Using per-register incrementing ID can lead to
find_good_pkt_pointers() confusing registers which
have completely different values. Consider example:
0: (bf) r6 = r1
1: (61) r8 = *(u32 *)(r6 +76)
2: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r6 +80)
3: (bf) r7 = r8
4: (07) r8 += 32
5: (2d) if r8 > r0 goto pc+9
R0=pkt_end R1=ctx R6=ctx R7=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=32) R8=pkt(id=0,off=32,r=32) R10=fp
6: (bf) r8 = r7
7: (bf) r9 = r7
8: (71) r1 = *(u8 *)(r7 +0)
9: (0f) r8 += r1
10: (71) r1 = *(u8 *)(r7 +1)
11: (0f) r9 += r1
12: (07) r8 += 32
13: (2d) if r8 > r0 goto pc+1
R0=pkt_end R1=inv56 R6=ctx R7=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=32) R8=pkt(id=1,off=32,r=32) R9=pkt(id=1,off=0,r=32) R10=fp
14: (71) r1 = *(u8 *)(r9 +16)
15: (b7) r7 = 0
16: (bf) r0 = r7
17: (95) exit
We need to get a UNKNOWN_VALUE with imm to force id
generation so lines 0-5 make r7 a valid packet pointer.
We then read two different bytes from the packet and
add them to copies of the constructed packet pointer.
r8 (line 9) and r9 (line 11) will get the same id of 1,
independently. When either of them is validated (line
13) - find_good_pkt_pointers() will also mark the other
as safe. This leads to access on line 14 being mistakenly
considered safe.
Fixes: 969bf05eb3 ("bpf: direct packet access")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>