The ufs symlink pathnames, stored in struct ufs_inode_info.i_u1.i_symlink
and therefore contained in the ufs_inode_cache slab cache, need to be
copied to/from userspace.
cache object allocation:
fs/ufs/super.c:
ufs_alloc_inode(...):
...
ei = kmem_cache_alloc(ufs_inode_cachep, GFP_NOFS);
...
return &ei->vfs_inode;
fs/ufs/ufs.h:
UFS_I(struct inode *inode):
return container_of(inode, struct ufs_inode_info, vfs_inode);
fs/ufs/namei.c:
ufs_symlink(...):
...
inode->i_link = (char *)UFS_I(inode)->i_u1.i_symlink;
example usage trace:
readlink_copy+0x43/0x70
vfs_readlink+0x62/0x110
SyS_readlinkat+0x100/0x130
fs/namei.c:
readlink_copy(..., link):
...
copy_to_user(..., link, len);
(inlined in vfs_readlink)
generic_readlink(dentry, ...):
struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
const char *link = inode->i_link;
...
readlink_copy(..., link);
In support of usercopy hardening, this patch defines a region in the
ufs_inode_cache slab cache in which userspace copy operations are allowed.
This region is known as the slab cache's usercopy region. Slab caches
can now check that each dynamically sized copy operation involving
cache-managed memory falls entirely within the slab's usercopy region.
This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY
whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my
understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are
mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.
Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net>
[kees: adjust commit log, provide usage trace]
Cc: Evgeniy Dushistov <dushistov@mail.ru>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
df5f3cfc52