IB/hfi1: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability
sl is controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. Fix this by sanitizing sl before using it to index ibp->sl_to_sc. Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20180423164740.GY17484@dhcp22.suse.cz/ Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190731175428.GA16736@embeddedor Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
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@ -54,6 +54,7 @@
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#include <linux/mm.h>
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#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
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#include <rdma/opa_addr.h>
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#include <linux/nospec.h>
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#include "hfi.h"
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#include "common.h"
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@ -1536,6 +1537,7 @@ static int hfi1_check_ah(struct ib_device *ibdev, struct rdma_ah_attr *ah_attr)
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sl = rdma_ah_get_sl(ah_attr);
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if (sl >= ARRAY_SIZE(ibp->sl_to_sc))
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return -EINVAL;
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sl = array_index_nospec(sl, ARRAY_SIZE(ibp->sl_to_sc));
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sc5 = ibp->sl_to_sc[sl];
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if (sc_to_vlt(dd, sc5) > num_vls && sc_to_vlt(dd, sc5) != 0xf)
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