boot_aggregate is the first entry of IMA measurement list. Its purpose is
to link pre-boot measurements to IMA measurements. As IMA was designed to
work with a TPM 1.2, the SHA1 PCR bank was always selected even if a
TPM 2.0 with support for stronger hash algorithms is available.
This patch first tries to find a PCR bank with the IMA default hash
algorithm. If it does not find it, it selects the SHA256 PCR bank for
TPM 2.0 and SHA1 for TPM 1.2. Ultimately, it selects SHA1 also for TPM 2.0
if the SHA256 PCR bank is not found.
If none of the PCR banks above can be found, boot_aggregate file digest is
filled with zeros, as for TPM bypass, making it impossible to perform a
remote attestation of the system.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.1.x
Fixes: 879b589210 ("tpm: retrieve digest size of unknown algorithms with PCR read")
Reported-by: Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
"Just a couple of updates for linux-5.7:
- A new Kconfig option to enable IMA architecture specific runtime
policy rules needed for secure and/or trusted boot, as requested.
- Some message cleanup (eg. pr_fmt, additional error messages)"
* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
ima: add a new CONFIG for loading arch-specific policies
integrity: Remove duplicate pr_fmt definitions
IMA: Add log statements for failure conditions
IMA: Update KBUILD_MODNAME for IMA files to ima
Every time a new architecture defines the IMA architecture specific
functions - arch_ima_get_secureboot() and arch_ima_get_policy(), the IMA
include file needs to be updated. To avoid this "noise", this patch
defines a new IMA Kconfig IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT option, allowing
the different architectures to select it.
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Philipp Rudo <prudo@linux.ibm.com> (s390)
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> (powerpc)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The #define for formatting log messages, pr_fmt, is duplicated in the
files under security/integrity.
This change moves the definition to security/integrity/integrity.h and
removes the duplicate definitions in the other files under
security/integrity.
With this change, the messages in the following files will be prefixed
with 'integrity'.
security/integrity/platform_certs/platform_keyring.c
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
security/integrity/iint.c
e.g. "integrity: Error adding keys to platform keyring %s\n"
And the messages in the following file will be prefixed with 'ima'.
security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c
e.g. "ima: Allocating IMA blacklist keyring.\n"
For the rest of the files under security/integrity, there will be no
change in the message format.
Suggested-by: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Suggested-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
process_buffer_measurement() does not have log messages for failure
conditions.
This change adds a log statement in the above function.
Suggested-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The kbuild Makefile specifies object files for vmlinux in the $(obj-y)
lists. These lists depend on the kernel configuration[1].
The kbuild Makefile for IMA combines the object files for IMA into a
single object file namely ima.o. All the object files for IMA should be
combined into ima.o. But certain object files are being added to their
own $(obj-y). This results in the log messages from those modules getting
prefixed with their respective base file name, instead of "ima". This is
inconsistent with the log messages from the IMA modules that are combined
into ima.o.
This change fixes the above issue.
[1] Documentation\kbuild\makefiles.rst
Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
This time, the set of changes for the EFI subsystem is much larger than
usual. The main reasons are:
- Get things cleaned up before EFI support for RISC-V arrives, which will
increase the size of the validation matrix, and therefore the threshold to
making drastic changes,
- After years of defunct maintainership, the GRUB project has finally started
to consider changes from the distros regarding UEFI boot, some of which are
highly specific to the way x86 does UEFI secure boot and measured boot,
based on knowledge of both shim internals and the layout of bootparams and
the x86 setup header. Having this maintenance burden on other architectures
(which don't need shim in the first place) is hard to justify, so instead,
we are introducing a generic Linux/UEFI boot protocol.
Summary of changes:
- Boot time GDT handling changes (Arvind)
- Simplify handling of EFI properties table on arm64
- Generic EFI stub cleanups, to improve command line handling, file I/O,
memory allocation, etc.
- Introduce a generic initrd loading method based on calling back into
the firmware, instead of relying on the x86 EFI handover protocol or
device tree.
- Introduce a mixed mode boot method that does not rely on the x86 EFI
handover protocol either, and could potentially be adopted by other
architectures (if another one ever surfaces where one execution mode
is a superset of another)
- Clean up the contents of struct efi, and move out everything that
doesn't need to be stored there.
- Incorporate support for UEFI spec v2.8A changes that permit firmware
implementations to return EFI_UNSUPPORTED from UEFI runtime services at
OS runtime, and expose a mask of which ones are supported or unsupported
via a configuration table.
- Various documentation updates and minor code cleanups (Heinrich)
- Partial fix for the lack of by-VA cache maintenance in the decompressor
on 32-bit ARM. Note that these patches were deliberately put at the
beginning so they can be used as a stable branch that will be shared with
a PR containing the complete fix, which I will send to the ARM tree.
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Merge tag 'efi-next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi into efi/core
Pull EFI updates for v5.7 from Ard Biesheuvel:
This time, the set of changes for the EFI subsystem is much larger than
usual. The main reasons are:
- Get things cleaned up before EFI support for RISC-V arrives, which will
increase the size of the validation matrix, and therefore the threshold to
making drastic changes,
- After years of defunct maintainership, the GRUB project has finally started
to consider changes from the distros regarding UEFI boot, some of which are
highly specific to the way x86 does UEFI secure boot and measured boot,
based on knowledge of both shim internals and the layout of bootparams and
the x86 setup header. Having this maintenance burden on other architectures
(which don't need shim in the first place) is hard to justify, so instead,
we are introducing a generic Linux/UEFI boot protocol.
Summary of changes:
- Boot time GDT handling changes (Arvind)
- Simplify handling of EFI properties table on arm64
- Generic EFI stub cleanups, to improve command line handling, file I/O,
memory allocation, etc.
- Introduce a generic initrd loading method based on calling back into
the firmware, instead of relying on the x86 EFI handover protocol or
device tree.
- Introduce a mixed mode boot method that does not rely on the x86 EFI
handover protocol either, and could potentially be adopted by other
architectures (if another one ever surfaces where one execution mode
is a superset of another)
- Clean up the contents of struct efi, and move out everything that
doesn't need to be stored there.
- Incorporate support for UEFI spec v2.8A changes that permit firmware
implementations to return EFI_UNSUPPORTED from UEFI runtime services at
OS runtime, and expose a mask of which ones are supported or unsupported
via a configuration table.
- Various documentation updates and minor code cleanups (Heinrich)
- Partial fix for the lack of by-VA cache maintenance in the decompressor
on 32-bit ARM. Note that these patches were deliberately put at the
beginning so they can be used as a stable branch that will be shared with
a PR containing the complete fix, which I will send to the ARM tree.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Testing the value of the efi.get_variable function pointer is not
the right way to establish whether the platform supports EFI
variables at runtime. Instead, use the newly added granular check
that can test for the presence of each EFI runtime service
individually.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
sm3 has been supported by the ima hash algorithm, but it is not
yet in the Kconfig configuration list. After adding, both ima and tpm2
can support sm3 well.
Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
If CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS is enabled, the kernel attempts to load the certs
from the db, dbx and MokListRT EFI variables into the appropriate keyrings.
But it just assumes that the variables will be present and prints an error
if the certs can't be loaded, even when is possible that the variables may
not exist. For example the MokListRT variable will only be present if shim
is used.
So only print an error message about failing to get the certs list from an
EFI variable if this is found. Otherwise these printed errors just pollute
the kernel log ring buffer with confusing messages like the following:
[ 5.427251] Couldn't get size: 0x800000000000000e
[ 5.427261] MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI db list
[ 5.428012] Couldn't get size: 0x800000000000000e
[ 5.428023] Couldn't get UEFI MokListRT
Reported-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Pull IMA updates from Mimi Zohar:
"Two new features - measuring certificates and querying IMA for a file
hash - and three bug fixes:
- Measuring certificates is like the rest of IMA, based on policy,
but requires loading a custom policy. Certificates loaded onto a
keyring, for example during early boot, before a custom policy has
been loaded, are queued and only processed after loading the custom
policy.
- IMA calculates and caches files hashes. Other kernel subsystems,
and possibly kernel modules, are interested in accessing these
cached file hashes.
The bug fixes prevent classifying a file short read (e.g. shutdown) as
an invalid file signature, add a missing blank when displaying the
securityfs policy rules containing LSM labels, and, lastly, fix the
handling of the IMA policy information for unknown LSM labels"
* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
IMA: Defined delayed workqueue to free the queued keys
IMA: Call workqueue functions to measure queued keys
IMA: Define workqueue for early boot key measurements
IMA: pre-allocate buffer to hold keyrings string
ima: ima/lsm policy rule loading logic bug fixes
ima: add the ability to query the cached hash of a given file
ima: Add a space after printing LSM rules for readability
IMA: fix measuring asymmetric keys Kconfig
IMA: Read keyrings= option from the IMA policy
IMA: Add support to limit measuring keys
KEYS: Call the IMA hook to measure keys
IMA: Define an IMA hook to measure keys
IMA: Add KEY_CHECK func to measure keys
IMA: Check IMA policy flag
ima: avoid appraise error for hash calc interrupt
Keys queued for measurement should be freed if a custom IMA policy
was not loaded. Otherwise, the keys will remain queued forever
consuming kernel memory.
This patch defines a delayed workqueue to handle the above scenario.
The workqueue handler is setup to execute 5 minutes after IMA
initialization is completed.
If a custom IMA policy is loaded before the workqueue handler is
scheduled to execute, the workqueue task is cancelled and any queued keys
are processed for measurement. But if a custom policy was not loaded then
the queued keys are just freed when the delayed workqueue handler is run.
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <rong.a.chen@intel.com> # sleeping
function called from invalid context
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com> # redefinition of
ima_init_key_queue() function.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Measuring keys requires a custom IMA policy to be loaded. Keys should
be queued for measurement if a custom IMA policy is not yet loaded.
Keys queued for measurement, if any, should be processed when a custom
policy is loaded.
This patch updates the IMA hook function ima_post_key_create_or_update()
to queue the key if a custom IMA policy has not yet been loaded. And,
ima_update_policy() function, which is called when a custom IMA policy
is loaded, is updated to process queued keys.
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Measuring keys requires a custom IMA policy to be loaded. Keys created
or updated before a custom IMA policy is loaded should be queued and
will be processed after a custom policy is loaded.
This patch defines a workqueue for queuing keys when a custom IMA policy
has not yet been loaded. An intermediate Kconfig boolean option namely
IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS is used to declare the workqueue functions.
A flag namely ima_process_keys is used to check if the key should be
queued or should be processed immediately.
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
ima_match_keyring() is called while holding rcu read lock. Since this
function executes in atomic context, it should not call any function
that can sleep (such as kstrdup()).
This patch pre-allocates a buffer to hold the keyrings string read from
the IMA policy and uses that to match the given keyring.
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Fixes: e9085e0ad3 ("IMA: Add support to limit measuring keys")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Keep the ima policy rules around from the beginning even if they appear
invalid at the time of loading, as they may become active after an lsm
policy load. However, loading a custom IMA policy with unknown LSM
labels is only safe after we have transitioned from the "built-in"
policy rules to a custom IMA policy.
Patch also fixes the rule re-use during the lsm policy reload and makes
some prints a bit more human readable.
Changelog:
v4:
- Do not allow the initial policy load refer to non-existing lsm rules.
v3:
- Fix too wide policy rule matching for non-initialized LSMs
v2:
- Fix log prints
Fixes: b169424551 ("ima: use the lsm policy update notifier")
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reported-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Janne Karhunen <janne.karhunen@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Konsta Karsisto <konsta.karsisto@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
This allows other parts of the kernel (perhaps a stacked LSM allowing
system monitoring, eg. the proposed KRSI LSM [1]) to retrieve the hash
of a given file from IMA if it's present in the iint cache.
It's true that the existence of the hash means that it's also in the
audit logs or in /sys/kernel/security/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements,
but it can be difficult to pull that information out for every
subsequent exec. This is especially true if a given host has been up
for a long time and the file was first measured a long time ago.
It should be kept in mind that this function gives access to cached
entries which can be removed, for instance on security_inode_free().
This is based on Peter Moody's patch:
https://sourceforge.net/p/linux-ima/mailman/message/33036180/
[1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/9/10/393
Signed-off-by: Florent Revest <revest@google.com>
Reviewed-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
When reading ima_policy from securityfs, there is a missing
space between output string of LSM rules and the remaining
rules.
Signed-off-by: Clay Chang <clayc@hpe.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
As a result of the asymmetric public keys subtype Kconfig option being
defined as tristate, with the existing IMA Makefile, ima_asymmetric_keys.c
could be built as a kernel module. To prevent this from happening, this
patch defines and uses an intermediate Kconfig boolean option named
IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS.
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Suggested-by: James.Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com> # ima_asymmetric_keys.c
is built as a kernel module.
Fixes: 88e70da170 ("IMA: Define an IMA hook to measure keys")
Fixes: cb1aa3823c ("KEYS: Call the IMA hook to measure keys")
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: updated patch description]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Read "keyrings=" option, if specified in the IMA policy, and store in
the list of IMA rules when the configured IMA policy is read.
This patch defines a new policy token enum namely Opt_keyrings
and an option flag IMA_KEYRINGS for reading "keyrings=" option
from the IMA policy.
Updated ima_parse_rule() to parse "keyrings=" option in the policy.
Updated ima_policy_show() to display "keyrings=" option.
The following example illustrates how key measurement can be verified.
Sample "key" measurement rule in the IMA policy:
measure func=KEY_CHECK uid=0 keyrings=.ima|.evm template=ima-buf
Display "key" measurement in the IMA measurement list:
cat /sys/kernel/security/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements
10 faf3...e702 ima-buf sha256:27c915b8ddb9fae7214cf0a8a7043cc3eeeaa7539bcb136f8427067b5f6c3b7b .ima 308202863082...4aee
Verify "key" measurement data for a key added to ".ima" keyring:
cat /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements | grep -m 1 "\.ima" | cut -d' ' -f 6 | xxd -r -p |tee ima-cert.der | sha256sum | cut -d' ' -f 1
The output of the above command should match the template hash
of the first "key" measurement entry in the IMA measurement list for
the key added to ".ima" keyring.
The file namely "ima-cert.der" generated by the above command
should be a valid x509 certificate (in DER format) and should match
the one that was used to import the key to the ".ima" keyring.
The certificate file can be verified using openssl tool.
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Limit measuring keys to those keys being loaded onto a given set of
keyrings only and when the user id (uid) matches if uid is specified
in the policy.
This patch defines a new IMA policy option namely "keyrings=" that
can be used to specify a set of keyrings. If this option is specified
in the policy for "measure func=KEY_CHECK" then only the keys
loaded onto a keyring given in the "keyrings=" option are measured.
If uid is specified in the policy then the key is measured only if
the current user id matches the one specified in the policy.
Added a new parameter namely "keyring" (name of the keyring) to
process_buffer_measurement(). The keyring name is passed to
ima_get_action() to determine the required action.
ima_match_rules() is updated to check keyring in the policy, if
specified, for KEY_CHECK function.
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Measure asymmetric keys used for verifying file signatures,
certificates, etc.
This patch defines a new IMA hook namely ima_post_key_create_or_update()
to measure the payload used to create a new asymmetric key or
update an existing asymmetric key.
Asymmetric key structure is defined only when
CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE is defined. Since the IMA hook
measures asymmetric keys, the IMA hook is defined in a new file namely
ima_asymmetric_keys.c which is built only if
CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE is defined.
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Measure keys loaded onto any keyring.
This patch defines a new IMA policy func namely KEY_CHECK to
measure keys. Updated ima_match_rules() to check for KEY_CHECK
and ima_parse_rule() to handle KEY_CHECK.
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
process_buffer_measurement() may be called prior to IMA being
initialized (for instance, when the IMA hook is called when
a key is added to the .builtin_trusted_keys keyring), which
would result in a kernel panic.
This patch adds the check in process_buffer_measurement()
to return immediately if IMA is not initialized yet.
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The integrity_kernel_read() call in ima_calc_file_hash_tfm() can return
a value of 0 before all bytes of the file are read. A value of 0 would
normally indicate an EOF. This has been observed if a user process is
causing a file appraisal and is terminated with a SIGTERM signal. The
most common occurrence of seeing the problem is if a shutdown or systemd
reload is initiated while files are being appraised.
The problem is similar to commit <f5e1040196db> (ima: always return
negative code for error) that fixed the problem in
ima_calc_file_hash_atfm().
Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick Callaghan <patrickc@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Replace all the occurrences of FIELD_SIZEOF() with sizeof_field() except
at places where these are defined. Later patches will remove the unused
definition of FIELD_SIZEOF().
This patch is generated using following script:
EXCLUDE_FILES="include/linux/stddef.h|include/linux/kernel.h"
git grep -l -e "\bFIELD_SIZEOF\b" | while read file;
do
if [[ "$file" =~ $EXCLUDE_FILES ]]; then
continue
fi
sed -i -e 's/\bFIELD_SIZEOF\b/sizeof_field/g' $file;
done
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Bharadiya <pankaj.laxminarayan.bharadiya@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190924105839.110713-3-pankaj.laxminarayan.bharadiya@intel.com
Co-developed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> # for net
The keys used to verify the Host OS kernel are managed by firmware as
secure variables. This patch loads the verification keys into the
.platform keyring and revocation hashes into .blacklist keyring. This
enables verification and loading of the kernels signed by the boot
time keys which are trusted by firmware.
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.ibm.com>
[mpe: Search by compatible in load_powerpc_certs(), not using format]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1573441836-3632-5-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com
The handlers to add the keys to the .platform keyring and blacklisted
hashes to the .blacklist keyring is common for both the uefi and powerpc
mechanisms of loading the keys/hashes from the firmware.
This patch moves the common code from load_uefi.c to keyring_handler.c
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1573441836-3632-4-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com
Asymmetric private keys are used to sign multiple files. The kernel
currently supports checking against blacklisted keys. However, if the
public key is blacklisted, any file signed by the blacklisted key will
automatically fail signature verification. Blacklisting the public key
is not fine enough granularity, as we might want to only blacklist a
particular file.
This patch adds support for checking against the blacklisted hash of
the file, without the appended signature, based on the IMA policy. It
defines a new policy option "appraise_flag=check_blacklist".
In addition to the blacklisted binary hashes stored in the firmware
"dbx" variable, the Linux kernel may be configured to load blacklisted
binary hashes onto the .blacklist keyring as well. The following
example shows how to blacklist a specific kernel module hash.
$ sha256sum kernel/kheaders.ko
77fa889b35a05338ec52e51591c1b89d4c8d1c99a21251d7c22b1a8642a6bad3
kernel/kheaders.ko
$ grep BLACKLIST .config
CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING=y
CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST="blacklist-hash-list"
$ cat certs/blacklist-hash-list
"bin:77fa889b35a05338ec52e51591c1b89d4c8d1c99a21251d7c22b1a8642a6bad3"
Update the IMA custom measurement and appraisal policy
rules (/etc/ima-policy):
measure func=MODULE_CHECK template=ima-modsig
appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_flag=check_blacklist
appraise_type=imasig|modsig
After building, installing, and rebooting the kernel:
545660333 ---lswrv 0 0 \_ blacklist:
bin:77fa889b35a05338ec52e51591c1b89d4c8d1c99a21251d7c22b1a8642a6bad3
measure func=MODULE_CHECK template=ima-modsig
appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_flag=check_blacklist
appraise_type=imasig|modsig
modprobe: ERROR: could not insert 'kheaders': Permission denied
10 0c9834db5a0182c1fb0cdc5d3adcf11a11fd83dd ima-sig
sha256:3bc6ed4f0b4d6e31bc1dbc9ef844605abc7afdc6d81a57d77a1ec9407997c40
2 /usr/lib/modules/5.4.0-rc3+/kernel/kernel/kheaders.ko
10 82aad2bcc3fa8ed94762356b5c14838f3bcfa6a0 ima-modsig
sha256:3bc6ed4f0b4d6e31bc1dbc9ef844605abc7afdc6d81a57d77a1ec9407997c40
2 /usr/lib/modules/5.4.0rc3+/kernel/kernel/kheaders.ko sha256:77fa889b3
5a05338ec52e51591c1b89d4c8d1c99a21251d7c22b1a8642a6bad3
3082029a06092a864886f70d010702a082028b30820287020101310d300b0609608648
016503040201300b06092a864886f70d01070131820264....
10 25b72217cc1152b44b134ce2cd68f12dfb71acb3 ima-buf
sha256:8b58427fedcf8f4b20bc8dc007f2e232bf7285d7b93a66476321f9c2a3aa132
b blacklisted-hash
77fa889b35a05338ec52e51591c1b89d4c8d1c99a21251d7c22b1a8642a6bad3
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: updated patch description]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1572492694-6520-8-git-send-email-zohar@linux.ibm.com
process_buffer_measurement() is limited to measuring the kexec boot
command line. This patch makes process_buffer_measurement() more
generic, allowing it to measure other types of buffer data (e.g.
blacklisted binary hashes or key hashes).
process_buffer_measurement() may be called directly from an IMA hook
or as an auxiliary measurement record. In both cases the buffer
measurement is based on policy. This patch modifies the function to
conditionally retrieve the policy defined PCR and template for the IMA
hook case.
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: added comment in process_buffer_measurement()]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1572492694-6520-6-git-send-email-zohar@linux.ibm.com
The ima/ and evm/ sub-directories contain built-in objects, so
obj-$(CONFIG_...) is the correct way to descend into them.
subdir-$(CONFIG_...) is redundant.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
I guess commit 15ea0e1e3e ("efi: Import certificates from UEFI Secure
Boot") attempted to add -fshort-wchar for building load_uefi.o, but it
has never worked as intended.
load_uefi.o is created in the platform_certs/ sub-directory. If you
really want to add -fshort-wchar, the correct code is:
$(obj)/platform_certs/load_uefi.o: KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fshort-wchar
But, you do not need to fix it.
Commit 8c97023cf0 ("Kbuild: use -fshort-wchar globally") had already
added -fshort-wchar globally. This code was unneeded in the first place.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Pull kernel lockdown mode from James Morris:
"This is the latest iteration of the kernel lockdown patchset, from
Matthew Garrett, David Howells and others.
From the original description:
This patchset introduces an optional kernel lockdown feature,
intended to strengthen the boundary between UID 0 and the kernel.
When enabled, various pieces of kernel functionality are restricted.
Applications that rely on low-level access to either hardware or the
kernel may cease working as a result - therefore this should not be
enabled without appropriate evaluation beforehand.
The majority of mainstream distributions have been carrying variants
of this patchset for many years now, so there's value in providing a
doesn't meet every distribution requirement, but gets us much closer
to not requiring external patches.
There are two major changes since this was last proposed for mainline:
- Separating lockdown from EFI secure boot. Background discussion is
covered here: https://lwn.net/Articles/751061/
- Implementation as an LSM, with a default stackable lockdown LSM
module. This allows the lockdown feature to be policy-driven,
rather than encoding an implicit policy within the mechanism.
The new locked_down LSM hook is provided to allow LSMs to make a
policy decision around whether kernel functionality that would allow
tampering with or examining the runtime state of the kernel should be
permitted.
The included lockdown LSM provides an implementation with a simple
policy intended for general purpose use. This policy provides a coarse
level of granularity, controllable via the kernel command line:
lockdown={integrity|confidentiality}
Enable the kernel lockdown feature. If set to integrity, kernel features
that allow userland to modify the running kernel are disabled. If set to
confidentiality, kernel features that allow userland to extract
confidential information from the kernel are also disabled.
This may also be controlled via /sys/kernel/security/lockdown and
overriden by kernel configuration.
New or existing LSMs may implement finer-grained controls of the
lockdown features. Refer to the lockdown_reason documentation in
include/linux/security.h for details.
The lockdown feature has had signficant design feedback and review
across many subsystems. This code has been in linux-next for some
weeks, with a few fixes applied along the way.
Stephen Rothwell noted that commit 9d1f8be5cf ("bpf: Restrict bpf
when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode") is missing a
Signed-off-by from its author. Matthew responded that he is providing
this under category (c) of the DCO"
* 'next-lockdown' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (31 commits)
kexec: Fix file verification on S390
security: constify some arrays in lockdown LSM
lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages
efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load when the kernel is locked down
tracefs: Restrict tracefs when the kernel is locked down
debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down
kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down
lockdown: Lock down perf when in confidentiality mode
bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode
lockdown: Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode
lockdown: Lock down /proc/kcore
x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module
lockdown: Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport)
lockdown: Lock down TIOCSSERIAL
lockdown: Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down
acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down
acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down
ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down
x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down
x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down
...
One of the more common cases of allocation size calculations is finding
the size of a structure that has a zero-sized array at the end, along
with memory for some number of elements for that array. For example:
struct ima_template_entry {
...
struct ima_field_data template_data[0]; /* template related data */
};
instance = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ima_template_entry) + count * sizeof(struct ima_field_data), GFP_NOFS);
Instead of leaving these open-coded and prone to type mistakes, we can
now use the new struct_size() helper:
instance = kzalloc(struct_size(instance, entry, count), GFP_NOFS);
This code was detected with the help of Coccinelle.
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
One of the more common cases of allocation size calculations is finding
the size of a structure that has a zero-sized array at the end, along
with memory for some number of elements for that array. For example:
struct foo {
int stuff;
struct boo entry[];
};
instance = kzalloc(sizeof(struct foo) + count * sizeof(struct boo), GFP_KERNEL);
Instead of leaving these open-coded and prone to type mistakes, we can
now use the new struct_size() helper:
instance = kzalloc(struct_size(instance, entry, count), GFP_KERNEL);
This code was detected with the help of Coccinelle.
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
If we can't parse the PKCS7 in the appended modsig, we will free the modsig
structure and then access one of its members to determine the error value.
Fixes: 39b0709636 ("ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures")
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Reported-by: Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@lip6.fr>
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Systems in lockdown mode should block the kexec of untrusted kernels.
For x86 and ARM we can ensure that a kernel is trustworthy by validating
a PE signature, but this isn't possible on other architectures. On those
platforms we can use IMA digital signatures instead. Add a function to
determine whether IMA has or will verify signatures for a given event type,
and if so permit kexec_file() even if the kernel is otherwise locked down.
This is restricted to cases where CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING is set
in order to prevent an attacker from loading additional keys at runtime.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This is a preparatory patch for kexec_file_load() lockdown. A locked down
kernel needs to prevent unsigned kernel images from being loaded with
kexec_file_load(). Currently, the only way to force the signature
verification is compiling with KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG. This prevents loading
usigned images even when the kernel is not locked down at runtime.
This patch splits KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE.
Analogous to the MODULE_SIG and MODULE_SIG_FORCE for modules, KEXEC_SIG
turns on the signature verification but allows unsigned images to be
loaded. KEXEC_SIG_FORCE disallows images without a valid signature.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
integrity_kernel_read() can fail in which case we forward to call
ahash_request_free() on a currently running request. We have to wait
for its completion before we can free the request.
This was observed by interrupting a "find / -type f -xdev -print0 | xargs -0
cat 1>/dev/null" with ctrl-c on an IMA enabled filesystem.
Signed-off-by: Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
integrity_kernel_read() returns the number of bytes read. If this is
a short read then this positive value is returned from
ima_calc_file_hash_atfm(). Currently this is only indirectly called from
ima_calc_file_hash() and this function only tests for the return value
being zero or nonzero and also doesn't forward the return value.
Nevertheless there's no point in returning a positive value as an error,
so translate a short read into -EINVAL.
Signed-off-by: Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
If the IMA template contains the "modsig" or "d-modsig" field, then the
modsig should be added to the measurement list when the file is appraised.
And that is what normally happens, but if a measurement rule caused a file
containing a modsig to be measured before a different rule causes it to be
appraised, the resulting measurement entry will not contain the modsig
because it is only fetched during appraisal. When the appraisal rule
triggers, it won't store a new measurement containing the modsig because
the file was already measured.
We need to detect that situation and store an additional measurement with
the modsig. This is done by adding an IMA_MEASURE action flag if we read a
modsig and the IMA template contains a modsig field.
Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Define new "d-modsig" template field which holds the digest that is
expected to match the one contained in the modsig, and also new "modsig"
template field which holds the appended file signature.
Add a new "ima-modsig" defined template descriptor with the new fields as
well as the ones from the "ima-sig" descriptor.
Change ima_store_measurement() to accept a struct modsig * argument so that
it can be passed along to the templates via struct ima_event_data.
Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Obtain the modsig and calculate its corresponding hash in
ima_collect_measurement().
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Implement the appraise_type=imasig|modsig option, allowing IMA to read and
verify modsig signatures.
In case a file has both an xattr signature and an appended modsig, IMA will
only use the appended signature if the key used by the xattr signature
isn't present in the IMA or platform keyring.
Because modsig verification needs to convert from an integrity keyring id
to the keyring itself, add an integrity_keyring_from_id() function in
digsig.c so that integrity_modsig_verify() can use it.
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Verify xattr signature in a separate function so that the logic in
ima_appraise_measurement() remains clear when it gains the ability to also
verify an appended module signature.
The code in the switch statement is unchanged except for having to
dereference the status and cause variables (since they're now pointers),
and fixing the style of a block comment to appease checkpatch.
Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Introduce the modsig keyword to the IMA policy syntax to specify that
a given hook should expect the file to have the IMA signature appended
to it. Here is how it can be used in a rule:
appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig
With this rule, IMA will accept either a signature stored in the extended
attribute or an appended signature.
For now, the rule above will behave exactly the same as if
appraise_type=imasig was specified. The actual modsig implementation
will be introduced separately.
Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
This avoids a dependency cycle in soon-to-be-introduced
CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG: it will select CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
which in turn selects CONFIG_KEYS. Kconfig then complains that
CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE depends on CONFIG_KEYS.
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
IMA policy rules are walked sequentially. Depending on the ordering of
the policy rules, the "template" field might be defined in one rule, but
will be replaced by subsequent, applicable rules, even if the rule does
not explicitly define the "template" field.
This patch initializes the "template" once and only replaces the
"template", when explicitly defined.
Fixes: 19453ce0bc ("IMA: support for per policy rule template formats")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Roberto Sassu