commit 1d1585ca0f upstream.
Commit 3d7081822f ("uaccess: Add non-pagefault user-space read functions")
missed to add probe write function, therefore factor out a probe_write_common()
helper with most logic of probe_kernel_write() except setting KERNEL_DS, and
add a new probe_user_write() helper so it can be used from BPF side.
Again, on some archs, the user address space and kernel address space can
co-exist and be overlapping, so in such case, setting KERNEL_DS would mean
that the given address is treated as being in kernel address space.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/9df2542e68141bfa3addde631441ee45503856a8.1572649915.git.daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
In commit 9f79b78ef7 ("Convert filldir[64]() from __put_user() to
unsafe_put_user()") I made filldir() use unsafe_put_user(), which
improves code generation on x86 enormously.
But because we didn't have a "unsafe_copy_to_user()", the dirent name
copy was also done by hand with unsafe_put_user() in a loop, and it
turns out that a lot of other architectures didn't like that, because
unlike x86, they have various alignment issues.
Most non-x86 architectures trap and fix it up, and some (like xtensa)
will just fail unaligned put_user() accesses unconditionally. Which
makes that "copy using put_user() in a loop" not work for them at all.
I could make that code do explicit alignment etc, but the architectures
that don't like unaligned accesses also don't really use the fancy
"user_access_begin/end()" model, so they might just use the regular old
__copy_to_user() interface.
So this commit takes that looping implementation, turns it into the x86
version of "unsafe_copy_to_user()", and makes other architectures
implement the unsafe copy version as __copy_to_user() (the same way they
do for the other unsafe_xyz() accessor functions).
Note that it only does this for the copying _to_ user space, and we
still don't have a unsafe version of copy_from_user().
That's partly because we have no current users of it, but also partly
because the copy_from_user() case is slightly different and cannot
efficiently be implemented in terms of a unsafe_get_user() loop (because
gcc can't do asm goto with outputs).
It would be trivial to do this using "rep movsb", which would work
really nicely on newer x86 cores, but really badly on some older ones.
Al Viro is looking at cleaning up all our user copy routines to make
this all a non-issue, but for now we have this simple-but-stupid version
for x86 that works fine for the dirent name copy case because those
names are short strings and we simply don't need anything fancier.
Fixes: 9f79b78ef7 ("Convert filldir[64]() from __put_user() to unsafe_put_user()")
Reported-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Reported-and-tested-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
A common pattern for syscall extensions is increasing the size of a
struct passed from userspace, such that the zero-value of the new fields
result in the old kernel behaviour (allowing for a mix of userspace and
kernel vintages to operate on one another in most cases).
While this interface exists for communication in both directions, only
one interface is straightforward to have reasonable semantics for
(userspace passing a struct to the kernel). For kernel returns to
userspace, what the correct semantics are (whether there should be an
error if userspace is unaware of a new extension) is very
syscall-dependent and thus probably cannot be unified between syscalls
(a good example of this problem is [1]).
Previously there was no common lib/ function that implemented
the necessary extension-checking semantics (and different syscalls
implemented them slightly differently or incompletely[2]). Future
patches replace common uses of this pattern to make use of
copy_struct_from_user().
Some in-kernel selftests that insure that the handling of alignment and
various byte patterns are all handled identically to memchr_inv() usage.
[1]: commit 1251201c0d ("sched/core: Fix uclamp ABI bug, clean up and
robustify sched_read_attr() ABI logic and code")
[2]: For instance {sched_setattr,perf_event_open,clone3}(2) all do do
similar checks to copy_struct_from_user() while rt_sigprocmask(2)
always rejects differently-sized struct arguments.
Suggested-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191001011055.19283-2-cyphar@cyphar.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
The usercopy implementation comments describe that callers of the
copy_*_user() family of functions must always have their return values
checked. This can be enforced at compile time with __must_check, so add
it where needed.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/201908251609.ADAD5CAAC1@keescook
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Declare a prototype of non-static __probe_user_read() as
same as __probe_kernel_read() at uaccess.h.
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Add probe_user_read(), strncpy_from_unsafe_user() and
strnlen_unsafe_user() which allows caller to access user-space
in IRQ context.
Current probe_kernel_read() and strncpy_from_unsafe() are
not available for user-space memory, because it sets
KERNEL_DS while accessing data. On some arch, user address
space and kernel address space can be co-exist, but others
can not. In that case, setting KERNEL_DS means given
address is treated as a kernel address space.
Also strnlen_user() is only available from user context since
it can sleep if pagefault is enabled.
To access user-space memory without pagefault, we need
these new functions which sets USER_DS while accessing
the data.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/155789869802.26965.4940338412595759063.stgit@devnote2
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
WARN_ON_IN_IRQ() assumes that the access_ok() and following
user memory access can sleep. But this assumption is not
always correct; when the pagefault is disabled, following
memory access will just returns -EFAULT and never sleep.
Add pagefault_disabled() check in WARN_ON_ONCE() so that
it can ignore the case we call it with disabling pagefault.
For this purpose, this modified pagefault_disabled() as
an inline function.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/155789868664.26965.7932665824135793317.stgit@devnote2
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Introduce common helpers for when we need to safely suspend a
uaccess section; for instance to generate a {KA,UB}SAN report.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Originally, the rule used to be that you'd have to do access_ok()
separately, and then user_access_begin() before actually doing the
direct (optimized) user access.
But experience has shown that people then decide not to do access_ok()
at all, and instead rely on it being implied by other operations or
similar. Which makes it very hard to verify that the access has
actually been range-checked.
If you use the unsafe direct user accesses, hardware features (either
SMAP - Supervisor Mode Access Protection - on x86, or PAN - Privileged
Access Never - on ARM) do force you to use user_access_begin(). But
nothing really forces the range check.
By putting the range check into user_access_begin(), we actually force
people to do the right thing (tm), and the range check vill be visible
near the actual accesses. We have way too long a history of people
trying to avoid them.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.
It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.
A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.
This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.
There were a couple of notable cases:
- csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.
- the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
really used it)
- microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout
but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.
I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This patch adds checking of usercopy cache whitelisting, and is modified
from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY whitelisting code in the
last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the
code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't
reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.
The SLAB and SLUB allocators are modified to WARN() on all copy operations
in which the kernel heap memory being modified falls outside of the cache's
defined usercopy region.
Based on an earlier patch from David Windsor.
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
In preparation for refactoring the usercopy checks to pass offset to
the hardened usercopy report, this renames report_usercopy() to the
more accurate usercopy_abort(), marks it as noreturn because it is,
adds a hopefully helpful comment for anyone investigating such reports,
makes the function available to the slab allocators, and adds new "detail"
and "offset" arguments.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
copy_in_user() copies data from user-space address @from to user-
space address @to. Hence declare both @from and @to as user-space
pointers.
Fixes: commit d597580d37 ("generic ...copy_..._user primitives")
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Pull __copy_in_user removal from Al Viro:
"There used to be 6 places in the entire tree calling __copy_in_user(),
all of them bogus.
Four got killed off in work.drm branch, this takes care of the
remaining ones and kills the definition of that sucker"
* 'work.__copy_in_user' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
kill __copy_in_user()
sanitize do_i2c_smbus_ioctl()
pagefault_disabled_dec is frequently used inline, and it has a WARN_ON
for underflow that expands to about 6.5k of extra code. The warning
doesn't seem to be that useful and worth so much code so remove it.
If it was needed could make it depending on some debug kernel option.
Saves ~6.5k in my kernel
text data bss dec hex filename
9039417 5367568 11116544 25523529 1857549 vmlinux-before-pf
9032805 5367568 11116544 25516917 1855b75 vmlinux-pf
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170315021431.13107-8-andi@firstfloor.org
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
When I initially added the unsafe_[get|put]_user() helpers in commit
5b24a7a2aa ("Add 'unsafe' user access functions for batched
accesses"), I made the mistake of modeling the interface on our
traditional __[get|put]_user() functions, which return zero on success,
or -EFAULT on failure.
That interface is fairly easy to use, but it's actually fairly nasty for
good code generation, since it essentially forces the caller to check
the error value for each access.
In particular, since the error handling is already internally
implemented with an exception handler, and we already use "asm goto" for
various other things, we could fairly easily make the error cases just
jump directly to an error label instead, and avoid the need for explicit
checking after each operation.
So switch the interface to pass in an error label, rather than checking
the error value in the caller. Best do it now before we start growing
more users (the signal handling code in particular would be a good place
to use the new interface).
So rather than
if (unsafe_get_user(x, ptr))
... handle error ..
the interface is now
unsafe_get_user(x, ptr, label);
where an error during the user mode fetch will now just cause a jump to
'label' in the caller.
Right now the actual _implementation_ of this all still ends up being a
"if (err) goto label", and does not take advantage of any exception
label tricks, but for "unsafe_put_user()" in particular it should be
fairly straightforward to convert to using the exception table model.
Note that "unsafe_get_user()" is much harder to convert to a clever
exception table model, because current versions of gcc do not allow the
use of "asm goto" (for the exception) with output values (for the actual
value to be fetched). But that is hopefully not a limitation in the
long term.
[ Also note that it might be a good idea to switch unsafe_get_user() to
actually _return_ the value it fetches from user space, but this
commit only changes the error handling semantics ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The naming is meant to discourage random use: the helper functions are
not really any more "unsafe" than the traditional double-underscore
functions (which need the address range checking), but they do need even
more infrastructure around them, and should not be used willy-nilly.
In addition to checking the access range, these user access functions
require that you wrap the user access with a "user_acess_{begin,end}()"
around it.
That allows architectures that implement kernel user access control
(x86: SMAP, arm64: PAN) to do the user access control in the wrapping
user_access_begin/end part, and then batch up the actual user space
accesses using the new interfaces.
The main (and hopefully only) use for these are for core generic access
helpers, initially just the generic user string functions
(strnlen_user() and strncpy_from_user()).
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
probe_kernel_address() is basically the same as the (later added)
probe_kernel_read().
The return value on EFAULT is a bit different: probe_kernel_address()
returns number-of-bytes-not-copied whereas probe_kernel_read() returns
-EFAULT. All callers have been checked, none cared.
probe_kernel_read() can be overridden by the architecture whereas
probe_kernel_address() cannot. parisc, blackfin and um do this, to insert
additional checking. Hence this patch possibly fixes obscure bugs,
although there are only two probe_kernel_address() callsites outside
arch/.
My first attempt involved removing probe_kernel_address() entirely and
converting all callsites to use probe_kernel_read() directly, but that got
tiresome.
This patch shrinks mm/slab_common.o by 218 bytes. For a single
probe_kernel_address() callsite.
Cc: Steven Miao <realmz6@gmail.com>
Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@parisc-linux.org>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
generalize FETCH_FUNC_NAME(memory, string) into
strncpy_from_unsafe() and fix sparse warnings that were
present in original implementation.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Introduce faulthandler_disabled() and use it to check for irq context and
disabled pagefaults (via pagefault_disable()) in the pagefault handlers.
Please note that we keep the in_atomic() checks in place - to detect
whether in irq context (in which case preemption is always properly
disabled).
In contrast, preempt_disable() should never be used to disable pagefaults.
With !CONFIG_PREEMPT_COUNT, preempt_disable() doesn't modify the preempt
counter, and therefore the result of in_atomic() differs.
We validate that condition by using might_fault() checks when calling
might_sleep().
Therefore, add a comment to faulthandler_disabled(), describing why this
is needed.
faulthandler_disabled() and pagefault_disable() are defined in
linux/uaccess.h, so let's properly add that include to all relevant files.
This patch is based on a patch from Thomas Gleixner.
Reviewed-and-tested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: David.Laight@ACULAB.COM
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: airlied@linux.ie
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org
Cc: benh@kernel.crashing.org
Cc: bigeasy@linutronix.de
Cc: borntraeger@de.ibm.com
Cc: daniel.vetter@intel.com
Cc: heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com
Cc: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au
Cc: hocko@suse.cz
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: mst@redhat.com
Cc: paulus@samba.org
Cc: ralf@linux-mips.org
Cc: schwidefsky@de.ibm.com
Cc: yang.shi@windriver.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1431359540-32227-7-git-send-email-dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Discourage drivers/modules to be creative with preemption.
Sadly all is implemented in macros and inline so if they want to do
evil they still can, but at least try and discourage some.
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Eliezer Tamir <eliezer.tamir@linux.intel.com>
Cc: rui.zhang@intel.com
Cc: jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com
Cc: Mike Galbraith <bitbucket@online.de>
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: lenb@kernel.org
Cc: rjw@rjwysocki.net
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-fn7h6vu8wtgxk0ih402qcijx@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Rewrite the preempt_count macros in order to extract the 3 basic
preempt_count value modifiers:
__preempt_count_add()
__preempt_count_sub()
and the new:
__preempt_count_dec_and_test()
And since we're at it anyway, replace the unconventional
$op_preempt_count names with the more conventional preempt_count_$op.
Since these basic operators are equivalent to the previous _notrace()
variants, do away with the _notrace() versions.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-ewbpdbupy9xpsjhg960zwbv8@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The functions probe_kernel_write() and probe_kernel_read() do not modify
the src pointer. Allow const pointers to be passed in without the need
of a typecast.
Acked-by: Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org>
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1305824936.1465.4.camel@gandalf.stny.rr.com
Some archs such as blackfin, would like to have an arch specific
probe_kernel_read() and probe_kernel_write() implementation which can
fall back to the generic implementation if no special operations are
needed.
CC: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CC: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org>
The following patch changes to use __copy_from_user_inatomic(),
but the passing parameters incorrect:
x86: some lock annotations for user copy paths, v3
This fixes the netfilter crash reported by Steven Noonan.
Reported-by: Steven Noonan <steven@uplinklabs.net>
Signed-off-by: Hiroshi Shimamoto <h-shimamoto@ct.jp.nec.com>
Tested-by: Steven Noonan <steven@uplinklabs.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
add probe_kernel_read() and probe_kernel_write().
Uninlined and restricted to kernel range memory only, as suggested
by Linus.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
probe_kernel_address() purports to be generic, only it forgot to select
KERNEL_DS, so it presently won't work right on all architectures.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Introduce pagefault_{disable,enable}() and use these where previously we did
manual preempt increments/decrements to make the pagefault handler do the
atomic thing.
Currently they still rely on the increased preempt count, but do not rely on
the disabled preemption, this might go away in the future.
(NOTE: the extra barrier() in pagefault_disable might fix some holes on
machines which have too many registers for their own good)
[heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com: s390 fix]
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Acked-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Caller of probe_kernel_address shouldn't need to know that
pka is internally implemented with __get_user. So move the
__user cast into pka.
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de>
Add a version of __get_user() which is safe to call inside mmap_sem.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Use the x86 cache-bypassing copy instructions for copy_from_user().
Some performance data are
Total of GLOBAL_POWER_EVENTS (CPU cycle samples)
2.6.12.4.orig 1921587
2.6.12.4.nt 1599424
1599424/1921587=83.23% (16.77% reduction)
BSQ_CACHE_REFERENCE (L3 cache miss)
2.6.12.4.orig 57427
2.6.12.4.nt 20858
20858/57427=36.32% (63.7% reduction)
L3 cache miss reduction of __copy_from_user_ll
samples %
37408 65.1412 vmlinux __copy_from_user_ll
23 0.1103 vmlinux __copy_user_zeroing_intel_nocache
23/37408=0.061% (99.94% reduction)
Top 5 of 2.6.12.4.nt
Counted GLOBAL_POWER_EVENTS events (time during which processor is not stopped) with a unit mask of 0x01 (mandatory) count 100000
samples % app name symbol name
128392 8.0274 vmlinux __copy_user_zeroing_intel_nocache
64206 4.0143 vmlinux journal_add_journal_head
59746 3.7355 vmlinux do_get_write_access
47674 2.9807 vmlinux journal_put_journal_head
46021 2.8774 vmlinux journal_dirty_metadata
pattern9-0-cpu4-0-09011728/summary.out
Counted BSQ_CACHE_REFERENCE events (cache references seen by the bus unit) with a unit mask of 0x3f (multiple flags) count 3000
samples % app name symbol name
69755 4.2861 vmlinux __copy_user_zeroing_intel_nocache
55685 3.4215 vmlinux journal_add_journal_head
52371 3.2179 vmlinux __find_get_block
45504 2.7960 vmlinux journal_put_journal_head
36005 2.2123 vmlinux journal_stop
pattern9-0-cpu4-0-09011744/summary.out
Counted BSQ_CACHE_REFERENCE events (cache references seen by the bus unit) with a unit mask of 0x200 (read 3rd level cache miss) count 3000
samples % app name symbol name
1147 5.4994 vmlinux journal_add_journal_head
881 4.2240 vmlinux journal_dirty_data
872 4.1809 vmlinux blk_rq_map_sg
734 3.5192 vmlinux journal_commit_transaction
617 2.9582 vmlinux radix_tree_delete
pattern9-0-cpu4-0-09011731/summary.out
iozone results are
original 2.6.12.4 CPU time = 207.768 sec
cache aware CPU time = 184.783 sec
(three times run)
184.783/207.768=88.94% (11.06% reduction)
original:
pattern9-0-cpu4-0-08191720/iozone.out: CPU Utilization: Wall time 45.997 CPU time 64.527 CPU utilization 140.28 %
pattern9-0-cpu4-0-08191741/iozone.out: CPU Utilization: Wall time 46.878 CPU time 71.933 CPU utilization 153.45 %
pattern9-0-cpu4-0-08191743/iozone.out: CPU Utilization: Wall time 45.152 CPU time 71.308 CPU utilization 157.93 %
cache awre:
pattern9-0-cpu4-0-09011728/iozone.out: CPU Utilization: Wall time 44.842 CPU time 62.465 CPU utilization 139.30 %
pattern9-0-cpu4-0-09011731/iozone.out: CPU Utilization: Wall time 44.718 CPU time 59.273 CPU utilization 132.55 %
pattern9-0-cpu4-0-09011744/iozone.out: CPU Utilization: Wall time 44.367 CPU time 63.045 CPU utilization 142.10 %
Signed-off-by: Hiro Yoshioka <hyoshiok@miraclelinux.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Daniel Borkmann