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KVM: x86: Refactor prefix decoding to prevent Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks

commit 125ffc5e0a upstream.

This fixes Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerabilities in
vmx_read_guest_seg_selector(), vmx_read_guest_seg_base(),
vmx_read_guest_seg_limit() and vmx_read_guest_seg_ar().  When
invoked from emulation, these functions contain index computations
based on the (attacker-influenced) segment value.  Using constants
prevents the attack.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
5.4-rM2-2.2.x-imx-squashed
Marios Pomonis 2019-12-11 12:47:50 -08:00 committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman
parent 443fd0049d
commit 79777eb82c
1 changed files with 14 additions and 2 deletions

View File

@ -5212,16 +5212,28 @@ int x86_decode_insn(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, void *insn, int insn_len)
ctxt->ad_bytes = def_ad_bytes ^ 6;
break;
case 0x26: /* ES override */
has_seg_override = true;
ctxt->seg_override = VCPU_SREG_ES;
break;
case 0x2e: /* CS override */
has_seg_override = true;
ctxt->seg_override = VCPU_SREG_CS;
break;
case 0x36: /* SS override */
has_seg_override = true;
ctxt->seg_override = VCPU_SREG_SS;
break;
case 0x3e: /* DS override */
has_seg_override = true;
ctxt->seg_override = (ctxt->b >> 3) & 3;
ctxt->seg_override = VCPU_SREG_DS;
break;
case 0x64: /* FS override */
has_seg_override = true;
ctxt->seg_override = VCPU_SREG_FS;
break;
case 0x65: /* GS override */
has_seg_override = true;
ctxt->seg_override = ctxt->b & 7;
ctxt->seg_override = VCPU_SREG_GS;
break;
case 0x40 ... 0x4f: /* REX */
if (mode != X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64)