alistair23-linux/net/sunrpc/auth_unix.c
Scott Mayhew ce52914eb7 sunrpc: move NO_CRKEY_TIMEOUT to the auth->au_flags
A generic_cred can be used to look up a unx_cred or a gss_cred, so it's
not really safe to use the the generic_cred->acred->ac_flags to store
the NO_CRKEY_TIMEOUT flag.  A lookup for a unx_cred triggered while the
KEY_EXPIRE_SOON flag is already set will cause both NO_CRKEY_TIMEOUT and
KEY_EXPIRE_SOON to be set in the ac_flags, leaving the user associated
with the auth_cred to be in a state where they're perpetually doing 4K
NFS_FILE_SYNC writes.

This can be reproduced as follows:

1. Mount two NFS filesystems, one with sec=krb5 and one with sec=sys.
They do not need to be the same export, nor do they even need to be from
the same NFS server.  Also, v3 is fine.
$ sudo mount -o v3,sec=krb5 server1:/export /mnt/krb5
$ sudo mount -o v3,sec=sys server2:/export /mnt/sys

2. As the normal user, before accessing the kerberized mount, kinit with
a short lifetime (but not so short that renewing the ticket would leave
you within the 4-minute window again by the time the original ticket
expires), e.g.
$ kinit -l 10m -r 60m

3. Do some I/O to the kerberized mount and verify that the writes are
wsize, UNSTABLE:
$ dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/krb5/file bs=1M count=1

4. Wait until you're within 4 minutes of key expiry, then do some more
I/O to the kerberized mount to ensure that RPC_CRED_KEY_EXPIRE_SOON gets
set.  Verify that the writes are 4K, FILE_SYNC:
$ dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/krb5/file bs=1M count=1

5. Now do some I/O to the sec=sys mount.  This will cause
RPC_CRED_NO_CRKEY_TIMEOUT to be set:
$ dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/sys/file bs=1M count=1

6. Writes for that user will now be permanently 4K, FILE_SYNC for that
user, regardless of which mount is being written to, until you reboot
the client.  Renewing the kerberos ticket (assuming it hasn't already
expired) will have no effect.  Grabbing a new kerberos ticket at this
point will have no effect either.

Move the flag to the auth->au_flags field (which is currently unused)
and rename it slightly to reflect that it's no longer associated with
the auth_cred->ac_flags.  Add the rpc_auth to the arg list of
rpcauth_cred_key_to_expire and check the au_flags there too.  Finally,
add the inode to the arg list of nfs_ctx_key_to_expire so we can
determine the rpc_auth to pass to rpcauth_cred_key_to_expire.

Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
2016-07-19 16:23:24 -04:00

247 lines
5.7 KiB
C

/*
* linux/net/sunrpc/auth_unix.c
*
* UNIX-style authentication; no AUTH_SHORT support
*
* Copyright (C) 1996, Olaf Kirch <okir@monad.swb.de>
*/
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/sunrpc/clnt.h>
#include <linux/sunrpc/auth.h>
#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
#define NFS_NGROUPS 16
struct unx_cred {
struct rpc_cred uc_base;
kgid_t uc_gid;
kgid_t uc_gids[NFS_NGROUPS];
};
#define uc_uid uc_base.cr_uid
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SUNRPC_DEBUG)
# define RPCDBG_FACILITY RPCDBG_AUTH
#endif
static struct rpc_auth unix_auth;
static const struct rpc_credops unix_credops;
static struct rpc_auth *
unx_create(struct rpc_auth_create_args *args, struct rpc_clnt *clnt)
{
dprintk("RPC: creating UNIX authenticator for client %p\n",
clnt);
atomic_inc(&unix_auth.au_count);
return &unix_auth;
}
static void
unx_destroy(struct rpc_auth *auth)
{
dprintk("RPC: destroying UNIX authenticator %p\n", auth);
rpcauth_clear_credcache(auth->au_credcache);
}
/*
* Lookup AUTH_UNIX creds for current process
*/
static struct rpc_cred *
unx_lookup_cred(struct rpc_auth *auth, struct auth_cred *acred, int flags)
{
return rpcauth_lookup_credcache(auth, acred, flags, GFP_NOFS);
}
static struct rpc_cred *
unx_create_cred(struct rpc_auth *auth, struct auth_cred *acred, int flags, gfp_t gfp)
{
struct unx_cred *cred;
unsigned int groups = 0;
unsigned int i;
dprintk("RPC: allocating UNIX cred for uid %d gid %d\n",
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, acred->uid),
from_kgid(&init_user_ns, acred->gid));
if (!(cred = kmalloc(sizeof(*cred), gfp)))
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
rpcauth_init_cred(&cred->uc_base, acred, auth, &unix_credops);
cred->uc_base.cr_flags = 1UL << RPCAUTH_CRED_UPTODATE;
if (acred->group_info != NULL)
groups = acred->group_info->ngroups;
if (groups > NFS_NGROUPS)
groups = NFS_NGROUPS;
cred->uc_gid = acred->gid;
for (i = 0; i < groups; i++)
cred->uc_gids[i] = GROUP_AT(acred->group_info, i);
if (i < NFS_NGROUPS)
cred->uc_gids[i] = INVALID_GID;
return &cred->uc_base;
}
static void
unx_free_cred(struct unx_cred *unx_cred)
{
dprintk("RPC: unx_free_cred %p\n", unx_cred);
kfree(unx_cred);
}
static void
unx_free_cred_callback(struct rcu_head *head)
{
struct unx_cred *unx_cred = container_of(head, struct unx_cred, uc_base.cr_rcu);
unx_free_cred(unx_cred);
}
static void
unx_destroy_cred(struct rpc_cred *cred)
{
call_rcu(&cred->cr_rcu, unx_free_cred_callback);
}
/*
* Match credentials against current process creds.
* The root_override argument takes care of cases where the caller may
* request root creds (e.g. for NFS swapping).
*/
static int
unx_match(struct auth_cred *acred, struct rpc_cred *rcred, int flags)
{
struct unx_cred *cred = container_of(rcred, struct unx_cred, uc_base);
unsigned int groups = 0;
unsigned int i;
if (!uid_eq(cred->uc_uid, acred->uid) || !gid_eq(cred->uc_gid, acred->gid))
return 0;
if (acred->group_info != NULL)
groups = acred->group_info->ngroups;
if (groups > NFS_NGROUPS)
groups = NFS_NGROUPS;
for (i = 0; i < groups ; i++)
if (!gid_eq(cred->uc_gids[i], GROUP_AT(acred->group_info, i)))
return 0;
if (groups < NFS_NGROUPS && gid_valid(cred->uc_gids[groups]))
return 0;
return 1;
}
/*
* Marshal credentials.
* Maybe we should keep a cached credential for performance reasons.
*/
static __be32 *
unx_marshal(struct rpc_task *task, __be32 *p)
{
struct rpc_clnt *clnt = task->tk_client;
struct unx_cred *cred = container_of(task->tk_rqstp->rq_cred, struct unx_cred, uc_base);
__be32 *base, *hold;
int i;
*p++ = htonl(RPC_AUTH_UNIX);
base = p++;
*p++ = htonl(jiffies/HZ);
/*
* Copy the UTS nodename captured when the client was created.
*/
p = xdr_encode_array(p, clnt->cl_nodename, clnt->cl_nodelen);
*p++ = htonl((u32) from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->uc_uid));
*p++ = htonl((u32) from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->uc_gid));
hold = p++;
for (i = 0; i < 16 && gid_valid(cred->uc_gids[i]); i++)
*p++ = htonl((u32) from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->uc_gids[i]));
*hold = htonl(p - hold - 1); /* gid array length */
*base = htonl((p - base - 1) << 2); /* cred length */
*p++ = htonl(RPC_AUTH_NULL);
*p++ = htonl(0);
return p;
}
/*
* Refresh credentials. This is a no-op for AUTH_UNIX
*/
static int
unx_refresh(struct rpc_task *task)
{
set_bit(RPCAUTH_CRED_UPTODATE, &task->tk_rqstp->rq_cred->cr_flags);
return 0;
}
static __be32 *
unx_validate(struct rpc_task *task, __be32 *p)
{
rpc_authflavor_t flavor;
u32 size;
flavor = ntohl(*p++);
if (flavor != RPC_AUTH_NULL &&
flavor != RPC_AUTH_UNIX &&
flavor != RPC_AUTH_SHORT) {
printk("RPC: bad verf flavor: %u\n", flavor);
return ERR_PTR(-EIO);
}
size = ntohl(*p++);
if (size > RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE) {
printk("RPC: giant verf size: %u\n", size);
return ERR_PTR(-EIO);
}
task->tk_rqstp->rq_cred->cr_auth->au_rslack = (size >> 2) + 2;
p += (size >> 2);
return p;
}
int __init rpc_init_authunix(void)
{
return rpcauth_init_credcache(&unix_auth);
}
void rpc_destroy_authunix(void)
{
rpcauth_destroy_credcache(&unix_auth);
}
const struct rpc_authops authunix_ops = {
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
.au_flavor = RPC_AUTH_UNIX,
.au_name = "UNIX",
.create = unx_create,
.destroy = unx_destroy,
.lookup_cred = unx_lookup_cred,
.crcreate = unx_create_cred,
};
static
struct rpc_auth unix_auth = {
.au_cslack = UNX_CALLSLACK,
.au_rslack = NUL_REPLYSLACK,
.au_flags = RPCAUTH_AUTH_NO_CRKEY_TIMEOUT,
.au_ops = &authunix_ops,
.au_flavor = RPC_AUTH_UNIX,
.au_count = ATOMIC_INIT(0),
};
static
const struct rpc_credops unix_credops = {
.cr_name = "AUTH_UNIX",
.crdestroy = unx_destroy_cred,
.crbind = rpcauth_generic_bind_cred,
.crmatch = unx_match,
.crmarshal = unx_marshal,
.crrefresh = unx_refresh,
.crvalidate = unx_validate,
};