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old buffer overflow in moxa driver

I noticed that the moxa input checking security bug described by
CVE-2005-0504 appears to remain unfixed upstream.

The issue is described here:
  http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2005-0504

Debian has been shipping the following patch from Andres Salomon.

(akpm: it's a privileged operation)

Signed-off-by: dann frazier <dannf@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Andres Salomon <dilinger@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
hifive-unleashed-5.1
dann frazier 2007-05-08 00:31:39 -07:00 committed by Linus Torvalds
parent 83ae1b79c8
commit a2f72982e2
1 changed files with 6 additions and 2 deletions

View File

@ -1582,7 +1582,7 @@ copy:
if(copy_from_user(&dltmp, argp, sizeof(struct dl_str)))
return -EFAULT;
if(dltmp.cardno < 0 || dltmp.cardno >= MAX_BOARDS)
if(dltmp.cardno < 0 || dltmp.cardno >= MAX_BOARDS || dltmp.len < 0)
return -EINVAL;
switch(cmd)
@ -2529,6 +2529,8 @@ static int moxaloadbios(int cardno, unsigned char __user *tmp, int len)
void __iomem *baseAddr;
int i;
if(len < 0 || len > sizeof(moxaBuff))
return -EINVAL;
if(copy_from_user(moxaBuff, tmp, len))
return -EFAULT;
baseAddr = moxa_boards[cardno].basemem;
@ -2576,7 +2578,7 @@ static int moxaload320b(int cardno, unsigned char __user *tmp, int len)
void __iomem *baseAddr;
int i;
if(len > sizeof(moxaBuff))
if(len < 0 || len > sizeof(moxaBuff))
return -EINVAL;
if(copy_from_user(moxaBuff, tmp, len))
return -EFAULT;
@ -2596,6 +2598,8 @@ static int moxaloadcode(int cardno, unsigned char __user *tmp, int len)
void __iomem *baseAddr, *ofsAddr;
int retval, port, i;
if(len < 0 || len > sizeof(moxaBuff))
return -EINVAL;
if(copy_from_user(moxaBuff, tmp, len))
return -EFAULT;
baseAddr = moxa_boards[cardno].basemem;