Add check for the return value of memblock_alloc*() functions and call
panic() in case of error. The panic message repeats the one used by
panicing memblock allocators with adjustment of parameters to include
only relevant ones.
The replacement was mostly automated with semantic patches like the one
below with manual massaging of format strings.
@@
expression ptr, size, align;
@@
ptr = memblock_alloc(size, align);
+ if (!ptr)
+ panic("%s: Failed to allocate %lu bytes align=0x%lx\n", __func__, size, align);
[anders.roxell@linaro.org: use '%pa' with 'phys_addr_t' type]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190131161046.21886-1-anders.roxell@linaro.org
[rppt@linux.ibm.com: fix format strings for panics after memblock_alloc]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1548950940-15145-1-git-send-email-rppt@linux.ibm.com
[rppt@linux.ibm.com: don't panic if the allocation in sparse_buffer_init fails]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190131074018.GD28876@rapoport-lnx
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix xtensa printk warning]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1548057848-15136-20-git-send-email-rppt@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Guo Ren <ren_guo@c-sky.com> [c-sky]
Acked-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com> [MIPS]
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> [s390]
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> [Xen]
Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> [m68k]
Acked-by: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com> [xtensa]
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Dennis Zhou <dennis@kernel.org>
Cc: Greentime Hu <green.hu@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Guan Xuetao <gxt@pku.edu.cn>
Cc: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu>
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org>
Cc: Rob Herring <robh+dt@kernel.org>
Cc: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com>
Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
There are two issues with assigning random percpu seeds right now:
1. We use for_each_possible_cpu() to iterate over cpus, but cpumask is
not set up yet at the moment of kasan_init(), and thus we only set
the seed for cpu #0.
2. A call to get_random_u32() always returns the same number and produces
a message in dmesg, since the random subsystem is not yet initialized.
Fix 1 by calling kasan_init_tags() after cpumask is set up.
Fix 2 by using get_cycles() instead of get_random_u32(). This gives us
lower quality random numbers, but it's good enough, as KASAN is meant to
be used as a debugging tool and not a mitigation.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1f815cc914b61f3516ed4cc9bfd9eeca9bd5d9de.1550677973.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Kmemleak does not play well with KASAN (tested on both HPE Apollo 70 and
Huawei TaiShan 2280 aarch64 servers).
After calling start_kernel()->setup_arch()->kasan_init(), kmemleak early
log buffer went from something like 280 to 260000 which caused kmemleak
disabled and crash dump memory reservation failed. The multitude of
kmemleak_alloc() calls is from nested loops while KASAN is setting up full
memory mappings, so let early kmemleak allocations skip those
memblock_alloc_internal() calls came from kasan_init() given that those
early KASAN memory mappings should not reference to other memory. Hence,
no kmemleak false positives.
kasan_init
kasan_map_populate [1]
kasan_pgd_populate [2]
kasan_pud_populate [3]
kasan_pmd_populate [4]
kasan_pte_populate [5]
kasan_alloc_zeroed_page
memblock_alloc_try_nid
memblock_alloc_internal
kmemleak_alloc
[1] for_each_memblock(memory, reg)
[2] while (pgdp++, addr = next, addr != end)
[3] while (pudp++, addr = next, addr != end && pud_none(READ_ONCE(*pudp)))
[4] while (pmdp++, addr = next, addr != end && pmd_none(READ_ONCE(*pmdp)))
[5] while (ptep++, addr = next, addr != end && pte_none(READ_ONCE(*ptep)))
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1543442925-17794-1-git-send-email-cai@gmx.us
Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <cai@gmx.us>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This commit adds a few helper functions, that are meant to be used to work
with tags embedded in the top byte of kernel pointers: to set, to get or
to reset the top byte.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f6c6437bb8e143bc44f42c3c259c62e734be7935.1544099024.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
A tag-based KASAN shadow memory cell contains a memory tag, that
corresponds to the tag in the top byte of the pointer, that points to that
memory. The native top byte value of kernel pointers is 0xff, so with
tag-based KASAN we need to initialize shadow memory to 0xff.
[cai@lca.pw: arm64: skip kmemleak for KASAN again\
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181226020550.63712-1-cai@lca.pw
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5cc1b789aad7c99cf4f3ec5b328b147ad53edb40.1544099024.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
With tag based KASAN mode the early shadow value is 0xff and not 0x00, so
this patch renames kasan_zero_(page|pte|pmd|pud|p4d) to
kasan_early_shadow_(page|pte|pmd|pud|p4d) to avoid confusion.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/3fed313280ebf4f88645f5b89ccbc066d320e177.1544099024.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Suggested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Move remaining definitions and declarations from include/linux/bootmem.h
into include/linux/memblock.h and remove the redundant header.
The includes were replaced with the semantic patch below and then
semi-automated removal of duplicated '#include <linux/memblock.h>
@@
@@
- #include <linux/bootmem.h>
+ #include <linux/memblock.h>
[sfr@canb.auug.org.au: dma-direct: fix up for the removal of linux/bootmem.h]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181002185342.133d1680@canb.auug.org.au
[sfr@canb.auug.org.au: powerpc: fix up for removal of linux/bootmem.h]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181005161406.73ef8727@canb.auug.org.au
[sfr@canb.auug.org.au: x86/kaslr, ACPI/NUMA: fix for linux/bootmem.h removal]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181008190341.5e396491@canb.auug.org.au
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1536927045-23536-30-git-send-email-rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Greentime Hu <green.hu@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Guan Xuetao <gxt@pku.edu.cn>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@parisc-linux.org>
Cc: Jonas Bonn <jonas@southpole.se>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Ley Foon Tan <lftan@altera.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com>
Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com>
Cc: Richard Kuo <rkuo@codeaurora.org>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Serge Semin <fancer.lancer@gmail.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com>
Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
"bellow" -> "below"
The recommendation from kegel.com/kerspell is to only fix the howlers.
"Bellow" is a synonym of "howl" so this should be appropriate.
Signed-off-by: Kyrylo Tkachov <kyrylo.tkachov@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
In many cases, page tables can be accessed concurrently by either another
CPU (due to things like fast gup) or by the hardware page table walker
itself, which may set access/dirty bits. In such cases, it is important
to use READ_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE when accessing page table entries so that
entries cannot be torn, merged or subject to apparent loss of coherence
due to compiler transformations.
Whilst there are some scenarios where this cannot happen (e.g. pinned
kernel mappings for the linear region), the overhead of using READ_ONCE
/WRITE_ONCE everywhere is minimal and makes the code an awful lot easier
to reason about. This patch consistently uses these macros in the arch
code, as well as explicitly namespacing pointers to page table entries
from the entries themselves by using adopting a 'p' suffix for the former
(as is sometimes used elsewhere in the kernel source).
Tested-by: Yury Norov <ynorov@caviumnetworks.com>
Tested-by: Richard Ruigrok <rruigrok@codeaurora.org>
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Right now the fact that KASAN uses a single shadow byte for 8 bytes of
memory is scattered all over the code.
This change defines KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT early in asm include files
and makes use of this constant where necessary.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/34937ca3b90736eaad91b568edf5684091f662e3.1515775666.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The kasan shadow is currently mapped using vmemmap_populate() since that
provides a semi-convenient way to map pages into init_top_pgt. However,
since that no longer zeroes the mapped pages, it is not suitable for
kasan, which requires zeroed shadow memory.
Add kasan_populate_shadow() interface and use it instead of
vmemmap_populate(). Besides, this allows us to take advantage of
gigantic pages and use them to populate the shadow, which should save us
some memory wasted on page tables and reduce TLB pressure.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171103185147.2688-3-pasha.tatashin@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@oracle.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Steven Sistare <steven.sistare@oracle.com>
Cc: Daniel Jordan <daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com>
Cc: Bob Picco <bob.picco@oracle.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
We used to read several bytes of the shadow memory in advance.
Therefore additional shadow memory mapped to prevent crash if
speculative load would happen near the end of the mapped shadow memory.
Now we don't have such speculative loads, so we no longer need to map
additional shadow memory.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170601162338.23540-3-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Booting a v4.11-rc1 kernel with DEBUG_VIRTUAL and KASAN enabled produces
the following splat (trimmed for brevity):
[ 0.000000] virt_to_phys used for non-linear address: ffff200008080000 (0xffff200008080000)
[ 0.000000] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at arch/arm64/mm/physaddr.c:14 __virt_to_phys+0x48/0x70
[ 0.000000] PC is at __virt_to_phys+0x48/0x70
[ 0.000000] LR is at __virt_to_phys+0x48/0x70
[ 0.000000] Call trace:
[ 0.000000] [<ffff2000080b1ac0>] __virt_to_phys+0x48/0x70
[ 0.000000] [<ffff20000a03b86c>] kasan_init+0x1c0/0x498
[ 0.000000] [<ffff20000a034018>] setup_arch+0x2fc/0x948
[ 0.000000] [<ffff20000a030c68>] start_kernel+0xb8/0x570
[ 0.000000] [<ffff20000a0301e8>] __primary_switched+0x6c/0x74
This is because we use virt_to_pfn() on a kernel image address when
trying to figure out its nid, so that we can allocate its shadow from
the same node.
As with other recent changes, this patch uses lm_alias() to solve this.
We could instead use NUMA_NO_NODE, as x86 does for all shadow
allocations, though we'll likely want the "real" memory shadow to be
backed from its corresponding nid anyway, so we may as well be
consistent and find the nid for the image shadow.
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Acked-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
__pa_symbol is technically the marcro that should be used for kernel
symbols. Switch to this as a pre-requisite for DEBUG_VIRTUAL which
will do bounds checking.
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Tested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
With the 16KB or 64KB page configurations, the generic
vmemmap_populate() implementation warns on potential offnode
page_structs via vmemmap_verify() because the arm64 kasan_init() passes
NUMA_NO_NODE instead of the actual node for the kernel image memory.
Fixes: f9040773b7 ("arm64: move kernel image to base of vmalloc area")
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Reported-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
This adds support for KASLR is implemented, based on entropy provided by
the bootloader in the /chosen/kaslr-seed DT property. Depending on the size
of the address space (VA_BITS) and the page size, the entropy in the
virtual displacement is up to 13 bits (16k/2 levels) and up to 25 bits (all
4 levels), with the sidenote that displacements that result in the kernel
image straddling a 1GB/32MB/512MB alignment boundary (for 4KB/16KB/64KB
granule kernels, respectively) are not allowed, and will be rounded up to
an acceptable value.
If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is enabled, the module region is
randomized independently from the core kernel. This makes it less likely
that the location of core kernel data structures can be determined by an
adversary, but causes all function calls from modules into the core kernel
to be resolved via entries in the module PLTs.
If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is not enabled, the module region is
randomized by choosing a page aligned 128 MB region inside the interval
[_etext - 128 MB, _stext + 128 MB). This gives between 10 and 14 bits of
entropy (depending on page size), independently of the kernel randomization,
but still guarantees that modules are within the range of relative branch
and jump instructions (with the caveat that, since the module region is
shared with other uses of the vmalloc area, modules may need to be loaded
further away if the module region is exhausted)
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
This moves the module area to right before the vmalloc area, and moves
the kernel image to the base of the vmalloc area. This is an intermediate
step towards implementing KASLR, which allows the kernel image to be
located anywhere in the vmalloc area.
Since other subsystems such as hibernate may still need to refer to the
kernel text or data segments via their linears addresses, both are mapped
in the linear region as well. The linear alias of the text region is
mapped read-only/non-executable to prevent inadvertent modification or
execution.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
At boot we may change the granularity of the tables mapping the kernel
(by splitting or making sections). This may happen when we create the
linear mapping (in __map_memblock), or at any point we try to apply
fine-grained permissions to the kernel (e.g. fixup_executable,
mark_rodata_ro, fixup_init).
Changing the active page tables in this manner may result in multiple
entries for the same address being allocated into TLBs, risking problems
such as TLB conflict aborts or issues derived from the amalgamation of
TLB entries. Generally, a break-before-make (BBM) approach is necessary
to avoid conflicts, but we cannot do this for the kernel tables as it
risks unmapping text or data being used to do so.
Instead, we can create a new set of tables from scratch in the safety of
the existing mappings, and subsequently migrate over to these using the
new cpu_replace_ttbr1 helper, which avoids the two sets of tables being
active simultaneously.
To avoid issues when we later modify permissions of the page tables
(e.g. in fixup_init), we must create the page tables at a granularity
such that later modification does not result in splitting of tables.
This patch applies this strategy, creating a new set of fine-grained
page tables from scratch, and safely migrating to them. The existing
fixmap and kasan shadow page tables are reused in the new fine-grained
tables.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@fedoraproject.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
The page table modification performed during the KASAN init risks the
allocation of conflicting TLB entries, as it swaps a set of valid global
entries for another without suitable TLB maintenance.
The presence of conflicting TLB entries can result in the delivery of
synchronous TLB conflict aborts, or may result in the use of erroneous
data being returned in response to a TLB lookup. This can affect
explicit data accesses from software as well as translations performed
asynchronously (e.g. as part of page table walks or speculative I-cache
fetches), and can therefore result in a wide variety of problems.
To avoid this, use cpu_replace_ttbr1 to swap the page tables. This
ensures that when the new tables are installed there are no stale
entries from the old tables which may conflict. As all updates are made
to the tables while they are not active, the updates themselves are
safe.
At the same time, add the missing barrier to ensure that the tmp_pg_dir
entries updated via memcpy are visible to the page table walkers at the
point the tmp_pg_dir is installed. All other page table updates made as
part of KASAN initialisation have the requisite barriers due to the use
of the standard page table accessors.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@fedoraproject.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
When switching from the early KASAN shadow region, which maps the
entire shadow space read-write, to the permanent KASAN shadow region,
which uses a zero page to shadow regions that are not subject to
instrumentation, the lowest level table kasan_zero_pte[] may be
reused unmodified, which means that the mappings of the zero page
that it contains will still be read-write.
So update it explicitly to map the zero page read only when we
activate the permanent mapping.
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Sparse reports some new issues introduced by the kasan patches:
arch/arm64/mm/kasan_init.c:91:13: warning: no previous prototype for
'kasan_early_init' [-Wmissing-prototypes] void __init kasan_early_init(void)
^
arch/arm64/mm/kasan_init.c:91:13: warning: symbol 'kasan_early_init'
was not declared. Should it be static? [sparse]
This patch resolves the problem by adding a prototype for
kasan_early_init and marking the function as asmlinkage, since it's only
called from head.S.
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
This patch adds arch specific code for kernel address sanitizer
(see Documentation/kasan.txt).
1/8 of kernel addresses reserved for shadow memory. There was no
big enough hole for this, so virtual addresses for shadow were
stolen from vmalloc area.
At early boot stage the whole shadow region populated with just
one physical page (kasan_zero_page). Later, this page reused
as readonly zero shadow for some memory that KASan currently
don't track (vmalloc).
After mapping the physical memory, pages for shadow memory are
allocated and mapped.
Functions like memset/memmove/memcpy do a lot of memory accesses.
If bad pointer passed to one of these function it is important
to catch this. Compiler's instrumentation cannot do this since
these functions are written in assembly.
KASan replaces memory functions with manually instrumented variants.
Original functions declared as weak symbols so strong definitions
in mm/kasan/kasan.c could replace them. Original functions have aliases
with '__' prefix in name, so we could call non-instrumented variant
if needed.
Some files built without kasan instrumentation (e.g. mm/slub.c).
Original mem* function replaced (via #define) with prefixed variants
to disable memory access checks for such files.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Mike Rapoport