![]() Pull userns fixes from Eric W Biederman: "The bulk of the changes are fixing the worst consequences of the user namespace design oversight in not considering what happens when one namespace starts off as a clone of another namespace, as happens with the mount namespace. The rest of the changes are just plain bug fixes. Many thanks to Andy Lutomirski for pointing out many of these issues." * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: userns: Restrict when proc and sysfs can be mounted ipc: Restrict mounting the mqueue filesystem vfs: Carefully propogate mounts across user namespaces vfs: Add a mount flag to lock read only bind mounts userns: Don't allow creation if the user is chrooted yama: Better permission check for ptraceme pid: Handle the exit of a multi-threaded init. scm: Require CAP_SYS_ADMIN over the current pidns to spoof pids. |
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apparmor | ||
integrity | ||
keys | ||
selinux | ||
smack | ||
tomoyo | ||
yama | ||
capability.c | ||
commoncap.c | ||
device_cgroup.c | ||
inode.c | ||
Kconfig | ||
lsm_audit.c | ||
Makefile | ||
min_addr.c | ||
security.c |