Pull networking updates from David Miller:
"Reasonably busy this cycle, but perhaps not as busy as in the 4.12
merge window:
1) Several optimizations for UDP processing under high load from
Paolo Abeni.
2) Support pacing internally in TCP when using the sch_fq packet
scheduler for this is not practical. From Eric Dumazet.
3) Support mutliple filter chains per qdisc, from Jiri Pirko.
4) Move to 1ms TCP timestamp clock, from Eric Dumazet.
5) Add batch dequeueing to vhost_net, from Jason Wang.
6) Flesh out more completely SCTP checksum offload support, from
Davide Caratti.
7) More plumbing of extended netlink ACKs, from David Ahern, Pablo
Neira Ayuso, and Matthias Schiffer.
8) Add devlink support to nfp driver, from Simon Horman.
9) Add RTM_F_FIB_MATCH flag to RTM_GETROUTE queries, from Roopa
Prabhu.
10) Add stack depth tracking to BPF verifier and use this information
in the various eBPF JITs. From Alexei Starovoitov.
11) Support XDP on qed device VFs, from Yuval Mintz.
12) Introduce BPF PROG ID for better introspection of installed BPF
programs. From Martin KaFai Lau.
13) Add bpf_set_hash helper for TC bpf programs, from Daniel Borkmann.
14) For loads, allow narrower accesses in bpf verifier checking, from
Yonghong Song.
15) Support MIPS in the BPF selftests and samples infrastructure, the
MIPS eBPF JIT will be merged in via the MIPS GIT tree. From David
Daney.
16) Support kernel based TLS, from Dave Watson and others.
17) Remove completely DST garbage collection, from Wei Wang.
18) Allow installing TCP MD5 rules using prefixes, from Ivan
Delalande.
19) Add XDP support to Intel i40e driver, from Björn Töpel
20) Add support for TC flower offload in nfp driver, from Simon
Horman, Pieter Jansen van Vuuren, Benjamin LaHaise, Jakub
Kicinski, and Bert van Leeuwen.
21) IPSEC offloading support in mlx5, from Ilan Tayari.
22) Add HW PTP support to macb driver, from Rafal Ozieblo.
23) Networking refcount_t conversions, From Elena Reshetova.
24) Add sock_ops support to BPF, from Lawrence Brako. This is useful
for tuning the TCP sockopt settings of a group of applications,
currently via CGROUPs"
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1899 commits)
net: phy: dp83867: add workaround for incorrect RX_CTRL pin strap
dt-bindings: phy: dp83867: provide a workaround for incorrect RX_CTRL pin strap
cxgb4: Support for get_ts_info ethtool method
cxgb4: Add PTP Hardware Clock (PHC) support
cxgb4: time stamping interface for PTP
nfp: default to chained metadata prepend format
nfp: remove legacy MAC address lookup
nfp: improve order of interfaces in breakout mode
net: macb: remove extraneous return when MACB_EXT_DESC is defined
bpf: add missing break in for the TCP_BPF_SNDCWND_CLAMP case
bpf: fix return in load_bpf_file
mpls: fix rtm policy in mpls_getroute
net, ax25: convert ax25_cb.refcount from atomic_t to refcount_t
net, ax25: convert ax25_route.refcount from atomic_t to refcount_t
net, ax25: convert ax25_uid_assoc.refcount from atomic_t to refcount_t
net, sctp: convert sctp_ep_common.refcnt from atomic_t to refcount_t
net, sctp: convert sctp_transport.refcnt from atomic_t to refcount_t
net, sctp: convert sctp_chunk.refcnt from atomic_t to refcount_t
net, sctp: convert sctp_datamsg.refcnt from atomic_t to refcount_t
net, sctp: convert sctp_auth_bytes.refcnt from atomic_t to refcount_t
...
Pull security layer updates from James Morris:
- a major update for AppArmor. From JJ:
* several bug fixes and cleanups
* the patch to add symlink support to securityfs that was floated
on the list earlier and the apparmorfs changes that make use of
securityfs symlinks
* it introduces the domain labeling base code that Ubuntu has been
carrying for several years, with several cleanups applied. And it
converts the current mediation over to using the domain labeling
base, which brings domain stacking support with it. This finally
will bring the base upstream code in line with Ubuntu and provide
a base to upstream the new feature work that Ubuntu carries.
* This does _not_ contain any of the newer apparmor mediation
features/controls (mount, signals, network, keys, ...) that
Ubuntu is currently carrying, all of which will be RFC'd on top
of this.
- Notable also is the Infiniband work in SELinux, and the new file:map
permission. From Paul:
"While we're down to 21 patches for v4.13 (it was 31 for v4.12),
the diffstat jumps up tremendously with over 2k of line changes.
Almost all of these changes are the SELinux/IB work done by
Daniel Jurgens; some other noteworthy changes include a NFS v4.2
labeling fix, a new file:map permission, and reporting of policy
capabilities on policy load"
There's also now genfscon labeling support for tracefs, which was
lost in v4.1 with the separation from debugfs.
- Smack incorporates a safer socket check in file_receive, and adds a
cap_capable call in privilege check.
- TPM as usual has a bunch of fixes and enhancements.
- Multiple calls to security_add_hooks() can now be made for the same
LSM, to allow LSMs to have hook declarations across multiple files.
- IMA now supports different "ima_appraise=" modes (eg. log, fix) from
the boot command line.
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (126 commits)
apparmor: put back designators in struct initialisers
seccomp: Switch from atomic_t to recount_t
seccomp: Adjust selftests to avoid double-join
seccomp: Clean up core dump logic
IMA: update IMA policy documentation to include pcr= option
ima: Log the same audit cause whenever a file has no signature
ima: Simplify policy_func_show.
integrity: Small code improvements
ima: fix get_binary_runtime_size()
ima: use ima_parse_buf() to parse template data
ima: use ima_parse_buf() to parse measurements headers
ima: introduce ima_parse_buf()
ima: Add cgroups2 to the defaults list
ima: use memdup_user_nul
ima: fix up #endif comments
IMA: Correct Kconfig dependencies for hash selection
ima: define is_ima_appraise_enabled()
ima: define Kconfig IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM option
ima: define a set of appraisal rules requiring file signatures
ima: extend the "ima_policy" boot command line to support multiple policies
...
Two entries being added at the same time to the IFLA
policy table, whilst parallel bug fixes to decnet
routing dst handling overlapping with the dst gc removal
in net-next.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
New NEWCACHEREPORT message type to be used for cache reports sent
via Netlink, effectively allowing splitting cache report reception from
mroute programming.
Suggested-by: Ryan Halbrook <halbrook@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Julien Gomes <julien@arista.com>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
In kernel version 4.1, tracefs was separated from debugfs into its
own filesystem. Prior to this split, files in
/sys/kernel/debug/tracing could be labeled during filesystem
creation using genfscon or later from userspace using setxattr. This
change re-enables support for genfscon labeling.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This patch is based on a discussion generated by an earlier patch
from Tetsuo Handa:
* https://marc.info/?t=149035659300001&r=1&w=2
The double free problem involves the mnt_opts field of the
security_mnt_opts struct, selinux_parse_opts_str() frees the memory
on error, but doesn't set the field to NULL so if the caller later
attempts to call security_free_mnt_opts() we trigger the problem.
In order to play it safe we change selinux_parse_opts_str() to call
security_free_mnt_opts() on error instead of free'ing the memory
directly. This should ensure that everything is handled correctly,
regardless of what the caller may do.
Fixes: e000752989 ("LSM/SELinux: Interfaces to allow FS to control mount options")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
When an NFSv4 client performs a mount operation, it first mounts the
NFSv4 root and then does path walk to the exported path and performs a
submount on that, cloning the security mount options from the root's
superblock to the submount's superblock in the process.
Unless the NFS server has an explicit fsid=0 export with the
"security_label" option, the NFSv4 root superblock will not have
SBLABEL_MNT set, and neither will the submount superblock after cloning
the security mount options. As a result, setxattr's of security labels
over NFSv4.2 will fail. In a similar fashion, NFSv4.2 mounts mounted
with the context= mount option will not show the correct labels because
the nfs_server->caps flags of the cloned superblock will still have
NFS_CAP_SECURITY_LABEL set.
Allowing the NFSv4 client to enable or disable SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS
behavior will ensure that the SBLABEL_MNT flag has the correct value
when the client traverses from an exported path without the
"security_label" option to one with the "security_label" option and
vice versa. Similarly, checking to see if SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS is
set upon return from security_sb_clone_mnt_opts() and clearing
NFS_CAP_SECURITY_LABEL if necessary will allow the correct labels to
be displayed for NFSv4.2 mounts mounted with the context= mount option.
Resolves: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/issues/35
Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Tested-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The allocated size for each ebitmap_node is 192byte by kzalloc().
Then, ebitmap_node size is fixed, so it's possible to use only 144byte
for each object by kmem_cache_zalloc().
It can reduce some dynamic allocation size.
Signed-off-by: Junil Lee <junil0814.lee@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
It will allow us to remove the old netfilter hook api in the near future.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
It is likely that the SID for the same PKey will be requested many
times. To reduce the time to modify QPs and process MADs use a cache to
store PKey SIDs.
This code is heavily based on the "netif" and "netport" concept
originally developed by James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> and Paul Moore
<paul@paul-moore.com> (see security/selinux/netif.c and
security/selinux/netport.c for more information)
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Add a type for Infiniband ports and an access vector for subnet
management packets. Implement the ib_port_smp hook to check that the
caller has permission to send and receive SMPs on the end port specified
by the device name and port. Add interface to query the SID for a IB
port, which walks the IB_PORT ocontexts to find an entry for the
given name and port.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Add a type and access vector for PKeys. Implement the ib_pkey_access
hook to check that the caller has permission to access the PKey on the
given subnet prefix. Add an interface to get the PKey SID. Walk the PKey
ocontexts to find an entry for the given subnet prefix and pkey.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Implement and attach hooks to allocate and free Infiniband object
security structures.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Support for Infiniband requires the addition of two new object contexts,
one for infiniband PKeys and another IB Ports. Added handlers to read
and write the new ocontext types when reading or writing a binary policy
representation.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Eli Cohen <eli@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Add a generic notificaiton mechanism in the LSM. Interested consumers
can register a callback with the LSM and security modules can produce
events.
Because access to Infiniband QPs are enforced in the setup phase of a
connection security should be enforced again if the policy changes.
Register infiniband devices for policy change notification and check all
QPs on that device when the notification is received.
Add a call to the notification mechanism from SELinux when the AVC
cache changes or setenforce is cleared.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The check is already performed in ocontext_read() when the policy is
loaded. Removing the array also fixes the following warning when
building with clang:
security/selinux/hooks.c:338:20: error: variable 'labeling_behaviors'
is not needed and will not be emitted
[-Werror,-Wunneeded-internal-declaration]
Signed-off-by: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Log the state of SELinux policy capabilities when a policy is loaded.
For each policy capability known to the kernel, log the policy capability
name and the value set in the policy. For policy capabilities that are
set in the loaded policy but unknown to the kernel, log the policy
capability index, since this is the only information presently available
in the policy.
Sample output with a policy created with a new capability defined
that is not known to the kernel:
SELinux: policy capability network_peer_controls=1
SELinux: policy capability open_perms=1
SELinux: policy capability extended_socket_class=1
SELinux: policy capability always_check_network=0
SELinux: policy capability cgroup_seclabel=0
SELinux: unknown policy capability 5
Resolves: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/issues/32
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
open permission is currently only defined for files in the kernel
(COMMON_FILE_PERMS rather than COMMON_FILE_SOCK_PERMS). Construction of
an artificial test case that tries to open a socket via /proc/pid/fd will
generate a recvfrom avc denial because recvfrom and open happen to map to
the same permission bit in socket vs file classes.
open of a socket via /proc/pid/fd is not supported by the kernel regardless
and will ultimately return ENXIO. But we hit the permission check first and
can thus produce these odd/misleading denials. Omit the open check when
operating on a socket.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Add a map permission check on mmap so that we can distinguish memory mapped
access (since it has different implications for revocation). When a file
is opened and then read or written via syscalls like read(2)/write(2),
we revalidate access on each read/write operation via
selinux_file_permission() and therefore can revoke access if the
process context, the file context, or the policy changes in such a
manner that access is no longer allowed. When a file is opened and then
memory mapped via mmap(2) and then subsequently read or written directly
in memory, we presently have no way to revalidate or revoke access.
The purpose of a separate map permission check on mmap(2) is to permit
policy to prohibit memory mapping of specific files for which we need
to ensure that every access is revalidated, particularly useful for
scenarios where we expect the file to be relabeled at runtime in order
to reflect state changes (e.g. cross-domain solution, assured pipeline
without data copying).
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
SELinux uses CAP_MAC_ADMIN to control the ability to get or set a raw,
uninterpreted security context unknown to the currently loaded security
policy. When performing these checks, we only want to perform a base
capabilities check and a SELinux permission check. If any other
modules that implement a capable hook are stacked with SELinux, we do
not want to require them to also have to authorize CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
since it may have different implications for their security model.
Rework the CAP_MAC_ADMIN checks within SELinux to only invoke the
capabilities module and the SELinux permission checking.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* Return an error code without storing it in an intermediate variable.
* Delete the local variable "rc" and the jump label "out" which became
unnecessary with this refactoring.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Replace five goto statements (and previous variable assignments) by
direct returns after a memory allocation failure in this function.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This patch is a preparation for getting rid of task_create hook because
task_alloc hook which can do what task_create hook can do was revived.
Creating a new thread is unlikely prohibited by security policy, for
fork()/execve()/exit() is fundamental of how processes are managed in
Unix. If a program is known to create a new thread, it is likely that
permission to create a new thread is given to that program. Therefore,
a situation where security_task_create() returns an error is likely that
the program was exploited and lost control. Even if SELinux failed to
check permission to create a thread at security_task_create(), SELinux
can later check it at security_task_alloc(). Since the new thread is not
yet visible from the rest of the system, nobody can do bad things using
the new thread. What we waste will be limited to some initialization
steps such as dup_task_struct(), copy_creds() and audit_alloc() in
copy_process(). We can tolerate these overhead for unlikely situation.
Therefore, this patch changes SELinux to use task_alloc hook rather than
task_create hook so that we can remove task_create hook.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Pull misc vfs updates from Al Viro:
"Assorted bits and pieces from various people. No common topic in this
pile, sorry"
* 'work.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
fs/affs: add rename exchange
fs/affs: add rename2 to prepare multiple methods
Make stat/lstat/fstatat pass AT_NO_AUTOMOUNT to vfs_statx()
fs: don't set *REFERENCED on single use objects
fs: compat: Remove warning from COMPATIBLE_IOCTL
remove pointless extern of atime_need_update_rcu()
fs: completely ignore unknown open flags
fs: add a VALID_OPEN_FLAGS
fs: remove _submit_bh()
fs: constify tree_descr arrays passed to simple_fill_super()
fs: drop duplicate header percpu-rwsem.h
fs/affs: bugfix: Write files greater than page size on OFS
fs/affs: bugfix: enable writes on OFS disks
fs/affs: remove node generation check
fs/affs: import amigaffs.h
fs/affs: bugfix: make symbolic links work again
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"Highlights:
IMA:
- provide ">" and "<" operators for fowner/uid/euid rules
KEYS:
- add a system blacklist keyring
- add KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING, exposes keyring link restriction
functionality to userland via keyctl()
LSM:
- harden LSM API with __ro_after_init
- add prlmit security hook, implement for SELinux
- revive security_task_alloc hook
TPM:
- implement contextual TPM command 'spaces'"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (98 commits)
tpm: Fix reference count to main device
tpm_tis: convert to using locality callbacks
tpm: fix handling of the TPM 2.0 event logs
tpm_crb: remove a cruft constant
keys: select CONFIG_CRYPTO when selecting DH / KDF
apparmor: Make path_max parameter readonly
apparmor: fix parameters so that the permission test is bypassed at boot
apparmor: fix invalid reference to index variable of iterator line 836
apparmor: use SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK
security/apparmor/lsm.c: set debug messages
apparmor: fix boolreturn.cocci warnings
Smack: Use GFP_KERNEL for smk_netlbl_mls().
smack: fix double free in smack_parse_opts_str()
KEYS: add SP800-56A KDF support for DH
KEYS: Keyring asymmetric key restrict method with chaining
KEYS: Restrict asymmetric key linkage using a specific keychain
KEYS: Add a lookup_restriction function for the asymmetric key type
KEYS: Add KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING
KEYS: Consistent ordering for __key_link_begin and restrict check
KEYS: Add an optional lookup_restriction hook to key_type
...
simple_fill_super() is passed an array of tree_descr structures which
describe the files to create in the filesystem's root directory. Since
these arrays are never modified intentionally, they should be 'const' so
that they are placed in .rodata and benefit from memory protection.
This patch updates the function signature and all users, and also
constifies tree_descr.name.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
We removed this initialization as a cleanup but it is probably required.
The concern is that "nel" can be zero. I'm not an expert on SELinux
code but I think it looks possible to write an SELinux policy which
triggers this bug. GCC doesn't catch this, but my static checker does.
Fixes: 9c312e79d6 ("selinux: Delete an unnecessary variable initialisation in range_read()")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
'perms' will never be NULL since it isn't a plain pointer but an array
of u32 values.
This fixes the following warning when building with clang:
security/selinux/ss/services.c:158:16: error: address of array
'p_in->perms' will always evaluate to 'true'
[-Werror,-Wpointer-bool-conversion]
while (p_in->perms && p_in->perms[k]) {
Signed-off-by: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
A string which did not contain data format specifications should be put
into a sequence. Thus use the corresponding function "seq_puts".
This issue was detected by using the Coccinelle software.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The script "checkpatch.pl" pointed information out like the following.
Comparison to NULL could be written !…
Thus fix affected source code places.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
A multiplication for the size determination of a memory allocation
indicated that an array data structure should be processed.
Thus use the corresponding function "kmalloc_array".
This issue was detected by using the Coccinelle software.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Return directly after a call of the function "kzalloc" failed
at the beginning.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Return directly after a call of the function "kzalloc" failed
at the beginning.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Return directly after a call of the function "kzalloc" failed
at the beginning.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Return directly after a call of the function "kzalloc" failed
at the beginning.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Return directly after a call of the function "kzalloc" failed
at the beginning.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Return directly after a call of the function "kzalloc" failed
at the beginning.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Return directly after a call of the function "kzalloc" failed
at the beginning.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Replace the specification of a data type by a pointer dereference
as the parameter for the operator "sizeof" to make the corresponding size
determination a bit safer according to the Linux coding style convention.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Return directly after a call of the function "kzalloc" failed
at the beginning.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Return directly after a call of the function "kzalloc" failed
at the beginning.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The local variable "rt" will be set to an appropriate pointer a bit later.
Thus omit the explicit initialisation at the beginning which became
unnecessary with a previous update step.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Return directly after a call of the function "next_entry" failed
at the beginning.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The local variable "ft" was set to a null pointer despite of an
immediate reassignment.
Thus remove this statement from the beginning of a loop.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Call the function "kfree" at the end only after it was determined
that the local variable "newgenfs" contained a non-null pointer.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Return directly after a call of the function "next_entry" failed
at the beginning.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The script "checkpatch.pl" pointed information out like the following.
WARNING: void function return statements are not generally useful
Thus remove such a statement in the affected function.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Linus Torvalds