alistair23-linux/security
KaiGai Kohei 1190416725 selinux: fast status update interface (/selinux/status)
This patch provides a new /selinux/status entry which allows applications
read-only mmap(2).
This region reflects selinux_kernel_status structure in kernel space.
  struct selinux_kernel_status
  {
          u32     length;         /* length of this structure */
          u32     sequence;       /* sequence number of seqlock logic */
          u32     enforcing;      /* current setting of enforcing mode */
          u32     policyload;     /* times of policy reloaded */
          u32     deny_unknown;   /* current setting of deny_unknown */
  };

When userspace object manager caches access control decisions provided
by SELinux, it needs to invalidate the cache on policy reload and setenforce
to keep consistency.
However, the applications need to check the kernel state for each accesses
on userspace avc, or launch a background worker process.
In heuristic, frequency of invalidation is much less than frequency of
making access control decision, so it is annoying to invoke a system call
to check we don't need to invalidate the userspace cache.
If we can use a background worker thread, it allows to receive invalidation
messages from the kernel. But it requires us an invasive coding toward the
base application in some cases; E.g, when we provide a feature performing
with SELinux as a plugin module, it is unwelcome manner to launch its own
worker thread from the module.

If we could map /selinux/status to process memory space, application can
know updates of selinux status; policy reload or setenforce.

A typical application checks selinux_kernel_status::sequence when it tries
to reference userspace avc. If it was changed from the last time when it
checked userspace avc, it means something was updated in the kernel space.
Then, the application can reset userspace avc or update current enforcing
mode, without any system call invocations.
This sequence number is updated according to the seqlock logic, so we need
to wait for a while if it is odd number.

Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
--
 security/selinux/include/security.h |   21 ++++++
 security/selinux/selinuxfs.c        |   56 +++++++++++++++
 security/selinux/ss/Makefile        |    2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/services.c      |    3 +
 security/selinux/ss/status.c        |  129 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 5 files changed, 210 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-10-21 10:12:36 +11:00
..
apparmor .gitignore: ignore apparmor/rlim_names.h 2010-10-21 10:12:35 +11:00
integrity/ima ima: always maintain counters 2010-09-08 09:51:41 +10:00
keys KEYS: Fix bug in keyctl_session_to_parent() if parent has no session keyring 2010-09-10 07:30:00 -07:00
selinux selinux: fast status update interface (/selinux/status) 2010-10-21 10:12:36 +11:00
smack Merge branch 'for-next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jikos/trivial 2010-08-04 15:31:02 -07:00
tomoyo tomoyo: cleanup. don't store bogus pointer 2010-10-21 10:12:32 +11:00
capability.c Merge branch 'writable_limits' of git://decibel.fi.muni.cz/~xslaby/linux 2010-08-10 12:07:51 -07:00
commoncap.c Make do_execve() take a const filename pointer 2010-08-17 18:07:43 -07:00
device_cgroup.c Merge branch 'master' into next 2010-05-06 10:56:07 +10:00
inode.c securityfs: Drop dentry reference count when mknod fails 2010-08-02 15:34:59 +10:00
Kconfig AppArmor: Enable configuring and building of the AppArmor security module 2010-08-02 15:38:34 +10:00
lsm_audit.c Merge branch 'master' into next 2010-05-06 10:56:07 +10:00
Makefile AppArmor: Enable configuring and building of the AppArmor security module 2010-08-02 15:38:34 +10:00
min_addr.c mmap_min_addr check CAP_SYS_RAWIO only for write 2010-04-23 08:56:31 +10:00
security.c LSM: Fix security_module_enable() error. 2010-10-21 10:12:34 +11:00