Commit graph

28 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Alexander Potapenko 505a0ef15f kasan: stackdepot: move filter_irq_stacks() to stackdepot.c
filter_irq_stacks() can be used by other tools (e.g.  KMSAN), so it needs
to be moved to a common location.  lib/stackdepot.c seems a good place, as
filter_irq_stacks() is usually applied to the output of
stack_trace_save().

This patch has been previously mailed as part of KMSAN RFC patch series.

[glider@google.co: nds32: linker script: add SOFTIRQENTRY_TEXT\
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200311121002.241430-1-glider@google.com
[glider@google.com: add IRQENTRY_TEXT and SOFTIRQENTRY_TEXT to linker script]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200311121124.243352-1-glider@google.com
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200220141916.55455-3-glider@google.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-04-07 10:43:43 -07:00
Walter Wu 8cceeff48f kasan: detect negative size in memory operation function
Patch series "fix the missing underflow in memory operation function", v4.

The patchset helps to produce a KASAN report when size is negative in
memory operation functions.  It is helpful for programmer to solve an
undefined behavior issue.  Patch 1 based on Dmitry's review and
suggestion, patch 2 is a test in order to verify the patch 1.

[1]https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199341
[2]https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/20190927034338.15813-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com/

This patch (of 2):

KASAN missed detecting size is a negative number in memset(), memcpy(),
and memmove(), it will cause out-of-bounds bug.  So needs to be detected
by KASAN.

If size is a negative number, then it has a reason to be defined as
out-of-bounds bug type.  Casting negative numbers to size_t would indeed
turn up as a large size_t and its value will be larger than ULONG_MAX/2,
so that this can qualify as out-of-bounds.

KASAN report is shown below:

 BUG: KASAN: out-of-bounds in kmalloc_memmove_invalid_size+0x70/0xa0
 Read of size 18446744073709551608 at addr ffffff8069660904 by task cat/72

 CPU: 2 PID: 72 Comm: cat Not tainted 5.4.0-rc1-next-20191004ajb-00001-gdb8af2f372b2-dirty #1
 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
 Call trace:
  dump_backtrace+0x0/0x288
  show_stack+0x14/0x20
  dump_stack+0x10c/0x164
  print_address_description.isra.9+0x68/0x378
  __kasan_report+0x164/0x1a0
  kasan_report+0xc/0x18
  check_memory_region+0x174/0x1d0
  memmove+0x34/0x88
  kmalloc_memmove_invalid_size+0x70/0xa0

[1] https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199341

[cai@lca.pw: fix -Wdeclaration-after-statement warn]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1583509030-27939-1-git-send-email-cai@lca.pw
[peterz@infradead.org: fix objtool warning]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200305095436.GV2596@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Suggested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com>
Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191112065302.7015-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-04-02 09:35:30 -07:00
Nick Hu 57ee58e393
kasan: No KASAN's memmove check if archs don't have it.
If archs don't have memmove then the C implementation from lib/string.c is used,
and then it's instrumented by compiler. So there is no need to add KASAN's
memmove to manual checks.

Signed-off-by: Nick Hu <nickhu@andestech.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com>
2020-01-22 13:09:41 -08:00
Daniel Axtens e218f1ca39 kasan: use apply_to_existing_page_range() for releasing vmalloc shadow
kasan_release_vmalloc uses apply_to_page_range to release vmalloc
shadow.  Unfortunately, apply_to_page_range can allocate memory to fill
in page table entries, which is not what we want.

Also, kasan_release_vmalloc is called under free_vmap_area_lock, so if
apply_to_page_range does allocate memory, we get a sleep in atomic bug:

	BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at mm/page_alloc.c:4681
	in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 15087, name:

	Call Trace:
	 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
	 dump_stack+0x199/0x216 lib/dump_stack.c:118
	 ___might_sleep.cold.97+0x1f5/0x238 kernel/sched/core.c:6800
	 __might_sleep+0x95/0x190 kernel/sched/core.c:6753
	 prepare_alloc_pages mm/page_alloc.c:4681 [inline]
	 __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x3cd/0x890 mm/page_alloc.c:4730
	 alloc_pages_current+0x10c/0x210 mm/mempolicy.c:2211
	 alloc_pages include/linux/gfp.h:532 [inline]
	 __get_free_pages+0xc/0x40 mm/page_alloc.c:4786
	 __pte_alloc_one_kernel include/asm-generic/pgalloc.h:21 [inline]
	 pte_alloc_one_kernel include/asm-generic/pgalloc.h:33 [inline]
	 __pte_alloc_kernel+0x1d/0x200 mm/memory.c:459
	 apply_to_pte_range mm/memory.c:2031 [inline]
	 apply_to_pmd_range mm/memory.c:2068 [inline]
	 apply_to_pud_range mm/memory.c:2088 [inline]
	 apply_to_p4d_range mm/memory.c:2108 [inline]
	 apply_to_page_range+0x77d/0xa00 mm/memory.c:2133
	 kasan_release_vmalloc+0xa7/0xc0 mm/kasan/common.c:970
	 __purge_vmap_area_lazy+0xcbb/0x1f30 mm/vmalloc.c:1313
	 try_purge_vmap_area_lazy mm/vmalloc.c:1332 [inline]
	 free_vmap_area_noflush+0x2ca/0x390 mm/vmalloc.c:1368
	 free_unmap_vmap_area mm/vmalloc.c:1381 [inline]
	 remove_vm_area+0x1cc/0x230 mm/vmalloc.c:2209
	 vm_remove_mappings mm/vmalloc.c:2236 [inline]
	 __vunmap+0x223/0xa20 mm/vmalloc.c:2299
	 __vfree+0x3f/0xd0 mm/vmalloc.c:2356
	 __vmalloc_area_node mm/vmalloc.c:2507 [inline]
	 __vmalloc_node_range+0x5d5/0x810 mm/vmalloc.c:2547
	 __vmalloc_node mm/vmalloc.c:2607 [inline]
	 __vmalloc_node_flags mm/vmalloc.c:2621 [inline]
	 vzalloc+0x6f/0x80 mm/vmalloc.c:2666
	 alloc_one_pg_vec_page net/packet/af_packet.c:4233 [inline]
	 alloc_pg_vec net/packet/af_packet.c:4258 [inline]
	 packet_set_ring+0xbc0/0x1b50 net/packet/af_packet.c:4342
	 packet_setsockopt+0xed7/0x2d90 net/packet/af_packet.c:3695
	 __sys_setsockopt+0x29b/0x4d0 net/socket.c:2117
	 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2133 [inline]
	 __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2130 [inline]
	 __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xbe/0x150 net/socket.c:2130
	 do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x780 arch/x86/entry/common.c:294
	 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

Switch to using the apply_to_existing_page_range() helper instead, which
won't allocate memory.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: s/apply_to_existing_pages/apply_to_existing_page_range/]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191205140407.1874-2-dja@axtens.net
Fixes: 3c5c3cfb9e ("kasan: support backing vmalloc space with real shadow memory")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Cc: Uladzislau Rezki (Sony) <urezki@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-12-17 20:59:59 -08:00
Andrey Ryabinin d98c9e83b5 kasan: fix crashes on access to memory mapped by vm_map_ram()
With CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC=y any use of memory obtained via vm_map_ram()
will crash because there is no shadow backing that memory.

Instead of sprinkling additional kasan_populate_vmalloc() calls all over
the vmalloc code, move it into alloc_vmap_area(). This will fix
vm_map_ram() and simplify the code a bit.

[aryabinin@virtuozzo.com: v2]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191205095942.1761-1-aryabinin@virtuozzo.comLink: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191204204534.32202-1-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
Fixes: 3c5c3cfb9e ("kasan: support backing vmalloc space with real shadow memory")
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Uladzislau Rezki (Sony) <urezki@gmail.com>
Cc: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-12-17 20:59:59 -08:00
zhong jiang 2e7d31704c mm/kasan/common.c: fix compile error
I hit the following compile error in arch/x86/

   mm/kasan/common.c: In function kasan_populate_vmalloc:
   mm/kasan/common.c:797:2: error: implicit declaration of function flush_cache_vmap; did you mean flush_rcu_work? [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
     flush_cache_vmap(shadow_start, shadow_end);
     ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
     flush_rcu_work
   cc1: some warnings being treated as errors

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1575363013-43761-1-git-send-email-zhongjiang@huawei.com
Fixes: 3c5c3cfb9e ("kasan: support backing vmalloc space with real shadow memory")
Signed-off-by: zhong jiang <zhongjiang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-12-04 19:44:11 -08:00
Daniel Axtens 3c5c3cfb9e kasan: support backing vmalloc space with real shadow memory
Patch series "kasan: support backing vmalloc space with real shadow
memory", v11.

Currently, vmalloc space is backed by the early shadow page.  This means
that kasan is incompatible with VMAP_STACK.

This series provides a mechanism to back vmalloc space with real,
dynamically allocated memory.  I have only wired up x86, because that's
the only currently supported arch I can work with easily, but it's very
easy to wire up other architectures, and it appears that there is some
work-in-progress code to do this on arm64 and s390.

This has been discussed before in the context of VMAP_STACK:
 - https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=202009
 - https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/7/22/198
 - https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/7/19/822

In terms of implementation details:

Most mappings in vmalloc space are small, requiring less than a full
page of shadow space.  Allocating a full shadow page per mapping would
therefore be wasteful.  Furthermore, to ensure that different mappings
use different shadow pages, mappings would have to be aligned to
KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE.

Instead, share backing space across multiple mappings.  Allocate a
backing page when a mapping in vmalloc space uses a particular page of
the shadow region.  This page can be shared by other vmalloc mappings
later on.

We hook in to the vmap infrastructure to lazily clean up unused shadow
memory.

Testing with test_vmalloc.sh on an x86 VM with 2 vCPUs shows that:

 - Turning on KASAN, inline instrumentation, without vmalloc, introuduces
   a 4.1x-4.2x slowdown in vmalloc operations.

 - Turning this on introduces the following slowdowns over KASAN:
     * ~1.76x slower single-threaded (test_vmalloc.sh performance)
     * ~2.18x slower when both cpus are performing operations
       simultaneously (test_vmalloc.sh sequential_test_order=1)

This is unfortunate but given that this is a debug feature only, not the
end of the world.  The benchmarks are also a stress-test for the vmalloc
subsystem: they're not indicative of an overall 2x slowdown!

This patch (of 4):

Hook into vmalloc and vmap, and dynamically allocate real shadow memory
to back the mappings.

Most mappings in vmalloc space are small, requiring less than a full
page of shadow space.  Allocating a full shadow page per mapping would
therefore be wasteful.  Furthermore, to ensure that different mappings
use different shadow pages, mappings would have to be aligned to
KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE.

Instead, share backing space across multiple mappings.  Allocate a
backing page when a mapping in vmalloc space uses a particular page of
the shadow region.  This page can be shared by other vmalloc mappings
later on.

We hook in to the vmap infrastructure to lazily clean up unused shadow
memory.

To avoid the difficulties around swapping mappings around, this code
expects that the part of the shadow region that covers the vmalloc space
will not be covered by the early shadow page, but will be left unmapped.
This will require changes in arch-specific code.

This allows KASAN with VMAP_STACK, and may be helpful for architectures
that do not have a separate module space (e.g.  powerpc64, which I am
currently working on).  It also allows relaxing the module alignment
back to PAGE_SIZE.

Testing with test_vmalloc.sh on an x86 VM with 2 vCPUs shows that:

 - Turning on KASAN, inline instrumentation, without vmalloc, introuduces
   a 4.1x-4.2x slowdown in vmalloc operations.

 - Turning this on introduces the following slowdowns over KASAN:
     * ~1.76x slower single-threaded (test_vmalloc.sh performance)
     * ~2.18x slower when both cpus are performing operations
       simultaneously (test_vmalloc.sh sequential_test_order=3D1)

This is unfortunate but given that this is a debug feature only, not the
end of the world.

The full benchmark results are:

Performance

                              No KASAN      KASAN original x baseline  KASAN vmalloc x baseline    x KASAN

fix_size_alloc_test             662004            11404956      17.23       19144610      28.92       1.68
full_fit_alloc_test             710950            12029752      16.92       13184651      18.55       1.10
long_busy_list_alloc_test      9431875            43990172       4.66       82970178       8.80       1.89
random_size_alloc_test         5033626            23061762       4.58       47158834       9.37       2.04
fix_align_alloc_test           1252514            15276910      12.20       31266116      24.96       2.05
random_size_align_alloc_te     1648501            14578321       8.84       25560052      15.51       1.75
align_shift_alloc_test             147                 830       5.65           5692      38.72       6.86
pcpu_alloc_test                  80732              125520       1.55         140864       1.74       1.12
Total Cycles              119240774314        763211341128       6.40  1390338696894      11.66       1.82

Sequential, 2 cpus

                              No KASAN      KASAN original x baseline  KASAN vmalloc x baseline    x KASAN

fix_size_alloc_test            1423150            14276550      10.03       27733022      19.49       1.94
full_fit_alloc_test            1754219            14722640       8.39       15030786       8.57       1.02
long_busy_list_alloc_test     11451858            52154973       4.55      107016027       9.34       2.05
random_size_alloc_test         5989020            26735276       4.46       68885923      11.50       2.58
fix_align_alloc_test           2050976            20166900       9.83       50491675      24.62       2.50
random_size_align_alloc_te     2858229            17971700       6.29       38730225      13.55       2.16
align_shift_alloc_test             405                6428      15.87          26253      64.82       4.08
pcpu_alloc_test                 127183              151464       1.19         216263       1.70       1.43
Total Cycles               54181269392        308723699764       5.70   650772566394      12.01       2.11
fix_size_alloc_test            1420404            14289308      10.06       27790035      19.56       1.94
full_fit_alloc_test            1736145            14806234       8.53       15274301       8.80       1.03
long_busy_list_alloc_test     11404638            52270785       4.58      107550254       9.43       2.06
random_size_alloc_test         6017006            26650625       4.43       68696127      11.42       2.58
fix_align_alloc_test           2045504            20280985       9.91       50414862      24.65       2.49
random_size_align_alloc_te     2845338            17931018       6.30       38510276      13.53       2.15
align_shift_alloc_test             472                3760       7.97           9656      20.46       2.57
pcpu_alloc_test                 118643              132732       1.12         146504       1.23       1.10
Total Cycles               54040011688        309102805492       5.72   651325675652      12.05       2.11

[dja@axtens.net: fixups]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191120052719.7201-1-dja@axtens.net
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3D202009
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191031093909.9228-2-dja@axtens.net
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> [shadow rework]
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Co-developed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-12-01 12:59:05 -08:00
Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) d8c6546b1a mm: introduce compound_nr()
Replace 1 << compound_order(page) with compound_nr(page).  Minor
improvements in readability.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190721104612.19120-4-willy@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-09-24 15:54:08 -07:00
Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) a50b854e07 mm: introduce page_size()
Patch series "Make working with compound pages easier", v2.

These three patches add three helpers and convert the appropriate
places to use them.

This patch (of 3):

It's unnecessarily hard to find out the size of a potentially huge page.
Replace 'PAGE_SIZE << compound_order(page)' with page_size(page).

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190721104612.19120-2-willy@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-09-24 15:54:08 -07:00
Walter Wu ae8f06b31a kasan: add memory corruption identification for software tag-based mode
Add memory corruption identification at bug report for software tag-based
mode.  The report shows whether it is "use-after-free" or "out-of-bound"
error instead of "invalid-access" error.  This will make it easier for
programmers to see the memory corruption problem.

We extend the slab to store five old free pointer tag and free backtrace,
we can check if the tagged address is in the slab record and make a good
guess if the object is more like "use-after-free" or "out-of-bound".
therefore every slab memory corruption can be identified whether it's
"use-after-free" or "out-of-bound".

[aryabinin@virtuozzo.com: simplify & clenup code]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/3318f9d7-a760-3cc8-b700-f06108ae745f@virtuozzo.com]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190821180332.11450-1-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Acked-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-09-24 15:54:07 -07:00
Andrey Ryabinin 00fb24a42a mm/kasan: fix false positive invalid-free reports with CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS=y
The code like this:

	ptr = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
	page = virt_to_page(ptr);
	offset = offset_in_page(ptr);
	kfree(page_address(page) + offset);

may produce false-positive invalid-free reports on the kernel with
CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS=y.

In the example above we lose the original tag assigned to 'ptr', so
kfree() gets the pointer with 0xFF tag.  In kfree() we check that 0xFF
tag is different from the tag in shadow hence print false report.

Instead of just comparing tags, do the following:

1) Check that shadow doesn't contain KASAN_TAG_INVALID.  Otherwise it's
   double-free and it doesn't matter what tag the pointer have.

2) If pointer tag is different from 0xFF, make sure that tag in the
   shadow is the same as in the pointer.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190819172540.19581-1-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
Fixes: 7f94ffbc4c ("kasan: add hooks implementation for tag-based mode")
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Reported-by: Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com>
Reported-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-08-24 19:48:42 -07:00
Marco Elver b5f6e0fc7d mm/kasan: change kasan_check_{read,write} to return boolean
This changes {,__}kasan_check_{read,write} functions to return a boolean
denoting if the access was valid or not.

[sfr@canb.auug.org.au: include types.h for "bool"]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190705184949.13cdd021@canb.auug.org.au
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190626142014.141844-3-elver@google.com
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-12 11:05:42 -07:00
Marco Elver 7d8ad890da mm/kasan: introduce __kasan_check_{read,write}
Patch series "mm/kasan: Add object validation in ksize()", v3.

This patch (of 5):

This introduces __kasan_check_{read,write}.  __kasan_check functions may
be used from anywhere, even compilation units that disable instrumentation
selectively.

This change eliminates the need for the __KASAN_INTERNAL definition.

[elver@google.com: v5]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190708170706.174189-2-elver@google.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190626142014.141844-2-elver@google.com
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-12 11:05:42 -07:00
Nathan Chancellor 0600597c85 kasan: initialize tag to 0xff in __kasan_kmalloc
When building with -Wuninitialized and CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS unset, Clang
warns:

mm/kasan/common.c:484:40: warning: variable 'tag' is uninitialized when
used here [-Wuninitialized]
        kasan_unpoison_shadow(set_tag(object, tag), size);
                                              ^~~

set_tag ignores tag in this configuration but clang doesn't realize it at
this point in its pipeline, as it points to arch_kasan_set_tag as being
the point where it is used, which will later be expanded to (void
*)(object) without a use of tag.  Initialize tag to 0xff, as it removes
this warning and doesn't change the meaning of the code.

Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/465
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190502163057.6603-1-natechancellor@gmail.com
Fixes: 7f94ffbc4c ("kasan: add hooks implementation for tag-based mode")
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-06-01 15:51:31 -07:00
Linus Torvalds 2c6a392cdd Merge branch 'core-stacktrace-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull stack trace updates from Ingo Molnar:
 "So Thomas looked at the stacktrace code recently and noticed a few
  weirdnesses, and we all know how such stories of crummy kernel code
  meeting German engineering perfection end: a 45-patch series to clean
  it all up! :-)

  Here's the changes in Thomas's words:

   'Struct stack_trace is a sinkhole for input and output parameters
    which is largely pointless for most usage sites. In fact if embedded
    into other data structures it creates indirections and extra storage
    overhead for no benefit.

    Looking at all usage sites makes it clear that they just require an
    interface which is based on a storage array. That array is either on
    stack, global or embedded into some other data structure.

    Some of the stack depot usage sites are outright wrong, but
    fortunately the wrongness just causes more stack being used for
    nothing and does not have functional impact.

    Another oddity is the inconsistent termination of the stack trace
    with ULONG_MAX. It's pointless as the number of entries is what
    determines the length of the stored trace. In fact quite some call
    sites remove the ULONG_MAX marker afterwards with or without nasty
    comments about it. Not all architectures do that and those which do,
    do it inconsistenly either conditional on nr_entries == 0 or
    unconditionally.

    The following series cleans that up by:

      1) Removing the ULONG_MAX termination in the architecture code

      2) Removing the ULONG_MAX fixups at the call sites

      3) Providing plain storage array based interfaces for stacktrace
         and stackdepot.

      4) Cleaning up the mess at the callsites including some related
         cleanups.

      5) Removing the struct stack_trace based interfaces

    This is not changing the struct stack_trace interfaces at the
    architecture level, but it removes the exposure to the generic
    code'"

* 'core-stacktrace-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (45 commits)
  x86/stacktrace: Use common infrastructure
  stacktrace: Provide common infrastructure
  lib/stackdepot: Remove obsolete functions
  stacktrace: Remove obsolete functions
  livepatch: Simplify stack trace retrieval
  tracing: Remove the last struct stack_trace usage
  tracing: Simplify stack trace retrieval
  tracing: Make ftrace_trace_userstack() static and conditional
  tracing: Use percpu stack trace buffer more intelligently
  tracing: Simplify stacktrace retrieval in histograms
  lockdep: Simplify stack trace handling
  lockdep: Remove save argument from check_prev_add()
  lockdep: Remove unused trace argument from print_circular_bug()
  drm: Simplify stacktrace handling
  dm persistent data: Simplify stack trace handling
  dm bufio: Simplify stack trace retrieval
  btrfs: ref-verify: Simplify stack trace retrieval
  dma/debug: Simplify stracktrace retrieval
  fault-inject: Simplify stacktrace retrieval
  mm/page_owner: Simplify stack trace handling
  ...
2019-05-06 13:11:48 -07:00
Thomas Gleixner 880e049c9c mm/kasan: Simplify stacktrace handling
Replace the indirection through struct stack_trace by using the storage
array based interfaces.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org
Cc: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Cc: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com>
Cc: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Cc: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Cc: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Cc: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Cc: linux-btrfs@vger.kernel.org
Cc: dm-devel@redhat.com
Cc: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Cc: Alasdair Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel@ffwll.ch>
Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com>
Cc: dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: David Airlie <airlied@linux.ie>
Cc: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Zanussi <tom.zanussi@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190425094801.963261479@linutronix.de
2019-04-29 12:37:49 +02:00
Thomas Gleixner ead97a49ec mm/kasan: Remove the ULONG_MAX stack trace hackery
No architecture terminates the stack trace with ULONG_MAX anymore. Remove
the cruft.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190410103644.750219625@linutronix.de
2019-04-14 19:58:31 +02:00
Peter Zijlstra 57b78a62e7 x86/uaccess, kasan: Fix KASAN vs SMAP
KASAN inserts extra code for every LOAD/STORE emitted by te compiler.
Much of this code is simple and safe to run with AC=1, however the
kasan_report() function, called on error, is most certainly not safe
to call with AC=1.

Therefore wrap kasan_report() in user_access_{save,restore}; which for
x86 SMAP, saves/restores EFLAGS and clears AC before calling the real
function.

Also ensure all the functions are without __fentry__ hook. The
function tracer is also not safe.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-04-03 11:02:24 +02:00
Arnd Bergmann bcf6f55a0d kasan: fix kasan_check_read/write definitions
Building little-endian allmodconfig kernels on arm64 started failing
with the generated atomic.h implementation, since we now try to call
kasan helpers from the EFI stub:

  aarch64-linux-gnu-ld: drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.stub.o: in function `atomic_set':
  include/generated/atomic-instrumented.h:44: undefined reference to `__efistub_kasan_check_write'

I suspect that we get similar problems in other files that explicitly
disable KASAN for some reason but call atomic_t based helper functions.

We can fix this by checking the predefined __SANITIZE_ADDRESS__ macro
that the compiler sets instead of checking CONFIG_KASAN, but this in
turn requires a small hack in mm/kasan/common.c so we do see the extern
declaration there instead of the inline function.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181211133453.2835077-1-arnd@arndb.de
Fixes: b1864b828644 ("locking/atomics: build atomic headers as required")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reported-by: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>,
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-03-05 21:07:13 -08:00
Andrey Konovalov e1db95befb kasan: fix assigning tags twice
When an object is kmalloc()'ed, two hooks are called: kasan_slab_alloc()
and kasan_kmalloc().  Right now we assign a tag twice, once in each of the
hooks.  Fix it by assigning a tag only in the former hook.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/ce8c6431da735aa7ec051fd6497153df690eb021.1549921721.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Evgeniy Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-02-21 09:01:00 -08:00
Andrey Konovalov a3fe7cdf02 kasan: fix krealloc handling for tag-based mode
Right now tag-based KASAN can retag the memory that is reallocated via
krealloc and return a differently tagged pointer even if the same slab
object gets used and no reallocated technically happens.

There are a few issues with this approach.  One is that krealloc callers
can't rely on comparing the return value with the passed argument to
check whether reallocation happened.  Another is that if a caller knows
that no reallocation happened, that it can access object memory through
the old pointer, which leads to false positives.  Look at
nf_ct_ext_add() to see an example.

Fix this by keeping the same tag if the memory don't actually gets
reallocated during krealloc.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/bb2a71d17ed072bcc528cbee46fcbd71a6da3be4.1546540962.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-08 17:15:11 -08:00
Andrey Konovalov eb214f2dda kasan, arm64: use ARCH_SLAB_MINALIGN instead of manual aligning
Instead of changing cache->align to be aligned to KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE
in kasan_cache_create() we can reuse the ARCH_SLAB_MINALIGN macro.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/52ddd881916bcc153a9924c154daacde78522227.1546540962.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Suggested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-08 17:15:11 -08:00
Andrey Konovalov e886bf9d9a kasan: add SPDX-License-Identifier mark to source files
This patch adds a "SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0" mark to all source
files under mm/kasan.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/bce2d1e618afa5142e81961ab8fa4b4165337380.1544099024.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-12-28 12:11:44 -08:00
Andrey Konovalov 66afc7f1e0 kasan: add __must_check annotations to kasan hooks
This patch adds __must_check annotations to kasan hooks that return a
pointer to make sure that a tagged pointer always gets propagated.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/03b269c5e453945f724bfca3159d4e1333a8fb1c.1544099024.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Suggested-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-12-28 12:11:44 -08:00
Andrey Konovalov 2813b9c029 kasan, mm, arm64: tag non slab memory allocated via pagealloc
Tag-based KASAN doesn't check memory accesses through pointers tagged with
0xff.  When page_address is used to get pointer to memory that corresponds
to some page, the tag of the resulting pointer gets set to 0xff, even
though the allocated memory might have been tagged differently.

For slab pages it's impossible to recover the correct tag to return from
page_address, since the page might contain multiple slab objects tagged
with different values, and we can't know in advance which one of them is
going to get accessed.  For non slab pages however, we can recover the tag
in page_address, since the whole page was marked with the same tag.

This patch adds tagging to non slab memory allocated with pagealloc.  To
set the tag of the pointer returned from page_address, the tag gets stored
to page->flags when the memory gets allocated.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/d758ddcef46a5abc9970182b9137e2fbee202a2c.1544099024.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-12-28 12:11:44 -08:00
Andrey Konovalov 7f94ffbc4c kasan: add hooks implementation for tag-based mode
This commit adds tag-based KASAN specific hooks implementation and
adjusts common generic and tag-based KASAN ones.

1. When a new slab cache is created, tag-based KASAN rounds up the size of
   the objects in this cache to KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE (== 16).

2. On each kmalloc tag-based KASAN generates a random tag, sets the shadow
   memory, that corresponds to this object to this tag, and embeds this
   tag value into the top byte of the returned pointer.

3. On each kfree tag-based KASAN poisons the shadow memory with a random
   tag to allow detection of use-after-free bugs.

The rest of the logic of the hook implementation is very much similar to
the one provided by generic KASAN. Tag-based KASAN saves allocation and
free stack metadata to the slab object the same way generic KASAN does.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/bda78069e3b8422039794050ddcb2d53d053ed41.1544099024.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-12-28 12:11:44 -08:00
Andrey Konovalov 080eb83f54 kasan: initialize shadow to 0xff for tag-based mode
A tag-based KASAN shadow memory cell contains a memory tag, that
corresponds to the tag in the top byte of the pointer, that points to that
memory.  The native top byte value of kernel pointers is 0xff, so with
tag-based KASAN we need to initialize shadow memory to 0xff.

[cai@lca.pw: arm64: skip kmemleak for KASAN again\
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181226020550.63712-1-cai@lca.pw
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5cc1b789aad7c99cf4f3ec5b328b147ad53edb40.1544099024.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-12-28 12:11:43 -08:00
Andrey Konovalov bffa986c6f kasan: move common generic and tag-based code to common.c
Tag-based KASAN reuses a significant part of the generic KASAN code, so
move the common parts to common.c without any functional changes.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/114064d002356e03bb8cc91f7835e20dc61b51d9.1544099024.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-12-28 12:11:43 -08:00