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Merge tag 'keys-acl-20190703' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs
Pull keyring ACL support from David Howells:
"This changes the permissions model used by keys and keyrings to be
based on an internal ACL by the following means:
- Replace the permissions mask internally with an ACL that contains a
list of ACEs, each with a specific subject with a permissions mask.
Potted default ACLs are available for new keys and keyrings.
ACE subjects can be macroised to indicate the UID and GID specified
on the key (which remain). Future commits will be able to add
additional subject types, such as specific UIDs or domain
tags/namespaces.
Also split a number of permissions to give finer control. Examples
include splitting the revocation permit from the change-attributes
permit, thereby allowing someone to be granted permission to revoke
a key without allowing them to change the owner; also the ability
to join a keyring is split from the ability to link to it, thereby
stopping a process accessing a keyring by joining it and thus
acquiring use of possessor permits.
- Provide a keyctl to allow the granting or denial of one or more
permits to a specific subject. Direct access to the ACL is not
granted, and the ACL cannot be viewed"
* tag 'keys-acl-20190703' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
keys: Provide KEYCTL_GRANT_PERMISSION
keys: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL
Replace the uid/gid/perm permissions checking on a key with an ACL to allow
the SETATTR and SEARCH permissions to be split. This will also allow a
greater range of subjects to represented.
============
WHY DO THIS?
============
The problem is that SETATTR and SEARCH cover a slew of actions, not all of
which should be grouped together.
For SETATTR, this includes actions that are about controlling access to a
key:
(1) Changing a key's ownership.
(2) Changing a key's security information.
(3) Setting a keyring's restriction.
And actions that are about managing a key's lifetime:
(4) Setting an expiry time.
(5) Revoking a key.
and (proposed) managing a key as part of a cache:
(6) Invalidating a key.
Managing a key's lifetime doesn't really have anything to do with
controlling access to that key.
Expiry time is awkward since it's more about the lifetime of the content
and so, in some ways goes better with WRITE permission. It can, however,
be set unconditionally by a process with an appropriate authorisation token
for instantiating a key, and can also be set by the key type driver when a
key is instantiated, so lumping it with the access-controlling actions is
probably okay.
As for SEARCH permission, that currently covers:
(1) Finding keys in a keyring tree during a search.
(2) Permitting keyrings to be joined.
(3) Invalidation.
But these don't really belong together either, since these actions really
need to be controlled separately.
Finally, there are number of special cases to do with granting the
administrator special rights to invalidate or clear keys that I would like
to handle with the ACL rather than key flags and special checks.
===============
WHAT IS CHANGED
===============
The SETATTR permission is split to create two new permissions:
(1) SET_SECURITY - which allows the key's owner, group and ACL to be
changed and a restriction to be placed on a keyring.
(2) REVOKE - which allows a key to be revoked.
The SEARCH permission is split to create:
(1) SEARCH - which allows a keyring to be search and a key to be found.
(2) JOIN - which allows a keyring to be joined as a session keyring.
(3) INVAL - which allows a key to be invalidated.
The WRITE permission is also split to create:
(1) WRITE - which allows a key's content to be altered and links to be
added, removed and replaced in a keyring.
(2) CLEAR - which allows a keyring to be cleared completely. This is
split out to make it possible to give just this to an administrator.
(3) REVOKE - see above.
Keys acquire ACLs which consist of a series of ACEs, and all that apply are
unioned together. An ACE specifies a subject, such as:
(*) Possessor - permitted to anyone who 'possesses' a key
(*) Owner - permitted to the key owner
(*) Group - permitted to the key group
(*) Everyone - permitted to everyone
Note that 'Other' has been replaced with 'Everyone' on the assumption that
you wouldn't grant a permit to 'Other' that you wouldn't also grant to
everyone else.
Further subjects may be made available by later patches.
The ACE also specifies a permissions mask. The set of permissions is now:
VIEW Can view the key metadata
READ Can read the key content
WRITE Can update/modify the key content
SEARCH Can find the key by searching/requesting
LINK Can make a link to the key
SET_SECURITY Can change owner, ACL, expiry
INVAL Can invalidate
REVOKE Can revoke
JOIN Can join this keyring
CLEAR Can clear this keyring
The KEYCTL_SETPERM function is then deprecated.
The KEYCTL_SET_TIMEOUT function then is permitted if SET_SECURITY is set,
or if the caller has a valid instantiation auth token.
The KEYCTL_INVALIDATE function then requires INVAL.
The KEYCTL_REVOKE function then requires REVOKE.
The KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING function then requires JOIN to join an
existing keyring.
The JOIN permission is enabled by default for session keyrings and manually
created keyrings only.
======================
BACKWARD COMPATIBILITY
======================
To maintain backward compatibility, KEYCTL_SETPERM will translate the
permissions mask it is given into a new ACL for a key - unless
KEYCTL_SET_ACL has been called on that key, in which case an error will be
returned.
It will convert possessor, owner, group and other permissions into separate
ACEs, if each portion of the mask is non-zero.
SETATTR permission turns on all of INVAL, REVOKE and SET_SECURITY. WRITE
permission turns on WRITE, REVOKE and, if a keyring, CLEAR. JOIN is turned
on if a keyring is being altered.
The KEYCTL_DESCRIBE function translates the ACL back into a permissions
mask to return depending on possessor, owner, group and everyone ACEs.
It will make the following mappings:
(1) INVAL, JOIN -> SEARCH
(2) SET_SECURITY -> SETATTR
(3) REVOKE -> WRITE if SETATTR isn't already set
(4) CLEAR -> WRITE
Note that the value subsequently returned by KEYCTL_DESCRIBE may not match
the value set with KEYCTL_SETATTR.
=======
TESTING
=======
This passes the keyutils testsuite for all but a couple of tests:
(1) tests/keyctl/dh_compute/badargs: The first wrong-key-type test now
returns EOPNOTSUPP rather than ENOKEY as READ permission isn't removed
if the type doesn't have ->read(). You still can't actually read the
key.
(2) tests/keyctl/permitting/valid: The view-other-permissions test doesn't
work as Other has been replaced with Everyone in the ACL.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at
your option any later version
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-or-later
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 3029 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190527070032.746973796@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Use RCU-based freeing for afs_cb_interest struct objects and use RCU on
vnode->cb_interest. Use that change to allow afs_check_validity() to use
read_seqbegin_or_lock() instead of read_seqlock_excl().
This also requires the caller of afs_check_validity() to hold the RCU read
lock across the call.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
When applying the status and callback in the response of an operation,
apply them in the same critical section so that there's no race between
checking the callback state and checking status-dependent state (such as
the data version).
Fix this by:
(1) Allocating a joint {status,callback} record (afs_status_cb) before
calling the RPC function for each vnode for which the RPC reply
contains a status or a status plus a callback. A flag is set in the
record to indicate if a callback was actually received.
(2) These records are passed into the RPC functions to be filled in. The
afs_decode_status() and yfs_decode_status() functions are removed and
the cb_lock is no longer taken.
(3) xdr_decode_AFSFetchStatus() and xdr_decode_YFSFetchStatus() no longer
update the vnode.
(4) xdr_decode_AFSCallBack() and xdr_decode_YFSCallBack() no longer update
the vnode.
(5) vnodes, expected data-version numbers and callback break counters
(cb_break) no longer need to be passed to the reply delivery
functions.
Note that, for the moment, the file locking functions still need
access to both the call and the vnode at the same time.
(6) afs_vnode_commit_status() is now given the cb_break value and the
expected data_version and the task of applying the status and the
callback to the vnode are now done here.
This is done under a single taking of vnode->cb_lock.
(7) afs_pages_written_back() is now called by afs_store_data() rather than
by the reply delivery function.
afs_pages_written_back() has been moved to before the call point and
is now given the first and last page numbers rather than a pointer to
the call.
(8) The indicator from YFS.RemoveFile2 as to whether the target file
actually got removed (status.abort_code == VNOVNODE) rather than
merely dropping a link is now checked in afs_unlink rather than in
xdr_decode_YFSFetchStatus().
Supplementary fixes:
(*) afs_cache_permit() now gets the caller_access mask from the
afs_status_cb object rather than picking it out of the vnode's status
record. afs_fetch_status() returns caller_access through its argument
list for this purpose also.
(*) afs_inode_init_from_status() now uses a write lock on cb_lock rather
than a read lock and now sets the callback inside the same critical
section.
Fixes: c435ee3455 ("afs: Overhaul the callback handling")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
When __afs_break_callback() clears the CB_PROMISED flag, it increments
vnode->cb_break to trigger a future refetch of the status and callback -
however it also calls afs_clear_permits(), which also increments
vnode->cb_break.
Fix this by removing the increment from afs_clear_permits().
Whilst we're at it, fix the conditional call to afs_put_permits() as the
function checks to see if the argument is NULL, so the check is redundant.
Fixes: be080a6f43 ("afs: Overhaul permit caching");
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
In some circumstances, the callback interest pointer is NULL, so in such a
case we can't dereference it when checking to see if the callback is
broken. This causes an oops in some circumstances.
Fix this by replacing the function that worked out the aggregate break
counter with one that actually does the comparison, and then make that
return true (ie. broken) if there is no callback interest as yet (ie. the
pointer is NULL).
Fixes: 68251f0a68 ("afs: Fix whole-volume callback handling")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Increase the sizes of the volume ID to 64 bits and the vnode ID (inode
number equivalent) to 96 bits to allow the support of YFS.
This requires the iget comparator to check the vnode->fid rather than i_ino
and i_generation as i_ino is not sufficiently capacious. It also requires
this data to be placed into the vnode cache key for fscache.
For the moment, just discard the top 32 bits of the vnode ID when returning
it though stat.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Doing faccessat("/afs/some/directory", 0) triggers a BUG in the permissions
check code.
Fix this by just removing the BUG section. If no permissions are asked
for, just return okay if the file exists.
Also:
(1) Split up the directory check so that it has separate if-statements
rather than if-else-if (e.g. checking for MAY_EXEC shouldn't skip the
check for MAY_READ and MAY_WRITE).
(2) Check for MAY_CHDIR as MAY_EXEC.
Without the main fix, the following BUG may occur:
kernel BUG at fs/afs/security.c:386!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
...
RIP: 0010:afs_permission+0x19d/0x1a0 [kafs]
...
Call Trace:
? inode_permission+0xbe/0x180
? do_faccessat+0xdc/0x270
? do_syscall_64+0x60/0x1f0
? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Fixes: 00d3b7a453 ("[AFS]: Add security support.")
Reported-by: Jonathan Billings <jsbillings@jsbillings.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
It's possible for an AFS file server to issue a whole-volume notification
that callbacks on all the vnodes in the file have been broken. This is
done for R/O and backup volumes (which don't have per-file callbacks) and
for things like a volume being taken offline.
Fix callback handling to detect whole-volume notifications, to track it
across operations and to check it during inode validation.
Fixes: c435ee3455 ("afs: Overhaul the callback handling")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Store the data version number indicated by an FS.FetchData op into the read
request structure so that it's accessible by the page reader.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Fix warnings raised by checker, including:
(*) Warnings raised by unequal comparison for the purposes of sorting,
where the endianness doesn't matter:
fs/afs/addr_list.c:246:21: warning: restricted __be16 degrades to integer
fs/afs/addr_list.c:246:30: warning: restricted __be16 degrades to integer
fs/afs/addr_list.c:248:21: warning: restricted __be32 degrades to integer
fs/afs/addr_list.c:248:49: warning: restricted __be32 degrades to integer
fs/afs/addr_list.c:283:21: warning: restricted __be16 degrades to integer
fs/afs/addr_list.c:283:30: warning: restricted __be16 degrades to integer
(*) afs_set_cb_interest() is not actually used and can be removed.
(*) afs_cell_gc_delay() should be provided with a sysctl.
(*) afs_cell_destroy() needs to use rcu_access_pointer() to read
cell->vl_addrs.
(*) afs_init_fs_cursor() should be static.
(*) struct afs_vnode::permit_cache needs to be marked __rcu.
(*) afs_server_rcu() needs to use rcu_access_pointer().
(*) afs_destroy_server() should use rcu_access_pointer() on
server->addresses as the server object is no longer accessible.
(*) afs_find_server() casts __be16/__be32 values to int in order to
directly compare them for the purpose of finding a match in a list,
but is should also annotate the cast with __force to avoid checker
warnings.
(*) afs_check_permit() accesses vnode->permit_cache outside of the RCU
readlock, though it doesn't then access the value; the extraneous
access is deleted.
False positives:
(*) Conditional locking around the code in xdr_decode_AFSFetchStatus. This
can be dealt with in a separate patch.
fs/afs/fsclient.c:148:9: warning: context imbalance in 'xdr_decode_AFSFetchStatus' - different lock contexts for basic block
(*) Incorrect handling of seq-retry lock context balance:
fs/afs/inode.c:455:38: warning: context imbalance in 'afs_getattr' - different
lock contexts for basic block
fs/afs/server.c:52:17: warning: context imbalance in 'afs_find_server' - different lock contexts for basic block
fs/afs/server.c:128:17: warning: context imbalance in 'afs_find_server_by_uuid' - different lock contexts for basic block
Errors:
(*) afs_lookup_cell_rcu() needs to break out of the seq-retry loop, not go
round again if it successfully found the workstation cell.
(*) Fix UUID decode in afs_deliver_cb_probe_uuid().
(*) afs_cache_permit() has a missing rcu_read_unlock() before one of the
jumps to the someone_else_changed_it label. Move the unlock to after
the label.
(*) afs_vl_get_addrs_u() is using ntohl() rather than htonl() when
encoding to XDR.
(*) afs_deliver_yfsvl_get_endpoints() is using htonl() rather than ntohl()
when decoding from XDR.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Fix four refcount bugs in afs_cache_permit():
(1) When checking the result of the kzalloc(), we can't just return, but
must put 'permits'.
(2) We shouldn't put permits immediately after hashing a new permit as we
need to keep the pointer stable so that we can check to see if
vnode->permit_cache has changed before we decide whether to assign to
it.
(3) 'permits' is being put twice.
(4) We need to put either the replacement or the thing replaced after the
assignment to vnode->permit_cache.
Without this, lots of the following are seen:
Kernel BUG at ffffffffa039857b [verbose debug info unavailable]
------------[ cut here ]------------
Kernel BUG at ffffffffa039858a [verbose debug info unavailable]
------------[ cut here ]------------
The addresses are in the .text..refcount section of the kafs.ko module.
Following the relocation records for the __ex_table section shows one to be
due to the decrement in afs_put_permits() and the other to be key_get() in
afs_cache_permit().
Occasionally, the following is seen:
refcount_t overflow at afs_cache_permit+0x57d/0x5c0 [kafs] in cc1[562], uid/euid: 0/0
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 562 at kernel/panic.c:657 refcount_error_report+0x9c/0xac
...
Reported-by: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
Fix the AFS file locking whereby the use of the big kernel lock (which
could be slept with) was replaced by a spinlock (which couldn't). The
problem is that the AFS code was doing stuff inside the critical section
that might call schedule(), so this is a broken transformation.
Fix this by the following means:
(1) Use a state machine with a proper state that can only be changed under
the spinlock rather than using a collection of bit flags.
(2) Cache the key used for the lock and the lock type in the afs_vnode
struct so that the manager work function doesn't have to refer to a
file_lock struct that's been dequeued. This makes signal handling
safer.
(4) Move the unlock from afs_do_unlk() to afs_fl_release_private() which
means that unlock is achieved in other circumstances too.
(5) Unlock the file on the server before taking the next conflicting lock.
Also change:
(1) Check the permits on a file before actually trying the lock.
(2) fsync the file before effecting an explicit unlock operation. We
don't fsync if the lock is erased otherwise as we might not be in a
context where we can actually do that.
Further fixes:
(1) Fixed-fileserver address rotation is made to work. It's only used by
the locking functions, so couldn't be tested before.
Fixes: 72f98e7255 ("locks: turn lock_flocks into a spinlock")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: jlayton@redhat.com
The current code assumes that volumes and servers are per-cell and are
never shared, but this is not enforced, and, indeed, public cells do exist
that are aliases of each other. Further, an organisation can, say, set up
a public cell and a private cell with overlapping, but not identical, sets
of servers. The difference is purely in the database attached to the VL
servers.
The current code will malfunction if it sees a server in two cells as it
assumes global address -> server record mappings and that each server is in
just one cell.
Further, each server may have multiple addresses - and may have addresses
of different families (IPv4 and IPv6, say).
To this end, the following structural changes are made:
(1) Server record management is overhauled:
(a) Server records are made independent of cell. The namespace keeps
track of them, volume records have lists of them and each vnode
has a server on which its callback interest currently resides.
(b) The cell record no longer keeps a list of servers known to be in
that cell.
(c) The server records are now kept in a flat list because there's no
single address to sort on.
(d) Server records are now keyed by their UUID within the namespace.
(e) The addresses for a server are obtained with the VL.GetAddrsU
rather than with VL.GetEntryByName, using the server's UUID as a
parameter.
(f) Cached server records are garbage collected after a period of
non-use and are counted out of existence before purging is allowed
to complete. This protects the work functions against rmmod.
(g) The servers list is now in /proc/fs/afs/servers.
(2) Volume record management is overhauled:
(a) An RCU-replaceable server list is introduced. This tracks both
servers and their coresponding callback interests.
(b) The superblock is now keyed on cell record and numeric volume ID.
(c) The volume record is now tied to the superblock which mounts it,
and is activated when mounted and deactivated when unmounted.
This makes it easier to handle the cache cookie without causing a
double-use in fscache.
(d) The volume record is loaded from the VLDB using VL.GetEntryByNameU
to get the server UUID list.
(e) The volume name is updated if it is seen to have changed when the
volume is updated (the update is keyed on the volume ID).
(3) The vlocation record is got rid of and VLDB records are no longer
cached. Sufficient information is stored in the volume record, though
an update to a volume record is now no longer shared between related
volumes (volumes come in bundles of three: R/W, R/O and backup).
and the following procedural changes are made:
(1) The fileserver cursor introduced previously is now fleshed out and
used to iterate over fileservers and their addresses.
(2) Volume status is checked during iteration, and the server list is
replaced if a change is detected.
(3) Server status is checked during iteration, and the address list is
replaced if a change is detected.
(4) The abort code is saved into the address list cursor and -ECONNABORTED
returned in afs_make_call() if a remote abort happened rather than
translating the abort into an error message. This allows actions to
be taken depending on the abort code more easily.
(a) If a VMOVED abort is seen then this is handled by rechecking the
volume and restarting the iteration.
(b) If a VBUSY, VRESTARTING or VSALVAGING abort is seen then this is
handled by sleeping for a short period and retrying and/or trying
other servers that might serve that volume. A message is also
displayed once until the condition has cleared.
(c) If a VOFFLINE abort is seen, then this is handled as VBUSY for the
moment.
(d) If a VNOVOL abort is seen, the volume is rechecked in the VLDB to
see if it has been deleted; if not, the fileserver is probably
indicating that the volume couldn't be attached and needs
salvaging.
(e) If statfs() sees one of these aborts, it does not sleep, but
rather returns an error, so as not to block the umount program.
(5) The fileserver iteration functions in vnode.c are now merged into
their callers and more heavily macroised around the cursor. vnode.c
is removed.
(6) Operations on a particular vnode are serialised on that vnode because
the server will lock that vnode whilst it operates on it, so a second
op sent will just have to wait.
(7) Fileservers are probed with FS.GetCapabilities before being used.
This is where service upgrade will be done.
(8) A callback interest on a fileserver is set up before an FS operation
is performed and passed through to afs_make_call() so that it can be
set on the vnode if the operation returns a callback. The callback
interest is passed through to afs_iget() also so that it can be set
there too.
In general, record updating is done on an as-needed basis when we try to
access servers, volumes or vnodes rather than offloading it to work items
and special threads.
Notes:
(1) Pre AFS-3.4 servers are no longer supported, though this can be added
back if necessary (AFS-3.4 was released in 1998).
(2) VBUSY is retried forever for the moment at intervals of 1s.
(3) /proc/fs/afs/<cell>/servers no longer exists.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Overhaul permit caching in AFS by making it per-vnode and sharing permit
lists where possible.
When most of the fileserver operations are called, they return a status
structure indicating the (revised) details of the vnode or vnodes involved
in the operation. This includes the access mark derived from the ACL
(named CallerAccess in the protocol definition file). This is cacheable
and if the ACL changes, the server will tell us that it is breaking the
callback promise, at which point we can discard the currently cached
permits.
With this patch, the afs_permits structure has, at the end, an array of
{ key, CallerAccess } elements, sorted by key pointer. This is then cached
in a hash table so that it can be shared between vnodes with the same
access permits.
Permit lists can only be shared if they contain the exact same set of
key->CallerAccess mappings.
Note that that table is global rather than being per-net_ns. If the keys
in a permit list cross net_ns boundaries, there is no problem sharing the
cached permits, since the permits are just integer masks.
Since permit lists pin keys, the permit cache also makes it easier for a
future patch to find all occurrences of a key and remove them by means of
setting the afs_permits::invalidated flag and then clearing the appropriate
key pointer. In such an event, memory barriers will need adding.
Lastly, the permit caching is skipped if the server has sent either a
vnode-specific or an entire-server callback since the start of the
operation.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Overhaul the AFS callback handling by the following means:
(1) Don't give up callback promises on vnodes that we are no longer using,
rather let them just expire on the server or let the server break
them. This is actually more efficient for the server as the callback
lookup is expensive if there are lots of extant callbacks.
(2) Only give up the callback promises we have from a server when the
server record is destroyed. Then we can just give up *all* the
callback promises on it in one go.
(3) Servers can end up being shared between cells if cells are aliased, so
don't add all the vnodes being backed by a particular server into a
big FID-indexed tree on that server as there may be duplicates.
Instead have each volume instance (~= superblock) register an interest
in a server as it starts to make use of it and use this to allow the
processor for callbacks from the server to find the superblock and
thence the inode corresponding to the FID being broken by means of
ilookup_nowait().
(4) Rather than iterating over the entire callback list when a mass-break
comes in from the server, maintain a counter of mass-breaks in
afs_server (cb_seq) and make afs_validate() check it against the copy
in afs_vnode.
It would be nice not to have to take a read_lock whilst doing this,
but that's tricky without using RCU.
(5) Save a ref on the fileserver we're using for a call in the afs_call
struct so that we can access its cb_s_break during call decoding.
(6) Write-lock around callback and status storage in a vnode and read-lock
around getattr so that we don't see the status mid-update.
This has the following consequences:
(1) Data invalidation isn't seen until someone calls afs_validate() on a
vnode. Unfortunately, we need to use a key to query the server, but
getting one from a background thread is tricky without caching loads
of keys all over the place.
(2) Mass invalidation isn't seen until someone calls afs_validate().
(3) Callback breaking is going to hit the inode_hash_lock quite a bit.
Could this be replaced with rcu_read_lock() since inodes are destroyed
under RCU conditions.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
The AFS_ACE_READ and AFS_ACE_WRITE permission bits should not
be used to make access decisions for the directory itself. They
are meant to control access for the objects contained in that
directory.
Reading a directory is allowed if the AFS_ACE_LOOKUP bit is set.
This would cause an incorrect access denied error for a directory
with AFS_ACE_LOOKUP but not AFS_ACE_READ.
The AFS_ACE_WRITE bit does not allow operations that modify the
directory. For a directory with AFS_ACE_WRITE but neither
AFS_ACE_INSERT nor AFS_ACE_DELETE, this would result in trying
operations that would ultimately be denied by the server.
Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The use of "rcu_assign_pointer()" is NULLing out the pointer.
According to RCU_INIT_POINTER()'s block comment:
"1. This use of RCU_INIT_POINTER() is NULLing out the pointer"
it is better to use it instead of rcu_assign_pointer() because it has a
smaller overhead.
The following Coccinelle semantic patch was used:
@@
@@
- rcu_assign_pointer
+ RCU_INIT_POINTER
(..., NULL)
Signed-off-by: Andreea-Cristina Bernat <bernat.ada@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Mode bits for an afs file should not be enforced in the usual
way.
For files, the absence of user bits can restrict file access
with respect to what is granted by the server.
These bits apply regardless of the owner or the current uid; the
rest of the mode bits (group, other) are ignored.
Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
its value depends only on inode and does not change; we might as
well store it in ->i_op->check_acl and be done with that.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
It seems clear from the surrounding code that xpermits is allowed to be
NULL here.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* kill nameidata * argument; map the 3 bits in ->flags anybody cares
about to new MAY_... ones and pass with the mask.
* kill redundant gfs2_iop_permission()
* sanitize ecryptfs_permission()
* fix remaining places where ->permission() instances might barf on new
MAY_... found in mask.
The obvious next target in that direction is permission(9)
folded fix for nfs_permission() breakage from Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
fs/afs/security.c: In function 'afs_permission':
fs/afs/security.c:290: warning: 'access' may be used uninitialized in this function
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
First thing mm.h does is including sched.h solely for can_do_mlock() inline
function which has "current" dereference inside. By dealing with can_do_mlock()
mm.h can be detached from sched.h which is good. See below, why.
This patch
a) removes unconditional inclusion of sched.h from mm.h
b) makes can_do_mlock() normal function in mm/mlock.c
c) exports can_do_mlock() to not break compilation
d) adds sched.h inclusions back to files that were getting it indirectly.
e) adds less bloated headers to some files (asm/signal.h, jiffies.h) that were
getting them indirectly
Net result is:
a) mm.h users would get less code to open, read, preprocess, parse, ... if
they don't need sched.h
b) sched.h stops being dependency for significant number of files:
on x86_64 allmodconfig touching sched.h results in recompile of 4083 files,
after patch it's only 3744 (-8.3%).
Cross-compile tested on
all arm defconfigs, all mips defconfigs, all powerpc defconfigs,
alpha alpha-up
arm
i386 i386-up i386-defconfig i386-allnoconfig
ia64 ia64-up
m68k
mips
parisc parisc-up
powerpc powerpc-up
s390 s390-up
sparc sparc-up
sparc64 sparc64-up
um-x86_64
x86_64 x86_64-up x86_64-defconfig x86_64-allnoconfig
as well as my two usual configs.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Make some miscellaneous changes to the AFS filesystem:
(1) Assert RCU barriers on module exit to make sure RCU has finished with
callbacks in this module.
(2) Correctly handle the AFS server returning a zero-length read.
(3) Split out data zapping calls into one function (afs_zap_data).
(4) Rename some afs_file_*() functions to afs_*() where they apply to
non-regular files too.
(5) Be consistent about the presentation of volume ID:vnode ID in debugging
output.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Add support for the create, link, symlink, unlink, mkdir, rmdir and
rename VFS operations to the in-kernel AFS filesystem.
Also:
(1) Fix dentry and inode revalidation. d_revalidate should only look at
state of the dentry. Revalidation of the contents of an inode pointed to
by a dentry is now separate.
(2) Fix afs_lookup() to hash negative dentries as well as positive ones.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Add security support to the AFS filesystem. Kerberos IV tickets are added as
RxRPC keys are added to the session keyring with the klog program. open() and
other VFS operations then find this ticket with request_key() and either use
it immediately (eg: mkdir, unlink) or attach it to a file descriptor (open).
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Linus Torvalds