From da5b4cf021b9b239377a139e1d6a9055c89d984a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alex Deucher Date: Tue, 5 Jan 2021 11:45:45 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 01/14] Revert "drm/amd/display: Fix memory leaks in S3 resume" This reverts commit a135a1b4c4db1f3b8cbed9676a40ede39feb3362. This leads to blank screens on some boards after replugging a display. Revert until we understand the root cause and can fix both the leak and the blank screen after replug. Cc: Stylon Wang Cc: Harry Wentland Cc: Nicholas Kazlauskas Cc: Andre Tomt Cc: Oleksandr Natalenko Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm.c index 09410971615c..d2dd387c95d8 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm.c @@ -1434,8 +1434,7 @@ amdgpu_dm_update_connector_after_detect(struct amdgpu_dm_connector *aconnector) drm_connector_update_edid_property(connector, aconnector->edid); - aconnector->num_modes = drm_add_edid_modes(connector, aconnector->edid); - drm_connector_list_update(connector); + drm_add_edid_modes(connector, aconnector->edid); if (aconnector->dc_link->aux_mode) drm_dp_cec_set_edid(&aconnector->dm_dp_aux.aux, From 4d3ba541bede68f9fc3d767396a94cfe20af6fbb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Felix Fietkau Date: Tue, 5 Jan 2021 11:18:21 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 02/14] Revert "mtd: spinand: Fix OOB read" This reverts stable commit baad618d078c857f99cc286ea249e9629159901f. This commit is adding lines to spinand_write_to_cache_op, wheras the upstream commit 868cbe2a6dcee451bd8f87cbbb2a73cf463b57e5 that this was supposed to backport was touching spinand_read_from_cache_op. It causes a crash on writing OOB data by attempting to write to read-only kernel memory. Cc: Miquel Raynal Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/mtd/nand/spi/core.c | 4 ---- 1 file changed, 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/mtd/nand/spi/core.c b/drivers/mtd/nand/spi/core.c index 671700af9180..0d21c68bfe24 100644 --- a/drivers/mtd/nand/spi/core.c +++ b/drivers/mtd/nand/spi/core.c @@ -317,10 +317,6 @@ static int spinand_write_to_cache_op(struct spinand_device *spinand, buf += ret; } - if (req->ooblen) - memcpy(req->oobbuf.in, spinand->oobbuf + req->ooboffs, - req->ooblen); - return 0; } From f2a0b7677444e12e604ed84b6cecc01ec6228b48 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tudor Ambarus Date: Thu, 23 Jan 2020 14:03:02 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 03/14] dmaengine: at_hdmac: Substitute kzalloc with kmalloc commit a6e7f19c910068cb54983f36acebedb376f3a9ac upstream. All members of the structure are initialized below in the function, there is no need to use kzalloc. Signed-off-by: Tudor Ambarus Acked-by: Ludovic Desroches Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200123140237.125799-1-tudor.ambarus@microchip.com Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/dma/at_hdmac.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/dma/at_hdmac.c b/drivers/dma/at_hdmac.c index ff366c2f58c1..9f2c377c8d18 100644 --- a/drivers/dma/at_hdmac.c +++ b/drivers/dma/at_hdmac.c @@ -1673,7 +1673,7 @@ static struct dma_chan *at_dma_xlate(struct of_phandle_args *dma_spec, dma_cap_zero(mask); dma_cap_set(DMA_SLAVE, mask); - atslave = kzalloc(sizeof(*atslave), GFP_KERNEL); + atslave = kmalloc(sizeof(*atslave), GFP_KERNEL); if (!atslave) return NULL; From 20d5ee563bfdcd45cfcb9c898102e0c2f63f8b6f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yu Kuai Date: Mon, 17 Aug 2020 19:57:27 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 04/14] dmaengine: at_hdmac: add missing put_device() call in at_dma_xlate() commit 3832b78b3ec2cf51e07102f9b4480e343459b20f upstream. If of_find_device_by_node() succeed, at_dma_xlate() doesn't have a corresponding put_device(). Thus add put_device() to fix the exception handling for this function implementation. Fixes: bbe89c8e3d59 ("at_hdmac: move to generic DMA binding") Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200817115728.1706719-3-yukuai3@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/dma/at_hdmac.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/dma/at_hdmac.c b/drivers/dma/at_hdmac.c index 9f2c377c8d18..80c1974ef539 100644 --- a/drivers/dma/at_hdmac.c +++ b/drivers/dma/at_hdmac.c @@ -1674,8 +1674,10 @@ static struct dma_chan *at_dma_xlate(struct of_phandle_args *dma_spec, dma_cap_set(DMA_SLAVE, mask); atslave = kmalloc(sizeof(*atslave), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!atslave) + if (!atslave) { + put_device(&dmac_pdev->dev); return NULL; + } atslave->cfg = ATC_DST_H2SEL_HW | ATC_SRC_H2SEL_HW; /* @@ -1704,8 +1706,10 @@ static struct dma_chan *at_dma_xlate(struct of_phandle_args *dma_spec, atslave->dma_dev = &dmac_pdev->dev; chan = dma_request_channel(mask, at_dma_filter, atslave); - if (!chan) + if (!chan) { + put_device(&dmac_pdev->dev); return NULL; + } atchan = to_at_dma_chan(chan); atchan->per_if = dma_spec->args[0] & 0xff; From 61a0d8e437bbb2e496acfff7f356cebf92c5bf1a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yu Kuai Date: Mon, 17 Aug 2020 19:57:28 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 05/14] dmaengine: at_hdmac: add missing kfree() call in at_dma_xlate() commit e097eb7473d9e70da9e03276f61cd392ccb9d79f upstream. If memory allocation for 'atslave' succeed, at_dma_xlate() doesn't have a corresponding kfree() in exception handling. Thus add kfree() for this function implementation. Fixes: bbe89c8e3d59 ("at_hdmac: move to generic DMA binding") Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200817115728.1706719-4-yukuai3@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/dma/at_hdmac.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/dma/at_hdmac.c b/drivers/dma/at_hdmac.c index 80c1974ef539..303bc3e601a1 100644 --- a/drivers/dma/at_hdmac.c +++ b/drivers/dma/at_hdmac.c @@ -1708,6 +1708,7 @@ static struct dma_chan *at_dma_xlate(struct of_phandle_args *dma_spec, chan = dma_request_channel(mask, at_dma_filter, atslave); if (!chan) { put_device(&dmac_pdev->dev); + kfree(atslave); return NULL; } From 7a736f41013e8fa53629ac04f3528ef897e36e95 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josh Poimboeuf Date: Tue, 29 Dec 2020 15:14:55 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 06/14] kdev_t: always inline major/minor helper functions commit aa8c7db494d0a83ecae583aa193f1134ef25d506 upstream. Silly GCC doesn't always inline these trivial functions. Fixes the following warning: arch/x86/kernel/sys_ia32.o: warning: objtool: cp_stat64()+0xd8: call to new_encode_dev() with UACCESS enabled Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/984353b44a4484d86ba9f73884b7306232e25e30.1608737428.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Reported-by: Randy Dunlap Acked-by: Randy Dunlap [build-tested] Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/linux/kdev_t.h | 22 +++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/kdev_t.h b/include/linux/kdev_t.h index 85b5151911cf..4856706fbfeb 100644 --- a/include/linux/kdev_t.h +++ b/include/linux/kdev_t.h @@ -21,61 +21,61 @@ }) /* acceptable for old filesystems */ -static inline bool old_valid_dev(dev_t dev) +static __always_inline bool old_valid_dev(dev_t dev) { return MAJOR(dev) < 256 && MINOR(dev) < 256; } -static inline u16 old_encode_dev(dev_t dev) +static __always_inline u16 old_encode_dev(dev_t dev) { return (MAJOR(dev) << 8) | MINOR(dev); } -static inline dev_t old_decode_dev(u16 val) +static __always_inline dev_t old_decode_dev(u16 val) { return MKDEV((val >> 8) & 255, val & 255); } -static inline u32 new_encode_dev(dev_t dev) +static __always_inline u32 new_encode_dev(dev_t dev) { unsigned major = MAJOR(dev); unsigned minor = MINOR(dev); return (minor & 0xff) | (major << 8) | ((minor & ~0xff) << 12); } -static inline dev_t new_decode_dev(u32 dev) +static __always_inline dev_t new_decode_dev(u32 dev) { unsigned major = (dev & 0xfff00) >> 8; unsigned minor = (dev & 0xff) | ((dev >> 12) & 0xfff00); return MKDEV(major, minor); } -static inline u64 huge_encode_dev(dev_t dev) +static __always_inline u64 huge_encode_dev(dev_t dev) { return new_encode_dev(dev); } -static inline dev_t huge_decode_dev(u64 dev) +static __always_inline dev_t huge_decode_dev(u64 dev) { return new_decode_dev(dev); } -static inline int sysv_valid_dev(dev_t dev) +static __always_inline int sysv_valid_dev(dev_t dev) { return MAJOR(dev) < (1<<14) && MINOR(dev) < (1<<18); } -static inline u32 sysv_encode_dev(dev_t dev) +static __always_inline u32 sysv_encode_dev(dev_t dev) { return MINOR(dev) | (MAJOR(dev) << 18); } -static inline unsigned sysv_major(u32 dev) +static __always_inline unsigned sysv_major(u32 dev) { return (dev >> 18) & 0x3fff; } -static inline unsigned sysv_minor(u32 dev) +static __always_inline unsigned sysv_minor(u32 dev) { return dev & 0x3ffff; } From 06c672dd61b50ab589c33a3e65e183fa16df9394 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jonathan Cameron Date: Sun, 20 Sep 2020 12:27:39 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 07/14] iio:imu:bmi160: Fix alignment and data leak issues commit 7b6b51234df6cd8b04fe736b0b89c25612d896b8 upstream One of a class of bugs pointed out by Lars in a recent review. iio_push_to_buffers_with_timestamp assumes the buffer used is aligned to the size of the timestamp (8 bytes). This is not guaranteed in this driver which uses an array of smaller elements on the stack. As Lars also noted this anti pattern can involve a leak of data to userspace and that indeed can happen here. We close both issues by moving to a suitable array in the iio_priv() data with alignment explicitly requested. This data is allocated with kzalloc() so no data can leak apart from previous readings. In this driver, depending on which channels are enabled, the timestamp can be in a number of locations. Hence we cannot use a structure to specify the data layout without it being misleading. Fixes: 77c4ad2d6a9b ("iio: imu: Add initial support for Bosch BMI160") Reported-by: Lars-Peter Clausen Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Reviewed-by: Alexandru Ardelean Cc: Daniel Baluta Cc: Daniel Baluta Cc: Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200920112742.170751-6-jic23@kernel.org [sudip: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iio/imu/bmi160/bmi160.h | 7 +++++++ drivers/iio/imu/bmi160/bmi160_core.c | 6 ++---- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/iio/imu/bmi160/bmi160.h b/drivers/iio/imu/bmi160/bmi160.h index 621f5309d735..431f10c2b951 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/imu/bmi160/bmi160.h +++ b/drivers/iio/imu/bmi160/bmi160.h @@ -7,6 +7,13 @@ struct bmi160_data { struct regmap *regmap; struct iio_trigger *trig; + /* + * Ensure natural alignment for timestamp if present. + * Max length needed: 2 * 3 channels + 4 bytes padding + 8 byte ts. + * If fewer channels are enabled, less space may be needed, as + * long as the timestamp is still aligned to 8 bytes. + */ + __le16 buf[12] __aligned(8); }; extern const struct regmap_config bmi160_regmap_config; diff --git a/drivers/iio/imu/bmi160/bmi160_core.c b/drivers/iio/imu/bmi160/bmi160_core.c index a5994899e396..088694c82327 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/imu/bmi160/bmi160_core.c +++ b/drivers/iio/imu/bmi160/bmi160_core.c @@ -411,8 +411,6 @@ static irqreturn_t bmi160_trigger_handler(int irq, void *p) struct iio_poll_func *pf = p; struct iio_dev *indio_dev = pf->indio_dev; struct bmi160_data *data = iio_priv(indio_dev); - __le16 buf[12]; - /* 2 sens x 3 axis x __le16 + 2 x __le16 pad + 4 x __le16 tstamp */ int i, ret, j = 0, base = BMI160_REG_DATA_MAGN_XOUT_L; __le16 sample; @@ -422,10 +420,10 @@ static irqreturn_t bmi160_trigger_handler(int irq, void *p) &sample, sizeof(sample)); if (ret) goto done; - buf[j++] = sample; + data->buf[j++] = sample; } - iio_push_to_buffers_with_timestamp(indio_dev, buf, pf->timestamp); + iio_push_to_buffers_with_timestamp(indio_dev, data->buf, pf->timestamp); done: iio_trigger_notify_done(indio_dev->trig); return IRQ_HANDLED; From 732251cabeb3bfd917d453a42274d769d6883fc4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miklos Szeredi Date: Thu, 10 Dec 2020 15:33:14 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 08/14] fuse: fix bad inode [ Upstream commit 5d069dbe8aaf2a197142558b6fb2978189ba3454 ] Jan Kara's analysis of the syzbot report (edited): The reproducer opens a directory on FUSE filesystem, it then attaches dnotify mark to the open directory. After that a fuse_do_getattr() call finds that attributes returned by the server are inconsistent, and calls make_bad_inode() which, among other things does: inode->i_mode = S_IFREG; This then confuses dnotify which doesn't tear down its structures properly and eventually crashes. Avoid calling make_bad_inode() on a live inode: switch to a private flag on the fuse inode. Also add the test to ops which the bad_inode_ops would have caught. This bug goes back to the initial merge of fuse in 2.6.14... Reported-by: syzbot+f427adf9324b92652ccc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi Tested-by: Jan Kara Cc: Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/fuse/acl.c | 6 ++++++ fs/fuse/dir.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- fs/fuse/file.c | 19 +++++++++++-------- fs/fuse/fuse_i.h | 12 ++++++++++++ fs/fuse/inode.c | 4 ++-- fs/fuse/readdir.c | 4 ++-- fs/fuse/xattr.c | 9 +++++++++ 7 files changed, 74 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/fuse/acl.c b/fs/fuse/acl.c index 5a48cee6d7d3..f529075a2ce8 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/acl.c +++ b/fs/fuse/acl.c @@ -19,6 +19,9 @@ struct posix_acl *fuse_get_acl(struct inode *inode, int type) void *value = NULL; struct posix_acl *acl; + if (fuse_is_bad(inode)) + return ERR_PTR(-EIO); + if (!fc->posix_acl || fc->no_getxattr) return NULL; @@ -53,6 +56,9 @@ int fuse_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, int type) const char *name; int ret; + if (fuse_is_bad(inode)) + return -EIO; + if (!fc->posix_acl || fc->no_setxattr) return -EOPNOTSUPP; diff --git a/fs/fuse/dir.c b/fs/fuse/dir.c index ee190119f45c..60378f3baaae 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/dir.c +++ b/fs/fuse/dir.c @@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ static int fuse_dentry_revalidate(struct dentry *entry, unsigned int flags) int ret; inode = d_inode_rcu(entry); - if (inode && is_bad_inode(inode)) + if (inode && fuse_is_bad(inode)) goto invalid; else if (time_before64(fuse_dentry_time(entry), get_jiffies_64()) || (flags & LOOKUP_REVAL)) { @@ -386,6 +386,9 @@ static struct dentry *fuse_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *entry, bool outarg_valid = true; bool locked; + if (fuse_is_bad(dir)) + return ERR_PTR(-EIO); + locked = fuse_lock_inode(dir); err = fuse_lookup_name(dir->i_sb, get_node_id(dir), &entry->d_name, &outarg, &inode); @@ -529,6 +532,9 @@ static int fuse_atomic_open(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *entry, struct fuse_conn *fc = get_fuse_conn(dir); struct dentry *res = NULL; + if (fuse_is_bad(dir)) + return -EIO; + if (d_in_lookup(entry)) { res = fuse_lookup(dir, entry, 0); if (IS_ERR(res)) @@ -577,6 +583,9 @@ static int create_new_entry(struct fuse_conn *fc, struct fuse_args *args, int err; struct fuse_forget_link *forget; + if (fuse_is_bad(dir)) + return -EIO; + forget = fuse_alloc_forget(); if (!forget) return -ENOMEM; @@ -704,6 +713,9 @@ static int fuse_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *entry) struct fuse_conn *fc = get_fuse_conn(dir); FUSE_ARGS(args); + if (fuse_is_bad(dir)) + return -EIO; + args.opcode = FUSE_UNLINK; args.nodeid = get_node_id(dir); args.in_numargs = 1; @@ -740,6 +752,9 @@ static int fuse_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *entry) struct fuse_conn *fc = get_fuse_conn(dir); FUSE_ARGS(args); + if (fuse_is_bad(dir)) + return -EIO; + args.opcode = FUSE_RMDIR; args.nodeid = get_node_id(dir); args.in_numargs = 1; @@ -818,6 +833,9 @@ static int fuse_rename2(struct inode *olddir, struct dentry *oldent, struct fuse_conn *fc = get_fuse_conn(olddir); int err; + if (fuse_is_bad(olddir)) + return -EIO; + if (flags & ~(RENAME_NOREPLACE | RENAME_EXCHANGE)) return -EINVAL; @@ -953,7 +971,7 @@ static int fuse_do_getattr(struct inode *inode, struct kstat *stat, if (!err) { if (fuse_invalid_attr(&outarg.attr) || (inode->i_mode ^ outarg.attr.mode) & S_IFMT) { - make_bad_inode(inode); + fuse_make_bad(inode); err = -EIO; } else { fuse_change_attributes(inode, &outarg.attr, @@ -1155,6 +1173,9 @@ static int fuse_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) bool refreshed = false; int err = 0; + if (fuse_is_bad(inode)) + return -EIO; + if (!fuse_allow_current_process(fc)) return -EACCES; @@ -1250,7 +1271,7 @@ static const char *fuse_get_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, int err; err = -EIO; - if (is_bad_inode(inode)) + if (fuse_is_bad(inode)) goto out_err; if (fc->cache_symlinks) @@ -1298,7 +1319,7 @@ static int fuse_dir_fsync(struct file *file, loff_t start, loff_t end, struct fuse_conn *fc = get_fuse_conn(inode); int err; - if (is_bad_inode(inode)) + if (fuse_is_bad(inode)) return -EIO; if (fc->no_fsyncdir) @@ -1575,7 +1596,7 @@ int fuse_do_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr, if (fuse_invalid_attr(&outarg.attr) || (inode->i_mode ^ outarg.attr.mode) & S_IFMT) { - make_bad_inode(inode); + fuse_make_bad(inode); err = -EIO; goto error; } @@ -1631,6 +1652,9 @@ static int fuse_setattr(struct dentry *entry, struct iattr *attr) struct file *file = (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_FILE) ? attr->ia_file : NULL; int ret; + if (fuse_is_bad(inode)) + return -EIO; + if (!fuse_allow_current_process(get_fuse_conn(inode))) return -EACCES; @@ -1689,6 +1713,9 @@ static int fuse_getattr(const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat, struct inode *inode = d_inode(path->dentry); struct fuse_conn *fc = get_fuse_conn(inode); + if (fuse_is_bad(inode)) + return -EIO; + if (!fuse_allow_current_process(fc)) return -EACCES; diff --git a/fs/fuse/file.c b/fs/fuse/file.c index ab4fc1255aca..1e1aef1bc20b 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/file.c +++ b/fs/fuse/file.c @@ -222,6 +222,9 @@ int fuse_open_common(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, bool isdir) fc->atomic_o_trunc && fc->writeback_cache; + if (fuse_is_bad(inode)) + return -EIO; + err = generic_file_open(inode, file); if (err) return err; @@ -443,7 +446,7 @@ static int fuse_flush(struct file *file, fl_owner_t id) FUSE_ARGS(args); int err; - if (is_bad_inode(inode)) + if (fuse_is_bad(inode)) return -EIO; if (fc->no_flush) @@ -506,7 +509,7 @@ static int fuse_fsync(struct file *file, loff_t start, loff_t end, struct fuse_conn *fc = get_fuse_conn(inode); int err; - if (is_bad_inode(inode)) + if (fuse_is_bad(inode)) return -EIO; inode_lock(inode); @@ -830,7 +833,7 @@ static int fuse_readpage(struct file *file, struct page *page) int err; err = -EIO; - if (is_bad_inode(inode)) + if (fuse_is_bad(inode)) goto out; err = fuse_do_readpage(file, page); @@ -973,7 +976,7 @@ static int fuse_readpages(struct file *file, struct address_space *mapping, int err; err = -EIO; - if (is_bad_inode(inode)) + if (fuse_is_bad(inode)) goto out; data.file = file; @@ -1569,7 +1572,7 @@ static ssize_t fuse_file_read_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *to) struct file *file = iocb->ki_filp; struct fuse_file *ff = file->private_data; - if (is_bad_inode(file_inode(file))) + if (fuse_is_bad(file_inode(file))) return -EIO; if (!(ff->open_flags & FOPEN_DIRECT_IO)) @@ -1583,7 +1586,7 @@ static ssize_t fuse_file_write_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *from) struct file *file = iocb->ki_filp; struct fuse_file *ff = file->private_data; - if (is_bad_inode(file_inode(file))) + if (fuse_is_bad(file_inode(file))) return -EIO; if (!(ff->open_flags & FOPEN_DIRECT_IO)) @@ -2133,7 +2136,7 @@ static int fuse_writepages(struct address_space *mapping, int err; err = -EIO; - if (is_bad_inode(inode)) + if (fuse_is_bad(inode)) goto out; data.inode = inode; @@ -2911,7 +2914,7 @@ long fuse_ioctl_common(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, if (!fuse_allow_current_process(fc)) return -EACCES; - if (is_bad_inode(inode)) + if (fuse_is_bad(inode)) return -EIO; return fuse_do_ioctl(file, cmd, arg, flags); diff --git a/fs/fuse/fuse_i.h b/fs/fuse/fuse_i.h index d7cde216fc87..e3688312e9f1 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/fuse_i.h +++ b/fs/fuse/fuse_i.h @@ -158,6 +158,8 @@ enum { FUSE_I_INIT_RDPLUS, /** An operation changing file size is in progress */ FUSE_I_SIZE_UNSTABLE, + /* Bad inode */ + FUSE_I_BAD, }; struct fuse_conn; @@ -787,6 +789,16 @@ static inline u64 fuse_get_attr_version(struct fuse_conn *fc) return atomic64_read(&fc->attr_version); } +static inline void fuse_make_bad(struct inode *inode) +{ + set_bit(FUSE_I_BAD, &get_fuse_inode(inode)->state); +} + +static inline bool fuse_is_bad(struct inode *inode) +{ + return unlikely(test_bit(FUSE_I_BAD, &get_fuse_inode(inode)->state)); +} + /** Device operations */ extern const struct file_operations fuse_dev_operations; diff --git a/fs/fuse/inode.c b/fs/fuse/inode.c index f58ab84b09fb..aa1d5cf1bc3a 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/inode.c +++ b/fs/fuse/inode.c @@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ static void fuse_evict_inode(struct inode *inode) fuse_queue_forget(fc, fi->forget, fi->nodeid, fi->nlookup); fi->forget = NULL; } - if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) && !is_bad_inode(inode)) { + if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) && !fuse_is_bad(inode)) { WARN_ON(!list_empty(&fi->write_files)); WARN_ON(!list_empty(&fi->queued_writes)); } @@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ struct inode *fuse_iget(struct super_block *sb, u64 nodeid, unlock_new_inode(inode); } else if ((inode->i_mode ^ attr->mode) & S_IFMT) { /* Inode has changed type, any I/O on the old should fail */ - make_bad_inode(inode); + fuse_make_bad(inode); iput(inode); goto retry; } diff --git a/fs/fuse/readdir.c b/fs/fuse/readdir.c index 6a40f75a0d25..70f685b61e3a 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/readdir.c +++ b/fs/fuse/readdir.c @@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ retry: dput(dentry); goto retry; } - if (is_bad_inode(inode)) { + if (fuse_is_bad(inode)) { dput(dentry); return -EIO; } @@ -568,7 +568,7 @@ int fuse_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); int err; - if (is_bad_inode(inode)) + if (fuse_is_bad(inode)) return -EIO; mutex_lock(&ff->readdir.lock); diff --git a/fs/fuse/xattr.c b/fs/fuse/xattr.c index 20d052e08b3b..28fed5295770 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/xattr.c +++ b/fs/fuse/xattr.c @@ -113,6 +113,9 @@ ssize_t fuse_listxattr(struct dentry *entry, char *list, size_t size) struct fuse_getxattr_out outarg; ssize_t ret; + if (fuse_is_bad(inode)) + return -EIO; + if (!fuse_allow_current_process(fc)) return -EACCES; @@ -178,6 +181,9 @@ static int fuse_xattr_get(const struct xattr_handler *handler, struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *value, size_t size) { + if (fuse_is_bad(inode)) + return -EIO; + return fuse_getxattr(inode, name, value, size); } @@ -186,6 +192,9 @@ static int fuse_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) { + if (fuse_is_bad(inode)) + return -EIO; + if (!value) return fuse_removexattr(inode, name); From 71b8355ba667028557a88253096d6991a11abfba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "peterz@infradead.org" Date: Fri, 28 Aug 2020 14:37:20 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 09/14] perf: Break deadlock involving exec_update_mutex [ Upstream commit 78af4dc949daaa37b3fcd5f348f373085b4e858f ] Syzbot reported a lock inversion involving perf. The sore point being perf holding exec_update_mutex() for a very long time, specifically across a whole bunch of filesystem ops in pmu::event_init() (uprobes) and anon_inode_getfile(). This then inverts against procfs code trying to take exec_update_mutex. Move the permission checks later, such that we need to hold the mutex over less code. Reported-by: syzbot+db9cdf3dd1f64252c6ef@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- kernel/events/core.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------- 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c index 9f7c2da99299..18dbdf248ed8 100644 --- a/kernel/events/core.c +++ b/kernel/events/core.c @@ -11001,24 +11001,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, goto err_task; } - if (task) { - err = mutex_lock_interruptible(&task->signal->exec_update_mutex); - if (err) - goto err_task; - - /* - * Reuse ptrace permission checks for now. - * - * We must hold exec_update_mutex across this and any potential - * perf_install_in_context() call for this new event to - * serialize against exec() altering our credentials (and the - * perf_event_exit_task() that could imply). - */ - err = -EACCES; - if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS)) - goto err_cred; - } - if (flags & PERF_FLAG_PID_CGROUP) cgroup_fd = pid; @@ -11026,7 +11008,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, NULL, NULL, cgroup_fd); if (IS_ERR(event)) { err = PTR_ERR(event); - goto err_cred; + goto err_task; } if (is_sampling_event(event)) { @@ -11145,6 +11127,24 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, goto err_context; } + if (task) { + err = mutex_lock_interruptible(&task->signal->exec_update_mutex); + if (err) + goto err_file; + + /* + * Preserve ptrace permission check for backwards compatibility. + * + * We must hold exec_update_mutex across this and any potential + * perf_install_in_context() call for this new event to + * serialize against exec() altering our credentials (and the + * perf_event_exit_task() that could imply). + */ + err = -EACCES; + if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS)) + goto err_cred; + } + if (move_group) { gctx = __perf_event_ctx_lock_double(group_leader, ctx); @@ -11320,7 +11320,10 @@ err_locked: if (move_group) perf_event_ctx_unlock(group_leader, gctx); mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex); -/* err_file: */ +err_cred: + if (task) + mutex_unlock(&task->signal->exec_update_mutex); +err_file: fput(event_file); err_context: perf_unpin_context(ctx); @@ -11332,9 +11335,6 @@ err_alloc: */ if (!event_file) free_event(event); -err_cred: - if (task) - mutex_unlock(&task->signal->exec_update_mutex); err_task: if (task) put_task_struct(task); From 1b75a263fbd95f7e03af23921eb3f32086db66f1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Eric W. Biederman" Date: Thu, 3 Dec 2020 14:10:32 -0600 Subject: [PATCH 10/14] rwsem: Implement down_read_killable_nested [ Upstream commit 0f9368b5bf6db0c04afc5454b1be79022a681615 ] In preparation for converting exec_update_mutex to a rwsem so that multiple readers can execute in parallel and not deadlock, add down_read_killable_nested. This is needed so that kcmp_lock can be converted from working on a mutexes to working on rw_semaphores. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87o8jabqh3.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- include/linux/rwsem.h | 2 ++ kernel/locking/rwsem.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/linux/rwsem.h b/include/linux/rwsem.h index 00d6054687dd..c91ac00d1ff8 100644 --- a/include/linux/rwsem.h +++ b/include/linux/rwsem.h @@ -173,6 +173,7 @@ extern void downgrade_write(struct rw_semaphore *sem); * See Documentation/locking/lockdep-design.rst for more details.) */ extern void down_read_nested(struct rw_semaphore *sem, int subclass); +extern int __must_check down_read_killable_nested(struct rw_semaphore *sem, int subclass); extern void down_write_nested(struct rw_semaphore *sem, int subclass); extern int down_write_killable_nested(struct rw_semaphore *sem, int subclass); extern void _down_write_nest_lock(struct rw_semaphore *sem, struct lockdep_map *nest_lock); @@ -193,6 +194,7 @@ extern void down_read_non_owner(struct rw_semaphore *sem); extern void up_read_non_owner(struct rw_semaphore *sem); #else # define down_read_nested(sem, subclass) down_read(sem) +# define down_read_killable_nested(sem, subclass) down_read_killable(sem) # define down_write_nest_lock(sem, nest_lock) down_write(sem) # define down_write_nested(sem, subclass) down_write(sem) # define down_write_killable_nested(sem, subclass) down_write_killable(sem) diff --git a/kernel/locking/rwsem.c b/kernel/locking/rwsem.c index baafa1dd9fcc..2ce13f958577 100644 --- a/kernel/locking/rwsem.c +++ b/kernel/locking/rwsem.c @@ -1608,6 +1608,20 @@ void down_read_nested(struct rw_semaphore *sem, int subclass) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(down_read_nested); +int down_read_killable_nested(struct rw_semaphore *sem, int subclass) +{ + might_sleep(); + rwsem_acquire_read(&sem->dep_map, subclass, 0, _RET_IP_); + + if (LOCK_CONTENDED_RETURN(sem, __down_read_trylock, __down_read_killable)) { + rwsem_release(&sem->dep_map, _RET_IP_); + return -EINTR; + } + + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(down_read_killable_nested); + void _down_write_nest_lock(struct rw_semaphore *sem, struct lockdep_map *nest) { might_sleep(); From d390fc97df62dd76770eeab53f78e8ce2a07113d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Eric W. Biederman" Date: Thu, 3 Dec 2020 14:11:13 -0600 Subject: [PATCH 11/14] rwsem: Implement down_read_interruptible [ Upstream commit 31784cff7ee073b34d6eddabb95e3be2880a425c ] In preparation for converting exec_update_mutex to a rwsem so that multiple readers can execute in parallel and not deadlock, add down_read_interruptible. This is needed for perf_event_open to be converted (with no semantic changes) from working on a mutex to wroking on a rwsem. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87k0tybqfy.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- include/linux/rwsem.h | 1 + kernel/locking/rwsem.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/linux/rwsem.h b/include/linux/rwsem.h index c91ac00d1ff8..8a3606372abc 100644 --- a/include/linux/rwsem.h +++ b/include/linux/rwsem.h @@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ static inline int rwsem_is_contended(struct rw_semaphore *sem) * lock for reading */ extern void down_read(struct rw_semaphore *sem); +extern int __must_check down_read_interruptible(struct rw_semaphore *sem); extern int __must_check down_read_killable(struct rw_semaphore *sem); /* diff --git a/kernel/locking/rwsem.c b/kernel/locking/rwsem.c index 2ce13f958577..a5eb87f2c581 100644 --- a/kernel/locking/rwsem.c +++ b/kernel/locking/rwsem.c @@ -1348,6 +1348,18 @@ inline void __down_read(struct rw_semaphore *sem) } } +static inline int __down_read_interruptible(struct rw_semaphore *sem) +{ + if (!rwsem_read_trylock(sem)) { + if (IS_ERR(rwsem_down_read_slowpath(sem, TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE))) + return -EINTR; + DEBUG_RWSEMS_WARN_ON(!is_rwsem_reader_owned(sem), sem); + } else { + rwsem_set_reader_owned(sem); + } + return 0; +} + static inline int __down_read_killable(struct rw_semaphore *sem) { if (!rwsem_read_trylock(sem)) { @@ -1498,6 +1510,20 @@ void __sched down_read(struct rw_semaphore *sem) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(down_read); +int __sched down_read_interruptible(struct rw_semaphore *sem) +{ + might_sleep(); + rwsem_acquire_read(&sem->dep_map, 0, 0, _RET_IP_); + + if (LOCK_CONTENDED_RETURN(sem, __down_read_trylock, __down_read_interruptible)) { + rwsem_release(&sem->dep_map, _RET_IP_); + return -EINTR; + } + + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(down_read_interruptible); + int __sched down_read_killable(struct rw_semaphore *sem) { might_sleep(); From 117433236ae296d9770442960ddf57459177e90e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Eric W. Biederman" Date: Thu, 3 Dec 2020 14:12:00 -0600 Subject: [PATCH 12/14] exec: Transform exec_update_mutex into a rw_semaphore [ Upstream commit f7cfd871ae0c5008d94b6f66834e7845caa93c15 ] Recently syzbot reported[0] that there is a deadlock amongst the users of exec_update_mutex. The problematic lock ordering found by lockdep was: perf_event_open (exec_update_mutex -> ovl_i_mutex) chown (ovl_i_mutex -> sb_writes) sendfile (sb_writes -> p->lock) by reading from a proc file and writing to overlayfs proc_pid_syscall (p->lock -> exec_update_mutex) While looking at possible solutions it occured to me that all of the users and possible users involved only wanted to state of the given process to remain the same. They are all readers. The only writer is exec. There is no reason for readers to block on each other. So fix this deadlock by transforming exec_update_mutex into a rw_semaphore named exec_update_lock that only exec takes for writing. Cc: Jann Horn Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov Cc: Al Viro Cc: Bernd Edlinger Cc: Oleg Nesterov Cc: Christopher Yeoh Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov Cc: Sargun Dhillon Cc: Christian Brauner Cc: Arnd Bergmann Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo Fixes: eea9673250db ("exec: Add exec_update_mutex to replace cred_guard_mutex") [0] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/00000000000063640c05ade8e3de@google.com Reported-by: syzbot+db9cdf3dd1f64252c6ef@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87ft4mbqen.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/exec.c | 12 ++++++------ fs/proc/base.c | 10 +++++----- include/linux/sched/signal.h | 11 ++++++----- init/init_task.c | 2 +- kernel/events/core.c | 12 ++++++------ kernel/fork.c | 6 +++--- kernel/kcmp.c | 30 +++++++++++++++--------------- kernel/locking/rwsem.c | 4 ++-- 8 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c index 2441eb1a1e2d..1b4d2206d53a 100644 --- a/fs/exec.c +++ b/fs/exec.c @@ -1009,8 +1009,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(read_code); /* * Maps the mm_struct mm into the current task struct. - * On success, this function returns with the mutex - * exec_update_mutex locked. + * On success, this function returns with exec_update_lock + * held for writing. */ static int exec_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm) { @@ -1023,7 +1023,7 @@ static int exec_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm) old_mm = current->mm; exec_mm_release(tsk, old_mm); - ret = mutex_lock_killable(&tsk->signal->exec_update_mutex); + ret = down_write_killable(&tsk->signal->exec_update_lock); if (ret) return ret; @@ -1038,7 +1038,7 @@ static int exec_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm) down_read(&old_mm->mmap_sem); if (unlikely(old_mm->core_state)) { up_read(&old_mm->mmap_sem); - mutex_unlock(&tsk->signal->exec_update_mutex); + up_write(&tsk->signal->exec_update_lock); return -EINTR; } } @@ -1450,7 +1450,7 @@ static void free_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm) free_arg_pages(bprm); if (bprm->cred) { if (bprm->called_exec_mmap) - mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->exec_update_mutex); + up_write(¤t->signal->exec_update_lock); mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex); abort_creds(bprm->cred); } @@ -1500,7 +1500,7 @@ void install_exec_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) * credentials; any time after this it may be unlocked. */ security_bprm_committed_creds(bprm); - mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->exec_update_mutex); + up_write(¤t->signal->exec_update_lock); mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(install_exec_creds); diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c index b690074e65ff..653c2d8aa1cd 100644 --- a/fs/proc/base.c +++ b/fs/proc/base.c @@ -403,11 +403,11 @@ print0: static int lock_trace(struct task_struct *task) { - int err = mutex_lock_killable(&task->signal->exec_update_mutex); + int err = down_read_killable(&task->signal->exec_update_lock); if (err) return err; if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS)) { - mutex_unlock(&task->signal->exec_update_mutex); + up_read(&task->signal->exec_update_lock); return -EPERM; } return 0; @@ -415,7 +415,7 @@ static int lock_trace(struct task_struct *task) static void unlock_trace(struct task_struct *task) { - mutex_unlock(&task->signal->exec_update_mutex); + up_read(&task->signal->exec_update_lock); } #ifdef CONFIG_STACKTRACE @@ -2769,7 +2769,7 @@ static int do_io_accounting(struct task_struct *task, struct seq_file *m, int wh unsigned long flags; int result; - result = mutex_lock_killable(&task->signal->exec_update_mutex); + result = down_read_killable(&task->signal->exec_update_lock); if (result) return result; @@ -2805,7 +2805,7 @@ static int do_io_accounting(struct task_struct *task, struct seq_file *m, int wh result = 0; out_unlock: - mutex_unlock(&task->signal->exec_update_mutex); + up_read(&task->signal->exec_update_lock); return result; } diff --git a/include/linux/sched/signal.h b/include/linux/sched/signal.h index a29df79540ce..baf58f4cb057 100644 --- a/include/linux/sched/signal.h +++ b/include/linux/sched/signal.h @@ -226,12 +226,13 @@ struct signal_struct { * credential calculations * (notably. ptrace) * Deprecated do not use in new code. - * Use exec_update_mutex instead. - */ - struct mutex exec_update_mutex; /* Held while task_struct is being - * updated during exec, and may have - * inconsistent permissions. + * Use exec_update_lock instead. */ + struct rw_semaphore exec_update_lock; /* Held while task_struct is + * being updated during exec, + * and may have inconsistent + * permissions. + */ } __randomize_layout; /* diff --git a/init/init_task.c b/init/init_task.c index bd403ed3e418..df7041be96fc 100644 --- a/init/init_task.c +++ b/init/init_task.c @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ static struct signal_struct init_signals = { .multiprocess = HLIST_HEAD_INIT, .rlim = INIT_RLIMITS, .cred_guard_mutex = __MUTEX_INITIALIZER(init_signals.cred_guard_mutex), - .exec_update_mutex = __MUTEX_INITIALIZER(init_signals.exec_update_mutex), + .exec_update_lock = __RWSEM_INITIALIZER(init_signals.exec_update_lock), #ifdef CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS .posix_timers = LIST_HEAD_INIT(init_signals.posix_timers), .cputimer = { diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c index 18dbdf248ed8..2ef33e9a7591 100644 --- a/kernel/events/core.c +++ b/kernel/events/core.c @@ -1254,7 +1254,7 @@ static void put_ctx(struct perf_event_context *ctx) * function. * * Lock order: - * exec_update_mutex + * exec_update_lock * task_struct::perf_event_mutex * perf_event_context::mutex * perf_event::child_mutex; @@ -11128,14 +11128,14 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, } if (task) { - err = mutex_lock_interruptible(&task->signal->exec_update_mutex); + err = down_read_interruptible(&task->signal->exec_update_lock); if (err) goto err_file; /* * Preserve ptrace permission check for backwards compatibility. * - * We must hold exec_update_mutex across this and any potential + * We must hold exec_update_lock across this and any potential * perf_install_in_context() call for this new event to * serialize against exec() altering our credentials (and the * perf_event_exit_task() that could imply). @@ -11298,7 +11298,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex); if (task) { - mutex_unlock(&task->signal->exec_update_mutex); + up_read(&task->signal->exec_update_lock); put_task_struct(task); } @@ -11322,7 +11322,7 @@ err_locked: mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex); err_cred: if (task) - mutex_unlock(&task->signal->exec_update_mutex); + up_read(&task->signal->exec_update_lock); err_file: fput(event_file); err_context: @@ -11639,7 +11639,7 @@ static void perf_event_exit_task_context(struct task_struct *child, int ctxn) /* * When a child task exits, feed back event values to parent events. * - * Can be called with exec_update_mutex held when called from + * Can be called with exec_update_lock held when called from * install_exec_creds(). */ void perf_event_exit_task(struct task_struct *child) diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c index 419fff8eb9e5..50f37d5afb32 100644 --- a/kernel/fork.c +++ b/kernel/fork.c @@ -1221,7 +1221,7 @@ struct mm_struct *mm_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode) struct mm_struct *mm; int err; - err = mutex_lock_killable(&task->signal->exec_update_mutex); + err = down_read_killable(&task->signal->exec_update_lock); if (err) return ERR_PTR(err); @@ -1231,7 +1231,7 @@ struct mm_struct *mm_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode) mmput(mm); mm = ERR_PTR(-EACCES); } - mutex_unlock(&task->signal->exec_update_mutex); + up_read(&task->signal->exec_update_lock); return mm; } @@ -1586,7 +1586,7 @@ static int copy_signal(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk) sig->oom_score_adj_min = current->signal->oom_score_adj_min; mutex_init(&sig->cred_guard_mutex); - mutex_init(&sig->exec_update_mutex); + init_rwsem(&sig->exec_update_lock); return 0; } diff --git a/kernel/kcmp.c b/kernel/kcmp.c index b3ff9288c6cc..c0d2ad9b4705 100644 --- a/kernel/kcmp.c +++ b/kernel/kcmp.c @@ -75,25 +75,25 @@ get_file_raw_ptr(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int idx) return file; } -static void kcmp_unlock(struct mutex *m1, struct mutex *m2) +static void kcmp_unlock(struct rw_semaphore *l1, struct rw_semaphore *l2) { - if (likely(m2 != m1)) - mutex_unlock(m2); - mutex_unlock(m1); + if (likely(l2 != l1)) + up_read(l2); + up_read(l1); } -static int kcmp_lock(struct mutex *m1, struct mutex *m2) +static int kcmp_lock(struct rw_semaphore *l1, struct rw_semaphore *l2) { int err; - if (m2 > m1) - swap(m1, m2); + if (l2 > l1) + swap(l1, l2); - err = mutex_lock_killable(m1); - if (!err && likely(m1 != m2)) { - err = mutex_lock_killable_nested(m2, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING); + err = down_read_killable(l1); + if (!err && likely(l1 != l2)) { + err = down_read_killable_nested(l2, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING); if (err) - mutex_unlock(m1); + up_read(l1); } return err; @@ -173,8 +173,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(kcmp, pid_t, pid1, pid_t, pid2, int, type, /* * One should have enough rights to inspect task details. */ - ret = kcmp_lock(&task1->signal->exec_update_mutex, - &task2->signal->exec_update_mutex); + ret = kcmp_lock(&task1->signal->exec_update_lock, + &task2->signal->exec_update_lock); if (ret) goto err; if (!ptrace_may_access(task1, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS) || @@ -229,8 +229,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(kcmp, pid_t, pid1, pid_t, pid2, int, type, } err_unlock: - kcmp_unlock(&task1->signal->exec_update_mutex, - &task2->signal->exec_update_mutex); + kcmp_unlock(&task1->signal->exec_update_lock, + &task2->signal->exec_update_lock); err: put_task_struct(task1); put_task_struct(task2); diff --git a/kernel/locking/rwsem.c b/kernel/locking/rwsem.c index a5eb87f2c581..5d54ff3179b8 100644 --- a/kernel/locking/rwsem.c +++ b/kernel/locking/rwsem.c @@ -1516,7 +1516,7 @@ int __sched down_read_interruptible(struct rw_semaphore *sem) rwsem_acquire_read(&sem->dep_map, 0, 0, _RET_IP_); if (LOCK_CONTENDED_RETURN(sem, __down_read_trylock, __down_read_interruptible)) { - rwsem_release(&sem->dep_map, _RET_IP_); + rwsem_release(&sem->dep_map, 1, _RET_IP_); return -EINTR; } @@ -1640,7 +1640,7 @@ int down_read_killable_nested(struct rw_semaphore *sem, int subclass) rwsem_acquire_read(&sem->dep_map, subclass, 0, _RET_IP_); if (LOCK_CONTENDED_RETURN(sem, __down_read_trylock, __down_read_killable)) { - rwsem_release(&sem->dep_map, _RET_IP_); + rwsem_release(&sem->dep_map, 1, _RET_IP_); return -EINTR; } From 0a49aaf4df2936bca119ee38fe5a570a7024efdc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zhang Xiaohui Date: Sun, 6 Dec 2020 16:48:01 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 13/14] mwifiex: Fix possible buffer overflows in mwifiex_cmd_802_11_ad_hoc_start [ Upstream commit 5c455c5ab332773464d02ba17015acdca198f03d ] mwifiex_cmd_802_11_ad_hoc_start() calls memcpy() without checking the destination size may trigger a buffer overflower, which a local user could use to cause denial of service or the execution of arbitrary code. Fix it by putting the length check before calling memcpy(). Signed-off-by: Zhang Xiaohui Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201206084801.26479-1-ruc_zhangxiaohui@163.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/join.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/join.c b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/join.c index d87aeff70cef..c2cb1e711c06 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/join.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/join.c @@ -877,6 +877,8 @@ mwifiex_cmd_802_11_ad_hoc_start(struct mwifiex_private *priv, memset(adhoc_start->ssid, 0, IEEE80211_MAX_SSID_LEN); + if (req_ssid->ssid_len > IEEE80211_MAX_SSID_LEN) + req_ssid->ssid_len = IEEE80211_MAX_SSID_LEN; memcpy(adhoc_start->ssid, req_ssid->ssid, req_ssid->ssid_len); mwifiex_dbg(adapter, INFO, "info: ADHOC_S_CMD: SSID = %s\n", From f3a4c8d501452b8c2e04c4500c317ce4bdb1b47c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Sat, 9 Jan 2021 13:44:55 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 14/14] Linux 5.4.88 Tested-by: Jon Hunter Tested-by: Shuah Khan Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing Tested-by: Guenter Roeck Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210107143049.929352526@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Makefile | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index 71968b4bb313..450ebe152806 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 VERSION = 5 PATCHLEVEL = 4 -SUBLEVEL = 87 +SUBLEVEL = 88 EXTRAVERSION = NAME = Kleptomaniac Octopus