![Christoph Hellwig](/assets/img/avatar_default.png)
All the ACL routines are called from inode operations which are guaranteed to have a referenced inode by the VFS, so there's no need for the ACL code to grab another temporary one. SGI-PV: 981498 SGI-Modid: xfs-linux-melb:xfs-kern:31763a Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Lachlan McIlroy <lachlan@sgi.com>
875 lines
21 KiB
C
875 lines
21 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright (c) 2001-2002,2005 Silicon Graphics, Inc.
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* All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
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* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
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* published by the Free Software Foundation.
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*
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* This program is distributed in the hope that it would be useful,
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* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
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* GNU General Public License for more details.
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*
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* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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* along with this program; if not, write the Free Software Foundation,
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* Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA
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*/
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#include "xfs.h"
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#include "xfs_fs.h"
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#include "xfs_types.h"
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#include "xfs_bit.h"
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#include "xfs_inum.h"
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#include "xfs_ag.h"
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#include "xfs_dir2.h"
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#include "xfs_bmap_btree.h"
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#include "xfs_alloc_btree.h"
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#include "xfs_ialloc_btree.h"
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#include "xfs_dir2_sf.h"
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#include "xfs_attr_sf.h"
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#include "xfs_dinode.h"
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#include "xfs_inode.h"
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#include "xfs_btree.h"
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#include "xfs_acl.h"
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#include "xfs_attr.h"
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#include "xfs_vnodeops.h"
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#include <linux/capability.h>
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#include <linux/posix_acl_xattr.h>
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STATIC int xfs_acl_setmode(bhv_vnode_t *, xfs_acl_t *, int *);
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STATIC void xfs_acl_filter_mode(mode_t, xfs_acl_t *);
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STATIC void xfs_acl_get_endian(xfs_acl_t *);
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STATIC int xfs_acl_access(uid_t, gid_t, xfs_acl_t *, mode_t, cred_t *);
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STATIC int xfs_acl_invalid(xfs_acl_t *);
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STATIC void xfs_acl_sync_mode(mode_t, xfs_acl_t *);
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STATIC void xfs_acl_get_attr(bhv_vnode_t *, xfs_acl_t *, int, int, int *);
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STATIC void xfs_acl_set_attr(bhv_vnode_t *, xfs_acl_t *, int, int *);
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STATIC int xfs_acl_allow_set(bhv_vnode_t *, int);
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kmem_zone_t *xfs_acl_zone;
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/*
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* Test for existence of access ACL attribute as efficiently as possible.
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*/
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int
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xfs_acl_vhasacl_access(
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bhv_vnode_t *vp)
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{
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int error;
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xfs_acl_get_attr(vp, NULL, _ACL_TYPE_ACCESS, ATTR_KERNOVAL, &error);
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return (error == 0);
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}
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/*
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* Test for existence of default ACL attribute as efficiently as possible.
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*/
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int
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xfs_acl_vhasacl_default(
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bhv_vnode_t *vp)
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{
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int error;
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if (!S_ISDIR(vp->i_mode))
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return 0;
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xfs_acl_get_attr(vp, NULL, _ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT, ATTR_KERNOVAL, &error);
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return (error == 0);
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}
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/*
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* Convert from extended attribute representation to in-memory for XFS.
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*/
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STATIC int
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posix_acl_xattr_to_xfs(
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posix_acl_xattr_header *src,
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size_t size,
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xfs_acl_t *dest)
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{
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posix_acl_xattr_entry *src_entry;
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xfs_acl_entry_t *dest_entry;
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int n;
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if (!src || !dest)
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return EINVAL;
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if (size < sizeof(posix_acl_xattr_header))
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return EINVAL;
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if (src->a_version != cpu_to_le32(POSIX_ACL_XATTR_VERSION))
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return EOPNOTSUPP;
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memset(dest, 0, sizeof(xfs_acl_t));
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dest->acl_cnt = posix_acl_xattr_count(size);
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if (dest->acl_cnt < 0 || dest->acl_cnt > XFS_ACL_MAX_ENTRIES)
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return EINVAL;
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/*
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* acl_set_file(3) may request that we set default ACLs with
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* zero length -- defend (gracefully) against that here.
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*/
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if (!dest->acl_cnt)
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return 0;
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src_entry = (posix_acl_xattr_entry *)((char *)src + sizeof(*src));
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dest_entry = &dest->acl_entry[0];
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for (n = 0; n < dest->acl_cnt; n++, src_entry++, dest_entry++) {
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dest_entry->ae_perm = le16_to_cpu(src_entry->e_perm);
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if (_ACL_PERM_INVALID(dest_entry->ae_perm))
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return EINVAL;
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dest_entry->ae_tag = le16_to_cpu(src_entry->e_tag);
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switch(dest_entry->ae_tag) {
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case ACL_USER:
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case ACL_GROUP:
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dest_entry->ae_id = le32_to_cpu(src_entry->e_id);
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break;
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case ACL_USER_OBJ:
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case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
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case ACL_MASK:
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case ACL_OTHER:
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dest_entry->ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID;
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break;
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default:
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return EINVAL;
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}
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}
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if (xfs_acl_invalid(dest))
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return EINVAL;
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* Comparison function called from xfs_sort().
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* Primary key is ae_tag, secondary key is ae_id.
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*/
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STATIC int
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xfs_acl_entry_compare(
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const void *va,
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const void *vb)
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{
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xfs_acl_entry_t *a = (xfs_acl_entry_t *)va,
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*b = (xfs_acl_entry_t *)vb;
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if (a->ae_tag == b->ae_tag)
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return (a->ae_id - b->ae_id);
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return (a->ae_tag - b->ae_tag);
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}
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/*
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* Convert from in-memory XFS to extended attribute representation.
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*/
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STATIC int
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posix_acl_xfs_to_xattr(
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xfs_acl_t *src,
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posix_acl_xattr_header *dest,
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size_t size)
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{
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int n;
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size_t new_size = posix_acl_xattr_size(src->acl_cnt);
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posix_acl_xattr_entry *dest_entry;
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xfs_acl_entry_t *src_entry;
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if (size < new_size)
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return -ERANGE;
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/* Need to sort src XFS ACL by <ae_tag,ae_id> */
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xfs_sort(src->acl_entry, src->acl_cnt, sizeof(src->acl_entry[0]),
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xfs_acl_entry_compare);
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dest->a_version = cpu_to_le32(POSIX_ACL_XATTR_VERSION);
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dest_entry = &dest->a_entries[0];
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src_entry = &src->acl_entry[0];
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for (n = 0; n < src->acl_cnt; n++, dest_entry++, src_entry++) {
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dest_entry->e_perm = cpu_to_le16(src_entry->ae_perm);
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if (_ACL_PERM_INVALID(src_entry->ae_perm))
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return -EINVAL;
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dest_entry->e_tag = cpu_to_le16(src_entry->ae_tag);
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switch (src_entry->ae_tag) {
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case ACL_USER:
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case ACL_GROUP:
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dest_entry->e_id = cpu_to_le32(src_entry->ae_id);
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break;
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case ACL_USER_OBJ:
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case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
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case ACL_MASK:
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case ACL_OTHER:
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dest_entry->e_id = cpu_to_le32(ACL_UNDEFINED_ID);
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break;
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default:
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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}
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return new_size;
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}
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int
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xfs_acl_vget(
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bhv_vnode_t *vp,
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void *acl,
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size_t size,
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int kind)
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{
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int error;
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xfs_acl_t *xfs_acl = NULL;
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posix_acl_xattr_header *ext_acl = acl;
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int flags = 0;
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if(size) {
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if (!(_ACL_ALLOC(xfs_acl))) {
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error = ENOMEM;
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goto out;
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}
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memset(xfs_acl, 0, sizeof(xfs_acl_t));
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} else
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flags = ATTR_KERNOVAL;
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xfs_acl_get_attr(vp, xfs_acl, kind, flags, &error);
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if (error)
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goto out;
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if (!size) {
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error = -posix_acl_xattr_size(XFS_ACL_MAX_ENTRIES);
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} else {
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if (xfs_acl_invalid(xfs_acl)) {
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error = EINVAL;
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goto out;
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}
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if (kind == _ACL_TYPE_ACCESS)
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xfs_acl_sync_mode(XFS_I(vp)->i_d.di_mode, xfs_acl);
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error = -posix_acl_xfs_to_xattr(xfs_acl, ext_acl, size);
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}
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out:
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if(xfs_acl)
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_ACL_FREE(xfs_acl);
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return -error;
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}
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int
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xfs_acl_vremove(
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bhv_vnode_t *vp,
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int kind)
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{
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int error;
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error = xfs_acl_allow_set(vp, kind);
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if (!error) {
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error = xfs_attr_remove(XFS_I(vp),
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kind == _ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT?
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SGI_ACL_DEFAULT: SGI_ACL_FILE,
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ATTR_ROOT);
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if (error == ENOATTR)
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error = 0; /* 'scool */
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}
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return -error;
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}
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int
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xfs_acl_vset(
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bhv_vnode_t *vp,
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void *acl,
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size_t size,
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int kind)
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{
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posix_acl_xattr_header *ext_acl = acl;
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xfs_acl_t *xfs_acl;
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int error;
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int basicperms = 0; /* more than std unix perms? */
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if (!acl)
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return -EINVAL;
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if (!(_ACL_ALLOC(xfs_acl)))
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return -ENOMEM;
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error = posix_acl_xattr_to_xfs(ext_acl, size, xfs_acl);
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if (error) {
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_ACL_FREE(xfs_acl);
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return -error;
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}
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if (!xfs_acl->acl_cnt) {
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_ACL_FREE(xfs_acl);
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return 0;
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}
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error = xfs_acl_allow_set(vp, kind);
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/* Incoming ACL exists, set file mode based on its value */
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if (!error && kind == _ACL_TYPE_ACCESS)
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error = xfs_acl_setmode(vp, xfs_acl, &basicperms);
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if (error)
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goto out;
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/*
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* If we have more than std unix permissions, set up the actual attr.
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* Otherwise, delete any existing attr. This prevents us from
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* having actual attrs for permissions that can be stored in the
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* standard permission bits.
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*/
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if (!basicperms) {
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xfs_acl_set_attr(vp, xfs_acl, kind, &error);
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} else {
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error = -xfs_acl_vremove(vp, _ACL_TYPE_ACCESS);
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}
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out:
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_ACL_FREE(xfs_acl);
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return -error;
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}
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int
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xfs_acl_iaccess(
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xfs_inode_t *ip,
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mode_t mode,
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cred_t *cr)
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{
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xfs_acl_t *acl;
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int rval;
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struct xfs_name acl_name = {SGI_ACL_FILE, SGI_ACL_FILE_SIZE};
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if (!(_ACL_ALLOC(acl)))
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return -1;
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/* If the file has no ACL return -1. */
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rval = sizeof(xfs_acl_t);
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if (xfs_attr_fetch(ip, &acl_name, (char *)acl, &rval, ATTR_ROOT)) {
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_ACL_FREE(acl);
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return -1;
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}
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xfs_acl_get_endian(acl);
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/* If the file has an empty ACL return -1. */
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if (acl->acl_cnt == XFS_ACL_NOT_PRESENT) {
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_ACL_FREE(acl);
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return -1;
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}
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/* Synchronize ACL with mode bits */
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xfs_acl_sync_mode(ip->i_d.di_mode, acl);
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rval = xfs_acl_access(ip->i_d.di_uid, ip->i_d.di_gid, acl, mode, cr);
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_ACL_FREE(acl);
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return rval;
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}
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STATIC int
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xfs_acl_allow_set(
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bhv_vnode_t *vp,
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int kind)
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{
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if (vp->i_flags & (S_IMMUTABLE|S_APPEND))
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return EPERM;
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if (kind == _ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT && !S_ISDIR(vp->i_mode))
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return ENOTDIR;
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if (vp->i_sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY)
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return EROFS;
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if (XFS_I(vp)->i_d.di_uid != current->fsuid && !capable(CAP_FOWNER))
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return EPERM;
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* Note: cr is only used here for the capability check if the ACL test fails.
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* It is not used to find out the credentials uid or groups etc, as was
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* done in IRIX. It is assumed that the uid and groups for the current
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* thread are taken from "current" instead of the cr parameter.
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*/
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STATIC int
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xfs_acl_access(
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uid_t fuid,
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gid_t fgid,
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xfs_acl_t *fap,
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mode_t md,
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cred_t *cr)
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{
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xfs_acl_entry_t matched;
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int i, allows;
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int maskallows = -1; /* true, but not 1, either */
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int seen_userobj = 0;
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matched.ae_tag = 0; /* Invalid type */
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matched.ae_perm = 0;
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for (i = 0; i < fap->acl_cnt; i++) {
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/*
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* Break out if we've got a user_obj entry or
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* a user entry and the mask (and have processed USER_OBJ)
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*/
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if (matched.ae_tag == ACL_USER_OBJ)
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break;
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if (matched.ae_tag == ACL_USER) {
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if (maskallows != -1 && seen_userobj)
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break;
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if (fap->acl_entry[i].ae_tag != ACL_MASK &&
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fap->acl_entry[i].ae_tag != ACL_USER_OBJ)
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continue;
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}
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/* True if this entry allows the requested access */
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allows = ((fap->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & md) == md);
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switch (fap->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) {
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case ACL_USER_OBJ:
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seen_userobj = 1;
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if (fuid != current->fsuid)
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continue;
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matched.ae_tag = ACL_USER_OBJ;
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matched.ae_perm = allows;
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break;
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case ACL_USER:
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if (fap->acl_entry[i].ae_id != current->fsuid)
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continue;
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matched.ae_tag = ACL_USER;
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matched.ae_perm = allows;
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break;
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case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
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if ((matched.ae_tag == ACL_GROUP_OBJ ||
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matched.ae_tag == ACL_GROUP) && !allows)
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continue;
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if (!in_group_p(fgid))
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continue;
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matched.ae_tag = ACL_GROUP_OBJ;
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matched.ae_perm = allows;
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break;
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case ACL_GROUP:
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if ((matched.ae_tag == ACL_GROUP_OBJ ||
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matched.ae_tag == ACL_GROUP) && !allows)
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continue;
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if (!in_group_p(fap->acl_entry[i].ae_id))
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continue;
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matched.ae_tag = ACL_GROUP;
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matched.ae_perm = allows;
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break;
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case ACL_MASK:
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maskallows = allows;
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break;
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case ACL_OTHER:
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if (matched.ae_tag != 0)
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continue;
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matched.ae_tag = ACL_OTHER;
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matched.ae_perm = allows;
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break;
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}
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}
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/*
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* First possibility is that no matched entry allows access.
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* The capability to override DAC may exist, so check for it.
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*/
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switch (matched.ae_tag) {
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case ACL_OTHER:
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case ACL_USER_OBJ:
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if (matched.ae_perm)
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return 0;
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break;
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case ACL_USER:
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case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
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case ACL_GROUP:
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if (maskallows && matched.ae_perm)
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return 0;
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break;
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case 0:
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break;
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}
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/* EACCES tells generic_permission to check for capability overrides */
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return EACCES;
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}
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/*
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* ACL validity checker.
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* This acl validation routine checks each ACL entry read in makes sense.
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*/
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STATIC int
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xfs_acl_invalid(
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xfs_acl_t *aclp)
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{
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xfs_acl_entry_t *entry, *e;
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int user = 0, group = 0, other = 0, mask = 0;
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int mask_required = 0;
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int i, j;
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if (!aclp)
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goto acl_invalid;
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if (aclp->acl_cnt > XFS_ACL_MAX_ENTRIES)
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goto acl_invalid;
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for (i = 0; i < aclp->acl_cnt; i++) {
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entry = &aclp->acl_entry[i];
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switch (entry->ae_tag) {
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case ACL_USER_OBJ:
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if (user++)
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goto acl_invalid;
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break;
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case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
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if (group++)
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goto acl_invalid;
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break;
|
|
case ACL_OTHER:
|
|
if (other++)
|
|
goto acl_invalid;
|
|
break;
|
|
case ACL_USER:
|
|
case ACL_GROUP:
|
|
for (j = i + 1; j < aclp->acl_cnt; j++) {
|
|
e = &aclp->acl_entry[j];
|
|
if (e->ae_id == entry->ae_id &&
|
|
e->ae_tag == entry->ae_tag)
|
|
goto acl_invalid;
|
|
}
|
|
mask_required++;
|
|
break;
|
|
case ACL_MASK:
|
|
if (mask++)
|
|
goto acl_invalid;
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
goto acl_invalid;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (!user || !group || !other || (mask_required && !mask))
|
|
goto acl_invalid;
|
|
else
|
|
return 0;
|
|
acl_invalid:
|
|
return EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Do ACL endian conversion.
|
|
*/
|
|
STATIC void
|
|
xfs_acl_get_endian(
|
|
xfs_acl_t *aclp)
|
|
{
|
|
xfs_acl_entry_t *ace, *end;
|
|
|
|
INT_SET(aclp->acl_cnt, ARCH_CONVERT, aclp->acl_cnt);
|
|
end = &aclp->acl_entry[0]+aclp->acl_cnt;
|
|
for (ace = &aclp->acl_entry[0]; ace < end; ace++) {
|
|
INT_SET(ace->ae_tag, ARCH_CONVERT, ace->ae_tag);
|
|
INT_SET(ace->ae_id, ARCH_CONVERT, ace->ae_id);
|
|
INT_SET(ace->ae_perm, ARCH_CONVERT, ace->ae_perm);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Get the ACL from the EA and do endian conversion.
|
|
*/
|
|
STATIC void
|
|
xfs_acl_get_attr(
|
|
bhv_vnode_t *vp,
|
|
xfs_acl_t *aclp,
|
|
int kind,
|
|
int flags,
|
|
int *error)
|
|
{
|
|
int len = sizeof(xfs_acl_t);
|
|
|
|
ASSERT((flags & ATTR_KERNOVAL) ? (aclp == NULL) : 1);
|
|
flags |= ATTR_ROOT;
|
|
*error = xfs_attr_get(XFS_I(vp),
|
|
kind == _ACL_TYPE_ACCESS ?
|
|
SGI_ACL_FILE : SGI_ACL_DEFAULT,
|
|
(char *)aclp, &len, flags);
|
|
if (*error || (flags & ATTR_KERNOVAL))
|
|
return;
|
|
xfs_acl_get_endian(aclp);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Set the EA with the ACL and do endian conversion.
|
|
*/
|
|
STATIC void
|
|
xfs_acl_set_attr(
|
|
bhv_vnode_t *vp,
|
|
xfs_acl_t *aclp,
|
|
int kind,
|
|
int *error)
|
|
{
|
|
xfs_acl_entry_t *ace, *newace, *end;
|
|
xfs_acl_t *newacl;
|
|
int len;
|
|
|
|
if (!(_ACL_ALLOC(newacl))) {
|
|
*error = ENOMEM;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
len = sizeof(xfs_acl_t) -
|
|
(sizeof(xfs_acl_entry_t) * (XFS_ACL_MAX_ENTRIES - aclp->acl_cnt));
|
|
end = &aclp->acl_entry[0]+aclp->acl_cnt;
|
|
for (ace = &aclp->acl_entry[0], newace = &newacl->acl_entry[0];
|
|
ace < end;
|
|
ace++, newace++) {
|
|
INT_SET(newace->ae_tag, ARCH_CONVERT, ace->ae_tag);
|
|
INT_SET(newace->ae_id, ARCH_CONVERT, ace->ae_id);
|
|
INT_SET(newace->ae_perm, ARCH_CONVERT, ace->ae_perm);
|
|
}
|
|
INT_SET(newacl->acl_cnt, ARCH_CONVERT, aclp->acl_cnt);
|
|
*error = xfs_attr_set(XFS_I(vp),
|
|
kind == _ACL_TYPE_ACCESS ?
|
|
SGI_ACL_FILE: SGI_ACL_DEFAULT,
|
|
(char *)newacl, len, ATTR_ROOT);
|
|
_ACL_FREE(newacl);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
xfs_acl_vtoacl(
|
|
bhv_vnode_t *vp,
|
|
xfs_acl_t *access_acl,
|
|
xfs_acl_t *default_acl)
|
|
{
|
|
int error = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (access_acl) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Get the Access ACL and the mode. If either cannot
|
|
* be obtained for some reason, invalidate the access ACL.
|
|
*/
|
|
xfs_acl_get_attr(vp, access_acl, _ACL_TYPE_ACCESS, 0, &error);
|
|
if (error)
|
|
access_acl->acl_cnt = XFS_ACL_NOT_PRESENT;
|
|
else /* We have a good ACL and the file mode, synchronize. */
|
|
xfs_acl_sync_mode(XFS_I(vp)->i_d.di_mode, access_acl);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (default_acl) {
|
|
xfs_acl_get_attr(vp, default_acl, _ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT, 0, &error);
|
|
if (error)
|
|
default_acl->acl_cnt = XFS_ACL_NOT_PRESENT;
|
|
}
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* This function retrieves the parent directory's acl, processes it
|
|
* and lets the child inherit the acl(s) that it should.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
xfs_acl_inherit(
|
|
bhv_vnode_t *vp,
|
|
mode_t mode,
|
|
xfs_acl_t *pdaclp)
|
|
{
|
|
xfs_acl_t *cacl;
|
|
int error = 0;
|
|
int basicperms = 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If the parent does not have a default ACL, or it's an
|
|
* invalid ACL, we're done.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!vp)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if (!pdaclp || xfs_acl_invalid(pdaclp))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Copy the default ACL of the containing directory to
|
|
* the access ACL of the new file and use the mode that
|
|
* was passed in to set up the correct initial values for
|
|
* the u::,g::[m::], and o:: entries. This is what makes
|
|
* umask() "work" with ACL's.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (!(_ACL_ALLOC(cacl)))
|
|
return ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(cacl, pdaclp, sizeof(xfs_acl_t));
|
|
xfs_acl_filter_mode(mode, cacl);
|
|
error = xfs_acl_setmode(vp, cacl, &basicperms);
|
|
if (error)
|
|
goto out_error;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Set the Default and Access ACL on the file. The mode is already
|
|
* set on the file, so we don't need to worry about that.
|
|
*
|
|
* If the new file is a directory, its default ACL is a copy of
|
|
* the containing directory's default ACL.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (S_ISDIR(vp->i_mode))
|
|
xfs_acl_set_attr(vp, pdaclp, _ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT, &error);
|
|
if (!error && !basicperms)
|
|
xfs_acl_set_attr(vp, cacl, _ACL_TYPE_ACCESS, &error);
|
|
out_error:
|
|
_ACL_FREE(cacl);
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Set up the correct mode on the file based on the supplied ACL. This
|
|
* makes sure that the mode on the file reflects the state of the
|
|
* u::,g::[m::], and o:: entries in the ACL. Since the mode is where
|
|
* the ACL is going to get the permissions for these entries, we must
|
|
* synchronize the mode whenever we set the ACL on a file.
|
|
*/
|
|
STATIC int
|
|
xfs_acl_setmode(
|
|
bhv_vnode_t *vp,
|
|
xfs_acl_t *acl,
|
|
int *basicperms)
|
|
{
|
|
struct iattr iattr;
|
|
xfs_acl_entry_t *ap;
|
|
xfs_acl_entry_t *gap = NULL;
|
|
int i, nomask = 1;
|
|
|
|
*basicperms = 1;
|
|
|
|
if (acl->acl_cnt == XFS_ACL_NOT_PRESENT)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Copy the u::, g::, o::, and m:: bits from the ACL into the
|
|
* mode. The m:: bits take precedence over the g:: bits.
|
|
*/
|
|
iattr.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE;
|
|
iattr.ia_mode = XFS_I(vp)->i_d.di_mode;
|
|
iattr.ia_mode &= ~(S_IRWXU|S_IRWXG|S_IRWXO);
|
|
ap = acl->acl_entry;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; ++i) {
|
|
switch (ap->ae_tag) {
|
|
case ACL_USER_OBJ:
|
|
iattr.ia_mode |= ap->ae_perm << 6;
|
|
break;
|
|
case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
|
|
gap = ap;
|
|
break;
|
|
case ACL_MASK: /* more than just standard modes */
|
|
nomask = 0;
|
|
iattr.ia_mode |= ap->ae_perm << 3;
|
|
*basicperms = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
case ACL_OTHER:
|
|
iattr.ia_mode |= ap->ae_perm;
|
|
break;
|
|
default: /* more than just standard modes */
|
|
*basicperms = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
ap++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Set the group bits from ACL_GROUP_OBJ if there's no ACL_MASK */
|
|
if (gap && nomask)
|
|
iattr.ia_mode |= gap->ae_perm << 3;
|
|
|
|
return xfs_setattr(XFS_I(vp), &iattr, 0, sys_cred);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The permissions for the special ACL entries (u::, g::[m::], o::) are
|
|
* actually stored in the file mode (if there is both a group and a mask,
|
|
* the group is stored in the ACL entry and the mask is stored on the file).
|
|
* This allows the mode to remain automatically in sync with the ACL without
|
|
* the need for a call-back to the ACL system at every point where the mode
|
|
* could change. This function takes the permissions from the specified mode
|
|
* and places it in the supplied ACL.
|
|
*
|
|
* This implementation draws its validity from the fact that, when the ACL
|
|
* was assigned, the mode was copied from the ACL.
|
|
* If the mode did not change, therefore, the mode remains exactly what was
|
|
* taken from the special ACL entries at assignment.
|
|
* If a subsequent chmod() was done, the POSIX spec says that the change in
|
|
* mode must cause an update to the ACL seen at user level and used for
|
|
* access checks. Before and after a mode change, therefore, the file mode
|
|
* most accurately reflects what the special ACL entries should permit/deny.
|
|
*
|
|
* CAVEAT: If someone sets the SGI_ACL_FILE attribute directly,
|
|
* the existing mode bits will override whatever is in the
|
|
* ACL. Similarly, if there is a pre-existing ACL that was
|
|
* never in sync with its mode (owing to a bug in 6.5 and
|
|
* before), it will now magically (or mystically) be
|
|
* synchronized. This could cause slight astonishment, but
|
|
* it is better than inconsistent permissions.
|
|
*
|
|
* The supplied ACL is a template that may contain any combination
|
|
* of special entries. These are treated as place holders when we fill
|
|
* out the ACL. This routine does not add or remove special entries, it
|
|
* simply unites each special entry with its associated set of permissions.
|
|
*/
|
|
STATIC void
|
|
xfs_acl_sync_mode(
|
|
mode_t mode,
|
|
xfs_acl_t *acl)
|
|
{
|
|
int i, nomask = 1;
|
|
xfs_acl_entry_t *ap;
|
|
xfs_acl_entry_t *gap = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Set ACL entries. POSIX1003.1eD16 requires that the MASK
|
|
* be set instead of the GROUP entry, if there is a MASK.
|
|
*/
|
|
for (ap = acl->acl_entry, i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; ap++, i++) {
|
|
switch (ap->ae_tag) {
|
|
case ACL_USER_OBJ:
|
|
ap->ae_perm = (mode >> 6) & 0x7;
|
|
break;
|
|
case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
|
|
gap = ap;
|
|
break;
|
|
case ACL_MASK:
|
|
nomask = 0;
|
|
ap->ae_perm = (mode >> 3) & 0x7;
|
|
break;
|
|
case ACL_OTHER:
|
|
ap->ae_perm = mode & 0x7;
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* Set the ACL_GROUP_OBJ if there's no ACL_MASK */
|
|
if (gap && nomask)
|
|
gap->ae_perm = (mode >> 3) & 0x7;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* When inheriting an Access ACL from a directory Default ACL,
|
|
* the ACL bits are set to the intersection of the ACL default
|
|
* permission bits and the file permission bits in mode. If there
|
|
* are no permission bits on the file then we must not give them
|
|
* the ACL. This is what what makes umask() work with ACLs.
|
|
*/
|
|
STATIC void
|
|
xfs_acl_filter_mode(
|
|
mode_t mode,
|
|
xfs_acl_t *acl)
|
|
{
|
|
int i, nomask = 1;
|
|
xfs_acl_entry_t *ap;
|
|
xfs_acl_entry_t *gap = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Set ACL entries. POSIX1003.1eD16 requires that the MASK
|
|
* be merged with GROUP entry, if there is a MASK.
|
|
*/
|
|
for (ap = acl->acl_entry, i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; ap++, i++) {
|
|
switch (ap->ae_tag) {
|
|
case ACL_USER_OBJ:
|
|
ap->ae_perm &= (mode >> 6) & 0x7;
|
|
break;
|
|
case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
|
|
gap = ap;
|
|
break;
|
|
case ACL_MASK:
|
|
nomask = 0;
|
|
ap->ae_perm &= (mode >> 3) & 0x7;
|
|
break;
|
|
case ACL_OTHER:
|
|
ap->ae_perm &= mode & 0x7;
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* Set the ACL_GROUP_OBJ if there's no ACL_MASK */
|
|
if (gap && nomask)
|
|
gap->ae_perm &= (mode >> 3) & 0x7;
|
|
}
|