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fs-verity: rename "file measurement" to "file digest"

I originally chose the name "file measurement" to refer to the fs-verity
file digest to avoid confusion with traditional full-file digests or
with the bare root hash of the Merkle tree.

But the name "file measurement" hasn't caught on, and usually people are
calling it something else, usually the "file digest".  E.g. see
"struct fsverity_digest" and "struct fsverity_formatted_digest", the
libfsverity_compute_digest() and libfsverity_sign_digest() functions in
libfsverity, and the "fsverity digest" command.

Having multiple names for the same thing is always confusing.

So to hopefully avoid confusion in the future, rename
"fs-verity file measurement" to "fs-verity file digest".

This leaves FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY as the only reference to "measure" in
the kernel, which makes some amount of sense since the ioctl is actively
"measuring" the file.

I'll be renaming this in fsverity-utils too (though similarly the
'fsverity measure' command, which is a wrapper for
FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY, will stay).

Acked-by: Luca Boccassi <luca.boccassi@microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201113211918.71883-4-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
zero-sugar-mainline-defconfig
Eric Biggers 2020-11-13 13:19:17 -08:00
parent 9e90f30e78
commit ed45e20164
6 changed files with 61 additions and 61 deletions

View File

@ -27,9 +27,9 @@ automatically verified against the file's Merkle tree. Reads of any
corrupted data, including mmap reads, will fail.
Userspace can use another ioctl to retrieve the root hash (actually
the "file measurement", which is a hash that includes the root hash)
that fs-verity is enforcing for the file. This ioctl executes in
constant time, regardless of the file size.
the "fs-verity file digest", which is a hash that includes the Merkle
tree root hash) that fs-verity is enforcing for the file. This ioctl
executes in constant time, regardless of the file size.
fs-verity is essentially a way to hash a file in constant time,
subject to the caveat that reads which would violate the hash will
@ -177,9 +177,10 @@ FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY can fail with the following errors:
FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY
---------------------
The FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY ioctl retrieves the measurement of a verity
file. The file measurement is a digest that cryptographically
identifies the file contents that are being enforced on reads.
The FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY ioctl retrieves the digest of a verity file.
The fs-verity file digest is a cryptographic digest that identifies
the file contents that are being enforced on reads; it is computed via
a Merkle tree and is different from a traditional full-file digest.
This ioctl takes in a pointer to a variable-length structure::
@ -197,7 +198,7 @@ On success, 0 is returned and the kernel fills in the structure as
follows:
- ``digest_algorithm`` will be the hash algorithm used for the file
measurement. It will match ``fsverity_enable_arg::hash_algorithm``.
digest. It will match ``fsverity_enable_arg::hash_algorithm``.
- ``digest_size`` will be the size of the digest in bytes, e.g. 32
for SHA-256. (This can be redundant with ``digest_algorithm``.)
- ``digest`` will be the actual bytes of the digest.
@ -257,25 +258,24 @@ non-verity one, with the following exceptions:
with EIO (for read()) or SIGBUS (for mmap() reads).
- If the sysctl "fs.verity.require_signatures" is set to 1 and the
file's verity measurement is not signed by a key in the fs-verity
keyring, then opening the file will fail. See `Built-in signature
verification`_.
file is not signed by a key in the fs-verity keyring, then opening
the file will fail. See `Built-in signature verification`_.
Direct access to the Merkle tree is not supported. Therefore, if a
verity file is copied, or is backed up and restored, then it will lose
its "verity"-ness. fs-verity is primarily meant for files like
executables that are managed by a package manager.
File measurement computation
============================
File digest computation
=======================
This section describes how fs-verity hashes the file contents using a
Merkle tree to produce the "file measurement" which cryptographically
identifies the file contents. This algorithm is the same for all
filesystems that support fs-verity.
Merkle tree to produce the digest which cryptographically identifies
the file contents. This algorithm is the same for all filesystems
that support fs-verity.
Userspace only needs to be aware of this algorithm if it needs to
compute the file measurement itself, e.g. in order to sign the file.
compute fs-verity file digests itself, e.g. in order to sign files.
.. _fsverity_merkle_tree:
@ -325,9 +325,9 @@ can't a distinguish a large file from a small second file whose data
is exactly the top-level hash block of the first file. Ambiguities
also arise from the convention of padding to the next block boundary.
To solve this problem, the verity file measurement is actually
computed as a hash of the following structure, which contains the
Merkle tree root hash as well as other fields such as the file size::
To solve this problem, the fs-verity file digest is actually computed
as a hash of the following structure, which contains the Merkle tree
root hash as well as other fields such as the file size::
struct fsverity_descriptor {
__u8 version; /* must be 1 */
@ -359,18 +359,18 @@ kernel. Specifically, it adds support for:
certificates from being added.
2. `FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY`_ accepts a pointer to a PKCS#7 formatted
detached signature in DER format of the file measurement. On
success, this signature is persisted alongside the Merkle tree.
detached signature in DER format of the file's fs-verity digest.
On success, this signature is persisted alongside the Merkle tree.
Then, any time the file is opened, the kernel will verify the
file's actual measurement against this signature, using the
certificates in the ".fs-verity" keyring.
file's actual digest against this signature, using the certificates
in the ".fs-verity" keyring.
3. A new sysctl "fs.verity.require_signatures" is made available.
When set to 1, the kernel requires that all verity files have a
correctly signed file measurement as described in (2).
correctly signed digest as described in (2).
File measurements must be signed in the following format, which is
similar to the structure used by `FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY`_::
fs-verity file digests must be signed in the following format, which
is similar to the structure used by `FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY`_::
struct fsverity_formatted_digest {
char magic[8]; /* must be "FSVerity" */
@ -421,8 +421,8 @@ can only be set by `FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY`_, and it cannot be cleared.
ext4 also supports encryption, which can be used simultaneously with
fs-verity. In this case, the plaintext data is verified rather than
the ciphertext. This is necessary in order to make the file
measurement meaningful, since every file is encrypted differently.
the ciphertext. This is necessary in order to make the fs-verity file
digest meaningful, since every file is encrypted differently.
ext4 stores the verity metadata (Merkle tree and fsverity_descriptor)
past the end of the file, starting at the first 64K boundary beyond
@ -592,8 +592,8 @@ weren't already directly answered in other parts of this document.
:Q: Isn't fs-verity useless because the attacker can just modify the
hashes in the Merkle tree, which is stored on-disk?
:A: To verify the authenticity of an fs-verity file you must verify
the authenticity of the "file measurement", which is basically the
root hash of the Merkle tree. See `Use cases`_.
the authenticity of the "fs-verity file digest", which
incorporates the root hash of the Merkle tree. See `Use cases`_.
:Q: Isn't fs-verity useless because the attacker can just replace a
verity file with a non-verity one?

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@ -398,9 +398,9 @@ int fsverity_ioctl_enable(struct file *filp, const void __user *uarg)
* Some pages of the file may have been evicted from pagecache after
* being used in the Merkle tree construction, then read into pagecache
* again by another process reading from the file concurrently. Since
* these pages didn't undergo verification against the file measurement
* which fs-verity now claims to be enforcing, we have to wipe the
* pagecache to ensure that all future reads are verified.
* these pages didn't undergo verification against the file digest which
* fs-verity now claims to be enforcing, we have to wipe the pagecache
* to ensure that all future reads are verified.
*/
filemap_write_and_wait(inode->i_mapping);
invalidate_inode_pages2(inode->i_mapping);

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@ -67,19 +67,19 @@ struct merkle_tree_params {
* When a verity file is first opened, an instance of this struct is allocated
* and stored in ->i_verity_info; it remains until the inode is evicted. It
* caches information about the Merkle tree that's needed to efficiently verify
* data read from the file. It also caches the file measurement. The Merkle
* tree pages themselves are not cached here, but the filesystem may cache them.
* data read from the file. It also caches the file digest. The Merkle tree
* pages themselves are not cached here, but the filesystem may cache them.
*/
struct fsverity_info {
struct merkle_tree_params tree_params;
u8 root_hash[FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
u8 measurement[FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
u8 file_digest[FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
const struct inode *inode;
};
/*
* Merkle tree properties. The file measurement is the hash of this structure
* excluding the signature and with the sig_size field set to 0.
* Merkle tree properties. The fs-verity file digest is the hash of this
* structure excluding the signature and with the sig_size field set to 0.
*/
struct fsverity_descriptor {
__u8 version; /* must be 1 */
@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ struct fsverity_descriptor {
sizeof(struct fsverity_descriptor))
/*
* Format in which verity file measurements are signed in built-in signatures.
* Format in which fs-verity file digests are signed in built-in signatures.
* This is the same as 'struct fsverity_digest', except here some magic bytes
* are prepended to provide some context about what is being signed in case the
* same key is used for non-fsverity purposes, and here the fields have fixed

View File

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* Ioctl to get a verity file's measurement
* Ioctl to get a verity file's digest
*
* Copyright 2019 Google LLC
*/
@ -10,12 +10,12 @@
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
/**
* fsverity_ioctl_measure() - get a verity file's measurement
* @filp: file to get measurement of
* fsverity_ioctl_measure() - get a verity file's digest
* @filp: file to get digest of
* @_uarg: user pointer to fsverity_digest
*
* Retrieve the file measurement that the kernel is enforcing for reads from a
* verity file. See the "FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY" section of
* Retrieve the file digest that the kernel is enforcing for reads from a verity
* file. See the "FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY" section of
* Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst for the documentation.
*
* Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ int fsverity_ioctl_measure(struct file *filp, void __user *_uarg)
if (copy_to_user(uarg, &arg, sizeof(arg)))
return -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(uarg->digest, vi->measurement, hash_alg->digest_size))
if (copy_to_user(uarg->digest, vi->file_digest, hash_alg->digest_size))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;

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@ -124,18 +124,18 @@ out_err:
}
/*
* Compute the file measurement by hashing the fsverity_descriptor excluding the
* Compute the file digest by hashing the fsverity_descriptor excluding the
* signature and with the sig_size field set to 0.
*/
static int compute_file_measurement(struct fsverity_hash_alg *hash_alg,
struct fsverity_descriptor *desc,
u8 *measurement)
static int compute_file_digest(struct fsverity_hash_alg *hash_alg,
struct fsverity_descriptor *desc,
u8 *file_digest)
{
__le32 sig_size = desc->sig_size;
int err;
desc->sig_size = 0;
err = fsverity_hash_buffer(hash_alg, desc, sizeof(*desc), measurement);
err = fsverity_hash_buffer(hash_alg, desc, sizeof(*desc), file_digest);
desc->sig_size = sig_size;
return err;
@ -199,15 +199,15 @@ struct fsverity_info *fsverity_create_info(const struct inode *inode,
memcpy(vi->root_hash, desc->root_hash, vi->tree_params.digest_size);
err = compute_file_measurement(vi->tree_params.hash_alg, desc,
vi->measurement);
err = compute_file_digest(vi->tree_params.hash_alg, desc,
vi->file_digest);
if (err) {
fsverity_err(inode, "Error %d computing file measurement", err);
fsverity_err(inode, "Error %d computing file digest", err);
goto out;
}
pr_debug("Computed file measurement: %s:%*phN\n",
pr_debug("Computed file digest: %s:%*phN\n",
vi->tree_params.hash_alg->name,
vi->tree_params.digest_size, vi->measurement);
vi->tree_params.digest_size, vi->file_digest);
err = fsverity_verify_signature(vi, desc, desc_size);
out:
@ -354,7 +354,7 @@ int __init fsverity_init_info_cache(void)
{
fsverity_info_cachep = KMEM_CACHE_USERCOPY(fsverity_info,
SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT,
measurement);
file_digest);
if (!fsverity_info_cachep)
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;

View File

@ -32,8 +32,8 @@ static struct key *fsverity_keyring;
* @desc: the file's fsverity_descriptor
* @desc_size: size of @desc
*
* If the file's fs-verity descriptor includes a signature of the file
* measurement, verify it against the certificates in the fs-verity keyring.
* If the file's fs-verity descriptor includes a signature of the file digest,
* verify it against the certificates in the fs-verity keyring.
*
* Return: 0 on success (signature valid or not required); -errno on failure
*/
@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ int fsverity_verify_signature(const struct fsverity_info *vi,
memcpy(d->magic, "FSVerity", 8);
d->digest_algorithm = cpu_to_le16(hash_alg - fsverity_hash_algs);
d->digest_size = cpu_to_le16(hash_alg->digest_size);
memcpy(d->digest, vi->measurement, hash_alg->digest_size);
memcpy(d->digest, vi->file_digest, hash_alg->digest_size);
err = verify_pkcs7_signature(d, sizeof(*d) + hash_alg->digest_size,
desc->signature, sig_size,
@ -90,8 +90,8 @@ int fsverity_verify_signature(const struct fsverity_info *vi,
return err;
}
pr_debug("Valid signature for file measurement %s:%*phN\n",
hash_alg->name, hash_alg->digest_size, vi->measurement);
pr_debug("Valid signature for file digest %s:%*phN\n",
hash_alg->name, hash_alg->digest_size, vi->file_digest);
return 0;
}