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Author SHA1 Message Date
Tycho Andersen f8e529ed94 seccomp, ptrace: add support for dumping seccomp filters
This patch adds support for dumping a process' (classic BPF) seccomp
filters via ptrace.

PTRACE_SECCOMP_GET_FILTER allows the tracer to dump the user's classic BPF
seccomp filters. addr should be an integer which represents the ith seccomp
filter (0 is the most recently installed filter). data should be a struct
sock_filter * with enough room for the ith filter, or NULL, in which case
the filter is not saved. The return value for this command is the number of
BPF instructions the program represents, or negative in the case of errors.
Command specific errors are ENOENT: which indicates that there is no ith
filter in this seccomp tree, and EMEDIUMTYPE, which indicates that the ith
filter was not installed as a classic BPF filter.

A caveat with this approach is that there is no way to get explicitly at
the heirarchy of seccomp filters, and users need to memcmp() filters to
decide which are inherited. This means that a task which installs two of
the same filter can potentially confuse users of this interface.

v2: * make save_orig const
    * check that the orig_prog exists (not necessary right now, but when
       grows eBPF support it will be)
    * s/n/filter_off and make it an unsigned long to match ptrace
    * count "down" the tree instead of "up" when passing a filter offset

v3: * don't take the current task's lock for inspecting its seccomp mode
    * use a 0x42** constant for the ptrace command value

v4: * don't copy to userspace while holding spinlocks

v5: * add another condition to WARN_ON

v6: * rebase on net-next

Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho.andersen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
CC: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
CC: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
CC: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
CC: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
CC: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
CC: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-27 19:55:13 -07:00
Tycho Andersen 13c4a90119 seccomp: add ptrace options for suspend/resume
This patch is the first step in enabling checkpoint/restore of processes
with seccomp enabled.

One of the things CRIU does while dumping tasks is inject code into them
via ptrace to collect information that is only available to the process
itself. However, if we are in a seccomp mode where these processes are
prohibited from making these syscalls, then what CRIU does kills the task.

This patch adds a new ptrace option, PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP, that enables
a task from the init user namespace which has CAP_SYS_ADMIN and no seccomp
filters to disable (and re-enable) seccomp filters for another task so that
they can be successfully dumped (and restored). We restrict the set of
processes that can disable seccomp through ptrace because although today
ptrace can be used to bypass seccomp, there is some discussion of closing
this loophole in the future and we would like this patch to not depend on
that behavior and be future proofed for when it is removed.

Note that seccomp can be suspended before any filters are actually
installed; this behavior is useful on criu restore, so that we can suspend
seccomp, restore the filters, unmap our restore code from the restored
process' address space, and then resume the task by detaching and have the
filters resumed as well.

v2 changes:

* require that the tracer have no seccomp filters installed
* drop TIF_NOTSC manipulation from the patch
* change from ptrace command to a ptrace option and use this ptrace option
  as the flag to check. This means that as soon as the tracer
  detaches/dies, seccomp is re-enabled and as a corrollary that one can not
  disable seccomp across PTRACE_ATTACHs.

v3 changes:

* get rid of various #ifdefs everywhere
* report more sensible errors when PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP is incorrectly
  used

v4 changes:

* get rid of may_suspend_seccomp() in favor of a capable() check in ptrace
  directly

v5 changes:

* check that seccomp is not enabled (or suspended) on the tracer

Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho.andersen@canonical.com>
CC: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
CC: Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com>
CC: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
CC: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
[kees: access seccomp.mode through seccomp_mode() instead]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2015-07-15 11:52:52 -07:00
Andrey Vagin 29000caecb ptrace: add ability to get/set signal-blocked mask
crtools uses a parasite code for dumping processes.  The parasite code is
injected into a process with help PTRACE_SEIZE.

Currently crtools blocks signals from a parasite code.  If a process has
pending signals, crtools wait while a process handles these signals.

This method is not suitable for stopped tasks.  A stopped task can have a
few pending signals, when we will try to execute a parasite code, we will
need to drop SIGSTOP, but all other signals must remain pending, because a
state of processes must not be changed during checkpointing.

This patch adds two ptrace commands to set/get signal-blocked mask.

I think gdb can use this commands too.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: be consistent with brace layout]
Signed-off-by: Andrey Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-07-03 16:08:01 -07:00
Andrey Vagin 84c751bd4a ptrace: add ability to retrieve signals without removing from a queue (v4)
This patch adds a new ptrace request PTRACE_PEEKSIGINFO.

This request is used to retrieve information about pending signals
starting with the specified sequence number.  Siginfo_t structures are
copied from the child into the buffer starting at "data".

The argument "addr" is a pointer to struct ptrace_peeksiginfo_args.
struct ptrace_peeksiginfo_args {
	u64 off;	/* from which siginfo to start */
	u32 flags;
	s32 nr;		/* how may siginfos to take */
};

"nr" has type "s32", because ptrace() returns "long", which has 32 bits on
i386 and a negative values is used for errors.

Currently here is only one flag PTRACE_PEEKSIGINFO_SHARED for dumping
signals from process-wide queue.  If this flag is not set, signals are
read from a per-thread queue.

The request PTRACE_PEEKSIGINFO returns a number of dumped signals.  If a
signal with the specified sequence number doesn't exist, ptrace returns
zero.  The request returns an error, if no signal has been dumped.

Errors:
EINVAL - one or more specified flags are not supported or nr is negative
EFAULT - buf or addr is outside your accessible address space.

A result siginfo contains a kernel part of si_code which usually striped,
but it's required for queuing the same siginfo back during restore of
pending signals.

This functionality is required for checkpointing pending signals.  Pedro
Alves suggested using it in "gdb" to peek at pending signals.  gdb already
uses PTRACE_GETSIGINFO to get the siginfo for the signal which was already
dequeued.  This functionality allows gdb to look at the pending signals
which were not reported yet.

The prototype of this code was developed by Oleg Nesterov.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Cc: "Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-04-30 17:04:05 -07:00
Oleg Nesterov 992fb6e170 ptrace: introduce PTRACE_O_EXITKILL
Ptrace jailers want to be sure that the tracee can never escape
from the control. However if the tracer dies unexpectedly the
tracee continues to run in potentially unsafe mode.

Add the new ptrace option PTRACE_O_EXITKILL. If the tracer exits
it sends SIGKILL to every tracee which has this bit set.

Note that the new option is not equal to the last-option << 1.  Because
currently all options have an event, and the new one starts the eventless
group.  It uses the random 20 bit, so we have the room for 12 more events,
but we can also add the new eventless options below this one.

Suggested by Amnon Shiloh.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Amnon Shiloh <u3557@miso.sublimeip.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Chris Evans <scarybeasts@gmail.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-12-17 17:15:22 -08:00
David Howells 607ca46e97 UAPI: (Scripted) Disintegrate include/linux
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
2012-10-13 10:46:48 +01:00