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futex: Validate atomic acquisition in futex_lock_pi_atomic() 

We need to protect the atomic acquisition in the kernel against rogue
user space which sets the user space futex to 0, so the kernel side
acquisition succeeds while there is existing state in the kernel
associated to the real owner.

Verify whether the futex has waiters associated with kernel state.  If
it has, return -EINVAL.  The state is corrupted already, so no point in
cleaning it up.  Subsequent calls will fail as well.  Not our problem.

[ tglx: Use futex_top_waiter() and explain why we do not need to try
  	restoring the already corrupted user space state. ]

Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
hifive-unleashed-5.1
Thomas Gleixner 2014-06-03 12:27:06 +00:00 committed by Linus Torvalds
parent e9c243a5a6
commit b3eaa9fc5c
1 changed files with 11 additions and 3 deletions
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14
kernel/futex.c
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@ -910,10 +910,18 @@ retry:
return -EDEADLK;
/*
* Surprise - we got the lock. Just return to userspace:
* Surprise - we got the lock, but we do not trust user space at all.
*/
if (unlikely(!curval))
return 1;
if (unlikely(!curval)) {
/*
* We verify whether there is kernel state for this
* futex. If not, we can safely assume, that the 0 ->
* TID transition is correct. If state exists, we do
* not bother to fixup the user space state as it was
* corrupted already.
*/
return futex_top_waiter(hb, key) ? -EINVAL : 1;
}
uval = curval;