![David Howells](/assets/img/avatar_default.png)
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks. A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to access or modify its own credentials. A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to execve(). With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified and committed using something like the following sequence of events: struct cred *new = prepare_creds(); int ret = blah(new); if (ret < 0) { abort_creds(new); return ret; } return commit_creds(new); There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter the keys in a keyring in use by another task. To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be modified, except under special circumstances: (1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented. (2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced. The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be added by a later patch). This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the security code rather than altering the current creds directly. (2) Temporary credential overrides. do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex on the thread being dumped. This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering the task's objective credentials. (3) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check() (*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set() Removed in favour of security_capset(). (*) security_capset(), ->capset() New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the new creds, are now const. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be killed if it's an error. (*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security() Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds(). (*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free() New. Free security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare() New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit() New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new security by commit_creds(). (*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid() Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid(). (*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid() Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid(). (*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init() Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred directly to init's credentials. NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no longer records the sid of the thread that forked it. (*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc() (*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission() Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to refer to the security context. (4) sys_capset(). This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it calls have been merged. (5) reparent_to_kthreadd(). This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using commit_thread() to point that way. (6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid() __sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if successful. switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting __sigqueue_alloc(). (7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups. The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying it. security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished. The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds(). Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into commit_creds(). The get functions all simply access the data directly. (8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl(). security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly rather than through an argument. Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even if it doesn't end up using it. (9) Keyrings. A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code: (a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly. They may want separating out again later. (b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer rather than a task pointer to specify the security context. (c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread keyring. (d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them. (e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for process or session keyrings (they're shared). (10) Usermode helper. The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process after it has been cloned. call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call. call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the supplied keyring as the new session keyring. (11) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the lock. (12) is_single_threaded(). This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now wants to use it too. The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD). (13) nfsd. The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches in this series have been applied. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
1305 lines
30 KiB
C
1305 lines
30 KiB
C
/* keyctl.c: userspace keyctl operations
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*
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* Copyright (C) 2004-5 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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* Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
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* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
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* as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
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* 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
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*/
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#include <linux/module.h>
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#include <linux/init.h>
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#include <linux/sched.h>
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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#include <linux/syscalls.h>
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#include <linux/keyctl.h>
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#include <linux/fs.h>
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#include <linux/capability.h>
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#include <linux/string.h>
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#include <linux/err.h>
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#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
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#include <linux/security.h>
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#include <asm/uaccess.h>
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#include "internal.h"
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static int key_get_type_from_user(char *type,
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const char __user *_type,
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unsigned len)
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{
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int ret;
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ret = strncpy_from_user(type, _type, len);
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if (ret < 0)
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return -EFAULT;
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if (ret == 0 || ret >= len)
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return -EINVAL;
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if (type[0] == '.')
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return -EPERM;
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type[len - 1] = '\0';
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return 0;
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}
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/*****************************************************************************/
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/*
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* extract the description of a new key from userspace and either add it as a
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* new key to the specified keyring or update a matching key in that keyring
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* - the keyring must be writable
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* - returns the new key's serial number
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* - implements add_key()
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*/
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asmlinkage long sys_add_key(const char __user *_type,
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const char __user *_description,
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const void __user *_payload,
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size_t plen,
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key_serial_t ringid)
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{
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key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_ref;
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char type[32], *description;
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void *payload;
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long ret;
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bool vm;
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ret = -EINVAL;
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if (plen > 1024 * 1024 - 1)
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goto error;
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/* draw all the data into kernel space */
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ret = key_get_type_from_user(type, _type, sizeof(type));
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if (ret < 0)
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goto error;
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description = strndup_user(_description, PAGE_SIZE);
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if (IS_ERR(description)) {
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ret = PTR_ERR(description);
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goto error;
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}
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/* pull the payload in if one was supplied */
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payload = NULL;
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vm = false;
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if (_payload) {
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ret = -ENOMEM;
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payload = kmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!payload) {
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if (plen <= PAGE_SIZE)
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goto error2;
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vm = true;
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payload = vmalloc(plen);
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if (!payload)
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goto error2;
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}
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ret = -EFAULT;
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if (copy_from_user(payload, _payload, plen) != 0)
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goto error3;
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}
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/* find the target keyring (which must be writable) */
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keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 1, 0, KEY_WRITE);
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if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
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ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
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goto error3;
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}
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/* create or update the requested key and add it to the target
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* keyring */
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key_ref = key_create_or_update(keyring_ref, type, description,
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payload, plen, KEY_PERM_UNDEF,
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KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA);
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if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
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ret = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref)->serial;
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key_ref_put(key_ref);
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}
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else {
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ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
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}
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key_ref_put(keyring_ref);
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error3:
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if (!vm)
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kfree(payload);
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else
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vfree(payload);
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error2:
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kfree(description);
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error:
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return ret;
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} /* end sys_add_key() */
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/*****************************************************************************/
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/*
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* search the process keyrings for a matching key
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* - nested keyrings may also be searched if they have Search permission
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* - if a key is found, it will be attached to the destination keyring if
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* there's one specified
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* - /sbin/request-key will be invoked if _callout_info is non-NULL
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* - the _callout_info string will be passed to /sbin/request-key
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* - if the _callout_info string is empty, it will be rendered as "-"
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* - implements request_key()
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*/
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asmlinkage long sys_request_key(const char __user *_type,
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const char __user *_description,
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const char __user *_callout_info,
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key_serial_t destringid)
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{
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struct key_type *ktype;
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struct key *key;
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key_ref_t dest_ref;
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size_t callout_len;
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char type[32], *description, *callout_info;
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long ret;
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/* pull the type into kernel space */
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ret = key_get_type_from_user(type, _type, sizeof(type));
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if (ret < 0)
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goto error;
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/* pull the description into kernel space */
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description = strndup_user(_description, PAGE_SIZE);
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if (IS_ERR(description)) {
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ret = PTR_ERR(description);
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goto error;
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}
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/* pull the callout info into kernel space */
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callout_info = NULL;
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callout_len = 0;
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if (_callout_info) {
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callout_info = strndup_user(_callout_info, PAGE_SIZE);
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if (IS_ERR(callout_info)) {
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ret = PTR_ERR(callout_info);
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goto error2;
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}
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callout_len = strlen(callout_info);
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}
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/* get the destination keyring if specified */
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dest_ref = NULL;
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if (destringid) {
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dest_ref = lookup_user_key(destringid, 1, 0, KEY_WRITE);
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if (IS_ERR(dest_ref)) {
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ret = PTR_ERR(dest_ref);
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goto error3;
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}
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}
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/* find the key type */
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ktype = key_type_lookup(type);
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if (IS_ERR(ktype)) {
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ret = PTR_ERR(ktype);
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goto error4;
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}
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/* do the search */
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key = request_key_and_link(ktype, description, callout_info,
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callout_len, NULL, key_ref_to_ptr(dest_ref),
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KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA);
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if (IS_ERR(key)) {
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ret = PTR_ERR(key);
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goto error5;
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}
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ret = key->serial;
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key_put(key);
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error5:
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key_type_put(ktype);
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error4:
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key_ref_put(dest_ref);
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error3:
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kfree(callout_info);
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error2:
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kfree(description);
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error:
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return ret;
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} /* end sys_request_key() */
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/*****************************************************************************/
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/*
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* get the ID of the specified process keyring
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* - the keyring must have search permission to be found
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* - implements keyctl(KEYCTL_GET_KEYRING_ID)
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*/
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long keyctl_get_keyring_ID(key_serial_t id, int create)
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{
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key_ref_t key_ref;
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long ret;
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key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, create, 0, KEY_SEARCH);
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if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
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ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
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goto error;
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}
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ret = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref)->serial;
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key_ref_put(key_ref);
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error:
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return ret;
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} /* end keyctl_get_keyring_ID() */
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/*****************************************************************************/
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/*
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* join the session keyring
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* - implements keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING)
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*/
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long keyctl_join_session_keyring(const char __user *_name)
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{
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char *name;
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long ret;
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/* fetch the name from userspace */
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name = NULL;
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if (_name) {
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name = strndup_user(_name, PAGE_SIZE);
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if (IS_ERR(name)) {
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ret = PTR_ERR(name);
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goto error;
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}
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}
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/* join the session */
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ret = join_session_keyring(name);
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error:
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return ret;
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} /* end keyctl_join_session_keyring() */
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/*****************************************************************************/
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/*
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* update a key's data payload
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* - the key must be writable
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* - implements keyctl(KEYCTL_UPDATE)
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*/
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long keyctl_update_key(key_serial_t id,
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const void __user *_payload,
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size_t plen)
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{
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key_ref_t key_ref;
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void *payload;
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long ret;
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ret = -EINVAL;
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if (plen > PAGE_SIZE)
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goto error;
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/* pull the payload in if one was supplied */
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payload = NULL;
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if (_payload) {
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ret = -ENOMEM;
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payload = kmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!payload)
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goto error;
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ret = -EFAULT;
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if (copy_from_user(payload, _payload, plen) != 0)
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goto error2;
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}
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/* find the target key (which must be writable) */
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key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, 0, KEY_WRITE);
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if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
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ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
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goto error2;
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}
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/* update the key */
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ret = key_update(key_ref, payload, plen);
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key_ref_put(key_ref);
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error2:
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kfree(payload);
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error:
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return ret;
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} /* end keyctl_update_key() */
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/*****************************************************************************/
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/*
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* revoke a key
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* - the key must be writable
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* - implements keyctl(KEYCTL_REVOKE)
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*/
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long keyctl_revoke_key(key_serial_t id)
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{
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key_ref_t key_ref;
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long ret;
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key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, 0, KEY_WRITE);
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if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
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ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
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goto error;
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}
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key_revoke(key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref));
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ret = 0;
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key_ref_put(key_ref);
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error:
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return ret;
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} /* end keyctl_revoke_key() */
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/*****************************************************************************/
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/*
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* clear the specified process keyring
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* - the keyring must be writable
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* - implements keyctl(KEYCTL_CLEAR)
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*/
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long keyctl_keyring_clear(key_serial_t ringid)
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{
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key_ref_t keyring_ref;
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long ret;
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keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 1, 0, KEY_WRITE);
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if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
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ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
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goto error;
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}
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ret = keyring_clear(key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref));
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key_ref_put(keyring_ref);
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error:
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return ret;
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} /* end keyctl_keyring_clear() */
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/*****************************************************************************/
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/*
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* link a key into a keyring
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* - the keyring must be writable
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* - the key must be linkable
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* - implements keyctl(KEYCTL_LINK)
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*/
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long keyctl_keyring_link(key_serial_t id, key_serial_t ringid)
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{
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key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_ref;
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long ret;
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keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 1, 0, KEY_WRITE);
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if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
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ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
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goto error;
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}
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key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 1, 0, KEY_LINK);
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if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
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ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
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goto error2;
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}
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ret = key_link(key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref), key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref));
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key_ref_put(key_ref);
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error2:
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key_ref_put(keyring_ref);
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error:
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return ret;
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} /* end keyctl_keyring_link() */
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/*****************************************************************************/
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/*
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* unlink the first attachment of a key from a keyring
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* - the keyring must be writable
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* - we don't need any permissions on the key
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* - implements keyctl(KEYCTL_UNLINK)
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*/
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long keyctl_keyring_unlink(key_serial_t id, key_serial_t ringid)
|
|
{
|
|
key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_ref;
|
|
long ret;
|
|
|
|
keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, 0, KEY_WRITE);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
|
|
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, 0, 0);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
|
|
ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
|
|
goto error2;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = key_unlink(key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref), key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref));
|
|
|
|
key_ref_put(key_ref);
|
|
error2:
|
|
key_ref_put(keyring_ref);
|
|
error:
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
} /* end keyctl_keyring_unlink() */
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
/*
|
|
* describe a user key
|
|
* - the key must have view permission
|
|
* - if there's a buffer, we place up to buflen bytes of data into it
|
|
* - unless there's an error, we return the amount of description available,
|
|
* irrespective of how much we may have copied
|
|
* - the description is formatted thus:
|
|
* type;uid;gid;perm;description<NUL>
|
|
* - implements keyctl(KEYCTL_DESCRIBE)
|
|
*/
|
|
long keyctl_describe_key(key_serial_t keyid,
|
|
char __user *buffer,
|
|
size_t buflen)
|
|
{
|
|
struct key *key, *instkey;
|
|
key_ref_t key_ref;
|
|
char *tmpbuf;
|
|
long ret;
|
|
|
|
key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, 0, 1, KEY_VIEW);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
|
|
/* viewing a key under construction is permitted if we have the
|
|
* authorisation token handy */
|
|
if (PTR_ERR(key_ref) == -EACCES) {
|
|
instkey = key_get_instantiation_authkey(keyid);
|
|
if (!IS_ERR(instkey)) {
|
|
key_put(instkey);
|
|
key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid,
|
|
0, 1, 0);
|
|
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
|
|
goto okay;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
okay:
|
|
/* calculate how much description we're going to return */
|
|
ret = -ENOMEM;
|
|
tmpbuf = kmalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!tmpbuf)
|
|
goto error2;
|
|
|
|
key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
|
|
|
|
ret = snprintf(tmpbuf, PAGE_SIZE - 1,
|
|
"%s;%d;%d;%08x;%s",
|
|
key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref)->type->name,
|
|
key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref)->uid,
|
|
key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref)->gid,
|
|
key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref)->perm,
|
|
key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref)->description ?
|
|
key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref)->description : ""
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
/* include a NUL char at the end of the data */
|
|
if (ret > PAGE_SIZE - 1)
|
|
ret = PAGE_SIZE - 1;
|
|
tmpbuf[ret] = 0;
|
|
ret++;
|
|
|
|
/* consider returning the data */
|
|
if (buffer && buflen > 0) {
|
|
if (buflen > ret)
|
|
buflen = ret;
|
|
|
|
if (copy_to_user(buffer, tmpbuf, buflen) != 0)
|
|
ret = -EFAULT;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
kfree(tmpbuf);
|
|
error2:
|
|
key_ref_put(key_ref);
|
|
error:
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
} /* end keyctl_describe_key() */
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
/*
|
|
* search the specified keyring for a matching key
|
|
* - the start keyring must be searchable
|
|
* - nested keyrings may also be searched if they are searchable
|
|
* - only keys with search permission may be found
|
|
* - if a key is found, it will be attached to the destination keyring if
|
|
* there's one specified
|
|
* - implements keyctl(KEYCTL_SEARCH)
|
|
*/
|
|
long keyctl_keyring_search(key_serial_t ringid,
|
|
const char __user *_type,
|
|
const char __user *_description,
|
|
key_serial_t destringid)
|
|
{
|
|
struct key_type *ktype;
|
|
key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_ref, dest_ref;
|
|
char type[32], *description;
|
|
long ret;
|
|
|
|
/* pull the type and description into kernel space */
|
|
ret = key_get_type_from_user(type, _type, sizeof(type));
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
description = strndup_user(_description, PAGE_SIZE);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(description)) {
|
|
ret = PTR_ERR(description);
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* get the keyring at which to begin the search */
|
|
keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, 0, KEY_SEARCH);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
|
|
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
|
|
goto error2;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* get the destination keyring if specified */
|
|
dest_ref = NULL;
|
|
if (destringid) {
|
|
dest_ref = lookup_user_key(destringid, 1, 0, KEY_WRITE);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(dest_ref)) {
|
|
ret = PTR_ERR(dest_ref);
|
|
goto error3;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* find the key type */
|
|
ktype = key_type_lookup(type);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(ktype)) {
|
|
ret = PTR_ERR(ktype);
|
|
goto error4;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* do the search */
|
|
key_ref = keyring_search(keyring_ref, ktype, description);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
|
|
ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
|
|
|
|
/* treat lack or presence of a negative key the same */
|
|
if (ret == -EAGAIN)
|
|
ret = -ENOKEY;
|
|
goto error5;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* link the resulting key to the destination keyring if we can */
|
|
if (dest_ref) {
|
|
ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_LINK);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
goto error6;
|
|
|
|
ret = key_link(key_ref_to_ptr(dest_ref), key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref));
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
goto error6;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref)->serial;
|
|
|
|
error6:
|
|
key_ref_put(key_ref);
|
|
error5:
|
|
key_type_put(ktype);
|
|
error4:
|
|
key_ref_put(dest_ref);
|
|
error3:
|
|
key_ref_put(keyring_ref);
|
|
error2:
|
|
kfree(description);
|
|
error:
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
} /* end keyctl_keyring_search() */
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
/*
|
|
* read a user key's payload
|
|
* - the keyring must be readable or the key must be searchable from the
|
|
* process's keyrings
|
|
* - if there's a buffer, we place up to buflen bytes of data into it
|
|
* - unless there's an error, we return the amount of data in the key,
|
|
* irrespective of how much we may have copied
|
|
* - implements keyctl(KEYCTL_READ)
|
|
*/
|
|
long keyctl_read_key(key_serial_t keyid, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
|
|
{
|
|
struct key *key;
|
|
key_ref_t key_ref;
|
|
long ret;
|
|
|
|
/* find the key first */
|
|
key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, 0, 0, 0);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
|
|
ret = -ENOKEY;
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
|
|
|
|
/* see if we can read it directly */
|
|
ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_READ);
|
|
if (ret == 0)
|
|
goto can_read_key;
|
|
if (ret != -EACCES)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
/* we can't; see if it's searchable from this process's keyrings
|
|
* - we automatically take account of the fact that it may be
|
|
* dangling off an instantiation key
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!is_key_possessed(key_ref)) {
|
|
ret = -EACCES;
|
|
goto error2;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* the key is probably readable - now try to read it */
|
|
can_read_key:
|
|
ret = key_validate(key);
|
|
if (ret == 0) {
|
|
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
|
|
if (key->type->read) {
|
|
/* read the data with the semaphore held (since we
|
|
* might sleep) */
|
|
down_read(&key->sem);
|
|
ret = key->type->read(key, buffer, buflen);
|
|
up_read(&key->sem);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
error2:
|
|
key_put(key);
|
|
error:
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
} /* end keyctl_read_key() */
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
/*
|
|
* change the ownership of a key
|
|
* - the keyring owned by the changer
|
|
* - if the uid or gid is -1, then that parameter is not changed
|
|
* - implements keyctl(KEYCTL_CHOWN)
|
|
*/
|
|
long keyctl_chown_key(key_serial_t id, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
|
|
{
|
|
struct key_user *newowner, *zapowner = NULL;
|
|
struct key *key;
|
|
key_ref_t key_ref;
|
|
long ret;
|
|
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
if (uid == (uid_t) -1 && gid == (gid_t) -1)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 1, 1, KEY_SETATTR);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
|
|
ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
|
|
|
|
/* make the changes with the locks held to prevent chown/chown races */
|
|
ret = -EACCES;
|
|
down_write(&key->sem);
|
|
|
|
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
|
|
/* only the sysadmin can chown a key to some other UID */
|
|
if (uid != (uid_t) -1 && key->uid != uid)
|
|
goto error_put;
|
|
|
|
/* only the sysadmin can set the key's GID to a group other
|
|
* than one of those that the current process subscribes to */
|
|
if (gid != (gid_t) -1 && gid != key->gid && !in_group_p(gid))
|
|
goto error_put;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* change the UID */
|
|
if (uid != (uid_t) -1 && uid != key->uid) {
|
|
ret = -ENOMEM;
|
|
newowner = key_user_lookup(uid);
|
|
if (!newowner)
|
|
goto error_put;
|
|
|
|
/* transfer the quota burden to the new user */
|
|
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA, &key->flags)) {
|
|
unsigned maxkeys = (uid == 0) ?
|
|
key_quota_root_maxkeys : key_quota_maxkeys;
|
|
unsigned maxbytes = (uid == 0) ?
|
|
key_quota_root_maxbytes : key_quota_maxbytes;
|
|
|
|
spin_lock(&newowner->lock);
|
|
if (newowner->qnkeys + 1 >= maxkeys ||
|
|
newowner->qnbytes + key->quotalen >= maxbytes ||
|
|
newowner->qnbytes + key->quotalen <
|
|
newowner->qnbytes)
|
|
goto quota_overrun;
|
|
|
|
newowner->qnkeys++;
|
|
newowner->qnbytes += key->quotalen;
|
|
spin_unlock(&newowner->lock);
|
|
|
|
spin_lock(&key->user->lock);
|
|
key->user->qnkeys--;
|
|
key->user->qnbytes -= key->quotalen;
|
|
spin_unlock(&key->user->lock);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
atomic_dec(&key->user->nkeys);
|
|
atomic_inc(&newowner->nkeys);
|
|
|
|
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags)) {
|
|
atomic_dec(&key->user->nikeys);
|
|
atomic_inc(&newowner->nikeys);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
zapowner = key->user;
|
|
key->user = newowner;
|
|
key->uid = uid;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* change the GID */
|
|
if (gid != (gid_t) -1)
|
|
key->gid = gid;
|
|
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
error_put:
|
|
up_write(&key->sem);
|
|
key_put(key);
|
|
if (zapowner)
|
|
key_user_put(zapowner);
|
|
error:
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
quota_overrun:
|
|
spin_unlock(&newowner->lock);
|
|
zapowner = newowner;
|
|
ret = -EDQUOT;
|
|
goto error_put;
|
|
|
|
} /* end keyctl_chown_key() */
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
/*
|
|
* change the permission mask on a key
|
|
* - the keyring owned by the changer
|
|
* - implements keyctl(KEYCTL_SETPERM)
|
|
*/
|
|
long keyctl_setperm_key(key_serial_t id, key_perm_t perm)
|
|
{
|
|
struct key *key;
|
|
key_ref_t key_ref;
|
|
long ret;
|
|
|
|
ret = -EINVAL;
|
|
if (perm & ~(KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_ALL | KEY_GRP_ALL | KEY_OTH_ALL))
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 1, 1, KEY_SETATTR);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
|
|
ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
|
|
|
|
/* make the changes with the locks held to prevent chown/chmod races */
|
|
ret = -EACCES;
|
|
down_write(&key->sem);
|
|
|
|
/* if we're not the sysadmin, we can only change a key that we own */
|
|
if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || key->uid == current_fsuid()) {
|
|
key->perm = perm;
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
up_write(&key->sem);
|
|
key_put(key);
|
|
error:
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
} /* end keyctl_setperm_key() */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* get the destination keyring for instantiation
|
|
*/
|
|
static long get_instantiation_keyring(key_serial_t ringid,
|
|
struct request_key_auth *rka,
|
|
struct key **_dest_keyring)
|
|
{
|
|
key_ref_t dkref;
|
|
|
|
/* just return a NULL pointer if we weren't asked to make a link */
|
|
if (ringid == 0) {
|
|
*_dest_keyring = NULL;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* if a specific keyring is nominated by ID, then use that */
|
|
if (ringid > 0) {
|
|
dkref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 1, 0, KEY_WRITE);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(dkref))
|
|
return PTR_ERR(dkref);
|
|
*_dest_keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(dkref);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ringid == KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
/* otherwise specify the destination keyring recorded in the
|
|
* authorisation key (any KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING) */
|
|
if (ringid >= KEY_SPEC_REQUESTOR_KEYRING) {
|
|
*_dest_keyring = rka->dest_keyring;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return -ENOKEY;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* change the request_key authorisation key on the current process
|
|
*/
|
|
static int keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(struct key *key)
|
|
{
|
|
struct cred *new;
|
|
|
|
new = prepare_creds();
|
|
if (!new)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
key_put(new->request_key_auth);
|
|
new->request_key_auth = key_get(key);
|
|
|
|
return commit_creds(new);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
/*
|
|
* instantiate the key with the specified payload, and, if one is given, link
|
|
* the key into the keyring
|
|
*/
|
|
long keyctl_instantiate_key(key_serial_t id,
|
|
const void __user *_payload,
|
|
size_t plen,
|
|
key_serial_t ringid)
|
|
{
|
|
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
|
|
struct request_key_auth *rka;
|
|
struct key *instkey, *dest_keyring;
|
|
void *payload;
|
|
long ret;
|
|
bool vm = false;
|
|
|
|
kenter("%d,,%zu,%d", id, plen, ringid);
|
|
|
|
ret = -EINVAL;
|
|
if (plen > 1024 * 1024 - 1)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
/* the appropriate instantiation authorisation key must have been
|
|
* assumed before calling this */
|
|
ret = -EPERM;
|
|
instkey = cred->request_key_auth;
|
|
if (!instkey)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
rka = instkey->payload.data;
|
|
if (rka->target_key->serial != id)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
/* pull the payload in if one was supplied */
|
|
payload = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (_payload) {
|
|
ret = -ENOMEM;
|
|
payload = kmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!payload) {
|
|
if (plen <= PAGE_SIZE)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
vm = true;
|
|
payload = vmalloc(plen);
|
|
if (!payload)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = -EFAULT;
|
|
if (copy_from_user(payload, _payload, plen) != 0)
|
|
goto error2;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* find the destination keyring amongst those belonging to the
|
|
* requesting task */
|
|
ret = get_instantiation_keyring(ringid, rka, &dest_keyring);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
goto error2;
|
|
|
|
/* instantiate the key and link it into a keyring */
|
|
ret = key_instantiate_and_link(rka->target_key, payload, plen,
|
|
dest_keyring, instkey);
|
|
|
|
key_put(dest_keyring);
|
|
|
|
/* discard the assumed authority if it's just been disabled by
|
|
* instantiation of the key */
|
|
if (ret == 0)
|
|
keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(NULL);
|
|
|
|
error2:
|
|
if (!vm)
|
|
kfree(payload);
|
|
else
|
|
vfree(payload);
|
|
error:
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
} /* end keyctl_instantiate_key() */
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
/*
|
|
* negatively instantiate the key with the given timeout (in seconds), and, if
|
|
* one is given, link the key into the keyring
|
|
*/
|
|
long keyctl_negate_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout, key_serial_t ringid)
|
|
{
|
|
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
|
|
struct request_key_auth *rka;
|
|
struct key *instkey, *dest_keyring;
|
|
long ret;
|
|
|
|
kenter("%d,%u,%d", id, timeout, ringid);
|
|
|
|
/* the appropriate instantiation authorisation key must have been
|
|
* assumed before calling this */
|
|
ret = -EPERM;
|
|
instkey = cred->request_key_auth;
|
|
if (!instkey)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
rka = instkey->payload.data;
|
|
if (rka->target_key->serial != id)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
/* find the destination keyring if present (which must also be
|
|
* writable) */
|
|
ret = get_instantiation_keyring(ringid, rka, &dest_keyring);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
/* instantiate the key and link it into a keyring */
|
|
ret = key_negate_and_link(rka->target_key, timeout,
|
|
dest_keyring, instkey);
|
|
|
|
key_put(dest_keyring);
|
|
|
|
/* discard the assumed authority if it's just been disabled by
|
|
* instantiation of the key */
|
|
if (ret == 0)
|
|
keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(NULL);
|
|
|
|
error:
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
} /* end keyctl_negate_key() */
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
/*
|
|
* set the default keyring in which request_key() will cache keys
|
|
* - return the old setting
|
|
*/
|
|
long keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(int reqkey_defl)
|
|
{
|
|
struct cred *new;
|
|
int ret, old_setting;
|
|
|
|
old_setting = current_cred_xxx(jit_keyring);
|
|
|
|
if (reqkey_defl == KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_NO_CHANGE)
|
|
return old_setting;
|
|
|
|
new = prepare_creds();
|
|
if (!new)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
switch (reqkey_defl) {
|
|
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING:
|
|
ret = install_thread_keyring_to_cred(new);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
goto set;
|
|
|
|
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_PROCESS_KEYRING:
|
|
ret = install_process_keyring_to_cred(new);
|
|
if (ret < 0) {
|
|
if (ret != -EEXIST)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
goto set;
|
|
|
|
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_DEFAULT:
|
|
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_SESSION_KEYRING:
|
|
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_KEYRING:
|
|
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_SESSION_KEYRING:
|
|
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_REQUESTOR_KEYRING:
|
|
goto set;
|
|
|
|
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_NO_CHANGE:
|
|
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_GROUP_KEYRING:
|
|
default:
|
|
ret = -EINVAL;
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
set:
|
|
new->jit_keyring = reqkey_defl;
|
|
commit_creds(new);
|
|
return old_setting;
|
|
error:
|
|
abort_creds(new);
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
} /* end keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring() */
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
/*
|
|
* set or clear the timeout for a key
|
|
*/
|
|
long keyctl_set_timeout(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout)
|
|
{
|
|
struct timespec now;
|
|
struct key *key;
|
|
key_ref_t key_ref;
|
|
time_t expiry;
|
|
long ret;
|
|
|
|
key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 1, 1, KEY_SETATTR);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
|
|
ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
|
|
|
|
/* make the changes with the locks held to prevent races */
|
|
down_write(&key->sem);
|
|
|
|
expiry = 0;
|
|
if (timeout > 0) {
|
|
now = current_kernel_time();
|
|
expiry = now.tv_sec + timeout;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
key->expiry = expiry;
|
|
|
|
up_write(&key->sem);
|
|
key_put(key);
|
|
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
error:
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
} /* end keyctl_set_timeout() */
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
/*
|
|
* assume the authority to instantiate the specified key
|
|
*/
|
|
long keyctl_assume_authority(key_serial_t id)
|
|
{
|
|
struct key *authkey;
|
|
long ret;
|
|
|
|
/* special key IDs aren't permitted */
|
|
ret = -EINVAL;
|
|
if (id < 0)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
/* we divest ourselves of authority if given an ID of 0 */
|
|
if (id == 0) {
|
|
ret = keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(NULL);
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* attempt to assume the authority temporarily granted to us whilst we
|
|
* instantiate the specified key
|
|
* - the authorisation key must be in the current task's keyrings
|
|
* somewhere
|
|
*/
|
|
authkey = key_get_instantiation_authkey(id);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(authkey)) {
|
|
ret = PTR_ERR(authkey);
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(authkey);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
key_put(authkey);
|
|
|
|
ret = authkey->serial;
|
|
error:
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
} /* end keyctl_assume_authority() */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* get the security label of a key
|
|
* - the key must grant us view permission
|
|
* - if there's a buffer, we place up to buflen bytes of data into it
|
|
* - unless there's an error, we return the amount of information available,
|
|
* irrespective of how much we may have copied (including the terminal NUL)
|
|
* - implements keyctl(KEYCTL_GET_SECURITY)
|
|
*/
|
|
long keyctl_get_security(key_serial_t keyid,
|
|
char __user *buffer,
|
|
size_t buflen)
|
|
{
|
|
struct key *key, *instkey;
|
|
key_ref_t key_ref;
|
|
char *context;
|
|
long ret;
|
|
|
|
key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, 0, 1, KEY_VIEW);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
|
|
if (PTR_ERR(key_ref) != -EACCES)
|
|
return PTR_ERR(key_ref);
|
|
|
|
/* viewing a key under construction is also permitted if we
|
|
* have the authorisation token handy */
|
|
instkey = key_get_instantiation_authkey(keyid);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(instkey))
|
|
return PTR_ERR(key_ref);
|
|
key_put(instkey);
|
|
|
|
key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, 0, 1, 0);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(key_ref))
|
|
return PTR_ERR(key_ref);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
|
|
ret = security_key_getsecurity(key, &context);
|
|
if (ret == 0) {
|
|
/* if no information was returned, give userspace an empty
|
|
* string */
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
if (buffer && buflen > 0 &&
|
|
copy_to_user(buffer, "", 1) != 0)
|
|
ret = -EFAULT;
|
|
} else if (ret > 0) {
|
|
/* return as much data as there's room for */
|
|
if (buffer && buflen > 0) {
|
|
if (buflen > ret)
|
|
buflen = ret;
|
|
|
|
if (copy_to_user(buffer, context, buflen) != 0)
|
|
ret = -EFAULT;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
kfree(context);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
key_ref_put(key_ref);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*****************************************************************************/
|
|
/*
|
|
* the key control system call
|
|
*/
|
|
asmlinkage long sys_keyctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
|
|
unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
|
|
{
|
|
switch (option) {
|
|
case KEYCTL_GET_KEYRING_ID:
|
|
return keyctl_get_keyring_ID((key_serial_t) arg2,
|
|
(int) arg3);
|
|
|
|
case KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING:
|
|
return keyctl_join_session_keyring((const char __user *) arg2);
|
|
|
|
case KEYCTL_UPDATE:
|
|
return keyctl_update_key((key_serial_t) arg2,
|
|
(const void __user *) arg3,
|
|
(size_t) arg4);
|
|
|
|
case KEYCTL_REVOKE:
|
|
return keyctl_revoke_key((key_serial_t) arg2);
|
|
|
|
case KEYCTL_DESCRIBE:
|
|
return keyctl_describe_key((key_serial_t) arg2,
|
|
(char __user *) arg3,
|
|
(unsigned) arg4);
|
|
|
|
case KEYCTL_CLEAR:
|
|
return keyctl_keyring_clear((key_serial_t) arg2);
|
|
|
|
case KEYCTL_LINK:
|
|
return keyctl_keyring_link((key_serial_t) arg2,
|
|
(key_serial_t) arg3);
|
|
|
|
case KEYCTL_UNLINK:
|
|
return keyctl_keyring_unlink((key_serial_t) arg2,
|
|
(key_serial_t) arg3);
|
|
|
|
case KEYCTL_SEARCH:
|
|
return keyctl_keyring_search((key_serial_t) arg2,
|
|
(const char __user *) arg3,
|
|
(const char __user *) arg4,
|
|
(key_serial_t) arg5);
|
|
|
|
case KEYCTL_READ:
|
|
return keyctl_read_key((key_serial_t) arg2,
|
|
(char __user *) arg3,
|
|
(size_t) arg4);
|
|
|
|
case KEYCTL_CHOWN:
|
|
return keyctl_chown_key((key_serial_t) arg2,
|
|
(uid_t) arg3,
|
|
(gid_t) arg4);
|
|
|
|
case KEYCTL_SETPERM:
|
|
return keyctl_setperm_key((key_serial_t) arg2,
|
|
(key_perm_t) arg3);
|
|
|
|
case KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE:
|
|
return keyctl_instantiate_key((key_serial_t) arg2,
|
|
(const void __user *) arg3,
|
|
(size_t) arg4,
|
|
(key_serial_t) arg5);
|
|
|
|
case KEYCTL_NEGATE:
|
|
return keyctl_negate_key((key_serial_t) arg2,
|
|
(unsigned) arg3,
|
|
(key_serial_t) arg4);
|
|
|
|
case KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING:
|
|
return keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(arg2);
|
|
|
|
case KEYCTL_SET_TIMEOUT:
|
|
return keyctl_set_timeout((key_serial_t) arg2,
|
|
(unsigned) arg3);
|
|
|
|
case KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY:
|
|
return keyctl_assume_authority((key_serial_t) arg2);
|
|
|
|
case KEYCTL_GET_SECURITY:
|
|
return keyctl_get_security((key_serial_t) arg2,
|
|
(char *) arg3,
|
|
(size_t) arg4);
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} /* end sys_keyctl() */
|