![Eric W. Biederman](/assets/img/avatar_default.png)
- Replace key_user ->user_ns equality checks with kuid_has_mapping checks. - Use from_kuid to generate key descriptions - Use kuid_t and kgid_t and the associated helpers instead of uid_t and gid_t - Avoid potential problems with file descriptor passing by displaying keys in the user namespace of the opener of key status proc files. Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: keyrings@linux-nfs.org Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
875 lines
21 KiB
C
875 lines
21 KiB
C
/* Manage a process's keyrings
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*
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* Copyright (C) 2004-2005, 2008 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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* Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
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* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
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* as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
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* 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
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*/
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#include <linux/module.h>
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#include <linux/init.h>
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#include <linux/sched.h>
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#include <linux/keyctl.h>
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#include <linux/fs.h>
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#include <linux/err.h>
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#include <linux/mutex.h>
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#include <linux/security.h>
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#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
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#include <asm/uaccess.h>
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#include "internal.h"
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/* Session keyring create vs join semaphore */
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static DEFINE_MUTEX(key_session_mutex);
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/* User keyring creation semaphore */
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static DEFINE_MUTEX(key_user_keyring_mutex);
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/* The root user's tracking struct */
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struct key_user root_key_user = {
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.usage = ATOMIC_INIT(3),
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.cons_lock = __MUTEX_INITIALIZER(root_key_user.cons_lock),
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.lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(root_key_user.lock),
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.nkeys = ATOMIC_INIT(2),
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.nikeys = ATOMIC_INIT(2),
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.uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
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};
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/*
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* Install the user and user session keyrings for the current process's UID.
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*/
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int install_user_keyrings(void)
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{
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struct user_struct *user;
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const struct cred *cred;
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struct key *uid_keyring, *session_keyring;
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char buf[20];
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int ret;
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uid_t uid;
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cred = current_cred();
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user = cred->user;
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uid = from_kuid(cred->user_ns, user->uid);
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kenter("%p{%u}", user, uid);
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if (user->uid_keyring) {
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kleave(" = 0 [exist]");
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return 0;
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}
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mutex_lock(&key_user_keyring_mutex);
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ret = 0;
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if (!user->uid_keyring) {
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/* get the UID-specific keyring
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* - there may be one in existence already as it may have been
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* pinned by a session, but the user_struct pointing to it
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* may have been destroyed by setuid */
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sprintf(buf, "_uid.%u", uid);
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uid_keyring = find_keyring_by_name(buf, true);
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if (IS_ERR(uid_keyring)) {
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uid_keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, user->uid, INVALID_GID,
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cred, KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA,
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NULL);
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if (IS_ERR(uid_keyring)) {
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ret = PTR_ERR(uid_keyring);
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goto error;
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}
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}
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/* get a default session keyring (which might also exist
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* already) */
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sprintf(buf, "_uid_ses.%u", uid);
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session_keyring = find_keyring_by_name(buf, true);
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if (IS_ERR(session_keyring)) {
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session_keyring =
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keyring_alloc(buf, user->uid, INVALID_GID,
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cred, KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
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if (IS_ERR(session_keyring)) {
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ret = PTR_ERR(session_keyring);
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goto error_release;
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}
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/* we install a link from the user session keyring to
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* the user keyring */
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ret = key_link(session_keyring, uid_keyring);
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if (ret < 0)
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goto error_release_both;
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}
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/* install the keyrings */
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user->uid_keyring = uid_keyring;
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user->session_keyring = session_keyring;
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}
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mutex_unlock(&key_user_keyring_mutex);
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kleave(" = 0");
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return 0;
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error_release_both:
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key_put(session_keyring);
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error_release:
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key_put(uid_keyring);
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error:
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mutex_unlock(&key_user_keyring_mutex);
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kleave(" = %d", ret);
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return ret;
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}
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/*
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* Install a fresh thread keyring directly to new credentials. This keyring is
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* allowed to overrun the quota.
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*/
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int install_thread_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *new)
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{
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struct key *keyring;
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keyring = keyring_alloc("_tid", new->uid, new->gid, new,
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KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN, NULL);
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if (IS_ERR(keyring))
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return PTR_ERR(keyring);
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new->thread_keyring = keyring;
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* Install a fresh thread keyring, discarding the old one.
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*/
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static int install_thread_keyring(void)
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{
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struct cred *new;
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int ret;
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new = prepare_creds();
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if (!new)
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return -ENOMEM;
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BUG_ON(new->thread_keyring);
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ret = install_thread_keyring_to_cred(new);
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if (ret < 0) {
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abort_creds(new);
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return ret;
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}
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return commit_creds(new);
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}
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/*
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* Install a process keyring directly to a credentials struct.
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*
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* Returns -EEXIST if there was already a process keyring, 0 if one installed,
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* and other value on any other error
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*/
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int install_process_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *new)
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{
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struct key *keyring;
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int ret;
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if (new->tgcred->process_keyring)
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return -EEXIST;
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keyring = keyring_alloc("_pid", new->uid, new->gid,
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new, KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN, NULL);
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if (IS_ERR(keyring))
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return PTR_ERR(keyring);
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spin_lock_irq(&new->tgcred->lock);
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if (!new->tgcred->process_keyring) {
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new->tgcred->process_keyring = keyring;
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keyring = NULL;
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ret = 0;
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} else {
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ret = -EEXIST;
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}
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spin_unlock_irq(&new->tgcred->lock);
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key_put(keyring);
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return ret;
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}
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/*
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* Make sure a process keyring is installed for the current process. The
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* existing process keyring is not replaced.
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*
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* Returns 0 if there is a process keyring by the end of this function, some
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* error otherwise.
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*/
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static int install_process_keyring(void)
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{
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struct cred *new;
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int ret;
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new = prepare_creds();
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if (!new)
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return -ENOMEM;
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ret = install_process_keyring_to_cred(new);
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if (ret < 0) {
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abort_creds(new);
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return ret != -EEXIST ? ret : 0;
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}
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return commit_creds(new);
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}
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/*
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* Install a session keyring directly to a credentials struct.
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*/
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int install_session_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *cred, struct key *keyring)
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{
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unsigned long flags;
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struct key *old;
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might_sleep();
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/* create an empty session keyring */
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if (!keyring) {
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flags = KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN;
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if (cred->tgcred->session_keyring)
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flags = KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA;
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keyring = keyring_alloc("_ses", cred->uid, cred->gid,
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cred, flags, NULL);
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if (IS_ERR(keyring))
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return PTR_ERR(keyring);
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} else {
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atomic_inc(&keyring->usage);
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}
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/* install the keyring */
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spin_lock_irq(&cred->tgcred->lock);
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old = cred->tgcred->session_keyring;
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rcu_assign_pointer(cred->tgcred->session_keyring, keyring);
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spin_unlock_irq(&cred->tgcred->lock);
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/* we're using RCU on the pointer, but there's no point synchronising
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* on it if it didn't previously point to anything */
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if (old) {
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synchronize_rcu();
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key_put(old);
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}
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* Install a session keyring, discarding the old one. If a keyring is not
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* supplied, an empty one is invented.
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*/
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static int install_session_keyring(struct key *keyring)
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{
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struct cred *new;
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int ret;
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new = prepare_creds();
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if (!new)
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return -ENOMEM;
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ret = install_session_keyring_to_cred(new, keyring);
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if (ret < 0) {
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abort_creds(new);
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return ret;
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}
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return commit_creds(new);
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}
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/*
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* Handle the fsuid changing.
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*/
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void key_fsuid_changed(struct task_struct *tsk)
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{
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/* update the ownership of the thread keyring */
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BUG_ON(!tsk->cred);
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if (tsk->cred->thread_keyring) {
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down_write(&tsk->cred->thread_keyring->sem);
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tsk->cred->thread_keyring->uid = tsk->cred->fsuid;
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up_write(&tsk->cred->thread_keyring->sem);
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}
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}
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/*
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* Handle the fsgid changing.
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*/
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void key_fsgid_changed(struct task_struct *tsk)
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{
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/* update the ownership of the thread keyring */
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BUG_ON(!tsk->cred);
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if (tsk->cred->thread_keyring) {
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down_write(&tsk->cred->thread_keyring->sem);
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tsk->cred->thread_keyring->gid = tsk->cred->fsgid;
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up_write(&tsk->cred->thread_keyring->sem);
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}
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}
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/*
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* Search the process keyrings attached to the supplied cred for the first
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* matching key.
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*
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* The search criteria are the type and the match function. The description is
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* given to the match function as a parameter, but doesn't otherwise influence
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* the search. Typically the match function will compare the description
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* parameter to the key's description.
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*
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* This can only search keyrings that grant Search permission to the supplied
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* credentials. Keyrings linked to searched keyrings will also be searched if
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* they grant Search permission too. Keys can only be found if they grant
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* Search permission to the credentials.
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*
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* Returns a pointer to the key with the key usage count incremented if
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* successful, -EAGAIN if we didn't find any matching key or -ENOKEY if we only
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* matched negative keys.
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*
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* In the case of a successful return, the possession attribute is set on the
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* returned key reference.
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*/
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key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
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const void *description,
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key_match_func_t match,
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bool no_state_check,
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const struct cred *cred)
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{
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key_ref_t key_ref, ret, err;
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/* we want to return -EAGAIN or -ENOKEY if any of the keyrings were
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* searchable, but we failed to find a key or we found a negative key;
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* otherwise we want to return a sample error (probably -EACCES) if
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* none of the keyrings were searchable
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*
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* in terms of priority: success > -ENOKEY > -EAGAIN > other error
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*/
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key_ref = NULL;
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ret = NULL;
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err = ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN);
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/* search the thread keyring first */
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if (cred->thread_keyring) {
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key_ref = keyring_search_aux(
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make_key_ref(cred->thread_keyring, 1),
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cred, type, description, match, no_state_check);
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if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
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goto found;
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switch (PTR_ERR(key_ref)) {
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case -EAGAIN: /* no key */
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if (ret)
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break;
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case -ENOKEY: /* negative key */
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ret = key_ref;
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break;
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default:
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err = key_ref;
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break;
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}
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}
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/* search the process keyring second */
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if (cred->tgcred->process_keyring) {
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key_ref = keyring_search_aux(
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make_key_ref(cred->tgcred->process_keyring, 1),
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cred, type, description, match, no_state_check);
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if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
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goto found;
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switch (PTR_ERR(key_ref)) {
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case -EAGAIN: /* no key */
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if (ret)
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break;
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case -ENOKEY: /* negative key */
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ret = key_ref;
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break;
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default:
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err = key_ref;
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break;
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}
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}
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/* search the session keyring */
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if (cred->tgcred->session_keyring) {
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rcu_read_lock();
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key_ref = keyring_search_aux(
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make_key_ref(rcu_dereference(
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cred->tgcred->session_keyring),
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1),
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cred, type, description, match, no_state_check);
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rcu_read_unlock();
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if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
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goto found;
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switch (PTR_ERR(key_ref)) {
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case -EAGAIN: /* no key */
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if (ret)
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break;
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case -ENOKEY: /* negative key */
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ret = key_ref;
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break;
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default:
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err = key_ref;
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break;
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}
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}
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/* or search the user-session keyring */
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else if (cred->user->session_keyring) {
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key_ref = keyring_search_aux(
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make_key_ref(cred->user->session_keyring, 1),
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cred, type, description, match, no_state_check);
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if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
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goto found;
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switch (PTR_ERR(key_ref)) {
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case -EAGAIN: /* no key */
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if (ret)
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break;
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case -ENOKEY: /* negative key */
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ret = key_ref;
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break;
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default:
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err = key_ref;
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break;
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}
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}
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/* no key - decide on the error we're going to go for */
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key_ref = ret ? ret : err;
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found:
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return key_ref;
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}
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/*
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* Search the process keyrings attached to the supplied cred for the first
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* matching key in the manner of search_my_process_keyrings(), but also search
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* the keys attached to the assumed authorisation key using its credentials if
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* one is available.
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*
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* Return same as search_my_process_keyrings().
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*/
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key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
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const void *description,
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key_match_func_t match,
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const struct cred *cred)
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{
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struct request_key_auth *rka;
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key_ref_t key_ref, ret = ERR_PTR(-EACCES), err;
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might_sleep();
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key_ref = search_my_process_keyrings(type, description, match,
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false, cred);
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if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
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goto found;
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err = key_ref;
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/* if this process has an instantiation authorisation key, then we also
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* search the keyrings of the process mentioned there
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* - we don't permit access to request_key auth keys via this method
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*/
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if (cred->request_key_auth &&
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cred == current_cred() &&
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type != &key_type_request_key_auth
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) {
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/* defend against the auth key being revoked */
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down_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
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if (key_validate(cred->request_key_auth) == 0) {
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rka = cred->request_key_auth->payload.data;
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key_ref = search_process_keyrings(type, description,
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match, rka->cred);
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up_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
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if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
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goto found;
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ret = key_ref;
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} else {
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up_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
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}
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}
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/* no key - decide on the error we're going to go for */
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if (err == ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY) || ret == ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY))
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key_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
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else if (err == ERR_PTR(-EACCES))
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key_ref = ret;
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else
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key_ref = err;
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found:
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return key_ref;
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}
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/*
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* See if the key we're looking at is the target key.
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*/
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int lookup_user_key_possessed(const struct key *key, const void *target)
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{
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return key == target;
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}
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/*
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* Look up a key ID given us by userspace with a given permissions mask to get
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* the key it refers to.
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*
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* Flags can be passed to request that special keyrings be created if referred
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* to directly, to permit partially constructed keys to be found and to skip
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* validity and permission checks on the found key.
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*
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* Returns a pointer to the key with an incremented usage count if successful;
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* -EINVAL if the key ID is invalid; -ENOKEY if the key ID does not correspond
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* to a key or the best found key was a negative key; -EKEYREVOKED or
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* -EKEYEXPIRED if the best found key was revoked or expired; -EACCES if the
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* found key doesn't grant the requested permit or the LSM denied access to it;
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* or -ENOMEM if a special keyring couldn't be created.
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*
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* In the case of a successful return, the possession attribute is set on the
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* returned key reference.
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*/
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key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long lflags,
|
|
key_perm_t perm)
|
|
{
|
|
struct request_key_auth *rka;
|
|
const struct cred *cred;
|
|
struct key *key;
|
|
key_ref_t key_ref, skey_ref;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
try_again:
|
|
cred = get_current_cred();
|
|
key_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
|
|
|
|
switch (id) {
|
|
case KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING:
|
|
if (!cred->thread_keyring) {
|
|
if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE))
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
ret = install_thread_keyring();
|
|
if (ret < 0) {
|
|
key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
goto reget_creds;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
key = cred->thread_keyring;
|
|
atomic_inc(&key->usage);
|
|
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case KEY_SPEC_PROCESS_KEYRING:
|
|
if (!cred->tgcred->process_keyring) {
|
|
if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE))
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
ret = install_process_keyring();
|
|
if (ret < 0) {
|
|
key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
goto reget_creds;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
key = cred->tgcred->process_keyring;
|
|
atomic_inc(&key->usage);
|
|
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING:
|
|
if (!cred->tgcred->session_keyring) {
|
|
/* always install a session keyring upon access if one
|
|
* doesn't exist yet */
|
|
ret = install_user_keyrings();
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
if (lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE)
|
|
ret = join_session_keyring(NULL);
|
|
else
|
|
ret = install_session_keyring(
|
|
cred->user->session_keyring);
|
|
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
goto reget_creds;
|
|
} else if (cred->tgcred->session_keyring ==
|
|
cred->user->session_keyring &&
|
|
lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE) {
|
|
ret = join_session_keyring(NULL);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
goto reget_creds;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rcu_read_lock();
|
|
key = rcu_dereference(cred->tgcred->session_keyring);
|
|
atomic_inc(&key->usage);
|
|
rcu_read_unlock();
|
|
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING:
|
|
if (!cred->user->uid_keyring) {
|
|
ret = install_user_keyrings();
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
key = cred->user->uid_keyring;
|
|
atomic_inc(&key->usage);
|
|
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING:
|
|
if (!cred->user->session_keyring) {
|
|
ret = install_user_keyrings();
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
key = cred->user->session_keyring;
|
|
atomic_inc(&key->usage);
|
|
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case KEY_SPEC_GROUP_KEYRING:
|
|
/* group keyrings are not yet supported */
|
|
key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
case KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY:
|
|
key = cred->request_key_auth;
|
|
if (!key)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
atomic_inc(&key->usage);
|
|
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case KEY_SPEC_REQUESTOR_KEYRING:
|
|
if (!cred->request_key_auth)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
down_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
|
|
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED,
|
|
&cred->request_key_auth->flags)) {
|
|
key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED);
|
|
key = NULL;
|
|
} else {
|
|
rka = cred->request_key_auth->payload.data;
|
|
key = rka->dest_keyring;
|
|
atomic_inc(&key->usage);
|
|
}
|
|
up_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
|
|
if (!key)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
|
|
if (id < 1)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
key = key_lookup(id);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(key)) {
|
|
key_ref = ERR_CAST(key);
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 0);
|
|
|
|
/* check to see if we possess the key */
|
|
skey_ref = search_process_keyrings(key->type, key,
|
|
lookup_user_key_possessed,
|
|
cred);
|
|
|
|
if (!IS_ERR(skey_ref)) {
|
|
key_put(key);
|
|
key_ref = skey_ref;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* unlink does not use the nominated key in any way, so can skip all
|
|
* the permission checks as it is only concerned with the keyring */
|
|
if (lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_FOR_UNLINK) {
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL)) {
|
|
ret = wait_for_key_construction(key, true);
|
|
switch (ret) {
|
|
case -ERESTARTSYS:
|
|
goto invalid_key;
|
|
default:
|
|
if (perm)
|
|
goto invalid_key;
|
|
case 0:
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (perm) {
|
|
ret = key_validate(key);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
goto invalid_key;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = -EIO;
|
|
if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL) &&
|
|
!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags))
|
|
goto invalid_key;
|
|
|
|
/* check the permissions */
|
|
ret = key_task_permission(key_ref, cred, perm);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
goto invalid_key;
|
|
|
|
key->last_used_at = current_kernel_time().tv_sec;
|
|
|
|
error:
|
|
put_cred(cred);
|
|
return key_ref;
|
|
|
|
invalid_key:
|
|
key_ref_put(key_ref);
|
|
key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
/* if we attempted to install a keyring, then it may have caused new
|
|
* creds to be installed */
|
|
reget_creds:
|
|
put_cred(cred);
|
|
goto try_again;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Join the named keyring as the session keyring if possible else attempt to
|
|
* create a new one of that name and join that.
|
|
*
|
|
* If the name is NULL, an empty anonymous keyring will be installed as the
|
|
* session keyring.
|
|
*
|
|
* Named session keyrings are joined with a semaphore held to prevent the
|
|
* keyrings from going away whilst the attempt is made to going them and also
|
|
* to prevent a race in creating compatible session keyrings.
|
|
*/
|
|
long join_session_keyring(const char *name)
|
|
{
|
|
const struct cred *old;
|
|
struct cred *new;
|
|
struct key *keyring;
|
|
long ret, serial;
|
|
|
|
/* only permit this if there's a single thread in the thread group -
|
|
* this avoids us having to adjust the creds on all threads and risking
|
|
* ENOMEM */
|
|
if (!current_is_single_threaded())
|
|
return -EMLINK;
|
|
|
|
new = prepare_creds();
|
|
if (!new)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
old = current_cred();
|
|
|
|
/* if no name is provided, install an anonymous keyring */
|
|
if (!name) {
|
|
ret = install_session_keyring_to_cred(new, NULL);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
serial = new->tgcred->session_keyring->serial;
|
|
ret = commit_creds(new);
|
|
if (ret == 0)
|
|
ret = serial;
|
|
goto okay;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* allow the user to join or create a named keyring */
|
|
mutex_lock(&key_session_mutex);
|
|
|
|
/* look for an existing keyring of this name */
|
|
keyring = find_keyring_by_name(name, false);
|
|
if (PTR_ERR(keyring) == -ENOKEY) {
|
|
/* not found - try and create a new one */
|
|
keyring = keyring_alloc(name, old->uid, old->gid, old,
|
|
KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
|
|
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
|
|
goto error2;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
|
|
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
|
|
goto error2;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* we've got a keyring - now to install it */
|
|
ret = install_session_keyring_to_cred(new, keyring);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
goto error2;
|
|
|
|
commit_creds(new);
|
|
mutex_unlock(&key_session_mutex);
|
|
|
|
ret = keyring->serial;
|
|
key_put(keyring);
|
|
okay:
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
error2:
|
|
mutex_unlock(&key_session_mutex);
|
|
error:
|
|
abort_creds(new);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Replace a process's session keyring on behalf of one of its children when
|
|
* the target process is about to resume userspace execution.
|
|
*/
|
|
void key_change_session_keyring(struct callback_head *twork)
|
|
{
|
|
const struct cred *old = current_cred();
|
|
struct cred *new = container_of(twork, struct cred, rcu);
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_EXITING)) {
|
|
put_cred(new);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
new-> uid = old-> uid;
|
|
new-> euid = old-> euid;
|
|
new-> suid = old-> suid;
|
|
new->fsuid = old->fsuid;
|
|
new-> gid = old-> gid;
|
|
new-> egid = old-> egid;
|
|
new-> sgid = old-> sgid;
|
|
new->fsgid = old->fsgid;
|
|
new->user = get_uid(old->user);
|
|
new->user_ns = get_user_ns(new->user_ns);
|
|
new->group_info = get_group_info(old->group_info);
|
|
|
|
new->securebits = old->securebits;
|
|
new->cap_inheritable = old->cap_inheritable;
|
|
new->cap_permitted = old->cap_permitted;
|
|
new->cap_effective = old->cap_effective;
|
|
new->cap_bset = old->cap_bset;
|
|
|
|
new->jit_keyring = old->jit_keyring;
|
|
new->thread_keyring = key_get(old->thread_keyring);
|
|
new->tgcred->tgid = old->tgcred->tgid;
|
|
new->tgcred->process_keyring = key_get(old->tgcred->process_keyring);
|
|
|
|
security_transfer_creds(new, old);
|
|
|
|
commit_creds(new);
|
|
}
|