![J.Bruce Fields](/assets/img/avatar_default.png)
The memory leak here is embarassingly obvious. This fixes a problem that causes the kernel to leak a small amount of memory every time it receives a integrity-protected request. Thanks to Aim Le Rouzic for the bug report. Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu> Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
1369 lines
34 KiB
C
1369 lines
34 KiB
C
/*
|
|
* Neil Brown <neilb@cse.unsw.edu.au>
|
|
* J. Bruce Fields <bfields@umich.edu>
|
|
* Andy Adamson <andros@umich.edu>
|
|
* Dug Song <dugsong@monkey.org>
|
|
*
|
|
* RPCSEC_GSS server authentication.
|
|
* This implements RPCSEC_GSS as defined in rfc2203 (rpcsec_gss) and rfc2078
|
|
* (gssapi)
|
|
*
|
|
* The RPCSEC_GSS involves three stages:
|
|
* 1/ context creation
|
|
* 2/ data exchange
|
|
* 3/ context destruction
|
|
*
|
|
* Context creation is handled largely by upcalls to user-space.
|
|
* In particular, GSS_Accept_sec_context is handled by an upcall
|
|
* Data exchange is handled entirely within the kernel
|
|
* In particular, GSS_GetMIC, GSS_VerifyMIC, GSS_Seal, GSS_Unseal are in-kernel.
|
|
* Context destruction is handled in-kernel
|
|
* GSS_Delete_sec_context is in-kernel
|
|
*
|
|
* Context creation is initiated by a RPCSEC_GSS_INIT request arriving.
|
|
* The context handle and gss_token are used as a key into the rpcsec_init cache.
|
|
* The content of this cache includes some of the outputs of GSS_Accept_sec_context,
|
|
* being major_status, minor_status, context_handle, reply_token.
|
|
* These are sent back to the client.
|
|
* Sequence window management is handled by the kernel. The window size if currently
|
|
* a compile time constant.
|
|
*
|
|
* When user-space is happy that a context is established, it places an entry
|
|
* in the rpcsec_context cache. The key for this cache is the context_handle.
|
|
* The content includes:
|
|
* uid/gidlist - for determining access rights
|
|
* mechanism type
|
|
* mechanism specific information, such as a key
|
|
*
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/types.h>
|
|
#include <linux/module.h>
|
|
#include <linux/pagemap.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/sunrpc/auth_gss.h>
|
|
#include <linux/sunrpc/svcauth.h>
|
|
#include <linux/sunrpc/gss_err.h>
|
|
#include <linux/sunrpc/svcauth.h>
|
|
#include <linux/sunrpc/svcauth_gss.h>
|
|
#include <linux/sunrpc/cache.h>
|
|
|
|
#ifdef RPC_DEBUG
|
|
# define RPCDBG_FACILITY RPCDBG_AUTH
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* The rpcsec_init cache is used for mapping RPCSEC_GSS_{,CONT_}INIT requests
|
|
* into replies.
|
|
*
|
|
* Key is context handle (\x if empty) and gss_token.
|
|
* Content is major_status minor_status (integers) context_handle, reply_token.
|
|
*
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int netobj_equal(struct xdr_netobj *a, struct xdr_netobj *b)
|
|
{
|
|
return a->len == b->len && 0 == memcmp(a->data, b->data, a->len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#define RSI_HASHBITS 6
|
|
#define RSI_HASHMAX (1<<RSI_HASHBITS)
|
|
#define RSI_HASHMASK (RSI_HASHMAX-1)
|
|
|
|
struct rsi {
|
|
struct cache_head h;
|
|
struct xdr_netobj in_handle, in_token;
|
|
struct xdr_netobj out_handle, out_token;
|
|
int major_status, minor_status;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static struct cache_head *rsi_table[RSI_HASHMAX];
|
|
static struct cache_detail rsi_cache;
|
|
static struct rsi *rsi_update(struct rsi *new, struct rsi *old);
|
|
static struct rsi *rsi_lookup(struct rsi *item);
|
|
|
|
static void rsi_free(struct rsi *rsii)
|
|
{
|
|
kfree(rsii->in_handle.data);
|
|
kfree(rsii->in_token.data);
|
|
kfree(rsii->out_handle.data);
|
|
kfree(rsii->out_token.data);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void rsi_put(struct kref *ref)
|
|
{
|
|
struct rsi *rsii = container_of(ref, struct rsi, h.ref);
|
|
rsi_free(rsii);
|
|
kfree(rsii);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline int rsi_hash(struct rsi *item)
|
|
{
|
|
return hash_mem(item->in_handle.data, item->in_handle.len, RSI_HASHBITS)
|
|
^ hash_mem(item->in_token.data, item->in_token.len, RSI_HASHBITS);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int rsi_match(struct cache_head *a, struct cache_head *b)
|
|
{
|
|
struct rsi *item = container_of(a, struct rsi, h);
|
|
struct rsi *tmp = container_of(b, struct rsi, h);
|
|
return netobj_equal(&item->in_handle, &tmp->in_handle)
|
|
&& netobj_equal(&item->in_token, &tmp->in_token);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int dup_to_netobj(struct xdr_netobj *dst, char *src, int len)
|
|
{
|
|
dst->len = len;
|
|
dst->data = (len ? kmemdup(src, len, GFP_KERNEL) : NULL);
|
|
if (len && !dst->data)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline int dup_netobj(struct xdr_netobj *dst, struct xdr_netobj *src)
|
|
{
|
|
return dup_to_netobj(dst, src->data, src->len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void rsi_init(struct cache_head *cnew, struct cache_head *citem)
|
|
{
|
|
struct rsi *new = container_of(cnew, struct rsi, h);
|
|
struct rsi *item = container_of(citem, struct rsi, h);
|
|
|
|
new->out_handle.data = NULL;
|
|
new->out_handle.len = 0;
|
|
new->out_token.data = NULL;
|
|
new->out_token.len = 0;
|
|
new->in_handle.len = item->in_handle.len;
|
|
item->in_handle.len = 0;
|
|
new->in_token.len = item->in_token.len;
|
|
item->in_token.len = 0;
|
|
new->in_handle.data = item->in_handle.data;
|
|
item->in_handle.data = NULL;
|
|
new->in_token.data = item->in_token.data;
|
|
item->in_token.data = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void update_rsi(struct cache_head *cnew, struct cache_head *citem)
|
|
{
|
|
struct rsi *new = container_of(cnew, struct rsi, h);
|
|
struct rsi *item = container_of(citem, struct rsi, h);
|
|
|
|
BUG_ON(new->out_handle.data || new->out_token.data);
|
|
new->out_handle.len = item->out_handle.len;
|
|
item->out_handle.len = 0;
|
|
new->out_token.len = item->out_token.len;
|
|
item->out_token.len = 0;
|
|
new->out_handle.data = item->out_handle.data;
|
|
item->out_handle.data = NULL;
|
|
new->out_token.data = item->out_token.data;
|
|
item->out_token.data = NULL;
|
|
|
|
new->major_status = item->major_status;
|
|
new->minor_status = item->minor_status;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static struct cache_head *rsi_alloc(void)
|
|
{
|
|
struct rsi *rsii = kmalloc(sizeof(*rsii), GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (rsii)
|
|
return &rsii->h;
|
|
else
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void rsi_request(struct cache_detail *cd,
|
|
struct cache_head *h,
|
|
char **bpp, int *blen)
|
|
{
|
|
struct rsi *rsii = container_of(h, struct rsi, h);
|
|
|
|
qword_addhex(bpp, blen, rsii->in_handle.data, rsii->in_handle.len);
|
|
qword_addhex(bpp, blen, rsii->in_token.data, rsii->in_token.len);
|
|
(*bpp)[-1] = '\n';
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int rsi_parse(struct cache_detail *cd,
|
|
char *mesg, int mlen)
|
|
{
|
|
/* context token expiry major minor context token */
|
|
char *buf = mesg;
|
|
char *ep;
|
|
int len;
|
|
struct rsi rsii, *rsip = NULL;
|
|
time_t expiry;
|
|
int status = -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
memset(&rsii, 0, sizeof(rsii));
|
|
/* handle */
|
|
len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
|
|
if (len < 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
status = -ENOMEM;
|
|
if (dup_to_netobj(&rsii.in_handle, buf, len))
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
/* token */
|
|
len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
|
|
status = -EINVAL;
|
|
if (len < 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
status = -ENOMEM;
|
|
if (dup_to_netobj(&rsii.in_token, buf, len))
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
rsip = rsi_lookup(&rsii);
|
|
if (!rsip)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
rsii.h.flags = 0;
|
|
/* expiry */
|
|
expiry = get_expiry(&mesg);
|
|
status = -EINVAL;
|
|
if (expiry == 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
/* major/minor */
|
|
len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
|
|
if (len < 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
if (len == 0) {
|
|
goto out;
|
|
} else {
|
|
rsii.major_status = simple_strtoul(buf, &ep, 10);
|
|
if (*ep)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
|
|
if (len <= 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
rsii.minor_status = simple_strtoul(buf, &ep, 10);
|
|
if (*ep)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
/* out_handle */
|
|
len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
|
|
if (len < 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
status = -ENOMEM;
|
|
if (dup_to_netobj(&rsii.out_handle, buf, len))
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
/* out_token */
|
|
len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
|
|
status = -EINVAL;
|
|
if (len < 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
status = -ENOMEM;
|
|
if (dup_to_netobj(&rsii.out_token, buf, len))
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
rsii.h.expiry_time = expiry;
|
|
rsip = rsi_update(&rsii, rsip);
|
|
status = 0;
|
|
out:
|
|
rsi_free(&rsii);
|
|
if (rsip)
|
|
cache_put(&rsip->h, &rsi_cache);
|
|
else
|
|
status = -ENOMEM;
|
|
return status;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static struct cache_detail rsi_cache = {
|
|
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
|
|
.hash_size = RSI_HASHMAX,
|
|
.hash_table = rsi_table,
|
|
.name = "auth.rpcsec.init",
|
|
.cache_put = rsi_put,
|
|
.cache_request = rsi_request,
|
|
.cache_parse = rsi_parse,
|
|
.match = rsi_match,
|
|
.init = rsi_init,
|
|
.update = update_rsi,
|
|
.alloc = rsi_alloc,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static struct rsi *rsi_lookup(struct rsi *item)
|
|
{
|
|
struct cache_head *ch;
|
|
int hash = rsi_hash(item);
|
|
|
|
ch = sunrpc_cache_lookup(&rsi_cache, &item->h, hash);
|
|
if (ch)
|
|
return container_of(ch, struct rsi, h);
|
|
else
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static struct rsi *rsi_update(struct rsi *new, struct rsi *old)
|
|
{
|
|
struct cache_head *ch;
|
|
int hash = rsi_hash(new);
|
|
|
|
ch = sunrpc_cache_update(&rsi_cache, &new->h,
|
|
&old->h, hash);
|
|
if (ch)
|
|
return container_of(ch, struct rsi, h);
|
|
else
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The rpcsec_context cache is used to store a context that is
|
|
* used in data exchange.
|
|
* The key is a context handle. The content is:
|
|
* uid, gidlist, mechanism, service-set, mech-specific-data
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#define RSC_HASHBITS 10
|
|
#define RSC_HASHMAX (1<<RSC_HASHBITS)
|
|
#define RSC_HASHMASK (RSC_HASHMAX-1)
|
|
|
|
#define GSS_SEQ_WIN 128
|
|
|
|
struct gss_svc_seq_data {
|
|
/* highest seq number seen so far: */
|
|
int sd_max;
|
|
/* for i such that sd_max-GSS_SEQ_WIN < i <= sd_max, the i-th bit of
|
|
* sd_win is nonzero iff sequence number i has been seen already: */
|
|
unsigned long sd_win[GSS_SEQ_WIN/BITS_PER_LONG];
|
|
spinlock_t sd_lock;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
struct rsc {
|
|
struct cache_head h;
|
|
struct xdr_netobj handle;
|
|
struct svc_cred cred;
|
|
struct gss_svc_seq_data seqdata;
|
|
struct gss_ctx *mechctx;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static struct cache_head *rsc_table[RSC_HASHMAX];
|
|
static struct cache_detail rsc_cache;
|
|
static struct rsc *rsc_update(struct rsc *new, struct rsc *old);
|
|
static struct rsc *rsc_lookup(struct rsc *item);
|
|
|
|
static void rsc_free(struct rsc *rsci)
|
|
{
|
|
kfree(rsci->handle.data);
|
|
if (rsci->mechctx)
|
|
gss_delete_sec_context(&rsci->mechctx);
|
|
if (rsci->cred.cr_group_info)
|
|
put_group_info(rsci->cred.cr_group_info);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void rsc_put(struct kref *ref)
|
|
{
|
|
struct rsc *rsci = container_of(ref, struct rsc, h.ref);
|
|
|
|
rsc_free(rsci);
|
|
kfree(rsci);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline int
|
|
rsc_hash(struct rsc *rsci)
|
|
{
|
|
return hash_mem(rsci->handle.data, rsci->handle.len, RSC_HASHBITS);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
rsc_match(struct cache_head *a, struct cache_head *b)
|
|
{
|
|
struct rsc *new = container_of(a, struct rsc, h);
|
|
struct rsc *tmp = container_of(b, struct rsc, h);
|
|
|
|
return netobj_equal(&new->handle, &tmp->handle);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
rsc_init(struct cache_head *cnew, struct cache_head *ctmp)
|
|
{
|
|
struct rsc *new = container_of(cnew, struct rsc, h);
|
|
struct rsc *tmp = container_of(ctmp, struct rsc, h);
|
|
|
|
new->handle.len = tmp->handle.len;
|
|
tmp->handle.len = 0;
|
|
new->handle.data = tmp->handle.data;
|
|
tmp->handle.data = NULL;
|
|
new->mechctx = NULL;
|
|
new->cred.cr_group_info = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
update_rsc(struct cache_head *cnew, struct cache_head *ctmp)
|
|
{
|
|
struct rsc *new = container_of(cnew, struct rsc, h);
|
|
struct rsc *tmp = container_of(ctmp, struct rsc, h);
|
|
|
|
new->mechctx = tmp->mechctx;
|
|
tmp->mechctx = NULL;
|
|
memset(&new->seqdata, 0, sizeof(new->seqdata));
|
|
spin_lock_init(&new->seqdata.sd_lock);
|
|
new->cred = tmp->cred;
|
|
tmp->cred.cr_group_info = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static struct cache_head *
|
|
rsc_alloc(void)
|
|
{
|
|
struct rsc *rsci = kmalloc(sizeof(*rsci), GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (rsci)
|
|
return &rsci->h;
|
|
else
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int rsc_parse(struct cache_detail *cd,
|
|
char *mesg, int mlen)
|
|
{
|
|
/* contexthandle expiry [ uid gid N <n gids> mechname ...mechdata... ] */
|
|
char *buf = mesg;
|
|
int len, rv;
|
|
struct rsc rsci, *rscp = NULL;
|
|
time_t expiry;
|
|
int status = -EINVAL;
|
|
struct gss_api_mech *gm = NULL;
|
|
|
|
memset(&rsci, 0, sizeof(rsci));
|
|
/* context handle */
|
|
len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
|
|
if (len < 0) goto out;
|
|
status = -ENOMEM;
|
|
if (dup_to_netobj(&rsci.handle, buf, len))
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
rsci.h.flags = 0;
|
|
/* expiry */
|
|
expiry = get_expiry(&mesg);
|
|
status = -EINVAL;
|
|
if (expiry == 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
rscp = rsc_lookup(&rsci);
|
|
if (!rscp)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
/* uid, or NEGATIVE */
|
|
rv = get_int(&mesg, &rsci.cred.cr_uid);
|
|
if (rv == -EINVAL)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
if (rv == -ENOENT)
|
|
set_bit(CACHE_NEGATIVE, &rsci.h.flags);
|
|
else {
|
|
int N, i;
|
|
|
|
/* gid */
|
|
if (get_int(&mesg, &rsci.cred.cr_gid))
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
/* number of additional gid's */
|
|
if (get_int(&mesg, &N))
|
|
goto out;
|
|
status = -ENOMEM;
|
|
rsci.cred.cr_group_info = groups_alloc(N);
|
|
if (rsci.cred.cr_group_info == NULL)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
/* gid's */
|
|
status = -EINVAL;
|
|
for (i=0; i<N; i++) {
|
|
gid_t gid;
|
|
if (get_int(&mesg, &gid))
|
|
goto out;
|
|
GROUP_AT(rsci.cred.cr_group_info, i) = gid;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* mech name */
|
|
len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
|
|
if (len < 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
gm = gss_mech_get_by_name(buf);
|
|
status = -EOPNOTSUPP;
|
|
if (!gm)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
status = -EINVAL;
|
|
/* mech-specific data: */
|
|
len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
|
|
if (len < 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
status = gss_import_sec_context(buf, len, gm, &rsci.mechctx);
|
|
if (status)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
rsci.h.expiry_time = expiry;
|
|
rscp = rsc_update(&rsci, rscp);
|
|
status = 0;
|
|
out:
|
|
gss_mech_put(gm);
|
|
rsc_free(&rsci);
|
|
if (rscp)
|
|
cache_put(&rscp->h, &rsc_cache);
|
|
else
|
|
status = -ENOMEM;
|
|
return status;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static struct cache_detail rsc_cache = {
|
|
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
|
|
.hash_size = RSC_HASHMAX,
|
|
.hash_table = rsc_table,
|
|
.name = "auth.rpcsec.context",
|
|
.cache_put = rsc_put,
|
|
.cache_parse = rsc_parse,
|
|
.match = rsc_match,
|
|
.init = rsc_init,
|
|
.update = update_rsc,
|
|
.alloc = rsc_alloc,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static struct rsc *rsc_lookup(struct rsc *item)
|
|
{
|
|
struct cache_head *ch;
|
|
int hash = rsc_hash(item);
|
|
|
|
ch = sunrpc_cache_lookup(&rsc_cache, &item->h, hash);
|
|
if (ch)
|
|
return container_of(ch, struct rsc, h);
|
|
else
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static struct rsc *rsc_update(struct rsc *new, struct rsc *old)
|
|
{
|
|
struct cache_head *ch;
|
|
int hash = rsc_hash(new);
|
|
|
|
ch = sunrpc_cache_update(&rsc_cache, &new->h,
|
|
&old->h, hash);
|
|
if (ch)
|
|
return container_of(ch, struct rsc, h);
|
|
else
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static struct rsc *
|
|
gss_svc_searchbyctx(struct xdr_netobj *handle)
|
|
{
|
|
struct rsc rsci;
|
|
struct rsc *found;
|
|
|
|
memset(&rsci, 0, sizeof(rsci));
|
|
if (dup_to_netobj(&rsci.handle, handle->data, handle->len))
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
found = rsc_lookup(&rsci);
|
|
rsc_free(&rsci);
|
|
if (!found)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
if (cache_check(&rsc_cache, &found->h, NULL))
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
return found;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Implements sequence number algorithm as specified in RFC 2203. */
|
|
static int
|
|
gss_check_seq_num(struct rsc *rsci, int seq_num)
|
|
{
|
|
struct gss_svc_seq_data *sd = &rsci->seqdata;
|
|
|
|
spin_lock(&sd->sd_lock);
|
|
if (seq_num > sd->sd_max) {
|
|
if (seq_num >= sd->sd_max + GSS_SEQ_WIN) {
|
|
memset(sd->sd_win,0,sizeof(sd->sd_win));
|
|
sd->sd_max = seq_num;
|
|
} else while (sd->sd_max < seq_num) {
|
|
sd->sd_max++;
|
|
__clear_bit(sd->sd_max % GSS_SEQ_WIN, sd->sd_win);
|
|
}
|
|
__set_bit(seq_num % GSS_SEQ_WIN, sd->sd_win);
|
|
goto ok;
|
|
} else if (seq_num <= sd->sd_max - GSS_SEQ_WIN) {
|
|
goto drop;
|
|
}
|
|
/* sd_max - GSS_SEQ_WIN < seq_num <= sd_max */
|
|
if (__test_and_set_bit(seq_num % GSS_SEQ_WIN, sd->sd_win))
|
|
goto drop;
|
|
ok:
|
|
spin_unlock(&sd->sd_lock);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
drop:
|
|
spin_unlock(&sd->sd_lock);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline u32 round_up_to_quad(u32 i)
|
|
{
|
|
return (i + 3 ) & ~3;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline int
|
|
svc_safe_getnetobj(struct kvec *argv, struct xdr_netobj *o)
|
|
{
|
|
int l;
|
|
|
|
if (argv->iov_len < 4)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
o->len = svc_getnl(argv);
|
|
l = round_up_to_quad(o->len);
|
|
if (argv->iov_len < l)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
o->data = argv->iov_base;
|
|
argv->iov_base += l;
|
|
argv->iov_len -= l;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline int
|
|
svc_safe_putnetobj(struct kvec *resv, struct xdr_netobj *o)
|
|
{
|
|
u8 *p;
|
|
|
|
if (resv->iov_len + 4 > PAGE_SIZE)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
svc_putnl(resv, o->len);
|
|
p = resv->iov_base + resv->iov_len;
|
|
resv->iov_len += round_up_to_quad(o->len);
|
|
if (resv->iov_len > PAGE_SIZE)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
memcpy(p, o->data, o->len);
|
|
memset(p + o->len, 0, round_up_to_quad(o->len) - o->len);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Verify the checksum on the header and return SVC_OK on success.
|
|
* Otherwise, return SVC_DROP (in the case of a bad sequence number)
|
|
* or return SVC_DENIED and indicate error in authp.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
gss_verify_header(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct rsc *rsci,
|
|
__be32 *rpcstart, struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc, __be32 *authp)
|
|
{
|
|
struct gss_ctx *ctx_id = rsci->mechctx;
|
|
struct xdr_buf rpchdr;
|
|
struct xdr_netobj checksum;
|
|
u32 flavor = 0;
|
|
struct kvec *argv = &rqstp->rq_arg.head[0];
|
|
struct kvec iov;
|
|
|
|
/* data to compute the checksum over: */
|
|
iov.iov_base = rpcstart;
|
|
iov.iov_len = (u8 *)argv->iov_base - (u8 *)rpcstart;
|
|
xdr_buf_from_iov(&iov, &rpchdr);
|
|
|
|
*authp = rpc_autherr_badverf;
|
|
if (argv->iov_len < 4)
|
|
return SVC_DENIED;
|
|
flavor = svc_getnl(argv);
|
|
if (flavor != RPC_AUTH_GSS)
|
|
return SVC_DENIED;
|
|
if (svc_safe_getnetobj(argv, &checksum))
|
|
return SVC_DENIED;
|
|
|
|
if (rqstp->rq_deferred) /* skip verification of revisited request */
|
|
return SVC_OK;
|
|
if (gss_verify_mic(ctx_id, &rpchdr, &checksum) != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
|
|
*authp = rpcsec_gsserr_credproblem;
|
|
return SVC_DENIED;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (gc->gc_seq > MAXSEQ) {
|
|
dprintk("RPC: svcauth_gss: discarding request with large sequence number %d\n",
|
|
gc->gc_seq);
|
|
*authp = rpcsec_gsserr_ctxproblem;
|
|
return SVC_DENIED;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!gss_check_seq_num(rsci, gc->gc_seq)) {
|
|
dprintk("RPC: svcauth_gss: discarding request with old sequence number %d\n",
|
|
gc->gc_seq);
|
|
return SVC_DROP;
|
|
}
|
|
return SVC_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
gss_write_null_verf(struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
|
|
{
|
|
__be32 *p;
|
|
|
|
svc_putnl(rqstp->rq_res.head, RPC_AUTH_NULL);
|
|
p = rqstp->rq_res.head->iov_base + rqstp->rq_res.head->iov_len;
|
|
/* don't really need to check if head->iov_len > PAGE_SIZE ... */
|
|
*p++ = 0;
|
|
if (!xdr_ressize_check(rqstp, p))
|
|
return -1;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
gss_write_verf(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct gss_ctx *ctx_id, u32 seq)
|
|
{
|
|
__be32 xdr_seq;
|
|
u32 maj_stat;
|
|
struct xdr_buf verf_data;
|
|
struct xdr_netobj mic;
|
|
__be32 *p;
|
|
struct kvec iov;
|
|
|
|
svc_putnl(rqstp->rq_res.head, RPC_AUTH_GSS);
|
|
xdr_seq = htonl(seq);
|
|
|
|
iov.iov_base = &xdr_seq;
|
|
iov.iov_len = sizeof(xdr_seq);
|
|
xdr_buf_from_iov(&iov, &verf_data);
|
|
p = rqstp->rq_res.head->iov_base + rqstp->rq_res.head->iov_len;
|
|
mic.data = (u8 *)(p + 1);
|
|
maj_stat = gss_get_mic(ctx_id, &verf_data, &mic);
|
|
if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
*p++ = htonl(mic.len);
|
|
memset((u8 *)p + mic.len, 0, round_up_to_quad(mic.len) - mic.len);
|
|
p += XDR_QUADLEN(mic.len);
|
|
if (!xdr_ressize_check(rqstp, p))
|
|
return -1;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
struct gss_domain {
|
|
struct auth_domain h;
|
|
u32 pseudoflavor;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static struct auth_domain *
|
|
find_gss_auth_domain(struct gss_ctx *ctx, u32 svc)
|
|
{
|
|
char *name;
|
|
|
|
name = gss_service_to_auth_domain_name(ctx->mech_type, svc);
|
|
if (!name)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
return auth_domain_find(name);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static struct auth_ops svcauthops_gss;
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
svcauth_gss_register_pseudoflavor(u32 pseudoflavor, char * name)
|
|
{
|
|
struct gss_domain *new;
|
|
struct auth_domain *test;
|
|
int stat = -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
new = kmalloc(sizeof(*new), GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!new)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
kref_init(&new->h.ref);
|
|
new->h.name = kstrdup(name, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!new->h.name)
|
|
goto out_free_dom;
|
|
new->h.flavour = &svcauthops_gss;
|
|
new->pseudoflavor = pseudoflavor;
|
|
|
|
test = auth_domain_lookup(name, &new->h);
|
|
if (test != &new->h) { /* XXX Duplicate registration? */
|
|
auth_domain_put(&new->h);
|
|
/* dangling ref-count... */
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
out_free_dom:
|
|
kfree(new);
|
|
out:
|
|
return stat;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(svcauth_gss_register_pseudoflavor);
|
|
|
|
static inline int
|
|
read_u32_from_xdr_buf(struct xdr_buf *buf, int base, u32 *obj)
|
|
{
|
|
__be32 raw;
|
|
int status;
|
|
|
|
status = read_bytes_from_xdr_buf(buf, base, &raw, sizeof(*obj));
|
|
if (status)
|
|
return status;
|
|
*obj = ntohl(raw);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* It would be nice if this bit of code could be shared with the client.
|
|
* Obstacles:
|
|
* The client shouldn't malloc(), would have to pass in own memory.
|
|
* The server uses base of head iovec as read pointer, while the
|
|
* client uses separate pointer. */
|
|
static int
|
|
unwrap_integ_data(struct xdr_buf *buf, u32 seq, struct gss_ctx *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
int stat = -EINVAL;
|
|
u32 integ_len, maj_stat;
|
|
struct xdr_netobj mic;
|
|
struct xdr_buf integ_buf;
|
|
|
|
integ_len = svc_getnl(&buf->head[0]);
|
|
if (integ_len & 3)
|
|
return stat;
|
|
if (integ_len > buf->len)
|
|
return stat;
|
|
if (xdr_buf_subsegment(buf, &integ_buf, 0, integ_len))
|
|
BUG();
|
|
/* copy out mic... */
|
|
if (read_u32_from_xdr_buf(buf, integ_len, &mic.len))
|
|
BUG();
|
|
if (mic.len > RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE)
|
|
return stat;
|
|
mic.data = kmalloc(mic.len, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!mic.data)
|
|
return stat;
|
|
if (read_bytes_from_xdr_buf(buf, integ_len + 4, mic.data, mic.len))
|
|
goto out;
|
|
maj_stat = gss_verify_mic(ctx, &integ_buf, &mic);
|
|
if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
if (svc_getnl(&buf->head[0]) != seq)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
stat = 0;
|
|
out:
|
|
kfree(mic.data);
|
|
return stat;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline int
|
|
total_buf_len(struct xdr_buf *buf)
|
|
{
|
|
return buf->head[0].iov_len + buf->page_len + buf->tail[0].iov_len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
fix_priv_head(struct xdr_buf *buf, int pad)
|
|
{
|
|
if (buf->page_len == 0) {
|
|
/* We need to adjust head and buf->len in tandem in this
|
|
* case to make svc_defer() work--it finds the original
|
|
* buffer start using buf->len - buf->head[0].iov_len. */
|
|
buf->head[0].iov_len -= pad;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
unwrap_priv_data(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct xdr_buf *buf, u32 seq, struct gss_ctx *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
u32 priv_len, maj_stat;
|
|
int pad, saved_len, remaining_len, offset;
|
|
|
|
rqstp->rq_sendfile_ok = 0;
|
|
|
|
priv_len = svc_getnl(&buf->head[0]);
|
|
if (rqstp->rq_deferred) {
|
|
/* Already decrypted last time through! The sequence number
|
|
* check at out_seq is unnecessary but harmless: */
|
|
goto out_seq;
|
|
}
|
|
/* buf->len is the number of bytes from the original start of the
|
|
* request to the end, where head[0].iov_len is just the bytes
|
|
* not yet read from the head, so these two values are different: */
|
|
remaining_len = total_buf_len(buf);
|
|
if (priv_len > remaining_len)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
pad = remaining_len - priv_len;
|
|
buf->len -= pad;
|
|
fix_priv_head(buf, pad);
|
|
|
|
/* Maybe it would be better to give gss_unwrap a length parameter: */
|
|
saved_len = buf->len;
|
|
buf->len = priv_len;
|
|
maj_stat = gss_unwrap(ctx, 0, buf);
|
|
pad = priv_len - buf->len;
|
|
buf->len = saved_len;
|
|
buf->len -= pad;
|
|
/* The upper layers assume the buffer is aligned on 4-byte boundaries.
|
|
* In the krb5p case, at least, the data ends up offset, so we need to
|
|
* move it around. */
|
|
/* XXX: This is very inefficient. It would be better to either do
|
|
* this while we encrypt, or maybe in the receive code, if we can peak
|
|
* ahead and work out the service and mechanism there. */
|
|
offset = buf->head[0].iov_len % 4;
|
|
if (offset) {
|
|
buf->buflen = RPCSVC_MAXPAYLOAD;
|
|
xdr_shift_buf(buf, offset);
|
|
fix_priv_head(buf, pad);
|
|
}
|
|
if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
out_seq:
|
|
if (svc_getnl(&buf->head[0]) != seq)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
struct gss_svc_data {
|
|
/* decoded gss client cred: */
|
|
struct rpc_gss_wire_cred clcred;
|
|
/* save a pointer to the beginning of the encoded verifier,
|
|
* for use in encryption/checksumming in svcauth_gss_release: */
|
|
__be32 *verf_start;
|
|
struct rsc *rsci;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
svcauth_gss_set_client(struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
|
|
{
|
|
struct gss_svc_data *svcdata = rqstp->rq_auth_data;
|
|
struct rsc *rsci = svcdata->rsci;
|
|
struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc = &svcdata->clcred;
|
|
|
|
rqstp->rq_client = find_gss_auth_domain(rsci->mechctx, gc->gc_svc);
|
|
if (rqstp->rq_client == NULL)
|
|
return SVC_DENIED;
|
|
return SVC_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline int
|
|
gss_write_init_verf(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct rsi *rsip)
|
|
{
|
|
struct rsc *rsci;
|
|
|
|
if (rsip->major_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
|
|
return gss_write_null_verf(rqstp);
|
|
rsci = gss_svc_searchbyctx(&rsip->out_handle);
|
|
if (rsci == NULL) {
|
|
rsip->major_status = GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
|
|
return gss_write_null_verf(rqstp);
|
|
}
|
|
return gss_write_verf(rqstp, rsci->mechctx, GSS_SEQ_WIN);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Accept an rpcsec packet.
|
|
* If context establishment, punt to user space
|
|
* If data exchange, verify/decrypt
|
|
* If context destruction, handle here
|
|
* In the context establishment and destruction case we encode
|
|
* response here and return SVC_COMPLETE.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
svcauth_gss_accept(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *authp)
|
|
{
|
|
struct kvec *argv = &rqstp->rq_arg.head[0];
|
|
struct kvec *resv = &rqstp->rq_res.head[0];
|
|
u32 crlen;
|
|
struct xdr_netobj tmpobj;
|
|
struct gss_svc_data *svcdata = rqstp->rq_auth_data;
|
|
struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc;
|
|
struct rsc *rsci = NULL;
|
|
struct rsi *rsip, rsikey;
|
|
__be32 *rpcstart;
|
|
__be32 *reject_stat = resv->iov_base + resv->iov_len;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
dprintk("RPC: svcauth_gss: argv->iov_len = %zd\n",argv->iov_len);
|
|
|
|
*authp = rpc_autherr_badcred;
|
|
if (!svcdata)
|
|
svcdata = kmalloc(sizeof(*svcdata), GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!svcdata)
|
|
goto auth_err;
|
|
rqstp->rq_auth_data = svcdata;
|
|
svcdata->verf_start = NULL;
|
|
svcdata->rsci = NULL;
|
|
gc = &svcdata->clcred;
|
|
|
|
/* start of rpc packet is 7 u32's back from here:
|
|
* xid direction rpcversion prog vers proc flavour
|
|
*/
|
|
rpcstart = argv->iov_base;
|
|
rpcstart -= 7;
|
|
|
|
/* credential is:
|
|
* version(==1), proc(0,1,2,3), seq, service (1,2,3), handle
|
|
* at least 5 u32s, and is preceeded by length, so that makes 6.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (argv->iov_len < 5 * 4)
|
|
goto auth_err;
|
|
crlen = svc_getnl(argv);
|
|
if (svc_getnl(argv) != RPC_GSS_VERSION)
|
|
goto auth_err;
|
|
gc->gc_proc = svc_getnl(argv);
|
|
gc->gc_seq = svc_getnl(argv);
|
|
gc->gc_svc = svc_getnl(argv);
|
|
if (svc_safe_getnetobj(argv, &gc->gc_ctx))
|
|
goto auth_err;
|
|
if (crlen != round_up_to_quad(gc->gc_ctx.len) + 5 * 4)
|
|
goto auth_err;
|
|
|
|
if ((gc->gc_proc != RPC_GSS_PROC_DATA) && (rqstp->rq_proc != 0))
|
|
goto auth_err;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We've successfully parsed the credential. Let's check out the
|
|
* verifier. An AUTH_NULL verifier is allowed (and required) for
|
|
* INIT and CONTINUE_INIT requests. AUTH_RPCSEC_GSS is required for
|
|
* PROC_DATA and PROC_DESTROY.
|
|
*
|
|
* AUTH_NULL verifier is 0 (AUTH_NULL), 0 (length).
|
|
* AUTH_RPCSEC_GSS verifier is:
|
|
* 6 (AUTH_RPCSEC_GSS), length, checksum.
|
|
* checksum is calculated over rpcheader from xid up to here.
|
|
*/
|
|
*authp = rpc_autherr_badverf;
|
|
switch (gc->gc_proc) {
|
|
case RPC_GSS_PROC_INIT:
|
|
case RPC_GSS_PROC_CONTINUE_INIT:
|
|
if (argv->iov_len < 2 * 4)
|
|
goto auth_err;
|
|
if (svc_getnl(argv) != RPC_AUTH_NULL)
|
|
goto auth_err;
|
|
if (svc_getnl(argv) != 0)
|
|
goto auth_err;
|
|
break;
|
|
case RPC_GSS_PROC_DATA:
|
|
case RPC_GSS_PROC_DESTROY:
|
|
*authp = rpcsec_gsserr_credproblem;
|
|
rsci = gss_svc_searchbyctx(&gc->gc_ctx);
|
|
if (!rsci)
|
|
goto auth_err;
|
|
switch (gss_verify_header(rqstp, rsci, rpcstart, gc, authp)) {
|
|
case SVC_OK:
|
|
break;
|
|
case SVC_DENIED:
|
|
goto auth_err;
|
|
case SVC_DROP:
|
|
goto drop;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
*authp = rpc_autherr_rejectedcred;
|
|
goto auth_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* now act upon the command: */
|
|
switch (gc->gc_proc) {
|
|
case RPC_GSS_PROC_INIT:
|
|
case RPC_GSS_PROC_CONTINUE_INIT:
|
|
*authp = rpc_autherr_badcred;
|
|
if (gc->gc_proc == RPC_GSS_PROC_INIT && gc->gc_ctx.len != 0)
|
|
goto auth_err;
|
|
memset(&rsikey, 0, sizeof(rsikey));
|
|
if (dup_netobj(&rsikey.in_handle, &gc->gc_ctx))
|
|
goto drop;
|
|
*authp = rpc_autherr_badverf;
|
|
if (svc_safe_getnetobj(argv, &tmpobj)) {
|
|
kfree(rsikey.in_handle.data);
|
|
goto auth_err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (dup_netobj(&rsikey.in_token, &tmpobj)) {
|
|
kfree(rsikey.in_handle.data);
|
|
goto drop;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rsip = rsi_lookup(&rsikey);
|
|
rsi_free(&rsikey);
|
|
if (!rsip) {
|
|
goto drop;
|
|
}
|
|
switch(cache_check(&rsi_cache, &rsip->h, &rqstp->rq_chandle)) {
|
|
case -EAGAIN:
|
|
goto drop;
|
|
case -ENOENT:
|
|
goto drop;
|
|
case 0:
|
|
if (gss_write_init_verf(rqstp, rsip))
|
|
goto drop;
|
|
if (resv->iov_len + 4 > PAGE_SIZE)
|
|
goto drop;
|
|
svc_putnl(resv, RPC_SUCCESS);
|
|
if (svc_safe_putnetobj(resv, &rsip->out_handle))
|
|
goto drop;
|
|
if (resv->iov_len + 3 * 4 > PAGE_SIZE)
|
|
goto drop;
|
|
svc_putnl(resv, rsip->major_status);
|
|
svc_putnl(resv, rsip->minor_status);
|
|
svc_putnl(resv, GSS_SEQ_WIN);
|
|
if (svc_safe_putnetobj(resv, &rsip->out_token))
|
|
goto drop;
|
|
rqstp->rq_client = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
goto complete;
|
|
case RPC_GSS_PROC_DESTROY:
|
|
set_bit(CACHE_NEGATIVE, &rsci->h.flags);
|
|
if (resv->iov_len + 4 > PAGE_SIZE)
|
|
goto drop;
|
|
svc_putnl(resv, RPC_SUCCESS);
|
|
goto complete;
|
|
case RPC_GSS_PROC_DATA:
|
|
*authp = rpcsec_gsserr_ctxproblem;
|
|
svcdata->verf_start = resv->iov_base + resv->iov_len;
|
|
if (gss_write_verf(rqstp, rsci->mechctx, gc->gc_seq))
|
|
goto auth_err;
|
|
rqstp->rq_cred = rsci->cred;
|
|
get_group_info(rsci->cred.cr_group_info);
|
|
*authp = rpc_autherr_badcred;
|
|
switch (gc->gc_svc) {
|
|
case RPC_GSS_SVC_NONE:
|
|
break;
|
|
case RPC_GSS_SVC_INTEGRITY:
|
|
if (unwrap_integ_data(&rqstp->rq_arg,
|
|
gc->gc_seq, rsci->mechctx))
|
|
goto auth_err;
|
|
/* placeholders for length and seq. number: */
|
|
svc_putnl(resv, 0);
|
|
svc_putnl(resv, 0);
|
|
break;
|
|
case RPC_GSS_SVC_PRIVACY:
|
|
if (unwrap_priv_data(rqstp, &rqstp->rq_arg,
|
|
gc->gc_seq, rsci->mechctx))
|
|
goto auth_err;
|
|
/* placeholders for length and seq. number: */
|
|
svc_putnl(resv, 0);
|
|
svc_putnl(resv, 0);
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
goto auth_err;
|
|
}
|
|
svcdata->rsci = rsci;
|
|
cache_get(&rsci->h);
|
|
ret = SVC_OK;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
auth_err:
|
|
/* Restore write pointer to original value: */
|
|
xdr_ressize_check(rqstp, reject_stat);
|
|
ret = SVC_DENIED;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
complete:
|
|
ret = SVC_COMPLETE;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
drop:
|
|
ret = SVC_DROP;
|
|
out:
|
|
if (rsci)
|
|
cache_put(&rsci->h, &rsc_cache);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static __be32 *
|
|
svcauth_gss_prepare_to_wrap(struct xdr_buf *resbuf, struct gss_svc_data *gsd)
|
|
{
|
|
__be32 *p;
|
|
u32 verf_len;
|
|
|
|
p = gsd->verf_start;
|
|
gsd->verf_start = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* If the reply stat is nonzero, don't wrap: */
|
|
if (*(p-1) != rpc_success)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
/* Skip the verifier: */
|
|
p += 1;
|
|
verf_len = ntohl(*p++);
|
|
p += XDR_QUADLEN(verf_len);
|
|
/* move accept_stat to right place: */
|
|
memcpy(p, p + 2, 4);
|
|
/* Also don't wrap if the accept stat is nonzero: */
|
|
if (*p != rpc_success) {
|
|
resbuf->head[0].iov_len -= 2 * 4;
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
p++;
|
|
return p;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline int
|
|
svcauth_gss_wrap_resp_integ(struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
|
|
{
|
|
struct gss_svc_data *gsd = (struct gss_svc_data *)rqstp->rq_auth_data;
|
|
struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc = &gsd->clcred;
|
|
struct xdr_buf *resbuf = &rqstp->rq_res;
|
|
struct xdr_buf integ_buf;
|
|
struct xdr_netobj mic;
|
|
struct kvec *resv;
|
|
__be32 *p;
|
|
int integ_offset, integ_len;
|
|
int stat = -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
p = svcauth_gss_prepare_to_wrap(resbuf, gsd);
|
|
if (p == NULL)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
integ_offset = (u8 *)(p + 1) - (u8 *)resbuf->head[0].iov_base;
|
|
integ_len = resbuf->len - integ_offset;
|
|
BUG_ON(integ_len % 4);
|
|
*p++ = htonl(integ_len);
|
|
*p++ = htonl(gc->gc_seq);
|
|
if (xdr_buf_subsegment(resbuf, &integ_buf, integ_offset,
|
|
integ_len))
|
|
BUG();
|
|
if (resbuf->page_len == 0
|
|
&& resbuf->head[0].iov_len + RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE
|
|
< PAGE_SIZE) {
|
|
BUG_ON(resbuf->tail[0].iov_len);
|
|
/* Use head for everything */
|
|
resv = &resbuf->head[0];
|
|
} else if (resbuf->tail[0].iov_base == NULL) {
|
|
if (resbuf->head[0].iov_len + RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE > PAGE_SIZE)
|
|
goto out_err;
|
|
resbuf->tail[0].iov_base = resbuf->head[0].iov_base
|
|
+ resbuf->head[0].iov_len;
|
|
resbuf->tail[0].iov_len = 0;
|
|
resv = &resbuf->tail[0];
|
|
} else {
|
|
resv = &resbuf->tail[0];
|
|
}
|
|
mic.data = (u8 *)resv->iov_base + resv->iov_len + 4;
|
|
if (gss_get_mic(gsd->rsci->mechctx, &integ_buf, &mic))
|
|
goto out_err;
|
|
svc_putnl(resv, mic.len);
|
|
memset(mic.data + mic.len, 0,
|
|
round_up_to_quad(mic.len) - mic.len);
|
|
resv->iov_len += XDR_QUADLEN(mic.len) << 2;
|
|
/* not strictly required: */
|
|
resbuf->len += XDR_QUADLEN(mic.len) << 2;
|
|
BUG_ON(resv->iov_len > PAGE_SIZE);
|
|
out:
|
|
stat = 0;
|
|
out_err:
|
|
return stat;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline int
|
|
svcauth_gss_wrap_resp_priv(struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
|
|
{
|
|
struct gss_svc_data *gsd = (struct gss_svc_data *)rqstp->rq_auth_data;
|
|
struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc = &gsd->clcred;
|
|
struct xdr_buf *resbuf = &rqstp->rq_res;
|
|
struct page **inpages = NULL;
|
|
__be32 *p, *len;
|
|
int offset;
|
|
int pad;
|
|
|
|
p = svcauth_gss_prepare_to_wrap(resbuf, gsd);
|
|
if (p == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
len = p++;
|
|
offset = (u8 *)p - (u8 *)resbuf->head[0].iov_base;
|
|
*p++ = htonl(gc->gc_seq);
|
|
inpages = resbuf->pages;
|
|
/* XXX: Would be better to write some xdr helper functions for
|
|
* nfs{2,3,4}xdr.c that place the data right, instead of copying: */
|
|
if (resbuf->tail[0].iov_base) {
|
|
BUG_ON(resbuf->tail[0].iov_base >= resbuf->head[0].iov_base
|
|
+ PAGE_SIZE);
|
|
BUG_ON(resbuf->tail[0].iov_base < resbuf->head[0].iov_base);
|
|
if (resbuf->tail[0].iov_len + resbuf->head[0].iov_len
|
|
+ 2 * RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE > PAGE_SIZE)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
memmove(resbuf->tail[0].iov_base + RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE,
|
|
resbuf->tail[0].iov_base,
|
|
resbuf->tail[0].iov_len);
|
|
resbuf->tail[0].iov_base += RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE;
|
|
}
|
|
if (resbuf->tail[0].iov_base == NULL) {
|
|
if (resbuf->head[0].iov_len + 2*RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE > PAGE_SIZE)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
resbuf->tail[0].iov_base = resbuf->head[0].iov_base
|
|
+ resbuf->head[0].iov_len + RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE;
|
|
resbuf->tail[0].iov_len = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (gss_wrap(gsd->rsci->mechctx, offset, resbuf, inpages))
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
*len = htonl(resbuf->len - offset);
|
|
pad = 3 - ((resbuf->len - offset - 1)&3);
|
|
p = (__be32 *)(resbuf->tail[0].iov_base + resbuf->tail[0].iov_len);
|
|
memset(p, 0, pad);
|
|
resbuf->tail[0].iov_len += pad;
|
|
resbuf->len += pad;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
svcauth_gss_release(struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
|
|
{
|
|
struct gss_svc_data *gsd = (struct gss_svc_data *)rqstp->rq_auth_data;
|
|
struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc = &gsd->clcred;
|
|
struct xdr_buf *resbuf = &rqstp->rq_res;
|
|
int stat = -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
if (gc->gc_proc != RPC_GSS_PROC_DATA)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
/* Release can be called twice, but we only wrap once. */
|
|
if (gsd->verf_start == NULL)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
/* normally not set till svc_send, but we need it here: */
|
|
/* XXX: what for? Do we mess it up the moment we call svc_putu32
|
|
* or whatever? */
|
|
resbuf->len = total_buf_len(resbuf);
|
|
switch (gc->gc_svc) {
|
|
case RPC_GSS_SVC_NONE:
|
|
break;
|
|
case RPC_GSS_SVC_INTEGRITY:
|
|
stat = svcauth_gss_wrap_resp_integ(rqstp);
|
|
if (stat)
|
|
goto out_err;
|
|
break;
|
|
case RPC_GSS_SVC_PRIVACY:
|
|
stat = svcauth_gss_wrap_resp_priv(rqstp);
|
|
if (stat)
|
|
goto out_err;
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
goto out_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
stat = 0;
|
|
out_err:
|
|
if (rqstp->rq_client)
|
|
auth_domain_put(rqstp->rq_client);
|
|
rqstp->rq_client = NULL;
|
|
if (rqstp->rq_cred.cr_group_info)
|
|
put_group_info(rqstp->rq_cred.cr_group_info);
|
|
rqstp->rq_cred.cr_group_info = NULL;
|
|
if (gsd->rsci)
|
|
cache_put(&gsd->rsci->h, &rsc_cache);
|
|
gsd->rsci = NULL;
|
|
|
|
return stat;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
svcauth_gss_domain_release(struct auth_domain *dom)
|
|
{
|
|
struct gss_domain *gd = container_of(dom, struct gss_domain, h);
|
|
|
|
kfree(dom->name);
|
|
kfree(gd);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static struct auth_ops svcauthops_gss = {
|
|
.name = "rpcsec_gss",
|
|
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
|
|
.flavour = RPC_AUTH_GSS,
|
|
.accept = svcauth_gss_accept,
|
|
.release = svcauth_gss_release,
|
|
.domain_release = svcauth_gss_domain_release,
|
|
.set_client = svcauth_gss_set_client,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
gss_svc_init(void)
|
|
{
|
|
int rv = svc_auth_register(RPC_AUTH_GSS, &svcauthops_gss);
|
|
if (rv == 0) {
|
|
cache_register(&rsc_cache);
|
|
cache_register(&rsi_cache);
|
|
}
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
gss_svc_shutdown(void)
|
|
{
|
|
if (cache_unregister(&rsc_cache))
|
|
printk(KERN_ERR "auth_rpcgss: failed to unregister rsc cache\n");
|
|
if (cache_unregister(&rsi_cache))
|
|
printk(KERN_ERR "auth_rpcgss: failed to unregister rsi cache\n");
|
|
svc_auth_unregister(RPC_AUTH_GSS);
|
|
}
|