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x86/cpu: Add 'table' argument to cpu_matches() 

commit 93920f61c2 upstream

To make cpu_matches() reusable for other matching tables, have it take a
pointer to a x86_cpu_id table as an argument.

 [ bp: Flip arguments order. ]

Signed-off-by: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
5.4-rM2-2.2.x-imx-squashed
Mark Gross 2020-04-16 17:32:42 +02:00 committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman
parent 749ec6b48a
commit dab0161b8a
1 changed files with 14 additions and 11 deletions
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25
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
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@ -1093,9 +1093,9 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {
{}
};
static bool __init cpu_matches(unsigned long which)
static bool __init cpu_matches(const struct x86_cpu_id *table, unsigned long which)
{
const struct x86_cpu_id *m = x86_match_cpu(cpu_vuln_whitelist);
const struct x86_cpu_id *m = x86_match_cpu(table);
return m && !!(m->driver_data & which);
}
@ -1115,31 +1115,34 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
u64 ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
/* Set ITLB_MULTIHIT bug if cpu is not in the whitelist and not mitigated */
if (!cpu_matches(NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO))
if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT) &&
!(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT);
if (cpu_matches(NO_SPECULATION))
if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SPECULATION))
return;
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1);
if (!cpu_matches(NO_SPECTRE_V2))
if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SPECTRE_V2))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2);
if (!cpu_matches(NO_SSB) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO) &&
if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SSB) &&
!(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO) &&
!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSB_NO))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);
if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL)
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED);
if (!cpu_matches(NO_MDS) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)) {
if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MDS) &&
!(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)) {
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MDS);
if (cpu_matches(MSBDS_ONLY))
if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, MSBDS_ONLY))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY);
}
if (!cpu_matches(NO_SWAPGS))
if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SWAPGS))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SWAPGS);
/*
@ -1157,7 +1160,7 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR)))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_TAA);
if (cpu_matches(NO_MELTDOWN))
if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN))
return;
/* Rogue Data Cache Load? No! */
@ -1166,7 +1169,7 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN);
if (cpu_matches(NO_L1TF))
if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_L1TF))
return;
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF);