ce6ada35bd
Privileged syslog operations currently require CAP_SYS_ADMIN. Split this off into a new CAP_SYSLOG privilege which we can sanely take away from a container through the capability bounding set. With this patch, an lxc container can be prevented from messing with the host's syslog (i.e. dmesg -c). Changelog: mar 12 2010: add selinux capability2:cap_syslog perm Changelog: nov 22 2010: . port to new kernel . add a WARN_ONCE if userspace isn't using CAP_SYSLOG Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Acked-By: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Christopher J. PeBenito" <cpebenito@tresys.com> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> |
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| .. | ||
| audit.h | ||
| avc.h | ||
| avc_ss.h | ||
| classmap.h | ||
| conditional.h | ||
| initial_sid_to_string.h | ||
| netif.h | ||
| netlabel.h | ||
| netnode.h | ||
| netport.h | ||
| objsec.h | ||
| security.h | ||
| xfrm.h | ||