Pull vfs pile (part one) from Al Viro:
"Assorted stuff - cleaning namei.c up a bit, fixing ->d_name/->d_parent
locking violations, etc.
The most visible changes here are death of FS_REVAL_DOT (replaced with
"has ->d_weak_revalidate()") and a new helper getting from struct file
to inode. Some bits of preparation to xattr method interface changes.
Misc patches by various people sent this cycle *and* ocfs2 fixes from
several cycles ago that should've been upstream right then.
PS: the next vfs pile will be xattr stuff."
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (46 commits)
saner proc_get_inode() calling conventions
proc: avoid extra pde_put() in proc_fill_super()
fs: change return values from -EACCES to -EPERM
fs/exec.c: make bprm_mm_init() static
ocfs2/dlm: use GFP_ATOMIC inside a spin_lock
ocfs2: fix possible use-after-free with AIO
ocfs2: Fix oops in ocfs2_fast_symlink_readpage() code path
get_empty_filp()/alloc_file() leave both ->f_pos and ->f_version zero
target: writev() on single-element vector is pointless
export kernel_write(), convert open-coded instances
fs: encode_fh: return FILEID_INVALID if invalid fid_type
kill f_vfsmnt
vfs: kill FS_REVAL_DOT by adding a d_weak_revalidate dentry op
nfsd: handle vfs_getattr errors in acl protocol
switch vfs_getattr() to struct path
default SET_PERSONALITY() in linux/elf.h
ceph: prepopulate inodes only when request is aborted
d_hash_and_lookup(): export, switch open-coded instances
9p: switch v9fs_set_create_acl() to inode+fid, do it before d_instantiate()
9p: split dropping the acls from v9fs_set_create_acl()
...
Pull user namespace and namespace infrastructure changes from Eric W Biederman:
"This set of changes starts with a few small enhnacements to the user
namespace. reboot support, allowing more arbitrary mappings, and
support for mounting devpts, ramfs, tmpfs, and mqueuefs as just the
user namespace root.
I do my best to document that if you care about limiting your
unprivileged users that when you have the user namespace support
enabled you will need to enable memory control groups.
There is a minor bug fix to prevent overflowing the stack if someone
creates way too many user namespaces.
The bulk of the changes are a continuation of the kuid/kgid push down
work through the filesystems. These changes make using uids and gids
typesafe which ensures that these filesystems are safe to use when
multiple user namespaces are in use. The filesystems converted for
3.9 are ceph, 9p, afs, ocfs2, gfs2, ncpfs, nfs, nfsd, and cifs. The
changes for these filesystems were a little more involved so I split
the changes into smaller hopefully obviously correct changes.
XFS is the only filesystem that remains. I was hoping I could get
that in this release so that user namespace support would be enabled
with an allyesconfig or an allmodconfig but it looks like the xfs
changes need another couple of days before it they are ready."
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (93 commits)
cifs: Enable building with user namespaces enabled.
cifs: Convert struct cifs_ses to use a kuid_t and a kgid_t
cifs: Convert struct cifs_sb_info to use kuids and kgids
cifs: Modify struct smb_vol to use kuids and kgids
cifs: Convert struct cifsFileInfo to use a kuid
cifs: Convert struct cifs_fattr to use kuid and kgids
cifs: Convert struct tcon_link to use a kuid.
cifs: Modify struct cifs_unix_set_info_args to hold a kuid_t and a kgid_t
cifs: Convert from a kuid before printing current_fsuid
cifs: Use kuids and kgids SID to uid/gid mapping
cifs: Pass GLOBAL_ROOT_UID and GLOBAL_ROOT_GID to keyring_alloc
cifs: Use BUILD_BUG_ON to validate uids and gids are the same size
cifs: Override unmappable incoming uids and gids
nfsd: Enable building with user namespaces enabled.
nfsd: Properly compare and initialize kuids and kgids
nfsd: Store ex_anon_uid and ex_anon_gid as kuids and kgids
nfsd: Modify nfsd4_cb_sec to use kuids and kgids
nfsd: Handle kuids and kgids in the nfs4acl to posix_acl conversion
nfsd: Convert nfsxdr to use kuids and kgids
nfsd: Convert nfs3xdr to use kuids and kgids
...
Remove a tabstop from the switch statement, in the usual fashion. A few
instances of weirdwrapping were removed as a result.
Cc: Chen Gang <gang.chen@asianux.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
arg2 will never < 0, for its type is 'unsigned long'
Also, use the provided macros.
Signed-off-by: Chen Gang <gang.chen@asianux.com>
Reported-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
In a container with its own pid namespace and user namespace, rebooting
the system won't reboot the host, but terminate all the processes in
it and thus have the container shutdown, so it's safe.
Signed-off-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
We have thread_group_cputime() and thread_group_times(). The naming
doesn't provide enough information about the difference between
these two APIs.
To lower the confusion, rename thread_group_times() to
thread_group_cputime_adjusted(). This name better suggests that
it's a version of thread_group_cputime() that does some stabilization
on the raw cputime values. ie here: scale on top of CFS runtime
stats and bound lower value for monotonicity.
Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
The min/max call needed to have explicit types on some architectures
(e.g. mn10300). Use clamp_t instead to avoid the warning:
kernel/sys.c: In function 'override_release':
kernel/sys.c:1287:10: warning: comparison of distinct pointer types lacks a cast [enabled by default]
Reported-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Calling uname() with the UNAME26 personality set allows a leak of kernel
stack contents. This fixes it by defensively calculating the length of
copy_to_user() call, making the len argument unsigned, and initializing
the stack buffer to zero (now technically unneeded, but hey, overkill).
CVE-2012-0957
Reported-by: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
orderly_poweroff is trying to poweroff platform in two steps:
step 1: Call user space application to poweroff
step 2: If user space poweroff fail, then do a force power off if force param
is set.
The bug here is, step 1 is always successful with param UMH_NO_WAIT, which obey
the design goal of orderly_poweroff.
We have two choices here:
UMH_WAIT_EXEC which means wait for the exec, but not the process;
UMH_WAIT_PROC which means wait for the process to complete.
we need to trade off the two choices:
If using UMH_WAIT_EXEC, there is potential issue comments by Serge E.
Hallyn: The exec will have started, but may for whatever (very unlikely)
reason fail.
If using UMH_WAIT_PROC, there is potential issue comments by Eric W.
Biederman: If the caller is not running in a kernel thread then we can
easily get into a case where the user space caller will block waiting for
us when we are waiting for the user space caller.
Thanks for their excellent ideas, based on the above discussion, we
finally choose UMH_WAIT_EXEC, which is much more safe, if the user
application really fails, we just complain the application itself, it
seems a better choice here.
Signed-off-by: Feng Hong <hongfeng@marvell.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@sisk.pl>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
As kernel_power_off() calls disable_nonboot_cpus(), we may also want to
have kernel_restart() call disable_nonboot_cpus(). Doing so can help
machines that require boot cpu be the last alive cpu during reboot to
survive with kernel restart.
This fixes one reboot issue seen on imx6q (Cortex-A9 Quad). The machine
requires that the restart routine be run on the primary cpu rather than
secondary ones. Otherwise, the secondary core running the restart
routine will fail to come to online after reboot.
Signed-off-by: Shawn Guo <shawn.guo@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
If argv_split() failed, the code will end up calling argv_free(NULL). Fix
it up and clean things up a bit.
Addresses Coverity report 703573.
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: WANG Cong <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Just setting the "error" to error number is enough on failure and It
doesn't require to set "error" variable to zero in each switch case,
since it was already initialized with zero. And also removed return 0
in switch case with break statement
Signed-off-by: Sasikantha babu <sasikanth.v19@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
"no other files mapped" requirement from my previous patch (c/r: prctl:
update prctl_set_mm_exe_file() after mm->num_exe_file_vmas removal) is too
paranoid, it forbids operation even if there mapped one shared-anon vma.
Let's check that current mm->exe_file already unmapped, in this case
exe_file symlink already outdated and its changing is reasonable.
Plus, this patch fixes exit code in case operation success.
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org>
Reported-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Tested-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Matt Helsley <matthltc@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
During merging of PR_GET_TID_ADDRESS patch the code has been misplaced (it
happened to appear under PR_MCE_KILL) in result noone can use this option.
Fix it by moving code snippet to a proper place.
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Andrey Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
In commit b76437579d ("procfs: mark thread stack correctly in
proc/<pid>/maps") the stack allocated via clone() is marked in
/proc/<pid>/maps as [stack:%d] thus it might be out of the former
mm->start_stack/end_stack values (and even has some custom VMA flags
set).
So to be able to restore mm->start_stack/end_stack drop vma flags test,
but still require the underlying VMA to exist.
As always note this feature is under CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE and
requires CAP_SYS_RESOURCE to be granted.
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Zero is written at clear_tid_address when the process exits. This
functionality is used by pthread_join().
We already have sys_set_tid_address() to change this address for the
current task but there is no way to obtain it from user space.
Without the ability to find this address and dump it we can't restore
pthread'ed apps which call pthread_join() once they have been restored.
This patch introduces the PR_GET_TID_ADDRESS prctl option which allows
the current process to obtain own clear_tid_address.
This feature is available iif CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE is set.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix prctl numbering]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
A fix for commit b32dfe3771 ("c/r: prctl: add ability to set new
mm_struct::exe_file").
After removing mm->num_exe_file_vmas kernel keeps mm->exe_file until
final mmput(), it never becomes NULL while task is alive.
We can check for other mapped files in mm instead of checking
mm->num_exe_file_vmas, and mark mm with flag MMF_EXE_FILE_CHANGED in
order to forbid second changing of mm->exe_file.
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org>
Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Matt Helsley <matthltc@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
When we do restore we would like to have a way to setup a former
mm_struct::exe_file so that /proc/pid/exe would point to the original
executable file a process had at checkpoint time.
For this the PR_SET_MM_EXE_FILE code is introduced. This option takes a
file descriptor which will be set as a source for new /proc/$pid/exe
symlink.
Note it allows to change /proc/$pid/exe if there are no VM_EXECUTABLE
vmas present for current process, simply because this feature is a special
to C/R and mm::num_exe_file_vmas become meaningless after that.
To minimize the amount of transition the /proc/pid/exe symlink might have,
this feature is implemented in one-shot manner. Thus once changed the
symlink can't be changed again. This should help sysadmins to monitor the
symlinks over all process running in a system.
In particular one could make a snapshot of processes and ring alarm if
there unexpected changes of /proc/pid/exe's in a system.
Note -- this feature is available iif CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE is set and
the caller must have CAP_SYS_RESOURCE capability granted, otherwise the
request to change symlink will be rejected.
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Matt Helsley <matthltc@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
During checkpoint we dump whole process memory to a file and the dump
includes process stack memory. But among stack data itself, the stack
carries additional parameters such as command line arguments, environment
data and auxiliary vector.
So when we do restore procedure and once we've restored stack data itself
we need to setup mm_struct::arg_start/end, env_start/end, so restored
process would be able to find command line arguments and environment data
it had at checkpoint time. The same applies to auxiliary vector.
For this reason additional PR_SET_MM_(ARG_START | ARG_END | ENV_START |
ENV_END | AUXV) codes are introduced.
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Both kernel/sys.c && security/keys/request_key.c where inlining the exact
same code as call_usermodehelper_fns(); So simply convert these sites to
directly use call_usermodehelper_fns().
Signed-off-by: Boaz Harrosh <bharrosh@panasas.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
sethostname() and setdomainname() notify userspace on failure (without
modifying uts_kern_table). Change things so that we only notify userspace
on success, when uts_kern_table was actually modified.
Signed-off-by: Sasikantha babu <sasikanth.v19@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: WANG Cong <amwang@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull user namespace enhancements from Eric Biederman:
"This is a course correction for the user namespace, so that we can
reach an inexpensive, maintainable, and reasonably complete
implementation.
Highlights:
- Config guards make it impossible to enable the user namespace and
code that has not been converted to be user namespace safe.
- Use of the new kuid_t type ensures the if you somehow get past the
config guards the kernel will encounter type errors if you enable
user namespaces and attempt to compile in code whose permission
checks have not been updated to be user namespace safe.
- All uids from child user namespaces are mapped into the initial
user namespace before they are processed. Removing the need to add
an additional check to see if the user namespace of the compared
uids remains the same.
- With the user namespaces compiled out the performance is as good or
better than it is today.
- For most operations absolutely nothing changes performance or
operationally with the user namespace enabled.
- The worst case performance I could come up with was timing 1
billion cache cold stat operations with the user namespace code
enabled. This went from 156s to 164s on my laptop (or 156ns to
164ns per stat operation).
- (uid_t)-1 and (gid_t)-1 are reserved as an internal error value.
Most uid/gid setting system calls treat these value specially
anyway so attempting to use -1 as a uid would likely cause
entertaining failures in userspace.
- If setuid is called with a uid that can not be mapped setuid fails.
I have looked at sendmail, login, ssh and every other program I
could think of that would call setuid and they all check for and
handle the case where setuid fails.
- If stat or a similar system call is called from a context in which
we can not map a uid we lie and return overflowuid. The LFS
experience suggests not lying and returning an error code might be
better, but the historical precedent with uids is different and I
can not think of anything that would break by lying about a uid we
can't map.
- Capabilities are localized to the current user namespace making it
safe to give the initial user in a user namespace all capabilities.
My git tree covers all of the modifications needed to convert the core
kernel and enough changes to make a system bootable to runlevel 1."
Fix up trivial conflicts due to nearby independent changes in fs/stat.c
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (46 commits)
userns: Silence silly gcc warning.
cred: use correct cred accessor with regards to rcu read lock
userns: Convert the move_pages, and migrate_pages permission checks to use uid_eq
userns: Convert cgroup permission checks to use uid_eq
userns: Convert tmpfs to use kuid and kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert sysfs to use kgid/kuid where appropriate
userns: Convert sysctl permission checks to use kuid and kgids.
userns: Convert proc to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert ext4 to user kuid/kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert ext3 to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert ext2 to use kuid/kgid where appropriate.
userns: Convert devpts to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert binary formats to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
userns: Add negative depends on entries to avoid building code that is userns unsafe
userns: signal remove unnecessary map_cred_ns
userns: Teach inode_capable to understand inodes whose uids map to other namespaces.
userns: Fail exec for suid and sgid binaries with ids outside our user namespace.
userns: Convert stat to return values mapped from kuids and kgids
userns: Convert user specfied uids and gids in chown into kuids and kgid
userns: Use uid_eq gid_eq helpers when comparing kuids and kgids in the vfs
...
Update the permission checks to use the new uid_eq and gid_eq helpers
and remove the now unnecessary user_ns equality comparison.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Convert setregid, setgid, setreuid, setuid,
setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setfsuid, setfsgid,
getuid, geteuid, getgid, getegid,
waitpid, waitid, wait4.
Convert userspace uids and gids into kuids and kgids before
being placed on struct cred. Convert struct cred kuids and
kgids into userspace uids and gids when returning them.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
cred.h and a few trivial users of struct cred are changed. The rest of the users
of struct cred are left for other patches as there are too many changes to make
in one go and leave the change reviewable. If the user namespace is disabled and
CONFIG_UIDGID_STRICT_TYPE_CHECKS are disabled the code will contiue to compile
and behave correctly.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
[This patch depends on luto@mit.edu's no_new_privs patch:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/1/30/264
The whole series including Andrew's patches can be found here:
https://github.com/redpig/linux/tree/seccomp
Complete diff here:
https://github.com/redpig/linux/compare/1dc65fed...seccomp
]
This patch adds support for seccomp mode 2. Mode 2 introduces the
ability for unprivileged processes to install system call filtering
policy expressed in terms of a Berkeley Packet Filter (BPF) program.
This program will be evaluated in the kernel for each system call
the task makes and computes a result based on data in the format
of struct seccomp_data.
A filter program may be installed by calling:
struct sock_fprog fprog = { ... };
...
prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &fprog);
The return value of the filter program determines if the system call is
allowed to proceed or denied. If the first filter program installed
allows prctl(2) calls, then the above call may be made repeatedly
by a task to further reduce its access to the kernel. All attached
programs must be evaluated before a system call will be allowed to
proceed.
Filter programs will be inherited across fork/clone and execve.
However, if the task attaching the filter is unprivileged
(!CAP_SYS_ADMIN) the no_new_privs bit will be set on the task. This
ensures that unprivileged tasks cannot attach filters that affect
privileged tasks (e.g., setuid binary).
There are a number of benefits to this approach. A few of which are
as follows:
- BPF has been exposed to userland for a long time
- BPF optimization (and JIT'ing) are well understood
- Userland already knows its ABI: system call numbers and desired
arguments
- No time-of-check-time-of-use vulnerable data accesses are possible.
- system call arguments are loaded on access only to minimize copying
required for system call policy decisions.
Mode 2 support is restricted to architectures that enable
HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER. In this patch, the primary dependency is on
syscall_get_arguments(). The full desired scope of this feature will
add a few minor additional requirements expressed later in this series.
Based on discussion, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO and SECCOMP_RET_TRACE seem to be
the desired additional functionality.
No architectures are enabled in this patch.
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Indan Zupancic <indan@nul.nu>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
v18: - rebase to v3.4-rc2
- s/chk/check/ (akpm@linux-foundation.org,jmorris@namei.org)
- allocate with GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOWARN (indan@nul.nu)
- add a comment for get_u32 regarding endianness (akpm@)
- fix other typos, style mistakes (akpm@)
- added acked-by
v17: - properly guard seccomp filter needed headers (leann@ubuntu.com)
- tighten return mask to 0x7fff0000
v16: - no change
v15: - add a 4 instr penalty when counting a path to account for seccomp_filter
size (indan@nul.nu)
- drop the max insns to 256KB (indan@nul.nu)
- return ENOMEM if the max insns limit has been hit (indan@nul.nu)
- move IP checks after args (indan@nul.nu)
- drop !user_filter check (indan@nul.nu)
- only allow explicit bpf codes (indan@nul.nu)
- exit_code -> exit_sig
v14: - put/get_seccomp_filter takes struct task_struct
(indan@nul.nu,keescook@chromium.org)
- adds seccomp_chk_filter and drops general bpf_run/chk_filter user
- add seccomp_bpf_load for use by net/core/filter.c
- lower max per-process/per-hierarchy: 1MB
- moved nnp/capability check prior to allocation
(all of the above: indan@nul.nu)
v13: - rebase on to 88ebdda615
v12: - added a maximum instruction count per path (indan@nul.nu,oleg@redhat.com)
- removed copy_seccomp (keescook@chromium.org,indan@nul.nu)
- reworded the prctl_set_seccomp comment (indan@nul.nu)
v11: - reorder struct seccomp_data to allow future args expansion (hpa@zytor.com)
- style clean up, @compat dropped, compat_sock_fprog32 (indan@nul.nu)
- do_exit(SIGSYS) (keescook@chromium.org, luto@mit.edu)
- pare down Kconfig doc reference.
- extra comment clean up
v10: - seccomp_data has changed again to be more aesthetically pleasing
(hpa@zytor.com)
- calling convention is noted in a new u32 field using syscall_get_arch.
This allows for cross-calling convention tasks to use seccomp filters.
(hpa@zytor.com)
- lots of clean up (thanks, Indan!)
v9: - n/a
v8: - use bpf_chk_filter, bpf_run_filter. update load_fns
- Lots of fixes courtesy of indan@nul.nu:
-- fix up load behavior, compat fixups, and merge alloc code,
-- renamed pc and dropped __packed, use bool compat.
-- Added a hidden CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER to synthesize non-arch
dependencies
v7: (massive overhaul thanks to Indan, others)
- added CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
- merged into seccomp.c
- minimal seccomp_filter.h
- no config option (part of seccomp)
- no new prctl
- doesn't break seccomp on systems without asm/syscall.h
(works but arg access always fails)
- dropped seccomp_init_task, extra free functions, ...
- dropped the no-asm/syscall.h code paths
- merges with network sk_run_filter and sk_chk_filter
v6: - fix memory leak on attach compat check failure
- require no_new_privs || CAP_SYS_ADMIN prior to filter
installation. (luto@mit.edu)
- s/seccomp_struct_/seccomp_/ for macros/functions (amwang@redhat.com)
- cleaned up Kconfig (amwang@redhat.com)
- on block, note if the call was compat (so the # means something)
v5: - uses syscall_get_arguments
(indan@nul.nu,oleg@redhat.com, mcgrathr@chromium.org)
- uses union-based arg storage with hi/lo struct to
handle endianness. Compromises between the two alternate
proposals to minimize extra arg shuffling and account for
endianness assuming userspace uses offsetof().
(mcgrathr@chromium.org, indan@nul.nu)
- update Kconfig description
- add include/seccomp_filter.h and add its installation
- (naive) on-demand syscall argument loading
- drop seccomp_t (eparis@redhat.com)
v4: - adjusted prctl to make room for PR_[SG]ET_NO_NEW_PRIVS
- now uses current->no_new_privs
(luto@mit.edu,torvalds@linux-foundation.com)
- assign names to seccomp modes (rdunlap@xenotime.net)
- fix style issues (rdunlap@xenotime.net)
- reworded Kconfig entry (rdunlap@xenotime.net)
v3: - macros to inline (oleg@redhat.com)
- init_task behavior fixed (oleg@redhat.com)
- drop creator entry and extra NULL check (oleg@redhat.com)
- alloc returns -EINVAL on bad sizing (serge.hallyn@canonical.com)
- adds tentative use of "always_unprivileged" as per
torvalds@linux-foundation.org and luto@mit.edu
v2: - (patch 2 only)
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
With this change, calling
prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)
disables privilege granting operations at execve-time. For example, a
process will not be able to execute a setuid binary to change their uid
or gid if this bit is set. The same is true for file capabilities.
Additionally, LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS is defined to ensure that
LSMs respect the requested behavior.
To determine if the NO_NEW_PRIVS bit is set, a task may call
prctl(PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 0, 0, 0, 0);
It returns 1 if set and 0 if it is not set. If any of the arguments are
non-zero, it will return -1 and set errno to -EINVAL.
(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS behaves similarly.)
This functionality is desired for the proposed seccomp filter patch
series. By using PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, it allows a task to modify the
system call behavior for itself and its child tasks without being
able to impact the behavior of a more privileged task.
Another potential use is making certain privileged operations
unprivileged. For example, chroot may be considered "safe" if it cannot
affect privileged tasks.
Note, this patch causes execve to fail when PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS is
set and AppArmor is in use. It is fixed in a subsequent patch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
v18: updated change desc
v17: using new define values as per 3.4
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Modify alloc_uid to take a kuid and make the user hash table global.
Stop holding a reference to the user namespace in struct user_struct.
This simplifies the code and makes the per user accounting not
care about which user namespace a uid happens to appear in.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Start distinguishing between internal kernel uids and gids and
values that userspace can use. This is done by introducing two
new types: kuid_t and kgid_t. These types and their associated
functions are infrastructure are declared in the new header
uidgid.h.
Ultimately there will be a different implementation of the mapping
functions for use with user namespaces. But to keep it simple
we introduce the mapping functions first to separate the meat
from the mechanical code conversions.
Export overflowuid and overflowgid so we can use from_kuid_munged
and from_kgid_munged in modular code.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Optimize performance and prepare for the removal of the user_ns reference
from user_struct. Remove the slow long walk through cred->user->user_ns and
instead go straight to cred->user_ns.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
In struct cred the user member is and has always been declared struct user_struct *user.
At most a constant struct cred will have a constant pointer to non-constant user_struct
so remove this unnecessary cast.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
In the case of a child pid namespace, rebooting the system does not really
makes sense. When the pid namespace is used in conjunction with the other
namespaces in order to create a linux container, the reboot syscall leads
to some problems.
A container can reboot the host. That can be fixed by dropping the
sys_reboot capability but we are unable to correctly to poweroff/
halt/reboot a container and the container stays stuck at the shutdown time
with the container's init process waiting indefinitively.
After several attempts, no solution from userspace was found to reliabily
handle the shutdown from a container.
This patch propose to make the init process of the child pid namespace to
exit with a signal status set to : SIGINT if the child pid namespace
called "halt/poweroff" and SIGHUP if the child pid namespace called
"reboot". When the reboot syscall is called and we are not in the initial
pid namespace, we kill the pid namespace for "HALT", "POWEROFF",
"RESTART", and "RESTART2". Otherwise we return EINVAL.
Returning EINVAL is also an easy way to check if this feature is supported
by the kernel when invoking another 'reboot' option like CAD.
By this way the parent process of the child pid namespace knows if it
rebooted or not and can take the right decision.
Test case:
==========
#include <alloca.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sched.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <sys/reboot.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <linux/reboot.h>
static int do_reboot(void *arg)
{
int *cmd = arg;
if (reboot(*cmd))
printf("failed to reboot(%d): %m\n", *cmd);
}
int test_reboot(int cmd, int sig)
{
long stack_size = 4096;
void *stack = alloca(stack_size) + stack_size;
int status;
pid_t ret;
ret = clone(do_reboot, stack, CLONE_NEWPID | SIGCHLD, &cmd);
if (ret < 0) {
printf("failed to clone: %m\n");
return -1;
}
if (wait(&status) < 0) {
printf("unexpected wait error: %m\n");
return -1;
}
if (!WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
printf("child process exited but was not signaled\n");
return -1;
}
if (WTERMSIG(status) != sig) {
printf("signal termination is not the one expected\n");
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int status;
status = test_reboot(LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_RESTART, SIGHUP);
if (status < 0)
return 1;
printf("reboot(LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_RESTART) succeed\n");
status = test_reboot(LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_RESTART2, SIGHUP);
if (status < 0)
return 1;
printf("reboot(LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_RESTART2) succeed\n");
status = test_reboot(LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_HALT, SIGINT);
if (status < 0)
return 1;
printf("reboot(LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_HALT) succeed\n");
status = test_reboot(LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_POWER_OFF, SIGINT);
if (status < 0)
return 1;
printf("reboot(LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_POWERR_OFF) succeed\n");
status = test_reboot(LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_CAD_ON, -1);
if (status >= 0) {
printf("reboot(LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_CAD_ON) should have failed\n");
return 1;
}
printf("reboot(LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_CAD_ON) has failed as expected\n");
return 0;
}
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: tweak and add comments]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Signed-off-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Tested-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Userspace service managers/supervisors need to track their started
services. Many services daemonize by double-forking and get implicitly
re-parented to PID 1. The service manager will no longer be able to
receive the SIGCHLD signals for them, and is no longer in charge of
reaping the children with wait(). All information about the children is
lost at the moment PID 1 cleans up the re-parented processes.
With this prctl, a service manager process can mark itself as a sort of
'sub-init', able to stay as the parent for all orphaned processes
created by the started services. All SIGCHLD signals will be delivered
to the service manager.
Receiving SIGCHLD and doing wait() is in cases of a service-manager much
preferred over any possible asynchronous notification about specific
PIDs, because the service manager has full access to the child process
data in /proc and the PID can not be re-used until the wait(), the
service-manager itself is in charge of, has happened.
As a side effect, the relevant parent PID information does not get lost
by a double-fork, which results in a more elaborate process tree and
'ps' output:
before:
# ps afx
253 ? Ss 0:00 /bin/dbus-daemon --system --nofork
294 ? Sl 0:00 /usr/libexec/polkit-1/polkitd
328 ? S 0:00 /usr/sbin/modem-manager
608 ? Sl 0:00 /usr/libexec/colord
658 ? Sl 0:00 /usr/libexec/upowerd
819 ? Sl 0:00 /usr/libexec/imsettings-daemon
916 ? Sl 0:00 /usr/libexec/udisks-daemon
917 ? S 0:00 \_ udisks-daemon: not polling any devices
after:
# ps afx
294 ? Ss 0:00 /bin/dbus-daemon --system --nofork
426 ? Sl 0:00 \_ /usr/libexec/polkit-1/polkitd
449 ? S 0:00 \_ /usr/sbin/modem-manager
635 ? Sl 0:00 \_ /usr/libexec/colord
705 ? Sl 0:00 \_ /usr/libexec/upowerd
959 ? Sl 0:00 \_ /usr/libexec/udisks-daemon
960 ? S 0:00 | \_ udisks-daemon: not polling any devices
977 ? Sl 0:00 \_ /usr/libexec/packagekitd
This prctl is orthogonal to PID namespaces. PID namespaces are isolated
from each other, while a service management process usually requires the
services to live in the same namespace, to be able to talk to each
other.
Users of this will be the systemd per-user instance, which provides
init-like functionality for the user's login session and D-Bus, which
activates bus services on-demand. Both need init-like capabilities to
be able to properly keep track of the services they start.
Many thanks to Oleg for several rounds of review and insights.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix comment layout and spelling]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: add lengthy code comment from Oleg]
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
Signed-off-by: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org>
Acked-by: Valdis Kletnieks <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CAP_SYS_ADMIN is already overloaded left and right, so to have more
fine-grained access control use CAP_SYS_RESOURCE here.
The CAP_SYS_RESOUCE is chosen because this prctl option allows a current
process to adjust some fields of memory map descriptor which rather
represents what the process owns: pointers to code, data, stack
segments, command line, auxiliary vector data and etc.
Suggested-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Bolle <pebolle@tiscali.nl>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
When we restore a task we need to set up text, data and data heap sizes
from userspace to the values a task had at checkpoint time. This patch
adds auxilary prctl codes for that.
While most of them have a statistical nature (their values are involved
into calculation of /proc/<pid>/statm output) the start_brk and brk values
are used to compute an allowed size of program data segment expansion.
Which means an arbitrary changes of this values might be dangerous
operation. So to restrict access the following requirements applied to
prctl calls:
- The process has to have CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability granted.
- For all opcodes except start_brk/brk members an appropriate
VMA area must exist and should fit certain VMA flags,
such as:
- code segment must be executable but not writable;
- data segment must not be executable.
start_brk/brk values must not intersect with data segment and must not
exceed RLIMIT_DATA resource limit.
Still the main guard is CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability check.
Note the kernel should be compiled with CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE support
otherwise these prctl calls will return -EINVAL.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: cache current->mm in a local, saving 200 bytes text]
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Make cputime_t and cputime64_t nocast to enable sparse checking to
detect incorrect use of cputime. Drop the cputime macros for simple
scalar operations. The conversion macros are still needed.
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
* 'modsplit-Oct31_2011' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/paulg/linux: (230 commits)
Revert "tracing: Include module.h in define_trace.h"
irq: don't put module.h into irq.h for tracking irqgen modules.
bluetooth: macroize two small inlines to avoid module.h
ip_vs.h: fix implicit use of module_get/module_put from module.h
nf_conntrack.h: fix up fallout from implicit moduleparam.h presence
include: replace linux/module.h with "struct module" wherever possible
include: convert various register fcns to macros to avoid include chaining
crypto.h: remove unused crypto_tfm_alg_modname() inline
uwb.h: fix implicit use of asm/page.h for PAGE_SIZE
pm_runtime.h: explicitly requires notifier.h
linux/dmaengine.h: fix implicit use of bitmap.h and asm/page.h
miscdevice.h: fix up implicit use of lists and types
stop_machine.h: fix implicit use of smp.h for smp_processor_id
of: fix implicit use of errno.h in include/linux/of.h
of_platform.h: delete needless include <linux/module.h>
acpi: remove module.h include from platform/aclinux.h
miscdevice.h: delete unnecessary inclusion of module.h
device_cgroup.h: delete needless include <linux/module.h>
net: sch_generic remove redundant use of <linux/module.h>
net: inet_timewait_sock doesnt need <linux/module.h>
...
Fix up trivial conflicts (other header files, and removal of the ab3550 mfd driver) in
- drivers/media/dvb/frontends/dibx000_common.c
- drivers/media/video/{mt9m111.c,ov6650.c}
- drivers/mfd/ab3550-core.c
- include/linux/dmaengine.h
Adding support for poll() in sysctl fs allows userspace to receive
notifications of changes in sysctl entries. This adds a infrastructure to
allow files in sysctl fs to be pollable and implements it for hostname and
domainname.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: s/declare/define/ for definitions]
Signed-off-by: Lucas De Marchi <lucas.demarchi@profusion.mobi>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@suse.de>
Cc: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
These files were implicitly relying on <linux/kmod.h> coming in via
module.h, as without it we get things like:
kernel/power/suspend.c💯 error: implicit declaration of function ‘usermodehelper_disable’
kernel/power/suspend.c:109: error: implicit declaration of function ‘usermodehelper_enable’
kernel/power/user.c:254: error: implicit declaration of function ‘usermodehelper_disable’
kernel/power/user.c:261: error: implicit declaration of function ‘usermodehelper_enable’
kernel/sys.c:317: error: implicit declaration of function ‘usermodehelper_disable’
kernel/sys.c:1816: error: implicit declaration of function ‘call_usermodehelper_setup’
kernel/sys.c:1822: error: implicit declaration of function ‘call_usermodehelper_setfns’
kernel/sys.c:1824: error: implicit declaration of function ‘call_usermodehelper_exec’
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
The changed files were only including linux/module.h for the
EXPORT_SYMBOL infrastructure, and nothing else. Revector them
onto the isolated export header for faster compile times.
Nothing to see here but a whole lot of instances of:
-#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
This commit is only changing the kernel dir; next targets
will probably be mm, fs, the arch dirs, etc.
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
The size is always valid, but variable-length arrays generate worse code
for no good reason (unless the function happens to be inlined and the
compiler sees the length for the simple constant it is).
Also, there seems to be some code generation problem on POWER, where
Henrik Bakken reports that register r28 can get corrupted under some
subtle circumstances (interrupt happening at the wrong time?). That all
indicates some seriously broken compiler issues, but since variable
length arrays are bad regardless, there's little point in trying to
chase it down.
"Just don't do that, then".
Reported-by: Henrik Grindal Bakken <henribak@cisco.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Add an event to monitor comm value changes of tasks. Such an event
becomes vital, if someone desires to control threads of a process in
different manner.
A natural characteristic of threads is its comm value, and helpfully
application developers have an opportunity to change it in runtime.
Reporting about such events via proc connector allows to fine-grain
monitoring and control potentials, for instance a process control daemon
listening to proc connector and following comm value policies can place
specific threads to assigned cgroup partitions.
It might be possible to achieve a pale partial one-shot likeness without
this update, if an application changes comm value of a thread generator
task beforehand, then a new thread is cloned, and after that proc
connector listener gets the fork event and reads new thread's comm value
from procfs stat file, but this change visibly simplifies and extends the
matter.
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Zapolskiy <vzapolskiy@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Evgeniy Polyakov <zbr@ioremap.net>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
I ran into a couple of programs which broke with the new Linux 3.0
version. Some of those were binary only. I tried to use LD_PRELOAD to
work around it, but it was quite difficult and in one case impossible
because of a mix of 32bit and 64bit executables.
For example, all kind of management software from HP doesnt work, unless
we pretend to run a 2.6 kernel.
$ uname -a
Linux svivoipvnx001 3.0.0-08107-g97cd98f #1062 SMP Fri Aug 12 18:11:45 CEST 2011 i686 i686 i386 GNU/Linux
$ hpacucli ctrl all show
Error: No controllers detected.
$ rpm -qf /usr/sbin/hpacucli
hpacucli-8.75-12.0
Another notable case is that Python now reports "linux3" from
sys.platform(); which in turn can break things that were checking
sys.platform() == "linux2":
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=664564
It seems pretty clear to me though it's a bug in the apps that are using
'==' instead of .startswith(), but this allows us to unbreak broken
programs.
This patch adds a UNAME26 personality that makes the kernel report a
2.6.40+x version number instead. The x is the x in 3.x.
I know this is somewhat ugly, but I didn't find a better workaround, and
compatibility to existing programs is important.
Some programs also read /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease. This can be worked
around in user space with mount --bind (and a mount namespace)
To use:
wget ftp://ftp.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/people/ak/uname26/uname26.c
gcc -o uname26 uname26.c
./uname26 program
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The patch http://lkml.org/lkml/2003/7/13/226 introduced an RLIMIT_NPROC
check in set_user() to check for NPROC exceeding via setuid() and
similar functions.
Before the check there was a possibility to greatly exceed the allowed
number of processes by an unprivileged user if the program relied on
rlimit only. But the check created new security threat: many poorly
written programs simply don't check setuid() return code and believe it
cannot fail if executed with root privileges. So, the check is removed
in this patch because of too often privilege escalations related to
buggy programs.
The NPROC can still be enforced in the common code flow of daemons
spawning user processes. Most of daemons do fork()+setuid()+execve().
The check introduced in execve() (1) enforces the same limit as in
setuid() and (2) doesn't create similar security issues.
Neil Brown suggested to track what specific process has exceeded the
limit by setting PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED process flag. With the change only
this process would fail on execve(), and other processes' execve()
behaviour is not changed.
Solar Designer suggested to re-check whether NPROC limit is still
exceeded at the moment of execve(). If the process was sleeping for
days between set*uid() and execve(), and the NPROC counter step down
under the limit, the defered execve() failure because NPROC limit was
exceeded days ago would be unexpected. If the limit is not exceeded
anymore, we clear the flag on successful calls to execve() and fork().
The flag is also cleared on successful calls to set_user() as the limit
was exceeded for the previous user, not the current one.
Similar check was introduced in -ow patches (without the process flag).
v3 - clear PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED on successful calls to set_user().
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Acked-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
It is not necessary to share the same notifier.h.
This patch already moves register_reboot_notifier() and
unregister_reboot_notifier() from kernel/notifier.c to kernel/sys.c.
[amwang@redhat.com: make allyesconfig succeed on ppc64]
Signed-off-by: WANG Cong <amwang@redhat.com>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@sisk.pl>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Signed-off-by: WANG Cong <amwang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* 'driver-core-next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core-2.6: (44 commits)
debugfs: Silence DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS=y warning
sysfs: remove "last sysfs file:" line from the oops messages
drivers/base/memory.c: fix warning due to "memory hotplug: Speed up add/remove when blocks are larger than PAGES_PER_SECTION"
memory hotplug: Speed up add/remove when blocks are larger than PAGES_PER_SECTION
SYSFS: Fix erroneous comments for sysfs_update_group().
driver core: remove the driver-model structures from the documentation
driver core: Add the device driver-model structures to kerneldoc
Translated Documentation/email-clients.txt
RAW driver: Remove call to kobject_put().
reboot: disable usermodehelper to prevent fs access
efivars: prevent oops on unload when efi is not enabled
Allow setting of number of raw devices as a module parameter
Introduce CONFIG_GOOGLE_FIRMWARE
driver: Google Memory Console
driver: Google EFI SMI
x86: Better comments for get_bios_ebda()
x86: get_bios_ebda_length()
misc: fix ti-st build issues
params.c: Use new strtobool function to process boolean inputs
debugfs: move to new strtobool
...
Fix up trivial conflicts in fs/debugfs/file.c due to the same patch
being applied twice, and an unrelated cleanup nearby.
Since suspend, resume and shutdown operations in struct sysdev_class
and struct sysdev_driver are not used any more, remove them. Also
drop sysdev_suspend(), sysdev_resume() and sysdev_shutdown() used
for executing those operations and modify all of their users
accordingly. This reduces kernel code size quite a bit and reduces
its complexity.
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
In case CONFIG_UEVENT_HELPER_PATH is not set to "", which it
should be on every system, the kernel forks processes during
shutdown, which try to access the rootfs, even when the
binary does not exist. It causes exceptions and long delays in
the disk driver, which gets read requests at the time it tries
to shut down the disk.
This patch disables all kernel-forked processes during reboot to
allow a clean poweroff.
Cc: Tejun Heo <htejun@gmail.com>
Tested-By: Anton Guda <atu@dmeti.dp.ua>
Signed-off-by: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
This allows setuid/setgid in containers. It also fixes some corner cases
where kernel logic foregoes capability checks when uids are equivalent.
The latter will need to be done throughout the whole kernel.
Changelog:
Jan 11: Use nsown_capable() as suggested by Bastian Blank.
Jan 11: Fix logic errors in uid checks pointed out by Bastian.
Feb 15: allow prlimit to current (was regression in previous version)
Feb 23: remove debugging printks, uninline set_one_prio_perm and
make it bool, and document its return value.
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Changelog:
Feb 23: let clone_uts_ns() handle setting uts->user_ns
To do so we need to pass in the task_struct who'll
get the utsname, so we can get its user_ns.
Feb 23: As per Oleg's coment, just pass in tsk, instead of two
of its members.
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Some subsystems need to carry out suspend/resume and shutdown
operations with one CPU on-line and interrupts disabled. The only
way to register such operations is to define a sysdev class and
a sysdev specifically for this purpose which is cumbersome and
inefficient. Moreover, the arguments taken by sysdev suspend,
resume and shutdown callbacks are practically never necessary.
For this reason, introduce a simpler interface allowing subsystems
to register operations to be executed very late during system suspend
and shutdown and very early during resume in the form of
strcut syscore_ops objects.
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Since check_prlimit_permission always fails in the case of SUID/GUID
processes, such processes are not able to read or set their own limits.
This commit changes this by assuming that process can always read/change
its own limits.
Signed-off-by: Kacper Kornet <kornet@camk.edu.pl>
Acked-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
We need to know the reason why system rebooted in support service.
However, we can't inform our customers of the reason because final
messages are lost on current Linux kernel.
This patch improves the situation above because the final messages are
saved by adding kmsg_dump() to reboot, halt, poweroff and
emergency_restart path.
Signed-off-by: Seiji Aguchi <seiji.aguchi@hds.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Marco Stornelli <marco.stornelli@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Artem Bityutskiy <Artem.Bityutskiy@nokia.com>
Reviewed-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
A recurring complaint from CFS users is that parallel kbuild has
a negative impact on desktop interactivity. This patch
implements an idea from Linus, to automatically create task
groups. Currently, only per session autogroups are implemented,
but the patch leaves the way open for enhancement.
Implementation: each task's signal struct contains an inherited
pointer to a refcounted autogroup struct containing a task group
pointer, the default for all tasks pointing to the
init_task_group. When a task calls setsid(), a new task group
is created, the process is moved into the new task group, and a
reference to the preveious task group is dropped. Child
processes inherit this task group thereafter, and increase it's
refcount. When the last thread of a process exits, the
process's reference is dropped, such that when the last process
referencing an autogroup exits, the autogroup is destroyed.
At runqueue selection time, IFF a task has no cgroup assignment,
its current autogroup is used.
Autogroup bandwidth is controllable via setting it's nice level
through the proc filesystem:
cat /proc/<pid>/autogroup
Displays the task's group and the group's nice level.
echo <nice level> > /proc/<pid>/autogroup
Sets the task group's shares to the weight of nice <level> task.
Setting nice level is rate limited for !admin users due to the
abuse risk of task group locking.
The feature is enabled from boot by default if
CONFIG_SCHED_AUTOGROUP=y is selected, but can be disabled via
the boot option noautogroup, and can also be turned on/off on
the fly via:
echo [01] > /proc/sys/kernel/sched_autogroup_enabled
... which will automatically move tasks to/from the root task group.
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Markus Trippelsdorf <markus@trippelsdorf.de>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
[ Removed the task_group_path() debug code, and fixed !EVENTFD build failure. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
LKML-Reference: <1290281700.28711.9.camel@maggy.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
[ 23.584719]
[ 23.584720] ===================================================
[ 23.585059] [ INFO: suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage. ]
[ 23.585176] ---------------------------------------------------
[ 23.585176] kernel/pid.c:419 invoked rcu_dereference_check() without protection!
[ 23.585176]
[ 23.585176] other info that might help us debug this:
[ 23.585176]
[ 23.585176]
[ 23.585176] rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 1
[ 23.585176] 1 lock held by rc.sysinit/728:
[ 23.585176] #0: (tasklist_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff8104771f>] sys_setpgid+0x5f/0x193
[ 23.585176]
[ 23.585176] stack backtrace:
[ 23.585176] Pid: 728, comm: rc.sysinit Not tainted 2.6.36-rc2 #2
[ 23.585176] Call Trace:
[ 23.585176] [<ffffffff8105b436>] lockdep_rcu_dereference+0x99/0xa2
[ 23.585176] [<ffffffff8104c324>] find_task_by_pid_ns+0x50/0x6a
[ 23.585176] [<ffffffff8104c35b>] find_task_by_vpid+0x1d/0x1f
[ 23.585176] [<ffffffff81047727>] sys_setpgid+0x67/0x193
[ 23.585176] [<ffffffff810029eb>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 24.959669] type=1400 audit(1282938522.956:4): avc: denied { module_request } for pid=766 comm="hwclock" kmod="char-major-10-135" scontext=system_u:system_r:hwclock_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0 tclas
It turns out that the setpgid() system call fails to enter an RCU
read-side critical section before doing a PID-to-task_struct translation.
This commit therefore does rcu_read_lock() before the translation, and
also does rcu_read_unlock() after the last use of the returned pointer.
Reported-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
This patch adds the code to support the sys_prlimit64 syscall which
modifies-and-returns the rlim values of a selected process atomically.
The first parameter, pid, being 0 means current process.
Unlike the current implementation, it is a generic interface,
architecture indepentent so that we needn't handle compat stuff
anymore. In the future, after glibc start to use this we can deprecate
sys_setrlimit and sys_getrlimit in favor to clean up the code finally.
It also adds a possibility of changing limits of other processes. We
check the user's permissions to do that and if it succeeds, the new
limits are propagated online. This is good for large scale
applications such as SAP or databases where administrators need to
change limits time by time (e.g. on crashes increase core size). And
it is unacceptable to restart the service.
For safety, all rlim users now either use accessors or doesn't need
them due to
- locking
- the fact a process was just forked and nobody else knows about it
yet (and nobody can't thus read/write limits)
hence it is safe to modify limits now.
The limitation is that we currently stay at ulong internal
representation. So the rlim64_is_infinity check is used where value is
compared against ULONG_MAX on 32-bit which is the maximum value there.
And since internally the limits are held in struct rlimit, converters
which are used before and after do_prlimit call in sys_prlimit64 are
introduced.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
After we added more generic do_prlimit, switch sys_getrlimit to that.
Also switch compat handling, so we can get rid of ugly __user casts
and avoid setting process' address limit to kernel data and back.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
It now allows also reading of limits. I.e. all read and writes will
later use this function.
It takes two parameters, new and old limits which can be both NULL.
If new is non-NULL, the value in it is set to rlimits.
If old is non-NULL, current rlimits are stored there.
If both are non-NULL, old are stored prior to setting the new ones,
atomically.
(Similar to sigaction.)
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Do security_task_setrlimit under task_lock. Other tasks may change
limits under our hands while we are checking limits inside the
function. From now on, they can't.
Note that all the security work is done under a spinlock here now.
Security hooks count with that, they are called from interrupt context
(like security_task_kill) and with spinlocks already held (e.g.
capable->security_capable).
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Add locking to allow setrlimit accept task parameter other than
current.
Namely, lock tasklist_lock for read and check whether the task
structure has sighand non-null. Do all the signal processing under
that lock still held.
There are some points:
1) security_task_setrlimit is now called with that lock held. This is
not new, many security_* functions are called with this lock held
already so it doesn't harm (all this security_* stuff does almost
the same).
2) task->sighand->siglock (in update_rlimit_cpu) is nested in
tasklist_lock. This dependence is already existing.
3) tsk->alloc_lock is nested in tasklist_lock. This is OK too, already
existing dependence.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@gmail.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Create do_setrlimit from sys_setrlimit and declare do_setrlimit
in the resource header. This is the first phase to have generic
do_prlimit which allows to be called from read, write and compat
rlimits code.
The new do_setrlimit also accepts a task pointer to change the limits
of. Currently, it cannot be other than current, but this will change
with locking later.
Also pass tsk->group_leader to security_task_setrlimit to check
whether current is allowed to change rlimits of the process and not
its arbitrary thread because it makes more sense given that rlimit are
per process and not per-thread.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Mostly preparation for Jiri's changes, but probably makes sense anyway.
sys_setrlimit() checks new_rlim.rlim_max <= old_rlim->rlim_max, but when
it takes task_lock() old_rlim->rlim_max can be already lowered. Move this
check under task_lock().
Currently this is not important, we can only race with our sub-thread,
this means the application is stupid. But when we change the code to allow
the update of !current task's limits, it becomes important to make sure
->rlim_max can be lowered "reliably" even if we race with the application
doing sys_setrlimit().
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Add task_struct as a parameter to update_rlimit_cpu to be able to set
rlimit_cpu of different task than current.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@gmail.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Add task_struct to task_setrlimit of security_operations to be able to set
rlimit of task other than current.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
About 6 months ago, I made a set of changes to how the core-dump-to-a-pipe
feature in the kernel works. We had reports of several races, including
some reports of apps bypassing our recursion check so that a process that
was forked as part of a core_pattern setup could infinitely crash and
refork until the system crashed.
We fixed those by improving our recursion checks. The new check basically
refuses to fork a process if its core limit is zero, which works well.
Unfortunately, I've been getting grief from maintainer of user space
programs that are inserted as the forked process of core_pattern. They
contend that in order for their programs (such as abrt and apport) to
work, all the running processes in a system must have their core limits
set to a non-zero value, to which I say 'yes'. I did this by design, and
think thats the right way to do things.
But I've been asked to ease this burden on user space enough times that I
thought I would take a look at it. The first suggestion was to make the
recursion check fail on a non-zero 'special' number, like one. That way
the core collector process could set its core size ulimit to 1, and enable
the kernel's recursion detection. This isn't a bad idea on the surface,
but I don't like it since its opt-in, in that if a program like abrt or
apport has a bug and fails to set such a core limit, we're left with a
recursively crashing system again.
So I've come up with this. What I've done is modify the
call_usermodehelper api such that an extra parameter is added, a function
pointer which will be called by the user helper task, after it forks, but
before it exec's the required process. This will give the caller the
opportunity to get a call back in the processes context, allowing it to do
whatever it needs to to the process in the kernel prior to exec-ing the
user space code. In the case of do_coredump, this callback is ues to set
the core ulimit of the helper process to 1. This elimnates the opt-in
problem that I had above, as it allows the ulimit for core sizes to be set
to the value of 1, which is what the recursion check looks for in
do_coredump.
This patch:
Create new function call_usermodehelper_fns() and allow it to assign both
an init and cleanup function, as we'll as arbitrary data.
The init function is called from the context of the forked process and
allows for customization of the helper process prior to calling exec. Its
return code gates the continuation of the process, or causes its exit.
Also add an arbitrary data pointer to the subprocess_info struct allowing
for data to be passed from the caller to the new process, and the
subsequent cleanup process
Also, use this patch to cleanup the cleanup function. It currently takes
an argp and envp pointer for freeing, which is ugly. Lets instead just
make the subprocess_info structure public, and pass that to the cleanup
and init routines
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
On ppc64 you get this error:
$ setarch ppc -R true
setarch: ppc: Unrecognized architecture
because uname still reports ppc64 as the machine.
So mask off the personality flags when checking for PER_LINUX32.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schwab <schwab@linux-m68k.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being
included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which
in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files
universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies.
percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for
this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those
headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion
needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is
used as the basis of conversion.
http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py
The script does the followings.
* Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that
only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used,
gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h.
* When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include
blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms
to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains
core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered -
alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there
doesn't seem to be any matching order.
* If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly
because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out
an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the
file.
The conversion was done in the following steps.
1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly
over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h
and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400
files.
2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion,
some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or
embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added
inclusions to around 150 files.
3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits
from #2 to make sure no file was left behind.
4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed.
e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab
APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually.
5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically
editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h
files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h
inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually
wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each
slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as
necessary.
6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h.
7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures
were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my
distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few
more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things
build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq).
* x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config.
* powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig
* sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig
* ia64 SMP allmodconfig
* s390 SMP allmodconfig
* alpha SMP allmodconfig
* um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig
8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as
a separate patch and serve as bisection point.
Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step
6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch.
If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch
headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of
the specific arch.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
Add generic implementations of the old and really old uname system calls.
Note that sh only implements sys_olduname but not sys_oldolduname, but I'm
not going to bother with another ifdef for that special case.
m32r implemented an old uname but never wired it up, so kill it, too.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com>
Cc: Hirokazu Takata <takata@linux-m32r.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Andreas Schwab <schwab@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
On an architecture that supports 32-bit compat we need to override the
reported machine in uname with the 32-bit value. Instead of doing this
separately in every architecture introduce a COMPAT_UTS_MACHINE define in
<asm/compat.h> and apply it directly in sys_newuname().
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com>
Cc: Hirokazu Takata <takata@linux-m32r.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Andreas Schwab <schwab@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Make sure compiler won't do weird things with limits. E.g. fetching them
twice may return 2 different values after writable limits are implemented.
I.e. either use rlimit helpers added in commit 3e10e716ab ("resource:
add helpers for fetching rlimits") or ACCESS_ONCE if not applicable.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* 'sched-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip: (25 commits)
sched: Fix SCHED_MC regression caused by change in sched cpu_power
sched: Don't use possibly stale sched_class
kthread, sched: Remove reference to kthread_create_on_cpu
sched: cpuacct: Use bigger percpu counter batch values for stats counters
percpu_counter: Make __percpu_counter_add an inline function on UP
sched: Remove member rt_se from struct rt_rq
sched: Change usage of rt_rq->rt_se to rt_rq->tg->rt_se[cpu]
sched: Remove unused update_shares_locked()
sched: Use for_each_bit
sched: Queue a deboosted task to the head of the RT prio queue
sched: Implement head queueing for sched_rt
sched: Extend enqueue_task to allow head queueing
sched: Remove USER_SCHED
sched: Fix the place where group powers are updated
sched: Assume *balance is valid
sched: Remove load_balance_newidle()
sched: Unify load_balance{,_newidle}()
sched: Add a lock break for PREEMPT=y
sched: Remove from fwd decls
sched: Remove rq_iterator from move_one_task
...
Fix up trivial conflicts in kernel/sched.c
find_task_by_vpid() is not safe without rcu_read_lock(). 2.6.33-rc7 got
RCU protection for sys_setpriority() but missed it for sys_getpriority().
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Remove the USER_SCHED feature. It has been scheduled to be removed in
2.6.34 as per http://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=125728479022976&w=2
Signed-off-by: Dhaval Giani <dhaval.giani@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
LKML-Reference: <1263990378.24844.3.camel@localhost>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
* 'core-fixes-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip:
sys: Fix missing rcu protection for __task_cred() access
signals: Fix more rcu assumptions
signal: Fix racy access to __task_cred in kill_pid_info_as_uid()
do_each_thread/while_each_thread wrap a block of code that is in this format:
for (...)
do
...
while
If curly braces do not surround the inner loop the following warning is
generated by sparse:
warning: do-while statement is not a compound statement
Fix the warning by adding the braces.
Signed-off-by: H Hartley Sweeten <hsweeten@visionengravers.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
commit c69e8d9 (CRED: Use RCU to access another task's creds and to
release a task's own creds) added non rcu_read_lock() protected access
to task creds of the target task in set_prio_one().
The comment above the function says:
* - the caller must hold the RCU read lock
The calling code in sys_setpriority does read_lock(&tasklist_lock) but
not rcu_read_lock(). This works only when CONFIG_TREE_PREEMPT_RCU=n.
With CONFIG_TREE_PREEMPT_RCU=y the rcu_callbacks can run in the tick
interrupt when they see no read side critical section.
There is another instance of __task_cred() in sys_setpriority() itself
which is equally unprotected.
Wrap the whole code section into a rcu read side critical section to
fix this quick and dirty.
Will be revisited in course of the read_lock(&tasklist_lock) -> rcu
crusade.
Oleg noted further:
This also fixes another bug here. find_task_by_vpid() is not safe
without rcu_read_lock(). I do not mean it is not safe to use the
result, just find_pid_ns() by itself is not safe.
Usually tasklist gives enough protection, but if copy_process() fails
it calls free_pid() lockless and does call_rcu(delayed_put_pid().
This means, without rcu lock find_pid_ns() can't scan the hash table
safely.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
LKML-Reference: <20091210004703.029784964@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* 'bkl-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip:
sys: Remove BKL from sys_reboot
pm_qos: clean up racy global "name" variable
pm_qos: remove BKL
This is a real fix for problem of utime/stime values decreasing
described in the thread:
http://lkml.org/lkml/2009/11/3/522
Now cputime is accounted in the following way:
- {u,s}time in task_struct are increased every time when the thread
is interrupted by a tick (timer interrupt).
- When a thread exits, its {u,s}time are added to signal->{u,s}time,
after adjusted by task_times().
- When all threads in a thread_group exits, accumulated {u,s}time
(and also c{u,s}time) in signal struct are added to c{u,s}time
in signal struct of the group's parent.
So {u,s}time in task struct are "raw" tick count, while
{u,s}time and c{u,s}time in signal struct are "adjusted" values.
And accounted values are used by:
- task_times(), to get cputime of a thread:
This function returns adjusted values that originates from raw
{u,s}time and scaled by sum_exec_runtime that accounted by CFS.
- thread_group_cputime(), to get cputime of a thread group:
This function returns sum of all {u,s}time of living threads in
the group, plus {u,s}time in the signal struct that is sum of
adjusted cputimes of all exited threads belonged to the group.
The problem is the return value of thread_group_cputime(),
because it is mixed sum of "raw" value and "adjusted" value:
group's {u,s}time = foreach(thread){{u,s}time} + exited({u,s}time)
This misbehavior can break {u,s}time monotonicity.
Assume that if there is a thread that have raw values greater
than adjusted values (e.g. interrupted by 1000Hz ticks 50 times
but only runs 45ms) and if it exits, cputime will decrease (e.g.
-5ms).
To fix this, we could do:
group's {u,s}time = foreach(t){task_times(t)} + exited({u,s}time)
But task_times() contains hard divisions, so applying it for
every thread should be avoided.
This patch fixes the above problem in the following way:
- Modify thread's exit (= __exit_signal()) not to use task_times().
It means {u,s}time in signal struct accumulates raw values instead
of adjusted values. As the result it makes thread_group_cputime()
to return pure sum of "raw" values.
- Introduce a new function thread_group_times(*task, *utime, *stime)
that converts "raw" values of thread_group_cputime() to "adjusted"
values, in same calculation procedure as task_times().
- Modify group's exit (= wait_task_zombie()) to use this introduced
thread_group_times(). It make c{u,s}time in signal struct to
have adjusted values like before this patch.
- Replace some thread_group_cputime() by thread_group_times().
This replacements are only applied where conveys the "adjusted"
cputime to users, and where already uses task_times() near by it.
(i.e. sys_times(), getrusage(), and /proc/<PID>/stat.)
This patch have a positive side effect:
- Before this patch, if a group contains many short-life threads
(e.g. runs 0.9ms and not interrupted by ticks), the group's
cputime could be invisible since thread's cputime was accumulated
after adjusted: imagine adjustment function as adj(ticks, runtime),
{adj(0, 0.9) + adj(0, 0.9) + ....} = {0 + 0 + ....} = 0.
After this patch it will not happen because the adjustment is
applied after accumulated.
v2:
- remove if()s, put new variables into signal_struct.
Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Spencer Candland <spencer@bluehost.com>
Cc: Americo Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@in.ibm.com>
Cc: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com>
LKML-Reference: <4B162517.8040909@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Functions task_{u,s}time() are called in pair in almost all
cases. However task_stime() is implemented to call task_utime()
from its inside, so such paired calls run task_utime() twice.
It means we do heavy divisions (div_u64 + do_div) twice to get
utime and stime which can be obtained at same time by one set
of divisions.
This patch introduces a function task_times(*tsk, *utime,
*stime) to retrieve utime and stime at once in better, optimized
way.
Signed-off-by: Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com>
Cc: Spencer Candland <spencer@bluehost.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@in.ibm.com>
Cc: Americo Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
LKML-Reference: <4B0E16AE.906@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
* 'hwpoison-2.6.32' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ak/linux-mce-2.6:
HWPOISON: fix invalid page count in printk output
HWPOISON: Allow schedule_on_each_cpu() from keventd
HWPOISON: fix/proc/meminfo alignment
HWPOISON: fix oops on ksm pages
HWPOISON: Fix page count leak in hwpoison late kill in do_swap_page
HWPOISON: return early on non-LRU pages
HWPOISON: Add brief hwpoison description to Documentation
HWPOISON: Clean up PR_MCE_KILL interface
Since commit 02b51df1b0 (proc connector: add
event for process becoming session leader) we have the following warning:
Badness at kernel/softirq.c:143
[...]
Krnl PSW : 0404c00180000000 00000000001481d4 (local_bh_enable+0xb0/0xe0)
[...]
Call Trace:
([<000000013fe04100>] 0x13fe04100)
[<000000000048a946>] sk_filter+0x9a/0xd0
[<000000000049d938>] netlink_broadcast+0x2c0/0x53c
[<00000000003ba9ae>] cn_netlink_send+0x272/0x2b0
[<00000000003baef0>] proc_sid_connector+0xc4/0xd4
[<0000000000142604>] __set_special_pids+0x58/0x90
[<0000000000159938>] sys_setsid+0xb4/0xd8
[<00000000001187fe>] sysc_noemu+0x10/0x16
[<00000041616cb266>] 0x41616cb266
The warning is
---> WARN_ON_ONCE(in_irq() || irqs_disabled());
The network code must not be called with disabled interrupts but
sys_setsid holds the tasklist_lock with spinlock_irq while calling the
connector.
After a discussion we agreed that we can move proc_sid_connector from
__set_special_pids to sys_setsid.
We also agreed that it is sufficient to change the check from
task_session(curr) != pid into err > 0, since if we don't change the
session, this means we were already the leader and return -EPERM.
One last thing:
There is also daemonize(), and some people might want to get a
notification in that case. Since daemonize() is only needed if a user
space does kernel_thread this does not look important (and there seems
to be no consensus if this connector should be called in daemonize). If
we really want this, we can add proc_sid_connector to daemonize() in an
additional patch (Scott?)
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Scott James Remnant <scott@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Matt Helsley <matthltc@us.ibm.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Evgeniy Polyakov <zbr@ioremap.net>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Serialization of sys_reboot can be done local. The BKL is not
protecting anything else.
LKML-Reference: <20091010153349.405590702@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
While writing the manpage I noticed some shortcomings in the
current interface.
- Define symbolic names for all the different values
- Boundary check the kill mode values
- For symmetry add a get interface too. This allows library
code to get/set the current state.
- For consistency define a PR_MCE_KILL_DEFAULT value
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
* 'hwpoison' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ak/linux-mce-2.6: (21 commits)
HWPOISON: Enable error_remove_page on btrfs
HWPOISON: Add simple debugfs interface to inject hwpoison on arbitary PFNs
HWPOISON: Add madvise() based injector for hardware poisoned pages v4
HWPOISON: Enable error_remove_page for NFS
HWPOISON: Enable .remove_error_page for migration aware file systems
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7
HWPOISON: Add PR_MCE_KILL prctl to control early kill behaviour per process
HWPOISON: shmem: call set_page_dirty() with locked page
HWPOISON: Define a new error_remove_page address space op for async truncation
HWPOISON: Add invalidate_inode_page
HWPOISON: Refactor truncate to allow direct truncating of page v2
HWPOISON: check and isolate corrupted free pages v2
HWPOISON: Handle hardware poisoned pages in try_to_unmap
HWPOISON: Use bitmask/action code for try_to_unmap behaviour
HWPOISON: x86: Add VM_FAULT_HWPOISON handling to x86 page fault handler v2
HWPOISON: Add poison check to page fault handling
HWPOISON: Add basic support for poisoned pages in fault handler v3
HWPOISON: Add new SIGBUS error codes for hardware poison signals
HWPOISON: Add support for poison swap entries v2
HWPOISON: Export some rmap vma locking to outside world
...
Bye-bye Performance Counters, welcome Performance Events!
In the past few months the perfcounters subsystem has grown out its
initial role of counting hardware events, and has become (and is
becoming) a much broader generic event enumeration, reporting, logging,
monitoring, analysis facility.
Naming its core object 'perf_counter' and naming the subsystem
'perfcounters' has become more and more of a misnomer. With pending
code like hw-breakpoints support the 'counter' name is less and
less appropriate.
All in one, we've decided to rename the subsystem to 'performance
events' and to propagate this rename through all fields, variables
and API names. (in an ABI compatible fashion)
The word 'event' is also a bit shorter than 'counter' - which makes
it slightly more convenient to write/handle as well.
Thanks goes to Stephane Eranian who first observed this misnomer and
suggested a rename.
User-space tooling and ABI compatibility is not affected - this patch
should be function-invariant. (Also, defconfigs were not touched to
keep the size down.)
This patch has been generated via the following script:
FILES=$(find * -type f | grep -vE 'oprofile|[^K]config')
sed -i \
-e 's/PERF_EVENT_/PERF_RECORD_/g' \
-e 's/PERF_COUNTER/PERF_EVENT/g' \
-e 's/perf_counter/perf_event/g' \
-e 's/nb_counters/nb_events/g' \
-e 's/swcounter/swevent/g' \
-e 's/tpcounter_event/tp_event/g' \
$FILES
for N in $(find . -name perf_counter.[ch]); do
M=$(echo $N | sed 's/perf_counter/perf_event/g')
mv $N $M
done
FILES=$(find . -name perf_event.*)
sed -i \
-e 's/COUNTER_MASK/REG_MASK/g' \
-e 's/COUNTER/EVENT/g' \
-e 's/\<event\>/event_id/g' \
-e 's/counter/event/g' \
-e 's/Counter/Event/g' \
$FILES
... to keep it as correct as possible. This script can also be
used by anyone who has pending perfcounters patches - it converts
a Linux kernel tree over to the new naming. We tried to time this
change to the point in time where the amount of pending patches
is the smallest: the end of the merge window.
Namespace clashes were fixed up in a preparatory patch - and some
stylistic fallout will be fixed up in a subsequent patch.
( NOTE: 'counters' are still the proper terminology when we deal
with hardware registers - and these sed scripts are a bit
over-eager in renaming them. I've undone some of that, but
in case there's something left where 'counter' would be
better than 'event' we can undo that on an individual basis
instead of touching an otherwise nicely automated patch. )
Suggested-by: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Acked-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Kyle McMartin <kyle@mcmartin.ca>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>
LKML-Reference: <new-submission>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
This allows processes to override their early/late kill
behaviour on hardware memory errors.
Typically applications which are memory error aware is
better of with early kill (see the error as soon
as possible), all others with late kill (only
see the error when the error is really impacting execution)
There's a global sysctl, but this way an application
can set its specific policy.
We're using two bits, one to signify that the process
stated its intention and that
I also made the prctl future proof by enforcing
the unused arguments are 0.
The state is inherited to children.
Note this makes us officially run out of process flags
on 32bit, but the next patch can easily add another field.
Manpage patch will be supplied separately.
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Move supplementary groups implementation to kernel/groups.c .
kernel/sys.c already accumulated quite a few random stuff.
Do strictly copy/paste + add required headers to compile. Compile-tested
on many configs and archs.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Merge reason: we have gathered quite a few conflicts, need to merge upstream
Conflicts:
arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile
arch/x86/ia32/ia32entry.S
arch/x86/include/asm/hardirq.h
arch/x86/include/asm/unistd_32.h
arch/x86/include/asm/unistd_64.h
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
arch/x86/kernel/irq.c
arch/x86/kernel/syscall_table_32.S
arch/x86/mm/iomap_32.c
include/linux/sched.h
kernel/Makefile
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6:
Remove two unneeded exports and make two symbols static in fs/mpage.c
Cleanup after commit 585d3bc06f
Trim includes of fdtable.h
Don't crap into descriptor table in binfmt_som
Trim includes in binfmt_elf
Don't mess with descriptor table in load_elf_binary()
Get rid of indirect include of fs_struct.h
New helper - current_umask()
check_unsafe_exec() doesn't care about signal handlers sharing
New locking/refcounting for fs_struct
Take fs_struct handling to new file (fs/fs_struct.c)
Get rid of bumping fs_struct refcount in pivot_root(2)
Kill unsharing fs_struct in __set_personality()
We are wasting 2 words in signal_struct without any reason to implement
task_pgrp_nr() and task_session_nr().
task_session_nr() has no callers since
2e2ba22ea4, we can remove it.
task_pgrp_nr() is still (I believe wrongly) used in fs/autofsX and
fs/coda.
This patch reimplements task_pgrp_nr() via task_pgrp_nr_ns(), and kills
__pgrp/__session and the related helpers.
The change in drivers/char/tty_io.c is cosmetic, but hopefully makes sense
anyway.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Alan Cox <number6@the-village.bc.nu> [tty parts]
Cc: Cedric Le Goater <clg@fr.ibm.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Don't pull it in sched.h; very few files actually need it and those
can include directly. sched.h itself only needs forward declaration
of struct fs_struct;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Impact: fix hung task with certain (non-default) rt-limit settings
Corey Hickey reported that on using setuid to change the uid of a
rt process, the process would be unkillable and not be running.
This is because there was no rt runtime for that user group. Add
in a check to see if a user can attach an rt task to its task group.
On failure, return EINVAL, which is also returned in
CONFIG_CGROUP_SCHED.
Reported-by: Corey Hickey <bugfood-ml@fatooh.org>
Signed-off-by: Dhaval Giani <dhaval@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Revert commit 0c2d64fb6c because it causes
(arguably poorly designed) existing userspace to spend interminable
periods closing billions of not-open file descriptors.
We could bring this back, with some sort of opt-in tunable in /proc, which
defaults to "off".
Peter's alanysis follows:
: I spent several hours trying to get to the bottom of a serious
: performance issue that appeared on one of our servers after upgrading to
: 2.6.28. In the end it's what could be considered a userspace bug that
: was triggered by a change in 2.6.28. Since this might also affect other
: people I figured I'd at least document what I found here, and maybe we
: can even do something about it:
:
:
: So, I upgraded some of debian.org's machines to 2.6.28.1 and immediately
: the team maintaining our ftp archive complained that one of their
: scripts that previously ran in a few minutes still hadn't even come
: close to being done after an hour or so. Downgrading to 2.6.27 fixed
: that.
:
: Turns out that script is forking a lot and something in it or python or
: whereever closes all the file descriptors it doesn't want to pass on.
: That is, it starts at zero and goes up to ulimit -n/RLIMIT_NOFILE and
: closes them all with a few exceptions.
:
: Turns out that takes a long time when your limit -n is now 2^20 (1048576).
:
: With 2.6.27.* the ulimit -n was the standard 1024, but with 2.6.28 it is
: now a thousand times that.
:
: 2.6.28 included a patch titled "rlimit: permit setting RLIMIT_NOFILE to
: RLIM_INFINITY" (0c2d64fb6c)[1] that
: allows, as the title implies, to set the limit for number of files to
: infinity.
:
: Closer investigation showed that the broken default ulimit did not apply
: to "system" processes (like stuff started from init). In the end I
: could establish that all processes that passed through pam_limit at one
: point had the bad resource limit.
:
: Apparently the pam library in Debian etch (4.0) initializes the limits
: to some default values when it doesn't have any settings in limit.conf
: to override them. Turns out that for nofiles this is RLIM_INFINITY.
: Commenting out "case RLIMIT_NOFILE" in pam_limit.c:267 of our pam
: package version 0.79-5 fixes that - tho I'm not sure what side effects
: that has.
:
: Debian lenny (the upcoming 5.0 version) doesn't have this issue as it
: uses a different pam (version).
Reported-by: Peter Palfrader <weasel@debian.org>
Cc: Adam Tkac <vonsch@gmail.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@googlemail.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> [2.6.28.x]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* 'sched-fixes-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip:
sched: fix section mismatch
sched: fix double kfree in failure path
sched: clean up arch_reinit_sched_domains()
sched: mark sched_create_sysfs_power_savings_entries() as __init
getrusage: RUSAGE_THREAD should return ru_utime and ru_stime
sched: fix sched_slice()
sched_clock: prevent scd->clock from moving backwards, take #2
sched: sched.c declare variables before they get used
At the moment, the times() system call will appear to fail for a period
shortly after boot, while the value it want to return is between -4095 and
-1. The same thing will also happen for the time() system call on 32-bit
platforms some time in 2106 or so.
On some platforms, such as x86, this is unavoidable because of the system
call ABI, but other platforms such as powerpc have a separate error
indication from the return value, so system calls can in fact return small
negative values without indicating an error. On those platforms,
force_successful_syscall_return() provides a way to indicate that the
system call return value should not be treated as an error even if it is
in the range which would normally be taken as a negative error number.
This adds a force_successful_syscall_return() call to the time() and
times() system calls plus their 32-bit compat versions, so that they don't
erroneously indicate an error on those platforms whose system call ABI has
a separate error indication. This will not affect anything on other
platforms.
Joakim Tjernlund added the fix for time() and the compat versions of
time() and times(), after I did the fix for times().
Signed-off-by: Joakim Tjernlund <Joakim.Tjernlund@transmode.se>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Impact: task stats regression fix
Original getrusage(RUSAGE_THREAD) implementation can return ru_utime and
ru_stime. But commit "f06febc: timers: fix itimer/many thread hang" broke it.
this patch restores it.
Signed-off-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
* 'core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip: (63 commits)
stacktrace: provide save_stack_trace_tsk() weak alias
rcu: provide RCU options on non-preempt architectures too
printk: fix discarding message when recursion_bug
futex: clean up futex_(un)lock_pi fault handling
"Tree RCU": scalable classic RCU implementation
futex: rename field in futex_q to clarify single waiter semantics
x86/swiotlb: add default swiotlb_arch_range_needs_mapping
x86/swiotlb: add default phys<->bus conversion
x86: unify pci iommu setup and allow swiotlb to compile for 32 bit
x86: add swiotlb allocation functions
swiotlb: consolidate swiotlb info message printing
swiotlb: support bouncing of HighMem pages
swiotlb: factor out copy to/from device
swiotlb: add arch hook to force mapping
swiotlb: allow architectures to override phys<->bus<->phys conversions
swiotlb: add comment where we handle the overflow of a dma mask on 32 bit
rcu: fix rcutorture behavior during reboot
resources: skip sanity check of busy resources
swiotlb: move some definitions to header
swiotlb: allow architectures to override swiotlb pool allocation
...
Fix up trivial conflicts in
arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
arch/x86/mm/init_32.c
include/linux/hardirq.h
as per Ingo's suggestions.
Add a way for self-monitoring tasks to disable/enable counters summarily,
via a prctl:
PR_TASK_PERF_COUNTERS_DISABLE 31
PR_TASK_PERF_COUNTERS_ENABLE 32
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
The user_ns is moved from nsproxy to user_struct, so that a struct
cred by itself is sufficient to determine access (which it otherwise
would not be). Corresponding ecryptfs fixes (by David Howells) are
here as well.
Fix refcounting. The following rules now apply:
1. The task pins the user struct.
2. The user struct pins its user namespace.
3. The user namespace pins the struct user which created it.
User namespaces are cloned during copy_creds(). Unsharing a new user_ns
is no longer possible. (We could re-add that, but it'll cause code
duplication and doesn't seem useful if PAM doesn't need to clone user
namespaces).
When a user namespace is created, its first user (uid 0) gets empty
keyrings and a clean group_info.
This incorporates a previous patch by David Howells. Here
is his original patch description:
>I suggest adding the attached incremental patch. It makes the following
>changes:
>
> (1) Provides a current_user_ns() macro to wrap accesses to current's user
> namespace.
>
> (2) Fixes eCryptFS.
>
> (3) Renames create_new_userns() to create_user_ns() to be more consistent
> with the other associated functions and because the 'new' in the name is
> superfluous.
>
> (4) Moves the argument and permission checks made for CLONE_NEWUSER to the
> beginning of do_fork() so that they're done prior to making any attempts
> at allocation.
>
> (5) Calls create_user_ns() after prepare_creds(), and gives it the new creds
> to fill in rather than have it return the new root user. I don't imagine
> the new root user being used for anything other than filling in a cred
> struct.
>
> This also permits me to get rid of a get_uid() and a free_uid(), as the
> reference the creds were holding on the old user_struct can just be
> transferred to the new namespace's creator pointer.
>
> (6) Makes create_user_ns() reset the UIDs and GIDs of the creds under
> preparation rather than doing it in copy_creds().
>
>David
>Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Changelog:
Oct 20: integrate dhowells comments
1. leave thread_keyring alone
2. use current_user_ns() in set_user()
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Impact: relax the locking of cpu-time accounting calls
->siglock buys nothing for thread_group_cputime() in do_sys_times() and
wait_task_zombie() (which btw takes the unrelated parent's ->siglock).
Actually I think do_sys_times() doesn't need ->siglock at all.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Use RCU to access another task's creds and to release a task's own creds.
This means that it will be possible for the credentials of a task to be
replaced without another task (a) requiring a full lock to read them, and (b)
seeing deallocated memory.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Wrap current->cred and a few other accessors to hide their actual
implementation.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Separate the task security context from task_struct. At this point, the
security data is temporarily embedded in the task_struct with two pointers
pointing to it.
Note that the Alpha arch is altered as it refers to (E)UID and (E)GID in
entry.S via asm-offsets.
With comment fixes Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne <marc.c.dionne@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.
Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().
Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id(). In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
Cc: containers@lists.linux-foundation.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
utsname() is quite expensive to calculate. Cache it in a local.
text data bss dec hex filename
before: 11136 720 16 11872 2e60 kernel/sys.o
after: 11096 720 16 11832 2e38 kernel/sys.o
Acked-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@gmail.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
On sethostname() and setdomainname(), previous information may be retained
if it was longer than than the new hostname/domainname.
This can be demonstrated trivially by calling sethostname() first with a
long name, then with a short name, and then calling uname() to retrieve
the full buffer that contains the hostname (and possibly parts of the old
hostname), one just has to look past the terminating zero.
I don't know if we should really care that much (hence the RFC); the only
scenarios I can possibly think of is administrator putting something
sensitive in the hostname (or domain name) by accident, and changing it
back will not undo the mistake entirely, though it's not like we can
recover gracefully from "rm -rf /" either... The other scenario is
namespaces (CLONE_NEWUTS) where some information may be unintentionally
"inherited" from the previous namespace (a program wants to hide the
original name and does clone + sethostname, but some information is still
left).
I think the patch may be defended on grounds of the principle of least
surprise. But I am not adamant :-)
(I guess the question now is whether userspace should be able to
write embedded NULs into the buffer or not...)
At least the observation has been made and the patch has been presented.
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@gmail.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
When a process wants to set the limit of open files to RLIM_INFINITY it
gets EPERM even if it has CAP_SYS_RESOURCE capability.
For example, BIND does:
...
#elif defined(NR_OPEN) && defined(__linux__)
/*
* Some Linux kernels don't accept RLIM_INFINIT; the maximum
* possible value is the NR_OPEN defined in linux/fs.h.
*/
if (resource == isc_resource_openfiles && rlim_value == RLIM_INFINITY) {
rl.rlim_cur = rl.rlim_max = NR_OPEN;
unixresult = setrlimit(unixresource, &rl);
if (unixresult == 0)
return (ISC_R_SUCCESS);
}
#elif ...
If we allow setting RLIMIT_NOFILE to RLIM_INFINITY we increase portability
- you don't have to check if OS is linux and then use different schema for
limits.
The spec says "Specifying RLIM_INFINITY as any resource limit value on a
successful call to setrlimit() shall inhibit enforcement of that resource
limit." and we're presently not doing that.
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Introduce a kref to the tty structure and use it to protect the tty->signal
tty references. For now we don't introduce it for anything else.
Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Overview
This patch reworks the handling of POSIX CPU timers, including the
ITIMER_PROF, ITIMER_VIRT timers and rlimit handling. It was put together
with the help of Roland McGrath, the owner and original writer of this code.
The problem we ran into, and the reason for this rework, has to do with using
a profiling timer in a process with a large number of threads. It appears
that the performance of the old implementation of run_posix_cpu_timers() was
at least O(n*3) (where "n" is the number of threads in a process) or worse.
Everything is fine with an increasing number of threads until the time taken
for that routine to run becomes the same as or greater than the tick time, at
which point things degrade rather quickly.
This patch fixes bug 9906, "Weird hang with NPTL and SIGPROF."
Code Changes
This rework corrects the implementation of run_posix_cpu_timers() to make it
run in constant time for a particular machine. (Performance may vary between
one machine and another depending upon whether the kernel is built as single-
or multiprocessor and, in the latter case, depending upon the number of
running processors.) To do this, at each tick we now update fields in
signal_struct as well as task_struct. The run_posix_cpu_timers() function
uses those fields to make its decisions.
We define a new structure, "task_cputime," to contain user, system and
scheduler times and use these in appropriate places:
struct task_cputime {
cputime_t utime;
cputime_t stime;
unsigned long long sum_exec_runtime;
};
This is included in the structure "thread_group_cputime," which is a new
substructure of signal_struct and which varies for uniprocessor versus
multiprocessor kernels. For uniprocessor kernels, it uses "task_cputime" as
a simple substructure, while for multiprocessor kernels it is a pointer:
struct thread_group_cputime {
struct task_cputime totals;
};
struct thread_group_cputime {
struct task_cputime *totals;
};
We also add a new task_cputime substructure directly to signal_struct, to
cache the earliest expiration of process-wide timers, and task_cputime also
replaces the it_*_expires fields of task_struct (used for earliest expiration
of thread timers). The "thread_group_cputime" structure contains process-wide
timers that are updated via account_user_time() and friends. In the non-SMP
case the structure is a simple aggregator; unfortunately in the SMP case that
simplicity was not achievable due to cache-line contention between CPUs (in
one measured case performance was actually _worse_ on a 16-cpu system than
the same test on a 4-cpu system, due to this contention). For SMP, the
thread_group_cputime counters are maintained as a per-cpu structure allocated
using alloc_percpu(). The timer functions update only the timer field in
the structure corresponding to the running CPU, obtained using per_cpu_ptr().
We define a set of inline functions in sched.h that we use to maintain the
thread_group_cputime structure and hide the differences between UP and SMP
implementations from the rest of the kernel. The thread_group_cputime_init()
function initializes the thread_group_cputime structure for the given task.
The thread_group_cputime_alloc() is a no-op for UP; for SMP it calls the
out-of-line function thread_group_cputime_alloc_smp() to allocate and fill
in the per-cpu structures and fields. The thread_group_cputime_free()
function, also a no-op for UP, in SMP frees the per-cpu structures. The
thread_group_cputime_clone_thread() function (also a UP no-op) for SMP calls
thread_group_cputime_alloc() if the per-cpu structures haven't yet been
allocated. The thread_group_cputime() function fills the task_cputime
structure it is passed with the contents of the thread_group_cputime fields;
in UP it's that simple but in SMP it must also safely check that tsk->signal
is non-NULL (if it is it just uses the appropriate fields of task_struct) and,
if so, sums the per-cpu values for each online CPU. Finally, the three
functions account_group_user_time(), account_group_system_time() and
account_group_exec_runtime() are used by timer functions to update the
respective fields of the thread_group_cputime structure.
Non-SMP operation is trivial and will not be mentioned further.
The per-cpu structure is always allocated when a task creates its first new
thread, via a call to thread_group_cputime_clone_thread() from copy_signal().
It is freed at process exit via a call to thread_group_cputime_free() from
cleanup_signal().
All functions that formerly summed utime/stime/sum_sched_runtime values from
from all threads in the thread group now use thread_group_cputime() to
snapshot the values in the thread_group_cputime structure or the values in
the task structure itself if the per-cpu structure hasn't been allocated.
Finally, the code in kernel/posix-cpu-timers.c has changed quite a bit.
The run_posix_cpu_timers() function has been split into a fast path and a
slow path; the former safely checks whether there are any expired thread
timers and, if not, just returns, while the slow path does the heavy lifting.
With the dedicated thread group fields, timers are no longer "rebalanced" and
the process_timer_rebalance() function and related code has gone away. All
summing loops are gone and all code that used them now uses the
thread_group_cputime() inline. When process-wide timers are set, the new
task_cputime structure in signal_struct is used to cache the earliest
expiration; this is checked in the fast path.
Performance
The fix appears not to add significant overhead to existing operations. It
generally performs the same as the current code except in two cases, one in
which it performs slightly worse (Case 5 below) and one in which it performs
very significantly better (Case 2 below). Overall it's a wash except in those
two cases.
I've since done somewhat more involved testing on a dual-core Opteron system.
Case 1: With no itimer running, for a test with 100,000 threads, the fixed
kernel took 1428.5 seconds, 513 seconds more than the unfixed system,
all of which was spent in the system. There were twice as many
voluntary context switches with the fix as without it.
Case 2: With an itimer running at .01 second ticks and 4000 threads (the most
an unmodified kernel can handle), the fixed kernel ran the test in
eight percent of the time (5.8 seconds as opposed to 70 seconds) and
had better tick accuracy (.012 seconds per tick as opposed to .023
seconds per tick).
Case 3: A 4000-thread test with an initial timer tick of .01 second and an
interval of 10,000 seconds (i.e. a timer that ticks only once) had
very nearly the same performance in both cases: 6.3 seconds elapsed
for the fixed kernel versus 5.5 seconds for the unfixed kernel.
With fewer threads (eight in these tests), the Case 1 test ran in essentially
the same time on both the modified and unmodified kernels (5.2 seconds versus
5.8 seconds). The Case 2 test ran in about the same time as well, 5.9 seconds
versus 5.4 seconds but again with much better tick accuracy, .013 seconds per
tick versus .025 seconds per tick for the unmodified kernel.
Since the fix affected the rlimit code, I also tested soft and hard CPU limits.
Case 4: With a hard CPU limit of 20 seconds and eight threads (and an itimer
running), the modified kernel was very slightly favored in that while
it killed the process in 19.997 seconds of CPU time (5.002 seconds of
wall time), only .003 seconds of that was system time, the rest was
user time. The unmodified kernel killed the process in 20.001 seconds
of CPU (5.014 seconds of wall time) of which .016 seconds was system
time. Really, though, the results were too close to call. The results
were essentially the same with no itimer running.
Case 5: With a soft limit of 20 seconds and a hard limit of 2000 seconds
(where the hard limit would never be reached) and an itimer running,
the modified kernel exhibited worse tick accuracy than the unmodified
kernel: .050 seconds/tick versus .028 seconds/tick. Otherwise,
performance was almost indistinguishable. With no itimer running this
test exhibited virtually identical behavior and times in both cases.
In times past I did some limited performance testing. those results are below.
On a four-cpu Opteron system without this fix, a sixteen-thread test executed
in 3569.991 seconds, of which user was 3568.435s and system was 1.556s. On
the same system with the fix, user and elapsed time were about the same, but
system time dropped to 0.007 seconds. Performance with eight, four and one
thread were comparable. Interestingly, the timer ticks with the fix seemed
more accurate: The sixteen-thread test with the fix received 149543 ticks
for 0.024 seconds per tick, while the same test without the fix received 58720
for 0.061 seconds per tick. Both cases were configured for an interval of
0.01 seconds. Again, the other tests were comparable. Each thread in this
test computed the primes up to 25,000,000.
I also did a test with a large number of threads, 100,000 threads, which is
impossible without the fix. In this case each thread computed the primes only
up to 10,000 (to make the runtime manageable). System time dominated, at
1546.968 seconds out of a total 2176.906 seconds (giving a user time of
629.938s). It received 147651 ticks for 0.015 seconds per tick, still quite
accurate. There is obviously no comparable test without the fix.
Signed-off-by: Frank Mayhar <fmayhar@google.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
We want to be able to control the default "rounding" that is used by
select() and poll() and friends. This is a per process property
(so that we can have a "nice" like program to start certain programs with
a looser or stricter rounding) that can be set/get via a prctl().
For this purpose, a field called "timer_slack_ns" is added to the task
struct. In addition, a field called "default_timer_slack"ns" is added
so that tasks easily can temporarily to a more/less accurate slack and then
back to the default.
The default value of the slack is set to 50 usec; this is significantly less
than 2.6.27's average select() and poll() timing error but still allows
the kernel to group timers somewhat to preserve power behavior. Applications
and admins can override this via the prctl()
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
When user calls sys_setpriority(PRIO_PGRP ...) on a NPTL style multi-LWP
process, only the task leader of the process is affected, all other
sibling LWP threads didn't receive the setting. The problem was that the
iterator used in sys_setpriority() only iteartes over one task for each
process, ignoring all other sibling thread.
Introduce a new macro do_each_pid_thread / while_each_pid_thread to walk
each thread of a process. Convert 4 call sites in {set/get}priority and
ioprio_{set/get}.
Signed-off-by: Ken Chen <kenchen@google.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This patch provides an enhancement to kexec/kdump. It implements the
following features:
- Backup/restore memory used by the original kernel before/after
kexec.
- Save/restore CPU state before/after kexec.
The features of this patch can be used as a general method to call program in
physical mode (paging turning off). This can be used to call BIOS code under
Linux.
kexec-tools needs to be patched to support kexec jump. The patches and
the precompiled kexec can be download from the following URL:
source: http://khibernation.sourceforge.net/download/release_v10/kexec-tools/kexec-tools-src_git_kh10.tar.bz2
patches: http://khibernation.sourceforge.net/download/release_v10/kexec-tools/kexec-tools-patches_git_kh10.tar.bz2
binary: http://khibernation.sourceforge.net/download/release_v10/kexec-tools/kexec_git_kh10
Usage example of calling some physical mode code and return:
1. Compile and install patched kernel with following options selected:
CONFIG_X86_32=y
CONFIG_KEXEC=y
CONFIG_PM=y
CONFIG_KEXEC_JUMP=y
2. Build patched kexec-tool or download the pre-built one.
3. Build some physical mode executable named such as "phy_mode"
4. Boot kernel compiled in step 1.
5. Load physical mode executable with /sbin/kexec. The shell command
line can be as follow:
/sbin/kexec --load-preserve-context --args-none phy_mode
6. Call physical mode executable with following shell command line:
/sbin/kexec -e
Implementation point:
To support jumping without reserving memory. One shadow backup page (source
page) is allocated for each page used by kexeced code image (destination
page). When do kexec_load, the image of kexeced code is loaded into source
pages, and before executing, the destination pages and the source pages are
swapped, so the contents of destination pages are backupped. Before jumping
to the kexeced code image and after jumping back to the original kernel, the
destination pages and the source pages are swapped too.
C ABI (calling convention) is used as communication protocol between
kernel and called code.
A flag named KEXEC_PRESERVE_CONTEXT for sys_kexec_load is added to
indicate that the loaded kernel image is used for jumping back.
Now, only the i386 architecture is supported.
Signed-off-by: Huang Ying <ying.huang@intel.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: Nigel Cunningham <nigel@nigel.suspend2.net>
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@sisk.pl>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
With the removal of the Solaris binary emulation the export of
uts_sem became unused.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Presently call_usermodehelper_setup() uses GFP_ATOMIC. but it can return
NULL _very_ easily.
GFP_ATOMIC is needed only when we can't sleep. and, GFP_KERNEL is robust
and better.
thus, I add gfp_mask argument to call_usermodehelper_setup().
So, its callers pass the gfp_t as below:
call_usermodehelper() and call_usermodehelper_keys():
depend on 'wait' argument.
call_usermodehelper_pipe():
always GFP_KERNEL because always run under process context.
orderly_poweroff():
pass to GFP_ATOMIC because may run under interrupt context.
Signed-off-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: "Paul Menage" <menage@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
If none of the switch cases match, the PR_SET_PDEATHSIG and
PR_SET_DUMPABLE cases of the switch statement will never write to local
variable `error'.
Signed-off-by: Shi Weihua <shiwh@cn.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
1. sys_getpgid() needs rcu_read_lock() to derive the pgrp _nr, even if
the task is current, otherwise we can race with another thread which
does sys_setpgid().
2. Use rcu_read_lock() instead of tasklist_lock when pid != 0, make sure
that we don't use the NULL pid if the task exits right after successful
find_task_by_vpid().
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
1. sys_getsid() needs rcu_read_lock() to derive the session _nr, even if
the task is current, otherwise we can race with another thread which
does sys_setsid().
2. The task can exit between find_task_by_vpid() and task_session_vnr(),
in that unlikely case sys_getsid() returns 0 instead of -ESRCH.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Use change_pid() instead of detach_pid() + attach_pid() in sys_setpgid().
This way task_pgrp() is not NULL in between.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Just a trivial example, more to come.
k_getrusage() holds rcu_read_lock() because it was previously required by
lock_task_sighand(). Unneeded now.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Add the RUSAGE_THREAD option for the getrusage system call. This is
essentially Roland's patch from http://lkml.org/lkml/2008/1/18/589, but the
line about RUSAGE_LWP line has been removed, as suggested by Ulrich and
Christoph.
Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sripathi Kodi <sripathik@in.ibm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@googlemail.com>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Linus Torvalds