Some changes to trust cpu-based hwrng (such as RDRAND) for

initializing hashed pointers and (optionally, controlled by a config
 option) to initialize the CRNG to avoid boot hangs.
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Merge tag 'random_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/random

Pull random updates from Ted Ts'o:
 "Some changes to trust cpu-based hwrng (such as RDRAND) for
  initializing hashed pointers and (optionally, controlled by a config
  option) to initialize the CRNG to avoid boot hangs"

* tag 'random_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/random:
  random: Make crng state queryable
  random: remove preempt disabled region
  random: add a config option to trust the CPU's hwrng
  vsprintf: Add command line option debug_boot_weak_hash
  vsprintf: Use hw RNG for ptr_key
  random: Return nbytes filled from hw RNG
  random: Fix whitespace pre random-bytes work

Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt

@@ -748,6 +748,14 @@
 
 	debug		[KNL] Enable kernel debugging (events log level).
 
+	debug_boot_weak_hash
+			[KNL] Enable printing [hashed] pointers early in the
+			boot sequence.  If enabled, we use a weak hash instead
+			of siphash to hash pointers.  Use this option if you are
+			seeing instances of '(___ptrval___)') and need to see a
+			value (hashed pointer) instead. Cryptographically
+			insecure, please do not use on production kernels.
+
 	debug_locks_verbose=
 			[KNL] verbose self-tests
 			Format=<0|1>

drivers/char/Kconfig

@@ -554,3 +554,17 @@ config ADI
 
 endmenu
 
+config RANDOM_TRUST_CPU
+	bool "Trust the CPU manufacturer to initialize Linux's CRNG"
+	depends on X86 || S390 || PPC
+	default n
+	help
+	Assume that CPU manufacturer (e.g., Intel or AMD for RDSEED or
+	RDRAND, IBM for the S390 and Power PC architectures) is trustworthy
+	for the purposes of initializing Linux's CRNG.  Since this is not
+	something that can be independently audited, this amounts to trusting
+	that CPU manufacturer (perhaps with the insistence or mandate
+	of a Nation State's intelligence or law enforcement agencies)
+	has not installed a hidden back door to compromise the CPU's
+	random number generation facilities.
+

drivers/char/random.c

@@ -782,6 +782,7 @@ static void invalidate_batched_entropy(void);
 static void crng_initialize(struct crng_state *crng)
 {
 	int		i;
+	int		arch_init = 1;
 	unsigned long	rv;
 
 	memcpy(&crng->state[0], "expand 32-byte k", 16);
@@ -792,10 +793,18 @@ static void crng_initialize(struct crng_state *crng)
 		_get_random_bytes(&crng->state[4], sizeof(__u32) * 12);
 	for (i = 4; i < 16; i++) {
 		if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) &&
-		    !arch_get_random_long(&rv))
+		    !arch_get_random_long(&rv)) {
 			rv = random_get_entropy();
+			arch_init = 0;
+		}
 		crng->state[i] ^= rv;
 	}
+#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU
+	if (arch_init) {
+		crng_init = 2;
+		pr_notice("random: crng done (trusting CPU's manufacturer)\n");
+	}
+#endif
 	crng->init_time = jiffies - CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL - 1;
 }
 
@@ -1122,8 +1131,6 @@ static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned num)
 	} sample;
 	long delta, delta2, delta3;
 
-	preempt_disable();
-
 	sample.jiffies = jiffies;
 	sample.cycles = random_get_entropy();
 	sample.num = num;
@@ -1161,8 +1168,6 @@ static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned num)
 	 * and limit entropy entimate to 12 bits.
 	 */
 	credit_entropy_bits(r, min_t(int, fls(delta>>1), 11));
-
-	preempt_enable();
 }
 
 void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
@@ -1658,6 +1663,21 @@ int wait_for_random_bytes(void)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(wait_for_random_bytes);
 
+/*
+ * Returns whether or not the urandom pool has been seeded and thus guaranteed
+ * to supply cryptographically secure random numbers. This applies to: the
+ * /dev/urandom device, the get_random_bytes function, and the get_random_{u32,
+ * ,u64,int,long} family of functions.
+ *
+ * Returns: true if the urandom pool has been seeded.
+ *          false if the urandom pool has not been seeded.
+ */
+bool rng_is_initialized(void)
+{
+	return crng_ready();
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(rng_is_initialized);
+
 /*
  * Add a callback function that will be invoked when the nonblocking
  * pool is initialised.
@@ -1725,30 +1745,31 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(del_random_ready_callback);
  * key known by the NSA).  So it's useful if we need the speed, but
  * only if we're willing to trust the hardware manufacturer not to
  * have put in a back door.
+ *
+ * Return number of bytes filled in.
  */
-void get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes)
+int __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes)
 {
+	int left = nbytes;
 	char *p = buf;
 
-	trace_get_random_bytes_arch(nbytes, _RET_IP_);
-	while (nbytes) {
+	trace_get_random_bytes_arch(left, _RET_IP_);
+	while (left) {
 		unsigned long v;
-		int chunk = min(nbytes, (int)sizeof(unsigned long));
+		int chunk = min_t(int, left, sizeof(unsigned long));
 
 		if (!arch_get_random_long(&v))
 			break;
-		
+
 		memcpy(p, &v, chunk);
 		p += chunk;
-		nbytes -= chunk;
+		left -= chunk;
 	}
 
-	if (nbytes)
-		get_random_bytes(p, nbytes);
+	return nbytes - left;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes_arch);
 
-
 /*
  * init_std_data - initialize pool with system data
  *

include/linux/random.h

@@ -36,9 +36,10 @@ extern void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags) __latent_entropy;
 
 extern void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
 extern int wait_for_random_bytes(void);
+extern bool rng_is_initialized(void);
 extern int add_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy);
 extern void del_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy);
-extern void get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes);
+extern int __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes);
 
 #ifndef MODULE
 extern const struct file_operations random_fops, urandom_fops;

lib/vsprintf.c

@@ -1651,6 +1651,17 @@ char *device_node_string(char *buf, char *end, struct device_node *dn,
 	return widen_string(buf, buf - buf_start, end, spec);
 }
 
+/* Make pointers available for printing early in the boot sequence. */
+static int debug_boot_weak_hash __ro_after_init;
+
+static int __init debug_boot_weak_hash_enable(char *str)
+{
+	debug_boot_weak_hash = 1;
+	pr_info("debug_boot_weak_hash enabled\n");
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("debug_boot_weak_hash", debug_boot_weak_hash_enable);
+
 static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(not_filled_random_ptr_key);
 static siphash_key_t ptr_key __read_mostly;
 
@@ -1675,8 +1686,16 @@ static struct random_ready_callback random_ready = {
 
 static int __init initialize_ptr_random(void)
 {
-	int ret = add_random_ready_callback(&random_ready);
+	int key_size = sizeof(ptr_key);
+	int ret;
 
+	/* Use hw RNG if available. */
+	if (get_random_bytes_arch(&ptr_key, key_size) == key_size) {
+		static_branch_disable(&not_filled_random_ptr_key);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	ret = add_random_ready_callback(&random_ready);
 	if (!ret) {
 		return 0;
 	} else if (ret == -EALREADY) {
@@ -1695,6 +1714,12 @@ static char *ptr_to_id(char *buf, char *end, void *ptr, struct printf_spec spec)
 	const char *str = sizeof(ptr) == 8 ? "(____ptrval____)" : "(ptrval)";
 	unsigned long hashval;
 
+	/* When debugging early boot use non-cryptographically secure hash. */
+	if (unlikely(debug_boot_weak_hash)) {
+		hashval = hash_long((unsigned long)ptr, 32);
+		return pointer_string(buf, end, (const void *)hashval, spec);
+	}
+
 	if (static_branch_unlikely(&not_filled_random_ptr_key)) {
 		spec.field_width = 2 * sizeof(ptr);
 		/* string length must be less than default_width */