = req->cryptlen;
|
||||
|
|
@ -827,6 +796,15 @@ static int gcmaes_crypt_by_sg(bool enc, struct aead_request *req,
|
|||
if (!enc)
|
||||
left -= auth_tag_len;
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef CONFIG_AS_AVX2
|
||||
if (left < AVX_GEN4_OPTSIZE && gcm_tfm == &aesni_gcm_tfm_avx_gen4)
|
||||
gcm_tfm = &aesni_gcm_tfm_avx_gen2;
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
#ifdef CONFIG_AS_AVX
|
||||
if (left < AVX_GEN2_OPTSIZE && gcm_tfm == &aesni_gcm_tfm_avx_gen2)
|
||||
gcm_tfm = &aesni_gcm_tfm_sse;
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
/* Linearize assoc, if not already linear */
|
||||
if (req->src->length >= assoclen && req->src->length &&
|
||||
(!PageHighMem(sg_page(req->src)) ||
|
||||
|
|
@ -851,7 +829,7 @@ static int gcmaes_crypt_by_sg(bool enc, struct aead_request *req,
|
|||
}
|
||||
|
||||
kernel_fpu_begin();
|
||||
aesni_gcm_init(aes_ctx, &data, iv,
|
||||
gcm_tfm->init(aes_ctx, &data, iv,
|
||||
hash_subkey, assoc, assoclen);
|
||||
if (req->src != req->dst) {
|
||||
while (left) {
|
||||
|
|
@ -862,10 +840,10 @@ static int gcmaes_crypt_by_sg(bool enc, struct aead_request *req,
|
|||
len = min(srclen, dstlen);
|
||||
if (len) {
|
||||
if (enc)
|
||||
aesni_gcm_enc_update(aes_ctx, &data,
|
||||
gcm_tfm->enc_update(aes_ctx, &data,
|
||||
dst, src, len);
|
||||
else
|
||||
aesni_gcm_dec_update(aes_ctx, &data,
|
||||
gcm_tfm->dec_update(aes_ctx, &data,
|
||||
dst, src, len);
|
||||
}
|
||||
left -= len;
|
||||
|
|
@ -883,10 +861,10 @@ static int gcmaes_crypt_by_sg(bool enc, struct aead_request *req,
|
|||
len = scatterwalk_clamp(&src_sg_walk, left);
|
||||
if (len) {
|
||||
if (enc)
|
||||
aesni_gcm_enc_update(aes_ctx, &data,
|
||||
gcm_tfm->enc_update(aes_ctx, &data,
|
||||
src, src, len);
|
||||
else
|
||||
aesni_gcm_dec_update(aes_ctx, &data,
|
||||
gcm_tfm->dec_update(aes_ctx, &data,
|
||||
src, src, len);
|
||||
}
|
||||
left -= len;
|
||||
|
|
@ -895,7 +873,7 @@ static int gcmaes_crypt_by_sg(bool enc, struct aead_request *req,
|
|||
scatterwalk_done(&src_sg_walk, 1, left);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
aesni_gcm_finalize(aes_ctx, &data, authTag, auth_tag_len);
|
||||
gcm_tfm->finalize(aes_ctx, &data, authTag, auth_tag_len);
|
||||
kernel_fpu_end();
|
||||
|
||||
if (!assocmem)
|
||||
|
|
@ -928,145 +906,15 @@ static int gcmaes_crypt_by_sg(bool enc, struct aead_request *req,
|
|||
static int gcmaes_encrypt(struct aead_request *req, unsigned int assoclen,
|
||||
u8 *hash_subkey, u8 *iv, void *aes_ctx)
|
||||
{
|
||||
u8 one_entry_in_sg = 0;
|
||||
u8 *src, *dst, *assoc;
|
||||
struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
|
||||
unsigned long auth_tag_len = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm);
|
||||
struct scatter_walk src_sg_walk;
|
||||
struct scatter_walk dst_sg_walk = {};
|
||||
struct gcm_context_data data AESNI_ALIGN_ATTR;
|
||||
|
||||
if (aesni_gcm_enc_tfm == aesni_gcm_enc ||
|
||||
req->cryptlen < AVX_GEN2_OPTSIZE) {
|
||||
return gcmaes_crypt_by_sg(true, req, assoclen, hash_subkey, iv,
|
||||
aes_ctx);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (sg_is_last(req->src) &&
|
||||
(!PageHighMem(sg_page(req->src)) ||
|
||||
req->src->offset + req->src->length <= PAGE_SIZE) &&
|
||||
sg_is_last(req->dst) &&
|
||||
(!PageHighMem(sg_page(req->dst)) ||
|
||||
req->dst->offset + req->dst->length <= PAGE_SIZE)) {
|
||||
one_entry_in_sg = 1;
|
||||
scatterwalk_start(&src_sg_walk, req->src);
|
||||
assoc = scatterwalk_map(&src_sg_walk);
|
||||
src = assoc + req->assoclen;
|
||||
dst = src;
|
||||
if (unlikely(req->src != req->dst)) {
|
||||
scatterwalk_start(&dst_sg_walk, req->dst);
|
||||
dst = scatterwalk_map(&dst_sg_walk) + req->assoclen;
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
/* Allocate memory for src, dst, assoc */
|
||||
assoc = kmalloc(req->cryptlen + auth_tag_len + req->assoclen,
|
||||
GFP_ATOMIC);
|
||||
if (unlikely(!assoc))
|
||||
return -ENOMEM;
|
||||
scatterwalk_map_and_copy(assoc, req->src, 0,
|
||||
req->assoclen + req->cryptlen, 0);
|
||||
src = assoc + req->assoclen;
|
||||
dst = src;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
kernel_fpu_begin();
|
||||
aesni_gcm_enc_tfm(aes_ctx, &data, dst, src, req->cryptlen, iv,
|
||||
hash_subkey, assoc, assoclen,
|
||||
dst + req->cryptlen, auth_tag_len);
|
||||
kernel_fpu_end();
|
||||
|
||||
/* The authTag (aka the Integrity Check Value) needs to be written
|
||||
* back to the packet. */
|
||||
if (one_entry_in_sg) {
|
||||
if (unlikely(req->src != req->dst)) {
|
||||
scatterwalk_unmap(dst - req->assoclen);
|
||||
scatterwalk_advance(&dst_sg_walk, req->dst->length);
|
||||
scatterwalk_done(&dst_sg_walk, 1, 0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
scatterwalk_unmap(assoc);
|
||||
scatterwalk_advance(&src_sg_walk, req->src->length);
|
||||
scatterwalk_done(&src_sg_walk, req->src == req->dst, 0);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
scatterwalk_map_and_copy(dst, req->dst, req->assoclen,
|
||||
req->cryptlen + auth_tag_len, 1);
|
||||
kfree(assoc);
|
||||
}
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
return gcmaes_crypt_by_sg(true, req, assoclen, hash_subkey, iv,
|
||||
aes_ctx);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int gcmaes_decrypt(struct aead_request *req, unsigned int assoclen,
|
||||
u8 *hash_subkey, u8 *iv, void *aes_ctx)
|
||||
{
|
||||
u8 one_entry_in_sg = 0;
|
||||
u8 *src, *dst, *assoc;
|
||||
unsigned long tempCipherLen = 0;
|
||||
struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
|
||||
unsigned long auth_tag_len = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm);
|
||||
u8 authTag[16];
|
||||
struct scatter_walk src_sg_walk;
|
||||
struct scatter_walk dst_sg_walk = {};
|
||||
struct gcm_context_data data AESNI_ALIGN_ATTR;
|
||||
int retval = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
if (aesni_gcm_enc_tfm == aesni_gcm_enc ||
|
||||
req->cryptlen < AVX_GEN2_OPTSIZE) {
|
||||
return gcmaes_crypt_by_sg(false, req, assoclen, hash_subkey, iv,
|
||||
aes_ctx);
|
||||
}
|
||||
tempCipherLen = (unsigned long)(req->cryptlen - auth_tag_len);
|
||||
|
||||
if (sg_is_last(req->src) &&
|
||||
(!PageHighMem(sg_page(req->src)) ||
|
||||
req->src->offset + req->src->length <= PAGE_SIZE) &&
|
||||
sg_is_last(req->dst) && req->dst->length &&
|
||||
(!PageHighMem(sg_page(req->dst)) ||
|
||||
req->dst->offset + req->dst->length <= PAGE_SIZE)) {
|
||||
one_entry_in_sg = 1;
|
||||
scatterwalk_start(&src_sg_walk, req->src);
|
||||
assoc = scatterwalk_map(&src_sg_walk);
|
||||
src = assoc + req->assoclen;
|
||||
dst = src;
|
||||
if (unlikely(req->src != req->dst)) {
|
||||
scatterwalk_start(&dst_sg_walk, req->dst);
|
||||
dst = scatterwalk_map(&dst_sg_walk) + req->assoclen;
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
/* Allocate memory for src, dst, assoc */
|
||||
assoc = kmalloc(req->cryptlen + req->assoclen, GFP_ATOMIC);
|
||||
if (!assoc)
|
||||
return -ENOMEM;
|
||||
scatterwalk_map_and_copy(assoc, req->src, 0,
|
||||
req->assoclen + req->cryptlen, 0);
|
||||
src = assoc + req->assoclen;
|
||||
dst = src;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
kernel_fpu_begin();
|
||||
aesni_gcm_dec_tfm(aes_ctx, &data, dst, src, tempCipherLen, iv,
|
||||
hash_subkey, assoc, assoclen,
|
||||
authTag, auth_tag_len);
|
||||
kernel_fpu_end();
|
||||
|
||||
/* Compare generated tag with passed in tag. */
|
||||
retval = crypto_memneq(src + tempCipherLen, authTag, auth_tag_len) ?
|
||||
-EBADMSG : 0;
|
||||
|
||||
if (one_entry_in_sg) {
|
||||
if (unlikely(req->src != req->dst)) {
|
||||
scatterwalk_unmap(dst - req->assoclen);
|
||||
scatterwalk_advance(&dst_sg_walk, req->dst->length);
|
||||
scatterwalk_done(&dst_sg_walk, 1, 0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
scatterwalk_unmap(assoc);
|
||||
scatterwalk_advance(&src_sg_walk, req->src->length);
|
||||
scatterwalk_done(&src_sg_walk, req->src == req->dst, 0);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
scatterwalk_map_and_copy(dst, req->dst, req->assoclen,
|
||||
tempCipherLen, 1);
|
||||
kfree(assoc);
|
||||
}
|
||||
return retval;
|
||||
|
||||
return gcmaes_crypt_by_sg(false, req, assoclen, hash_subkey, iv,
|
||||
aes_ctx);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int helper_rfc4106_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
|
||||
|
|
@ -1434,21 +1282,18 @@ static int __init aesni_init(void)
|
|||
#ifdef CONFIG_AS_AVX2
|
||||
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX2)) {
|
||||
pr_info("AVX2 version of gcm_enc/dec engaged.\n");
|
||||
aesni_gcm_enc_tfm = aesni_gcm_enc_avx2;
|
||||
aesni_gcm_dec_tfm = aesni_gcm_dec_avx2;
|
||||
aesni_gcm_tfm = &aesni_gcm_tfm_avx_gen4;
|
||||
} else
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
#ifdef CONFIG_AS_AVX
|
||||
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX)) {
|
||||
pr_info("AVX version of gcm_enc/dec engaged.\n");
|
||||
aesni_gcm_enc_tfm = aesni_gcm_enc_avx;
|
||||
aesni_gcm_dec_tfm = aesni_gcm_dec_avx;
|
||||
aesni_gcm_tfm = &aesni_gcm_tfm_avx_gen2;
|
||||
} else
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
{
|
||||
pr_info("SSE version of gcm_enc/dec engaged.\n");
|
||||
aesni_gcm_enc_tfm = aesni_gcm_enc;
|
||||
aesni_gcm_dec_tfm = aesni_gcm_dec;
|
||||
aesni_gcm_tfm = &aesni_gcm_tfm_sse;
|
||||
}
|
||||
aesni_ctr_enc_tfm = aesni_ctr_enc;
|
||||
#ifdef CONFIG_AS_AVX
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue