A NMI can hit in the middle of context switching or in the middle of
switch_mm_irqs_off(). In either case, CR3 might not match current->mm,
which could cause copy_from_user_nmi() and friends to read the wrong
memory.
Fix it by adding a new nmi_uaccess_okay() helper and checking it in
copy_from_user_nmi() and in __copy_from_user_nmi()'s callers.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Cc: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/dd956eba16646fd0b15c3c0741269dfd84452dac.1535557289.git.luto@kernel.org
* DAX broke a fundamental assumption of truncate of file mapped pages.
The truncate path assumed that it is safe to disconnect a pinned page
from a file and let the filesystem reclaim the physical block. With DAX
the page is equivalent to the filesystem block. Introduce
dax_layout_busy_page() to enable filesystems to wait for pinned DAX
pages to be released. Without this wait a filesystem could allocate
blocks under active device-DMA to a new file.
* DAX arranges for the block layer to be bypassed and uses
dax_direct_access() + copy_to_iter() to satisfy read(2) calls.
However, the memcpy_mcsafe() facility is available through the pmem
block driver. In order to safely handle media errors, via the DAX
block-layer bypass, introduce copy_to_iter_mcsafe().
* Fix cache management policy relative to the ACPI NFIT Platform
Capabilities Structure to properly elide cache flushes when they are not
necessary. The table indicates whether CPU caches are power-fail
protected. Clarify that a deep flush is always performed on
REQ_{FUA,PREFLUSH} requests.
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Merge tag 'libnvdimm-for-4.18' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/nvdimm/nvdimm
Pull libnvdimm updates from Dan Williams:
"This adds a user for the new 'bytes-remaining' updates to
memcpy_mcsafe() that you already received through Ingo via the
x86-dax- for-linus pull.
Not included here, but still targeting this cycle, is support for
handling memory media errors (poison) consumed via userspace dax
mappings.
Summary:
- DAX broke a fundamental assumption of truncate of file mapped
pages. The truncate path assumed that it is safe to disconnect a
pinned page from a file and let the filesystem reclaim the physical
block. With DAX the page is equivalent to the filesystem block.
Introduce dax_layout_busy_page() to enable filesystems to wait for
pinned DAX pages to be released. Without this wait a filesystem
could allocate blocks under active device-DMA to a new file.
- DAX arranges for the block layer to be bypassed and uses
dax_direct_access() + copy_to_iter() to satisfy read(2) calls.
However, the memcpy_mcsafe() facility is available through the pmem
block driver. In order to safely handle media errors, via the DAX
block-layer bypass, introduce copy_to_iter_mcsafe().
- Fix cache management policy relative to the ACPI NFIT Platform
Capabilities Structure to properly elide cache flushes when they
are not necessary. The table indicates whether CPU caches are
power-fail protected. Clarify that a deep flush is always performed
on REQ_{FUA,PREFLUSH} requests"
* tag 'libnvdimm-for-4.18' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/nvdimm/nvdimm: (21 commits)
dax: Use dax_write_cache* helpers
libnvdimm, pmem: Do not flush power-fail protected CPU caches
libnvdimm, pmem: Unconditionally deep flush on *sync
libnvdimm, pmem: Complete REQ_FLUSH => REQ_PREFLUSH
acpi, nfit: Remove ecc_unit_size
dax: dax_insert_mapping_entry always succeeds
libnvdimm, e820: Register all pmem resources
libnvdimm: Debug probe times
linvdimm, pmem: Preserve read-only setting for pmem devices
x86, nfit_test: Add unit test for memcpy_mcsafe()
pmem: Switch to copy_to_iter_mcsafe()
dax: Report bytes remaining in dax_iomap_actor()
dax: Introduce a ->copy_to_iter dax operation
uio, lib: Fix CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_UACCESS_MCSAFE compilation
xfs, dax: introduce xfs_break_dax_layouts()
xfs: prepare xfs_break_layouts() for another layout type
xfs: prepare xfs_break_layouts() to be called with XFS_MMAPLOCK_EXCL
mm, fs, dax: handle layout changes to pinned dax mappings
mm: fix __gup_device_huge vs unmap
mm: introduce MEMORY_DEVICE_FS_DAX and CONFIG_DEV_PAGEMAP_OPS
...
Pull x86 dax updates from Ingo Molnar:
"This contains x86 memcpy_mcsafe() fault handling improvements the
nvdimm tree would like to make more use of"
* 'x86-dax-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/asm/memcpy_mcsafe: Define copy_to_iter_mcsafe()
x86/asm/memcpy_mcsafe: Add write-protection-fault handling
x86/asm/memcpy_mcsafe: Return bytes remaining
x86/asm/memcpy_mcsafe: Add labels for __memcpy_mcsafe() write fault handling
x86/asm/memcpy_mcsafe: Remove loop unrolling
Given the fact that the ACPI "EINJ" (error injection) facility is not
universally available, implement software infrastructure to validate the
memcpy_mcsafe() exception handling implementation.
For each potential read exception point in memcpy_mcsafe(), inject a
emulated exception point at the address identified by 'mcsafe_inject'
variable. With this infrastructure implement a test to validate that the
'bytes remaining' calculation is correct for a range of various source
buffer alignments.
This code is compiled out by default. The CONFIG_MCSAFE_DEBUG
configuration symbol needs to be manually enabled by editing
Kconfig.debug. I.e. this functionality can not be accidentally enabled
by a user / distro, it's only for development.
Cc: <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Reported-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
In preparation for using memcpy_mcsafe() to handle user copies it needs
to be to handle write-protection faults while writing user pages. Add
MMU-fault handlers alongside the machine-check exception handlers.
Note that the machine check fault exception handling makes assumptions
about source buffer alignment and poison alignment. In the write fault
case, given the destination buffer is arbitrarily aligned, it needs a
separate / additional fault handling approach. The mcsafe_handle_tail()
helper is reused. The @limit argument is set to @len since there is no
safety concern about retriggering an MMU fault, and this simplifies the
assembly.
Co-developed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Reported-by: Mika Penttilä <mika.penttila@nextfour.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: hch@lst.de
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/152539238635.31796.14056325365122961778.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Machine check safe memory copies are currently deployed in the pmem
driver whenever reading from persistent memory media, so that -EIO is
returned rather than triggering a kernel panic. While this protects most
pmem accesses, it is not complete in the filesystem-dax case. When
filesystem-dax is enabled reads may bypass the block layer and the
driver via dax_iomap_actor() and its usage of copy_to_iter().
In preparation for creating a copy_to_iter() variant that can handle
machine checks, teach memcpy_mcsafe() to return the number of bytes
remaining rather than -EFAULT when an exception occurs.
Co-developed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: hch@lst.de
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/152539238119.31796.14318473522414462886.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The memcpy_mcsafe() implementation handles CPU exceptions when reading
from the source address. Before it can be used for user copies it needs
to grow support for handling write faults. In preparation for adding
that exception handling update the labels for the read cache word X case
(.L_cache_rX) and write cache word X case (.L_cache_wX).
Reported-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: hch@lst.de
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/152539237606.31796.6719743548991782264.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
In preparation for teaching memcpy_mcsafe() to return 'bytes remaining'
rather than pass / fail, simplify the implementation to remove loop
unrolling. The unrolling complicates the fault handling for negligible
benefit given modern CPUs perform loop stream detection.
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: hch@lst.de
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/152539237092.31796.9115692316555638048.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Save two registers. Adding constants should be just as fast as adding registers.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180507213937.GB32406@avx2
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Pull x86 cleanups and msr updates from Ingo Molnar:
"The main change is a performance/latency improvement to /dev/msr
access. The rest are misc cleanups"
* 'x86-cleanups-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/msr: Make rdmsrl_safe_on_cpu() scheduling safe as well
x86/cpuid: Allow cpuid_read() to schedule
x86/msr: Allow rdmsr_safe_on_cpu() to schedule
x86/rtc: Stop using deprecated functions
x86/dumpstack: Unify show_regs()
x86/fault: Do not print IP in show_fault_oops()
x86/MSR: Move native_* variants to msr.h
Pull x86 asm fixlets from Ingo Molnar:
"A clobber list fix and cleanups"
* 'x86-asm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/asm: Trim clear_page.S includes
x86/asm: Clobber flags in clear_page()
When changing rdmsr_safe_on_cpu() to schedule, it was missed that
__rdmsr_safe_on_cpu() was also used by rdmsrl_safe_on_cpu()
Make rdmsrl_safe_on_cpu() a wrapper instead of copy/pasting the code which
was added for the completion handling.
Fixes: 07cde313b2 ("x86/msr: Allow rdmsr_safe_on_cpu() to schedule")
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180328032233.153055-1-edumazet@google.com
High latencies can be observed caused by a daemon periodically reading
various MSR on all cpus. On KASAN enabled kernels ~10ms latencies can be
observed simply reading one MSR. Even without KASAN, sending an IPI to a
CPU, which is in a deep sleep state or in a long hard IRQ disabled section,
waiting for the answer can consume hundreds of microseconds.
All usage sites are in preemptible context, convert rdmsr_safe_on_cpu() to
use a completion instead of busy polling.
Overall daemon cpu usage was reduced by 35 %, and latencies caused by
msr_read() disappeared.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180323215818.127774-1-edumazet@google.com
Pull x86 fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
"Yet another pile of melted spectrum related changes:
- sanitize the array_index_nospec protection mechanism: Remove the
overengineered array_index_nospec_mask_check() magic and allow
const-qualified types as index to avoid temporary storage in a
non-const local variable.
- make the microcode loader more robust by properly propagating error
codes. Provide information about new feature bits after micro code
was updated so administrators can act upon.
- optimizations of the entry ASM code which reduce code footprint and
make the code simpler and faster.
- fix the {pmd,pud}_{set,clear}_flags() implementations to work
properly on paravirt kernels by removing the address translation
operations.
- revert the harmful vmexit_fill_RSB() optimization
- use IBRS around firmware calls
- teach objtool about retpolines and add annotations for indirect
jumps and calls.
- explicitly disable jumplabel patching in __init code and handle
patching failures properly instead of silently ignoring them.
- remove indirect paravirt calls for writing the speculation control
MSR as these calls are obviously proving the same attack vector
which is tried to be mitigated.
- a few small fixes which address build issues with recent compiler
and assembler versions"
* 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (38 commits)
KVM/VMX: Optimize vmx_vcpu_run() and svm_vcpu_run() by marking the RDMSR path as unlikely()
KVM/x86: Remove indirect MSR op calls from SPEC_CTRL
objtool, retpolines: Integrate objtool with retpoline support more closely
x86/entry/64: Simplify ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
extable: Make init_kernel_text() global
jump_label: Warn on failed jump_label patching attempt
jump_label: Explicitly disable jump labels in __init code
x86/entry/64: Open-code switch_to_thread_stack()
x86/entry/64: Move ASM_CLAC to interrupt_entry()
x86/entry/64: Remove 'interrupt' macro
x86/entry/64: Move the switch_to_thread_stack() call to interrupt_entry()
x86/entry/64: Move ENTER_IRQ_STACK from interrupt macro to interrupt_entry
x86/entry/64: Move PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS from interrupt macro to helper function
x86/speculation: Move firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_*() from C to CPP
objtool: Add module specific retpoline rules
objtool: Add retpoline validation
objtool: Use existing global variables for options
x86/mm/sme, objtool: Annotate indirect call in sme_encrypt_execute()
x86/boot, objtool: Annotate indirect jump in secondary_startup_64()
x86/paravirt, objtool: Annotate indirect calls
...
This reverts commit 1dde7415e9. By putting
the RSB filling out of line and calling it, we waste one RSB slot for
returning from the function itself, which means one fewer actual function
call we can make if we're doing the Skylake abomination of call-depth
counting.
It also changed the number of RSB stuffings we do on vmexit from 32,
which was correct, to 16. Let's just stop with the bikeshedding; it
didn't actually *fix* anything anyway.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: jmattson@google.com
Cc: karahmed@amazon.de
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com
Cc: rkrcmar@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1519037457-7643-4-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Pull x86 fixes from Ingo Molnar:
"Misc fixes all across the map:
- /proc/kcore vsyscall related fixes
- LTO fix
- build warning fix
- CPU hotplug fix
- Kconfig NR_CPUS cleanups
- cpu_has() cleanups/robustification
- .gitignore fix
- memory-failure unmapping fix
- UV platform fix"
* 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/mm, mm/hwpoison: Don't unconditionally unmap kernel 1:1 pages
x86/error_inject: Make just_return_func() globally visible
x86/platform/UV: Fix GAM Range Table entries less than 1GB
x86/build: Add arch/x86/tools/insn_decoder_test to .gitignore
x86/smpboot: Fix uncore_pci_remove() indexing bug when hot-removing a physical CPU
x86/mm/kcore: Add vsyscall page to /proc/kcore conditionally
vfs/proc/kcore, x86/mm/kcore: Fix SMAP fault when dumping vsyscall user page
x86/Kconfig: Further simplify the NR_CPUS config
x86/Kconfig: Simplify NR_CPUS config
x86/MCE: Fix build warning introduced by "x86: do not use print_symbol()"
x86/cpufeature: Update _static_cpu_has() to use all named variables
x86/cpufeature: Reindent _static_cpu_has()
Pull x86 PTI and Spectre related fixes and updates from Ingo Molnar:
"Here's the latest set of Spectre and PTI related fixes and updates:
Spectre:
- Add entry code register clearing to reduce the Spectre attack
surface
- Update the Spectre microcode blacklist
- Inline the KVM Spectre helpers to get close to v4.14 performance
again.
- Fix indirect_branch_prediction_barrier()
- Fix/improve Spectre related kernel messages
- Fix array_index_nospec_mask() asm constraint
- KVM: fix two MSR handling bugs
PTI:
- Fix a paranoid entry PTI CR3 handling bug
- Fix comments
objtool:
- Fix paranoid_entry() frame pointer warning
- Annotate WARN()-related UD2 as reachable
- Various fixes
- Add Add Peter Zijlstra as objtool co-maintainer
Misc:
- Various x86 entry code self-test fixes
- Improve/simplify entry code stack frame generation and handling
after recent heavy-handed PTI and Spectre changes. (There's two
more WIP improvements expected here.)
- Type fix for cache entries
There's also some low risk non-fix changes I've included in this
branch to reduce backporting conflicts:
- rename a confusing x86_cpu field name
- de-obfuscate the naming of single-TLB flushing primitives"
* 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (41 commits)
x86/entry/64: Fix CR3 restore in paranoid_exit()
x86/cpu: Change type of x86_cache_size variable to unsigned int
x86/spectre: Fix an error message
x86/cpu: Rename cpu_data.x86_mask to cpu_data.x86_stepping
selftests/x86/mpx: Fix incorrect bounds with old _sigfault
x86/mm: Rename flush_tlb_single() and flush_tlb_one() to __flush_tlb_one_[user|kernel]()
x86/speculation: Add <asm/msr-index.h> dependency
nospec: Move array_index_nospec() parameter checking into separate macro
x86/speculation: Fix up array_index_nospec_mask() asm constraint
x86/debug: Use UD2 for WARN()
x86/debug, objtool: Annotate WARN()-related UD2 as reachable
objtool: Fix segfault in ignore_unreachable_insn()
selftests/x86: Disable tests requiring 32-bit support on pure 64-bit systems
selftests/x86: Do not rely on "int $0x80" in single_step_syscall.c
selftests/x86: Do not rely on "int $0x80" in test_mremap_vdso.c
selftests/x86: Fix build bug caused by the 5lvl test which has been moved to the VM directory
selftests/x86/pkeys: Remove unused functions
selftests/x86: Clean up and document sscanf() usage
selftests/x86: Fix vDSO selftest segfault for vsyscall=none
x86/entry/64: Remove the unused 'icebp' macro
...
x86_mask is a confusing name which is hard to associate with the
processor's stepping.
Additionally, correct an indent issue in lib/cpu.c.
Signed-off-by: Jia Zhang <qianyue.zj@alibaba-inc.com>
[ Updated it to more recent kernels. ]
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: tony.luck@intel.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1514771530-70829-1-git-send-email-qianyue.zj@alibaba-inc.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
After alternatives were shifted to the call site, only 2 headers are
necessary.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180113190648.GB23111@avx2
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
With link time optimizations enabled, I get a link failure:
./ccLbOEHX.ltrans19.ltrans.o: In function `override_function_with_return':
<artificial>:(.text+0x7f3): undefined reference to `just_return_func'
Marking the symbol .globl makes it work as expected.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Fixes: 540adea380 ("error-injection: Separate error-injection from kprobe")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180202145634.200291-3-arnd@arndb.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Pull spectre/meltdown updates from Thomas Gleixner:
"The next round of updates related to melted spectrum:
- The initial set of spectre V1 mitigations:
- Array index speculation blocker and its usage for syscall,
fdtable and the n180211 driver.
- Speculation barrier and its usage in user access functions
- Make indirect calls in KVM speculation safe
- Blacklisting of known to be broken microcodes so IPBP/IBSR are not
touched.
- The initial IBPB support and its usage in context switch
- The exposure of the new speculation MSRs to KVM guests.
- A fix for a regression in x86/32 related to the cpu entry area
- Proper whitelisting for known to be safe CPUs from the mitigations.
- objtool fixes to deal proper with retpolines and alternatives
- Exclude __init functions from retpolines which speeds up the boot
process.
- Removal of the syscall64 fast path and related cleanups and
simplifications
- Removal of the unpatched paravirt mode which is yet another source
of indirect unproteced calls.
- A new and undisputed version of the module mismatch warning
- A couple of cleanup and correctness fixes all over the place
Yet another step towards full mitigation. There are a few things still
missing like the RBS underflow mitigation for Skylake and other small
details, but that's being worked on.
That said, I'm taking a belated christmas vacation for a week and hope
that everything is magically solved when I'm back on Feb 12th"
* 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (37 commits)
KVM/SVM: Allow direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL
KVM/VMX: Allow direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL
KVM/VMX: Emulate MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES
KVM/x86: Add IBPB support
KVM/x86: Update the reverse_cpuid list to include CPUID_7_EDX
x86/speculation: Fix typo IBRS_ATT, which should be IBRS_ALL
x86/pti: Mark constant arrays as __initconst
x86/spectre: Simplify spectre_v2 command line parsing
x86/retpoline: Avoid retpolines for built-in __init functions
x86/kvm: Update spectre-v1 mitigation
KVM: VMX: make MSR bitmaps per-VCPU
x86/paravirt: Remove 'noreplace-paravirt' cmdline option
x86/speculation: Use Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier in context switch
x86/cpuid: Fix up "virtual" IBRS/IBPB/STIBP feature bits on Intel
x86/spectre: Fix spelling mistake: "vunerable"-> "vulnerable"
x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1
nl80211: Sanitize array index in parse_txq_params
vfs, fdtable: Prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
x86/syscall: Sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation
x86/get_user: Use pointer masking to limit speculation
...
Pull networking updates from David Miller:
1) Significantly shrink the core networking routing structures. Result
of http://vger.kernel.org/~davem/seoul2017_netdev_keynote.pdf
2) Add netdevsim driver for testing various offloads, from Jakub
Kicinski.
3) Support cross-chip FDB operations in DSA, from Vivien Didelot.
4) Add a 2nd listener hash table for TCP, similar to what was done for
UDP. From Martin KaFai Lau.
5) Add eBPF based queue selection to tun, from Jason Wang.
6) Lockless qdisc support, from John Fastabend.
7) SCTP stream interleave support, from Xin Long.
8) Smoother TCP receive autotuning, from Eric Dumazet.
9) Lots of erspan tunneling enhancements, from William Tu.
10) Add true function call support to BPF, from Alexei Starovoitov.
11) Add explicit support for GRO HW offloading, from Michael Chan.
12) Support extack generation in more netlink subsystems. From Alexander
Aring, Quentin Monnet, and Jakub Kicinski.
13) Add 1000BaseX, flow control, and EEE support to mvneta driver. From
Russell King.
14) Add flow table abstraction to netfilter, from Pablo Neira Ayuso.
15) Many improvements and simplifications to the NFP driver bpf JIT,
from Jakub Kicinski.
16) Support for ipv6 non-equal cost multipath routing, from Ido
Schimmel.
17) Add resource abstration to devlink, from Arkadi Sharshevsky.
18) Packet scheduler classifier shared filter block support, from Jiri
Pirko.
19) Avoid locking in act_csum, from Davide Caratti.
20) devinet_ioctl() simplifications from Al viro.
21) More TCP bpf improvements from Lawrence Brakmo.
22) Add support for onlink ipv6 route flag, similar to ipv4, from David
Ahern.
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1925 commits)
tls: Add support for encryption using async offload accelerator
ip6mr: fix stale iterator
net/sched: kconfig: Remove blank help texts
openvswitch: meter: Use 64-bit arithmetic instead of 32-bit
tcp_nv: fix potential integer overflow in tcpnv_acked
r8169: fix RTL8168EP take too long to complete driver initialization.
qmi_wwan: Add support for Quectel EP06
rtnetlink: enable IFLA_IF_NETNSID for RTM_NEWLINK
ipmr: Fix ptrdiff_t print formatting
ibmvnic: Wait for device response when changing MAC
qlcnic: fix deadlock bug
tcp: release sk_frag.page in tcp_disconnect
ipv4: Get the address of interface correctly.
net_sched: gen_estimator: fix lockdep splat
net: macb: Handle HRESP error
net/mlx5e: IPoIB, Fix copy-paste bug in flow steering refactoring
ipv6: addrconf: break critical section in addrconf_verify_rtnl()
ipv6: change route cache aging logic
i40e/i40evf: Update DESC_NEEDED value to reflect larger value
bnxt_en: cleanup DIM work on device shutdown
...
Quoting Linus:
I do think that it would be a good idea to very expressly document
the fact that it's not that the user access itself is unsafe. I do
agree that things like "get_user()" want to be protected, but not
because of any direct bugs or problems with get_user() and friends,
but simply because get_user() is an excellent source of a pointer
that is obviously controlled from a potentially attacking user
space. So it's a prime candidate for then finding _subsequent_
accesses that can then be used to perturb the cache.
Unlike the __get_user() case get_user() includes the address limit check
near the pointer de-reference. With that locality the speculation can be
mitigated with pointer narrowing rather than a barrier, i.e.
array_index_nospec(). Where the narrowing is performed by:
cmp %limit, %ptr
sbb %mask, %mask
and %mask, %ptr
With respect to speculation the value of %ptr is either less than %limit
or NULL.
Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: alan@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727417469.33451.11804043010080838495.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Quoting Linus:
I do think that it would be a good idea to very expressly document
the fact that it's not that the user access itself is unsafe. I do
agree that things like "get_user()" want to be protected, but not
because of any direct bugs or problems with get_user() and friends,
but simply because get_user() is an excellent source of a pointer
that is obviously controlled from a potentially attacking user
space. So it's a prime candidate for then finding _subsequent_
accesses that can then be used to perturb the cache.
__uaccess_begin_nospec() covers __get_user() and copy_from_iter() where the
limit check is far away from the user pointer de-reference. In those cases
a barrier_nospec() prevents speculation with a potential pointer to
privileged memory. uaccess_try_nospec covers get_user_try.
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Suggested-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: alan@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727416953.33451.10508284228526170604.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
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Merge tag 'v4.15' into x86/pti, to be able to merge dependent changes
Time has come to switch PTI development over to a v4.15 base - we'll still
try to make sure that all PTI fixes backport cleanly to v4.14 and earlier.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Pull x86/pti updates from Thomas Gleixner:
"Another set of melted spectrum related changes:
- Code simplifications and cleanups for RSB and retpolines.
- Make the indirect calls in KVM speculation safe.
- Whitelist CPUs which are known not to speculate from Meltdown and
prepare for the new CPUID flag which tells the kernel that a CPU is
not affected.
- A less rigorous variant of the module retpoline check which merily
warns when a non-retpoline protected module is loaded and reflects
that fact in the sysfs file.
- Prepare for Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier support.
- Prepare for exposure of the Speculation Control MSRs to guests, so
guest OSes which depend on those "features" can use them. Includes
a blacklist of the broken microcodes. The actual exposure of the
MSRs through KVM is still being worked on"
* 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/speculation: Simplify indirect_branch_prediction_barrier()
x86/retpoline: Simplify vmexit_fill_RSB()
x86/cpufeatures: Clean up Spectre v2 related CPUID flags
x86/cpu/bugs: Make retpoline module warning conditional
x86/bugs: Drop one "mitigation" from dmesg
x86/nospec: Fix header guards names
x86/alternative: Print unadorned pointers
x86/speculation: Add basic IBPB (Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier) support
x86/cpufeature: Blacklist SPEC_CTRL/PRED_CMD on early Spectre v2 microcodes
x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on CPUs which are not vulnerable to Meltdown
x86/msr: Add definitions for new speculation control MSRs
x86/cpufeatures: Add AMD feature bits for Speculation Control
x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel feature bits for Speculation Control
x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUID_7_EDX CPUID leaf
module/retpoline: Warn about missing retpoline in module
KVM: VMX: Make indirect call speculation safe
KVM: x86: Make indirect calls in emulator speculation safe
Pull x86 retpoline fixlet from Thomas Gleixner:
"Remove the ESP/RSP thunks for retpoline as they cannot ever work.
Get rid of them before they show up in a release"
* 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/retpoline: Remove the esp/rsp thunk
It doesn't make sense to have an indirect call thunk with esp/rsp as
retpoline code won't work correctly with the stack pointer register.
Removing it will help compiler writers to catch error in case such
a thunk call is emitted incorrectly.
Fixes: 76b043848f ("x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support")
Suggested-by: Jeff Law <law@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1516658974-27852-1-git-send-email-longman@redhat.com
en_rx_am.c was deleted in 'net-next' but had a bug fixed in it in
'net'.
The esp{4,6}_offload.c conflicts were overlapping changes.
The 'out' label is removed so we just return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL)
directly.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Pull x86 pti fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
"A small set of fixes for the meltdown/spectre mitigations:
- Make kprobes aware of retpolines to prevent probes in the retpoline
thunks.
- Make the machine check exception speculation protected. MCE used to
issue an indirect call directly from the ASM entry code. Convert
that to a direct call into a C-function and issue the indirect call
from there so the compiler can add the retpoline protection,
- Make the vmexit_fill_RSB() assembly less stupid
- Fix a typo in the PTI documentation"
* 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/retpoline: Optimize inline assembler for vmexit_fill_RSB
x86/pti: Document fix wrong index
kprobes/x86: Disable optimizing on the function jumps to indirect thunk
kprobes/x86: Blacklist indirect thunk functions for kprobes
retpoline: Introduce start/end markers of indirect thunk
x86/mce: Make machine check speculation protected
Mark __x86_indirect_thunk_* functions as blacklist for kprobes
because those functions can be called from anywhere in the kernel
including blacklist functions of kprobes.
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151629209111.10241.5444852823378068683.stgit@devbox
Introduce start/end markers of __x86_indirect_thunk_* functions.
To make it easy, consolidate .text.__x86.indirect_thunk.* sections
to one .text.__x86.indirect_thunk section and put it in the
end of kernel text section and adds __indirect_thunk_start/end
so that other subsystem (e.g. kprobes) can identify it.
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151629206178.10241.6828804696410044771.stgit@devbox
__const_udelay is marked inline, and LTO will happily inline it everywhere
Dropping the inline saves ~44k text in a LTO build.
13999560 1740864 1499136 17239560 1070e08 vmlinux-with-udelay-inline
13954764 1736768 1499136 17190668 1064f0c vmlinux-wo-udelay-inline
Inlining it has no advantage in general, so its the right thing to do.
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171222001821.2157-2-andi@firstfloor.org
Pull x86 pti updates from Thomas Gleixner:
"This contains:
- a PTI bugfix to avoid setting reserved CR3 bits when PCID is
disabled. This seems to cause issues on a virtual machine at least
and is incorrect according to the AMD manual.
- a PTI bugfix which disables the perf BTS facility if PTI is
enabled. The BTS AUX buffer is not globally visible and causes the
CPU to fault when the mapping disappears on switching CR3 to user
space. A full fix which restores BTS on PTI is non trivial and will
be worked on.
- PTI bugfixes for EFI and trusted boot which make sure that the user
space visible page table entries have the NX bit cleared
- removal of dead code in the PTI pagetable setup functions
- add PTI documentation
- add a selftest for vsyscall to verify that the kernel actually
implements what it advertises.
- a sysfs interface to expose vulnerability and mitigation
information so there is a coherent way for users to retrieve the
status.
- the initial spectre_v2 mitigations, aka retpoline:
+ The necessary ASM thunk and compiler support
+ The ASM variants of retpoline and the conversion of affected ASM
code
+ Make LFENCE serializing on AMD so it can be used as speculation
trap
+ The RSB fill after vmexit
- initial objtool support for retpoline
As I said in the status mail this is the most of the set of patches
which should go into 4.15 except two straight forward patches still on
hold:
- the retpoline add on of LFENCE which waits for ACKs
- the RSB fill after context switch
Both should be ready to go early next week and with that we'll have
covered the major holes of spectre_v2 and go back to normality"
* 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (28 commits)
x86,perf: Disable intel_bts when PTI
security/Kconfig: Correct the Documentation reference for PTI
x86/pti: Fix !PCID and sanitize defines
selftests/x86: Add test_vsyscall
x86/retpoline: Fill return stack buffer on vmexit
x86/retpoline/irq32: Convert assembler indirect jumps
x86/retpoline/checksum32: Convert assembler indirect jumps
x86/retpoline/xen: Convert Xen hypercall indirect jumps
x86/retpoline/hyperv: Convert assembler indirect jumps
x86/retpoline/ftrace: Convert ftrace assembler indirect jumps
x86/retpoline/entry: Convert entry assembler indirect jumps
x86/retpoline/crypto: Convert crypto assembler indirect jumps
x86/spectre: Add boot time option to select Spectre v2 mitigation
x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support
objtool: Allow alternatives to be ignored
objtool: Detect jumps to retpoline thunks
x86/pti: Make unpoison of pgd for trusted boot work for real
x86/alternatives: Fix optimize_nops() checking
sysfs/cpu: Fix typos in vulnerability documentation
x86/cpu/AMD: Use LFENCE_RDTSC in preference to MFENCE_RDTSC
...
Since error-injection framework is not limited to be used
by kprobes, nor bpf. Other kernel subsystems can use it
freely for checking safeness of error-injection, e.g.
livepatch, ftrace etc.
So this separate error-injection framework from kprobes.
Some differences has been made:
- "kprobe" word is removed from any APIs/structures.
- BPF_ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION() is renamed to
ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION() since it is not limited for BPF too.
- CONFIG_FUNCTION_ERROR_INJECTION is the config item of this
feature. It is automatically enabled if the arch supports
error injection feature for kprobe or ftrace etc.
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Enable the use of -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern in newer GCC, and provide
the corresponding thunks. Provide assembler macros for invoking the thunks
in the same way that GCC does, from native and inline assembler.
This adds X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE and sets it by default on all CPUs. In
some circumstances, IBRS microcode features may be used instead, and the
retpoline can be disabled.
On AMD CPUs if lfence is serialising, the retpoline can be dramatically
simplified to a simple "lfence; jmp *\reg". A future patch, after it has
been verified that lfence really is serialising in all circumstances, can
enable this by setting the X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD feature bit in addition
to X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE.
Do not align the retpoline in the altinstr section, because there is no
guarantee that it stays aligned when it's copied over the oldinstr during
alternative patching.
[ Andi Kleen: Rename the macros, add CONFIG_RETPOLINE option, export thunks]
[ tglx: Put actual function CALL/JMP in front of the macros, convert to
symbolic labels ]
[ dwmw2: Convert back to numeric labels, merge objtool fixes ]
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-4-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Pull x86 syscall entry code changes for PTI from Ingo Molnar:
"The main changes here are Andy Lutomirski's changes to switch the
x86-64 entry code to use the 'per CPU entry trampoline stack'. This,
besides helping fix KASLR leaks (the pending Page Table Isolation
(PTI) work), also robustifies the x86 entry code"
* 'WIP.x86-pti.entry-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (26 commits)
x86/cpufeatures: Make CPU bugs sticky
x86/paravirt: Provide a way to check for hypervisors
x86/paravirt: Dont patch flush_tlb_single
x86/entry/64: Make cpu_entry_area.tss read-only
x86/entry: Clean up the SYSENTER_stack code
x86/entry/64: Remove the SYSENTER stack canary
x86/entry/64: Move the IST stacks into struct cpu_entry_area
x86/entry/64: Create a per-CPU SYSCALL entry trampoline
x86/entry/64: Return to userspace from the trampoline stack
x86/entry/64: Use a per-CPU trampoline stack for IDT entries
x86/espfix/64: Stop assuming that pt_regs is on the entry stack
x86/entry/64: Separate cpu_current_top_of_stack from TSS.sp0
x86/entry: Remap the TSS into the CPU entry area
x86/entry: Move SYSENTER_stack to the beginning of struct tss_struct
x86/dumpstack: Handle stack overflow on all stacks
x86/entry: Fix assumptions that the HW TSS is at the beginning of cpu_tss
x86/kasan/64: Teach KASAN about the cpu_entry_area
x86/mm/fixmap: Generalize the GDT fixmap mechanism, introduce struct cpu_entry_area
x86/entry/gdt: Put per-CPU GDT remaps in ascending order
x86/dumpstack: Add get_stack_info() support for the SYSENTER stack
...
The TSS is a fairly juicy target for exploits, and, now that the TSS
is in the cpu_entry_area, it's no longer protected by kASLR. Make it
read-only on x86_64.
On x86_32, it can't be RO because it's written by the CPU during task
switches, and we use a task gate for double faults. I'd also be
nervous about errata if we tried to make it RO even on configurations
without double fault handling.
[ tglx: AMD confirmed that there is no problem on 64-bit with TSS RO. So
it's probably safe to assume that it's a non issue, though Intel
might have been creative in that area. Still waiting for
confirmation. ]
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.733700132@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Update x86-opcode-map.txt based on the October 2017 Intel SDM publication.
Fix INVPID to INVVPID.
Add UD0 and UD1 instruction opcodes.
Also sync the objtool and perf tooling copies of this file.
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/aac062d7-c0f6-96e3-5c92-ed299e2bd3da@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The kbuild test robot reported this build warning:
Warning: arch/x86/tools/test_get_len found difference at <jump_table>:ffffffff8103dd2c
Warning: ffffffff8103dd82: f6 09 d8 testb $0xd8,(%rcx)
Warning: objdump says 3 bytes, but insn_get_length() says 2
Warning: decoded and checked 1569014 instructions with 1 warnings
This sequence seems to be a new instruction not in the opcode map in the Intel SDM.
The instruction sequence is "F6 09 d8", means Group3(F6), MOD(00)REG(001)RM(001), and 0xd8.
Intel SDM vol2 A.4 Table A-6 said the table index in the group is "Encoding of Bits 5,4,3 of
the ModR/M Byte (bits 2,1,0 in parenthesis)"
In that table, opcodes listed by the index REG bits as:
000 001 010 011 100 101 110 111
TEST Ib/Iz,(undefined),NOT,NEG,MUL AL/rAX,IMUL AL/rAX,DIV AL/rAX,IDIV AL/rAX
So, it seems TEST Ib is assigned to 001.
Add the new pattern.
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
In order to save on redundant structs definitions
insn_get_code_seg_params() was made to return two 4-bit values in a char
but clang complains:
arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c:780:10: warning: implicit conversion from 'int' to 'char'
changes value from 132 to -124 [-Wconstant-conversion]
return INSN_CODE_SEG_PARAMS(4, 8);
~~~~~~ ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
./arch/x86/include/asm/insn-eval.h:16:57: note: expanded from macro 'INSN_CODE_SEG_PARAMS'
#define INSN_CODE_SEG_PARAMS(oper_sz, addr_sz) (oper_sz | (addr_sz << 4))
Those two values do get picked apart afterwards the opposite way of how
they were ORed so wrt to the LSByte, the return value is the same.
But this function returns -EINVAL in the error case, which is an int. So
make it return an int which is the native word size anyway and thus fix
the clang warning.
Reported-by: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Reported-by: Nick Desaulniers <nick.desaulniers@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171123091951.1462-1-bp@alien8.de
Pull x86 core updates from Ingo Molnar:
"Note that in this cycle most of the x86 topics interacted at a level
that caused them to be merged into tip:x86/asm - but this should be a
temporary phenomenon, hopefully we'll back to the usual patterns in
the next merge window.
The main changes in this cycle were:
Hardware enablement:
- Add support for the Intel UMIP (User Mode Instruction Prevention)
CPU feature. This is a security feature that disables certain
instructions such as SGDT, SLDT, SIDT, SMSW and STR. (Ricardo Neri)
[ Note that this is disabled by default for now, there are some
smaller enhancements in the pipeline that I'll follow up with in
the next 1-2 days, which allows this to be enabled by default.]
- Add support for the AMD SEV (Secure Encrypted Virtualization) CPU
feature, on top of SME (Secure Memory Encryption) support that was
added in v4.14. (Tom Lendacky, Brijesh Singh)
- Enable new SSE/AVX/AVX512 CPU features: AVX512_VBMI2, GFNI, VAES,
VPCLMULQDQ, AVX512_VNNI, AVX512_BITALG. (Gayatri Kammela)
Other changes:
- A big series of entry code simplifications and enhancements (Andy
Lutomirski)
- Make the ORC unwinder default on x86 and various objtool
enhancements. (Josh Poimboeuf)
- 5-level paging enhancements (Kirill A. Shutemov)
- Micro-optimize the entry code a bit (Borislav Petkov)
- Improve the handling of interdependent CPU features in the early
FPU init code (Andi Kleen)
- Build system enhancements (Changbin Du, Masahiro Yamada)
- ... plus misc enhancements, fixes and cleanups"
* 'x86-asm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (118 commits)
x86/build: Make the boot image generation less verbose
selftests/x86: Add tests for the STR and SLDT instructions
selftests/x86: Add tests for User-Mode Instruction Prevention
x86/traps: Fix up general protection faults caused by UMIP
x86/umip: Enable User-Mode Instruction Prevention at runtime
x86/umip: Force a page fault when unable to copy emulated result to user
x86/umip: Add emulation code for UMIP instructions
x86/cpufeature: Add User-Mode Instruction Prevention definitions
x86/insn-eval: Add support to resolve 16-bit address encodings
x86/insn-eval: Handle 32-bit address encodings in virtual-8086 mode
x86/insn-eval: Add wrapper function for 32 and 64-bit addresses
x86/insn-eval: Add support to resolve 32-bit address encodings
x86/insn-eval: Compute linear address in several utility functions
resource: Fix resource_size.cocci warnings
X86/KVM: Clear encryption attribute when SEV is active
X86/KVM: Decrypt shared per-cpu variables when SEV is active
percpu: Introduce DEFINE_PER_CPU_DECRYPTED
x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot
x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active
x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active
...
Tasks running in virtual-8086 mode, in protected mode with code segment
descriptors that specify 16-bit default address sizes via the D bit, or via
an address override prefix will use 16-bit addressing form encodings as
described in the Intel 64 and IA-32 Architecture Software Developer's
Manual Volume 2A Section 2.1.5, Table 2-1.
16-bit addressing encodings differ in several ways from the 32-bit/64-bit
addressing form encodings: ModRM.rm points to different registers and, in
some cases, effective addresses are indicated by the addition of the value
of two registers. Also, there is no support for SIB bytes. Thus, a
separate function is needed to parse this form of addressing.
Three functions are introduced. get_reg_offset_16() obtains the
offset from the base of pt_regs of the registers indicated by the ModRM
byte of the address encoding. get_eff_addr_modrm_16() computes the
effective address from the value of the register operands.
get_addr_ref_16() computes the linear address using the obtained effective
address and the base address of the segment.
Segment limits are enforced when running in protected mode.
Signed-off-by: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Adam Buchbinder <adam.buchbinder@gmail.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Chen Yucong <slaoub@gmail.com>
Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com>
Cc: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Huang Rui <ray.huang@amd.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lstoakes@gmail.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Qiaowei Ren <qiaowei.ren@intel.com>
Cc: Ravi V. Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: ricardo.neri@intel.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509935277-22138-6-git-send-email-ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
It is possible to utilize 32-bit address encodings in virtual-8086 mode via
an address override instruction prefix. However, the range of the
effective address is still limited to [0x-0xffff]. In such a case, return
error.
Also, linear addresses in virtual-8086 mode are limited to 20 bits. Enforce
such limit by truncating the most significant bytes of the computed linear
address.
Signed-off-by: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Adam Buchbinder <adam.buchbinder@gmail.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Chen Yucong <slaoub@gmail.com>
Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com>
Cc: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Huang Rui <ray.huang@amd.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lstoakes@gmail.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Qiaowei Ren <qiaowei.ren@intel.com>
Cc: Ravi V. Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: ricardo.neri@intel.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509935277-22138-5-git-send-email-ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
