perf-security: wrap paragraphs on 72 columns
Implemented formatting of paragraphs to be not wider than 72 columns. Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>hifive-unleashed-5.1
Alexey Budankov
Jonathan Corbet
parent
e152c7b7bf
commit
e85a198e30
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@ -6,84 +6,94 @@ Perf Events and tool security
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Overview
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--------
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Usage of Performance Counters for Linux (perf_events) [1]_ , [2]_ , [3]_ can
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impose a considerable risk of leaking sensitive data accessed by monitored
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processes. The data leakage is possible both in scenarios of direct usage of
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perf_events system call API [2]_ and over data files generated by Perf tool user
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mode utility (Perf) [3]_ , [4]_ . The risk depends on the nature of data that
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perf_events performance monitoring units (PMU) [2]_ and Perf collect and expose
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for performance analysis. Collected system and performance data may be split into
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several categories:
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Usage of Performance Counters for Linux (perf_events) [1]_ , [2]_ , [3]_
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can impose a considerable risk of leaking sensitive data accessed by
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monitored processes. The data leakage is possible both in scenarios of
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direct usage of perf_events system call API [2]_ and over data files
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generated by Perf tool user mode utility (Perf) [3]_ , [4]_ . The risk
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depends on the nature of data that perf_events performance monitoring
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units (PMU) [2]_ and Perf collect and expose for performance analysis.
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Collected system and performance data may be split into several
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categories:
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1. System hardware and software configuration data, for example: a CPU model and
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its cache configuration, an amount of available memory and its topology, used
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kernel and Perf versions, performance monitoring setup including experiment
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time, events configuration, Perf command line parameters, etc.
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1. System hardware and software configuration data, for example: a CPU
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model and its cache configuration, an amount of available memory and
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its topology, used kernel and Perf versions, performance monitoring
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setup including experiment time, events configuration, Perf command
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line parameters, etc.
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2. User and kernel module paths and their load addresses with sizes, process and
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thread names with their PIDs and TIDs, timestamps for captured hardware and
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software events.
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2. User and kernel module paths and their load addresses with sizes,
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process and thread names with their PIDs and TIDs, timestamps for
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captured hardware and software events.
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3. Content of kernel software counters (e.g., for context switches, page faults,
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CPU migrations), architectural hardware performance counters (PMC) [8]_ and
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machine specific registers (MSR) [9]_ that provide execution metrics for
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various monitored parts of the system (e.g., memory controller (IMC), interconnect
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(QPI/UPI) or peripheral (PCIe) uncore counters) without direct attribution to any
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execution context state.
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3. Content of kernel software counters (e.g., for context switches, page
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faults, CPU migrations), architectural hardware performance counters
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(PMC) [8]_ and machine specific registers (MSR) [9]_ that provide
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execution metrics for various monitored parts of the system (e.g.,
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memory controller (IMC), interconnect (QPI/UPI) or peripheral (PCIe)
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uncore counters) without direct attribution to any execution context
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state.
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4. Content of architectural execution context registers (e.g., RIP, RSP, RBP on
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x86_64), process user and kernel space memory addresses and data, content of
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various architectural MSRs that capture data from this category.
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4. Content of architectural execution context registers (e.g., RIP, RSP,
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RBP on x86_64), process user and kernel space memory addresses and
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data, content of various architectural MSRs that capture data from
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this category.
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Data that belong to the fourth category can potentially contain sensitive process
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data. If PMUs in some monitoring modes capture values of execution context registers
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or data from process memory then access to such monitoring capabilities requires
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to be ordered and secured properly. So, perf_events/Perf performance monitoring
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is the subject for security access control management [5]_ .
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Data that belong to the fourth category can potentially contain
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sensitive process data. If PMUs in some monitoring modes capture values
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of execution context registers or data from process memory then access
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to such monitoring capabilities requires to be ordered and secured
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properly. So, perf_events/Perf performance monitoring is the subject for
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security access control management [5]_ .
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perf_events/Perf access control
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-------------------------------
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To perform security checks, the Linux implementation splits processes into two
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categories [6]_ : a) privileged processes (whose effective user ID is 0, referred
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to as superuser or root), and b) unprivileged processes (whose effective UID is
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nonzero). Privileged processes bypass all kernel security permission checks so
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perf_events performance monitoring is fully available to privileged processes
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without access, scope and resource restrictions.
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To perform security checks, the Linux implementation splits processes
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into two categories [6]_ : a) privileged processes (whose effective user
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ID is 0, referred to as superuser or root), and b) unprivileged
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processes (whose effective UID is nonzero). Privileged processes bypass
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all kernel security permission checks so perf_events performance
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monitoring is fully available to privileged processes without access,
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scope and resource restrictions.
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Unprivileged processes are subject to a full security permission check based on
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the process's credentials [5]_ (usually: effective UID, effective GID, and
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supplementary group list).
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Unprivileged processes are subject to a full security permission check
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based on the process's credentials [5]_ (usually: effective UID,
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effective GID, and supplementary group list).
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Linux divides the privileges traditionally associated with superuser into
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distinct units, known as capabilities [6]_ , which can be independently enabled
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and disabled on per-thread basis for processes and files of unprivileged users.
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Linux divides the privileges traditionally associated with superuser
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into distinct units, known as capabilities [6]_ , which can be
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independently enabled and disabled on per-thread basis for processes and
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files of unprivileged users.
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Unprivileged processes with enabled CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability are treated as
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privileged processes with respect to perf_events performance monitoring and
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bypass *scope* permissions checks in the kernel.
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Unprivileged processes with enabled CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability are treated
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as privileged processes with respect to perf_events performance
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monitoring and bypass *scope* permissions checks in the kernel.
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Unprivileged processes using perf_events system call API is also subject for
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PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS ptrace access mode check [7]_ , whose outcome
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determines whether monitoring is permitted. So unprivileged processes provided
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with CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability are effectively permitted to pass the check.
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Unprivileged processes using perf_events system call API is also subject
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for PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS ptrace access mode check [7]_ , whose
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outcome determines whether monitoring is permitted. So unprivileged
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processes provided with CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability are effectively
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permitted to pass the check.
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Other capabilities being granted to unprivileged processes can effectively
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enable capturing of additional data required for later performance analysis of
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monitored processes or a system. For example, CAP_SYSLOG capability permits
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reading kernel space memory addresses from /proc/kallsyms file.
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Other capabilities being granted to unprivileged processes can
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effectively enable capturing of additional data required for later
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performance analysis of monitored processes or a system. For example,
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CAP_SYSLOG capability permits reading kernel space memory addresses from
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/proc/kallsyms file.
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perf_events/Perf privileged users
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---------------------------------
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Mechanisms of capabilities, privileged capability-dumb files [6]_ and file system
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ACLs [10]_ can be used to create a dedicated group of perf_events/Perf privileged
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users who are permitted to execute performance monitoring without scope limits.
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The following steps can be taken to create such a group of privileged Perf users.
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Mechanisms of capabilities, privileged capability-dumb files [6]_ and
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file system ACLs [10]_ can be used to create a dedicated group of
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perf_events/Perf privileged users who are permitted to execute
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performance monitoring without scope limits. The following steps can be
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taken to create such a group of privileged Perf users.
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1. Create perf_users group of privileged Perf users, assign perf_users group to
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Perf tool executable and limit access to the executable for other users in the
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system who are not in the perf_users group:
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1. Create perf_users group of privileged Perf users, assign perf_users
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group to Perf tool executable and limit access to the executable for
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other users in the system who are not in the perf_users group:
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::
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@ -97,8 +107,9 @@ The following steps can be taken to create such a group of privileged Perf users
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# ls -alhF
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-rwxr-x--- 2 root perf_users 11M Oct 19 15:12 perf
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2. Assign the required capabilities to the Perf tool executable file and enable
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members of perf_users group with performance monitoring privileges [6]_ :
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2. Assign the required capabilities to the Perf tool executable file and
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enable members of perf_users group with performance monitoring
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privileges [6]_ :
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::
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@ -108,49 +119,52 @@ The following steps can be taken to create such a group of privileged Perf users
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# getcap perf
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perf = cap_sys_ptrace,cap_sys_admin,cap_syslog+ep
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As a result, members of perf_users group are capable of conducting performance
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monitoring by using functionality of the configured Perf tool executable that,
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when executes, passes perf_events subsystem scope checks.
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As a result, members of perf_users group are capable of conducting
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performance monitoring by using functionality of the configured Perf
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tool executable that, when executes, passes perf_events subsystem scope
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checks.
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This specific access control management is only available to superuser or root
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running processes with CAP_SETPCAP, CAP_SETFCAP [6]_ capabilities.
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This specific access control management is only available to superuser
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or root running processes with CAP_SETPCAP, CAP_SETFCAP [6]_
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capabilities.
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perf_events/Perf unprivileged users
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-----------------------------------
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perf_events/Perf *scope* and *access* control for unprivileged processes is
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governed by perf_event_paranoid [2]_ setting:
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perf_events/Perf *scope* and *access* control for unprivileged processes
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is governed by perf_event_paranoid [2]_ setting:
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-1:
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Impose no *scope* and *access* restrictions on using perf_events performance
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monitoring. Per-user per-cpu perf_event_mlock_kb [2]_ locking limit is
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ignored when allocating memory buffers for storing performance data.
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This is the least secure mode since allowed monitored *scope* is
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maximized and no perf_events specific limits are imposed on *resources*
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allocated for performance monitoring.
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Impose no *scope* and *access* restrictions on using perf_events
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performance monitoring. Per-user per-cpu perf_event_mlock_kb [2]_
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locking limit is ignored when allocating memory buffers for storing
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performance data. This is the least secure mode since allowed
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monitored *scope* is maximized and no perf_events specific limits
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are imposed on *resources* allocated for performance monitoring.
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>=0:
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*scope* includes per-process and system wide performance monitoring
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but excludes raw tracepoints and ftrace function tracepoints monitoring.
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CPU and system events happened when executing either in user or
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in kernel space can be monitored and captured for later analysis.
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Per-user per-cpu perf_event_mlock_kb locking limit is imposed but
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ignored for unprivileged processes with CAP_IPC_LOCK [6]_ capability.
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but excludes raw tracepoints and ftrace function tracepoints
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monitoring. CPU and system events happened when executing either in
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user or in kernel space can be monitored and captured for later
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analysis. Per-user per-cpu perf_event_mlock_kb locking limit is
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imposed but ignored for unprivileged processes with CAP_IPC_LOCK
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[6]_ capability.
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>=1:
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*scope* includes per-process performance monitoring only and excludes
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system wide performance monitoring. CPU and system events happened when
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executing either in user or in kernel space can be monitored and
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captured for later analysis. Per-user per-cpu perf_event_mlock_kb
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locking limit is imposed but ignored for unprivileged processes with
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CAP_IPC_LOCK capability.
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*scope* includes per-process performance monitoring only and
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excludes system wide performance monitoring. CPU and system events
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happened when executing either in user or in kernel space can be
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monitored and captured for later analysis. Per-user per-cpu
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perf_event_mlock_kb locking limit is imposed but ignored for
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unprivileged processes with CAP_IPC_LOCK capability.
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>=2:
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*scope* includes per-process performance monitoring only. CPU and system
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events happened when executing in user space only can be monitored and
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captured for later analysis. Per-user per-cpu perf_event_mlock_kb
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locking limit is imposed but ignored for unprivileged processes with
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CAP_IPC_LOCK capability.
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*scope* includes per-process performance monitoring only. CPU and
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system events happened when executing in user space only can be
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monitored and captured for later analysis. Per-user per-cpu
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perf_event_mlock_kb locking limit is imposed but ignored for
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unprivileged processes with CAP_IPC_LOCK capability.
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perf_events/Perf resource control
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---------------------------------
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@ -158,39 +172,45 @@ perf_events/Perf resource control
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Open file descriptors
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+++++++++++++++++++++
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The perf_events system call API [2]_ allocates file descriptors for every configured
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PMU event. Open file descriptors are a per-process accountable resource governed
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by the RLIMIT_NOFILE [11]_ limit (ulimit -n), which is usually derived from the login
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shell process. When configuring Perf collection for a long list of events on a
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large server system, this limit can be easily hit preventing required monitoring
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configuration. RLIMIT_NOFILE limit can be increased on per-user basis modifying
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content of the limits.conf file [12]_ . Ordinarily, a Perf sampling session
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(perf record) requires an amount of open perf_event file descriptors that is not
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less than the number of monitored events multiplied by the number of monitored CPUs.
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The perf_events system call API [2]_ allocates file descriptors for
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every configured PMU event. Open file descriptors are a per-process
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accountable resource governed by the RLIMIT_NOFILE [11]_ limit
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(ulimit -n), which is usually derived from the login shell process. When
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configuring Perf collection for a long list of events on a large server
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system, this limit can be easily hit preventing required monitoring
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configuration. RLIMIT_NOFILE limit can be increased on per-user basis
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modifying content of the limits.conf file [12]_ . Ordinarily, a Perf
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sampling session (perf record) requires an amount of open perf_event
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file descriptors that is not less than the number of monitored events
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multiplied by the number of monitored CPUs.
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Memory allocation
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+++++++++++++++++
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The amount of memory available to user processes for capturing performance monitoring
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data is governed by the perf_event_mlock_kb [2]_ setting. This perf_event specific
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resource setting defines overall per-cpu limits of memory allowed for mapping
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by the user processes to execute performance monitoring. The setting essentially
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extends the RLIMIT_MEMLOCK [11]_ limit, but only for memory regions mapped specifically
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for capturing monitored performance events and related data.
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The amount of memory available to user processes for capturing
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performance monitoring data is governed by the perf_event_mlock_kb [2]_
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setting. This perf_event specific resource setting defines overall
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per-cpu limits of memory allowed for mapping by the user processes to
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execute performance monitoring. The setting essentially extends the
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RLIMIT_MEMLOCK [11]_ limit, but only for memory regions mapped
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specifically for capturing monitored performance events and related data.
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For example, if a machine has eight cores and perf_event_mlock_kb limit is set
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to 516 KiB, then a user process is provided with 516 KiB * 8 = 4128 KiB of memory
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above the RLIMIT_MEMLOCK limit (ulimit -l) for perf_event mmap buffers. In particular,
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this means that, if the user wants to start two or more performance monitoring
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processes, the user is required to manually distribute the available 4128 KiB between the
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monitoring processes, for example, using the --mmap-pages Perf record mode option.
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Otherwise, the first started performance monitoring process allocates all available
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4128 KiB and the other processes will fail to proceed due to the lack of memory.
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For example, if a machine has eight cores and perf_event_mlock_kb limit
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is set to 516 KiB, then a user process is provided with 516 KiB * 8 =
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4128 KiB of memory above the RLIMIT_MEMLOCK limit (ulimit -l) for
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perf_event mmap buffers. In particular, this means that, if the user
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wants to start two or more performance monitoring processes, the user is
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required to manually distribute the available 4128 KiB between the
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monitoring processes, for example, using the --mmap-pages Perf record
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mode option. Otherwise, the first started performance monitoring process
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allocates all available 4128 KiB and the other processes will fail to
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proceed due to the lack of memory.
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RLIMIT_MEMLOCK and perf_event_mlock_kb resource constraints are ignored for
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processes with the CAP_IPC_LOCK capability. Thus, perf_events/Perf privileged users
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can be provided with memory above the constraints for perf_events/Perf performance
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monitoring purpose by providing the Perf executable with CAP_IPC_LOCK capability.
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RLIMIT_MEMLOCK and perf_event_mlock_kb resource constraints are ignored
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for processes with the CAP_IPC_LOCK capability. Thus, perf_events/Perf
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privileged users can be provided with memory above the constraints for
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perf_events/Perf performance monitoring purpose by providing the Perf
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executable with CAP_IPC_LOCK capability.
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Bibliography
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------------
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